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ABSTRACT 
 
The history of prison reform after 1994 was shaped by the relationship between governance 
and human rights standards; the requirements for both are set out in the Constitution and 
elaborated on in the Correctional Services Act. Good governance and human rights converge 
in five dimensions of a constitutional democracy: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, 
the rule of law; and resource utilisation. The new constitutional order established a set of 
governance and rights requirements for the prison system demanding fundamental reform. It 
de-legitimised the existing prison system and thus placed it in a crisis. This required its 
reinvention to establish a system compatible with constitutional demands. The thesis 
investigates whether constitutionalism provided the necessary transformative basis for prison 
reform in South Africa after 1994. The Department of Correctional Services (DCS) senior 
management failed to anticipate this in the period 1990 to 1994. In the five years after 1994 
senior management equally failed to initiate a fundamental reform process. This lack of 
vision, as well as a number of external factors relating to the state of the public service in the 
period 1994 to 2000, gave rise to a second crisis: the collapse of order and discipline in the 
DCS. By the late 1990s the state had lost control of the DCS and its internal workings can be 
described as a mess – a highly interactive set of problems in causal relationships. In many 
regards the problems beleaguering the prison system were created in the period 1994 – 1999. 
The leadership at the time did not recognize that the prison system was in crisis or that the 
crisis presented an opportunity for fundamental reform. The new democratic order demanded 
constitutional and political imagination, but this failed to materialise. Consequently, the role 
and function of imprisonment within the criminal justice system has remained fundamentally 
unchanged and there has not been a critical re-examination of its purpose, save that the 
criminal justice system has become more punitive.  
 
Several investigations (1998-2006) into the DCS found widespread corruption and rights 
violations. Organised labour understood transformation primarily as the racial transformation 
of the staff corps and embarked on an organised campaign to seize control of management 
and key positions. This introduced a culture of lawlessness, enabling widespread corruption. 
Under new leadership by 2001 and facing pressure from the national government, the DCS 
responded to the situation by focusing on corruption and on regaining control of the 
Department. A number of gains have been made since then, especially after 2004. Regaining 
control of the Department focused on addressing systemic weaknesses, enforcing the 
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disciplinary code and defining a new employer-employee relationship. This has been a slow 
process with notable setbacks, but it continues to form part of the Department’s strategic 
direction. It is concluded that the DCS has engaged with and developed a deeper 
understanding of its constitutional obligations insofar as they pertain to governance 
requirements in the Constitution.  
 
However, compliance with human rights standards had not received the same attention and 
areas of substantial non-compliance remain in violation of the Constitution and subordinate 
legislation. Overcrowding, violations of personal safety, poor services and/or lack of access 
to services persist. Despite the detailed rights standards set out in the Correctional Services 
Act, there is little to indicate that legislative compliance is an overt focus for the DCS. While 
meeting the minimum standards of humane detention, as required by the Constitution, should 
have been the strategic focus of the DCS in relation to the prison population, the 2004 White 
Paper defines “offender rehabilitation” as the core business of the DCS. In many regards the 
DCS has assigned more prominence and weight to the White Paper than to its obligations 
under the Correctional Services Act. In an attempt to legitimise the prison system, the DCS 
defined for itself a goal that is required neither by the Constitution nor the Correctional 
Services Act. Compliance with the minimum standards of humane detention must be 
regarded as a prerequisite for successful interventions to reduce future criminality. After 
seven years, delivery results on the rehabilitation objective have been minimal and not 
objectively measurable. The noble and over-ambitious focus on rehabilitation at policy level 
distracted the DCS from its primary constitutional obligation, namely to ensure safe and 
humane custody under conditions of human dignity.  
 
Throughout the period (1994 to 2012) the DCS has been suspicious if not dismissive of 
advice, guidance and at times orders (including court orders) offered or given by external 
stakeholders. Its relationship with civil society organisations remain strained and there is no 
formal structure for interaction. Since 2004 Parliament has reasserted its authority over the 
DCS, not hesitating to criticise poor decisions and sub-standard performance. Civil society 
organisations have increasingly used Parliament as a platform for raising concerns about 
prison reform. Litigation by civil society and prisoners has also been used on a growing scale 
to ensure legislative compliance. It is concluded that prison reform efforts needs to refocus on 
the rights requirements set out in the Correctional Services Act and approach this task in an 
inclusive, transparent and accountable manner. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1. Background to the study 
 
Seventeen years after the first democratic elections, and 15 years after the final Constitution 
was adopted, South Africa remains a society in transition, one grappling with complex socio-
economic, political and human rights dilemmas. These tensions persist due to South Africa’s 
unique and variously interpreted history, its divergent political discourses, the aspirations of 
multiple interest groups, and the requirements set in the Constitution. It remains a society 
characterised by flux and transition. 
 
Perhaps the single greatest threat to democratic South Africa has been the high rate of crime, 
particularly violent crime, and the question of how to respond to it. The high violent crime 
rate has had pervasive effects on the fabric of society and the aspirations of its members. 
Responses from both the state and broader society have resulted in a critical interrogation of 
the constitutional order and the Bill of Rights. Frustrated with the crime rate, post-1994 
governments have adopted an approach emphasising “law and order” or “getting tough on 
crime” in their attempts to reduce it, and in the process they have invested heavily in 
strengthening the criminal justice system, especially the police and prison system. 
 
The prison system in post-1994 South Africa has been characterised by a range of persistent 
challenges such as corruption, gross human rights violations, leadership instability, and lack 
of direction. While the Constitution placed radically different demands upon the prison 
system, with detailed rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
1
 the first six years of democratic 
rule saw problems in the prison system deepening and discipline and order collapsing. As 
early as 1996, the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services requested an investigation 
into the prison system, and by 2000 there was a real fear that the state had lost control of the 
Department of Correctional Services (DCS).
2
 It was ultimately in response to the 
                                                            
1 s 35 Act 108 of 1996. 
2
 Muntingh, L. (2006) Corruption in the prisons context, CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law 
Centre. PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 14 March 2000 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20000413-audit-department-correctional-services. Accessed 15 December 
2011. 
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assassination of a potential whistleblower that, in 2001, President Mbeki appointed a Judicial 
Commission on Inquiry into corruption and maladministration in the DCS (the Jali 
Commission).
3
 Although all government departments have had to deal with the special 
challenges of the South African democratic project, the events that unfolded in the DCS were 
in many ways unique in their nature, scope and extent.  
 
When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994, there was a legitimate 
expectation that the combined effect of, first, a progressive and liberal constitution, and, 
second, the fact that so many leaders in the liberation movements had themselves been 
imprisoned, there would be a rapid and fundamental transformation of the apartheid-era 
prison system; this transformation would not only be compatible with the new Constitution 
but exemplary in embodying the successful transition to a constitutional democracy. For 
human rights advocates and other observers, this was a logical, even inevitable, conclusion. 
Regrettably, it did not come to pass. South African prisons remain overcrowded, gross human 
rights violations are common, services to prisoners are limited and poorly developed, 
corruption is rife, and litigation by prisoners against the DCS is increasing. In many regards 
the DCS is not complying with its principal legislation, the Correctional Services Act (111 of 
1998), and the requirements in the Bill of Rights.  
 
This thesis will explore and analyse the reasons why the reform of the South African prison 
system, from an arrangement inherited from the previous regime to one compatible with a 
constitutional democracy, has faltered. This is not to argue that it has failed or is in the 
process of failing, as there is evidence to the contrary; rather, it is to argue that the 
reinvention of the prison system into one that is compatible with a constitutional democracy 
has proven to be an extremely difficult process and has yielded limited achievements. Within 
the broader context of criminal justice reform, it is therefore important to identify, describe 
and understand the reasons underlying the difficulties of the prison-reform process in South 
Africa; it is equally important to identify the positive achievements and the reasons for these 
successes. Doing so will enable the formulation of recommendations for prison system 
transformation, recommendations which may be applicable in other jurisdictions undergoing 
similar processes. 
                                                            
3
 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2007) The State of the Nation's Prisons. In S. Buhlungu, J. Daniel, R. Southall, and J. 
Latchman, State of the Nation: South Africa 2007. Pretoria: HSRC Press, p. 380. 
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2. Statement of the problem 
 
Although numerous scholars have described the nature of the faltering processes of prison 
reform, the recent (that is, post-2004) literature does not provide a comprehensive description 
and analysis of the factors that have undermined the process of prison reform. Furthermore, 
there is a need for a study reviewing the entire period from 1994 to present (2012).  
 
The first cohort of published research on prison reform focused on describing events 
unfolding in the prison system during the period 1994 to 2002 and how the latter had failed to 
meet expectations.
4
 These works provided valuable descriptions and analyses at the time, and 
are drawn on extensively in the present study’s account of the history of prison reform during 
the earlier years.  
 
The second cohort of more recent publications either continued the overview-descriptive 
trend,
5
 took a philosophical perspective,
6
 or focused on particular and substantive aspects of 
the prison system. These include sexual violence,
7
 sentencing,
8
 unsentenced prisoners and 
                                                            
 
4
Giffard, C. (1997) Out of Step? The Transformation Process in the South African Department of Correctional 
Services, unpublished MSc dissertation, University of Leicester; Oppler, S. (1998) Correcting Corrections 
Prospects for South Africa’s Prisons. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies; Pete, S. (1998) The Politics of 
Imprisonment in the aftermath of South Africa’s first democratic election, South African Journal on Criminal 
Justice , 51 (7); Dissel, A. (2002) Tracking Transformation in South African Prisons. Track Two, 11 (2); Dissel, 
A. and Ellis, S. (2002) Reform and Stasis: Transformation in South African Prisons. Johannesburg: CSVR; 
Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003) Overview of Policy Developments in South African Correctional Services. Bellville: 
Community Law Centre; Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001) South Africa. In D. Van Zyl Smit & F. Dunkel, Imprisonment 
Today and Tomorrow (pp. 589-608) London: Kluwer Law International; Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004) Swimming 
against the tide. In B. Dixon and E. Van der Spuy, Justice Gained (pp. 227-258) Cape Town: Willan. 
5
Luyt, W. (2008) Contemporary corrections in South Africa after more than a decade of transformation, Acta 
Criminologica, 21 (2), 176-195; Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2007); Super, G. (2011) Like some rough beast slouching 
towards Bethlehem to be born – a historical perspective on the institution of the prison in South Africa 1976-
2004, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 51. 
6 Gillespie, K. (2007) Criminal abstractions and the post-apartheid prison. Chicago: A dissertation submitted to 
the Faculty of the Division of the Social Sciences in candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
University of Chicago. 
7 Gear, S. (2007) Fear, violence and sexual violence in a Gauteng Juvenile Correctional Centre for males. 
Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation; Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002) Daai 
Ding. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.; Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. 
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caseflow management,
9
 offender reintegration,
10
 HIV and AIDS,
11
 prisoners’ rights and the 
prevention of torture,
12
 corruption,
13
 children in prison,
14
 prison governance,
15
 comparative 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(2011) Sexual violence in prisons – Part 1: The duty to provide safe custody and the nature of prison sex, SA 
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analysis,
16
 the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons,
17
 oversight over the prison system,
18
 and 
litigation on prisoners’ rights.
19
 
 
There also exists a body of international literature focusing on the transformation of 
institutions of state and more specifically on the reform of prison systems.
20
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body of research has emerged in South Africa in the past seventeen years on specific issues of 
imprisonment, the prison system and experiences of released prisoners. The focused South 
African research referred to above continued to describe, but in more detail than earlier work, 
the range of continual problems in the prison system and how the prison system was falling 
short of Constitutional requirements. It is also the case that the Annual Reports of the DCS, 
strategic plans of the DCS, and reports by the Auditor General on the DCS have become 
more sophisticated and comprehensive, thus providing valuable official information on the 
workings of the prison system.  
 
The recent history of prison reform in South Africa is notable for two important events that 
inserted new energy into the discourse on imprisonment in South Africa: first, the 
promulgation in full of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) in October 2004, and, 
second, the release of the White Paper on Corrections in South Africa (the 2004 White Paper) 
in March 2004. After the Correctional Services Act was adopted by Parliament in 1998, a 
limited number of chapters were brought into operation in 1999 and 2000, but the bulk of the 
Act would remain without force until July and October 2004. Inevitably the in-limbo status of 
the Correctional Services Act between 1998 and 2004 resulted in great legal uncertainty, 
since the Department’s core mandate was defined at the time by the chapters of the 1998 Act 
that were in force as well by the remaining provisions of the 1959 legislation.
21
 Importantly, 
the chapters dealing with conditions of detention and the treatment of prisoners would only 
come into force in 2004. The situation was not assisted by the absence of an overarching 
policy framework. The year 2004 is therefore important for the analysis presented in this 
present study. 
 
Although a White Paper was developed in 1994 as the overarching policy framework, it 
failed to engage effectively with the Interim Constitution (200 of 1993) which provided 
detailed rights to prisoners, and thus did not address the fundamental challenges facing the 
prison system. Ten years later, the 2004 White Paper saw the light and articulated a new 
vision for the DCS. The 2004 White Paper followed the appointment of a new leadership 
corps to the Department from 2001 onwards that brought about some measure of stability. 
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Unlike the 1994 White Paper, the 2004 White Paper is remarkably honest about the 
challenges that the DCS faced in terms of its self-reinvention. It notes, for example, the 
deficits the DCS has in respect of the quality of human resources, and refers to the culture of 
the Department at operational level. It remains surprising and perplexing that, despite the 
substantive challenges that the White Paper articulated, it established at the same time a 
vision at a bar higher than what the Constitution requires, given that the White Paper defines 
rehabilitation as the “core business” of the Department. While the Constitution is clear about 
maintaining the minimum standards of humane detention, it does not articulate a right to 
rehabilitation services for offenders and prisoners in particular. Commentators at the time of 
the White Paper’s release emphasised the importance of meeting the minimum standards of 
humane detention, on the grounds that prison overcrowding was (and remains) a key 
challenge. The ambitiousness of the White Paper is striking, since it regards “corrections as a 
societal responsibility” (Chapter 3) and envisages that “members of the public will support 
internal rehabilitation programmes”.
22
 The White Paper adopts unit management as the model 
of delivery, and prescribes in Chapter 9 that “needs-based intervention plans” must be 
developed for all offenders. In short, the White Paper articulates a vision for the prison 
system that even well-resourced prison systems with adequate professionally qualified staff 
in industrialised countries struggle to attain. The appropriateness of the 2004 White Paper as 
a guide to future prison reform therefore requires closer analysis. 
 
Seven years after the White Paper was adopted, the Department’s performance continues to 
fall materially short of this vision and there are substantive issues of non-compliance with the 
Correctional Services Act. The DCS spent a fair amount of energy and resources in 
promoting the 2004 White Paper amongst its staff corps, and consequently established it as 
the primary reference document for decisions and rhetoric. Since 2004, a plethora of policy 
documents have been developed from the White Paper, and the latest reports indicate that 
these have now been enhanced by procedures development.
23
 By contrast, the Correctional 
Services Act has been relegated to relative obscurity. Public statements by DCS officials are 
more likely to refer to the 2004 White Paper than the Correctional Services Act. As an 
indicator of this trend, the Department’s Strategic Plan for 2009/10 to 2013/14 emphasises, 
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first, the development of internal systems and management procedures, and second, goals and 
objectives derived from the White Paper.
24
 In addition, since 2002 the DCS has become 
increasingly inwardly-focused in its managerial style, a tendency reflected in the growing 
number of projects and targets relating to building internal information systems, developing 
procedures and solving problems within the management of the Department (e.g. addressing 
audit qualifications).  
 
In overview, the post-1994 history of reform in the prison system can be divided into two 
periods – the period from 1994 roughly to 2004, and the period from 2004 onwards. While 
the first period has been described to some extent in the literature, the challenges in reform 
after 2004, especially since the adoption of the White Paper and the coming into force of the 
Correctional Services Act, have not been analysed and described in a comprehensive manner.  
  
The post-1994 prison system can be characterised by two substantial crises. The first was 
occasioned by the new demands placed on the prison system, initially by the Interim 
Constitution
25
 and later the final Constitution.
26
 Both of these articulated detailed rights for 
arrested and detained persons, including prisoners, rights which were derived from the right 
to dignity. This de-legitimised the system inherited from the apartheid government and 
necessitated that the prison system be reformed in alignment with the Constitution. The 
second crisis emerged particularly after 1996 and saw the collapse of discipline and order in 
the DCS. It will be argued that the two crises presented opportunities for reform; however, 
utilising crisis for successful reform depends on a number of variable organisational 
characteristics. Furthermore, the Constitution places particular demands on the prison system 
in respect of upholding prisoners’ rights and adherence to the principles of good governance. 
The relationship between human rights and good governance is therefore key to the analysis 
to be presented. 
 
This study will argue that a combination of factors (poor responses to the political 
environment, poor governance, ineffective leadership and management, legal uncertainty, 
policy vagueness, and poor oversight) undermined the process of prison reform. The opposite 
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will also be demonstrated, namely that when certain problems were addressed, it was possible 
to make progress in reforming the South African prison system.  
3. Research question 
 
After 1994 there was a legitimate expectation that the Interim and final Constitutions, 
providing for a bill of rights and regulating how the state may or may not exercise its power, 
would provide the basis for reform of the prison system. The expectation that the Constitution 
would spark as well as guide reform was not limited to the prison system but held by broader 
society, too. Klare, with reference to the South African Constitution, refers to “transformative 
constitutionalism” as:  
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement 
committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political 
developments) to transforming a country's political and social institutions and power 
relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative 
constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through 
nonviolent political processes grounded in law.
27
 
The transformative character of the South African Constitution was also recognised by 
former Chief Justice Pius Langa, citing from the epilogue of the Interim Constitution: 
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided 
society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future 
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and 
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, 
belief or sex. The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens 
and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the 
reconstruction of society.
28
 
The Preamble to the 1996 Constitution encapsulates the transformative purpose of the South 
African constitutionalism into four distinct aims, namely to: 
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Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on 
the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and 
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign 
state in the family of nations.
29
 
The Constitution is therefore written firmly with a view to the future, but, in the light of the 
country’s past, recognises that achieving these aims is a transformative process. The “ism” of 
constitutionalism in South Africa is thus defined by the four cited aims above.  
Turning to the transformation of the prison system, constitutional obligations in respect of 
good governance in the prison system and of prisoners’ rights, and their inextricable nexus, 
are the central foci of constitutionalism for the purposes of the analysis. Reflecting on the 
post-1994 period of prison reform in South Africa, the research question of this thesis is: 
Did constitutionalism provide a transformative basis for advancing good governance 
and compliance with human rights standards in the post-1994 prison system in South 
Africa? 
4. Aims of the study 
 
As noted above, after 1994 there was a legitimate expectation that a democratic South Africa 
would see the relatively easy emergence of a new prison system that was the antithesis of the 
apartheid-era prison system. This did not happen, and the DCS was beset by a number of 
persistent problems that prevented the emergence of a prison system fully compatible with a 
constitutional democracy. The aim of the study is consequently to provide an analysis of 
prison reform and its failures after 1994 in order to assess the impact of constitutionalism on 
the prison system. 
 
Prisons compatible with a constitutional democracy are understood to meet four basic 
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requirements: there must be an underlying philosophical framework based on knowledge and 
Constitutional standards; the rights of prisoners must be upheld and the necessary preventive 
and reactive measures must be in place to achieve this; the prison system must be transparent, 
and the managers and officials working in the prison system must be accountable to effective 
oversight.
30
 Reform, for the purposes of this thesis, refers to the processes embarked upon to 
meet the above four requirements. 
 
The literature cited above has documented various ways in which the South African prison 
system has not lived up to these requirements. At a systemic level this requires further 
enquiry, enquiry which the present study will make according to a number of defined 
dimensions that are regarded as the key arenas of reform. In respect of each of the arenas of 
reform, a four-pronged analysis, supported by comparative methodologies where appropriate, 
will be undertaken. First, a careful analysis will be conducted of the nature, scope and causes 
of the problems that have undermined transformation. Second, an analysis will be provided of 
the steps taken, or not taken, by the state and the DCS in particular to address the problems; 
the reasons why these steps were taken or not will also be examined. Third, the efficacy of 
these state responses will be described and analysed in order to extract the lessons that were 
learnt. Fourth, recommendations for improvement and/or strengthened reform will be 
developed.  
 
Based on the extant literature, four themes are identified as key arenas of reform. First, it is 
necessary to understand the crises in the prison system as they unfolded during the period 
1994 to 2004. Even though this may now be regarded as having only historical importance 
(given that new reform efforts have subsequently been implemented), documenting and 
analysing the dimensions of the crises enables significant lessons to be distilled, both about 
the successes as well as the failures.  
 
The second arena of reform is the extent to which the principles of good governance were 
promoted, established and complied with in the DCS. Immediately after 1994 the DCS 
underwent an extremely difficult period characterised by wide-spread and high-level 
corruption and violence amongst its staff corps. The role of organised labour in this regard 
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stands out, and there is good reason to conclude that, at least in certain geographical areas, 
the state lost control of the DCS as it was captured by groups from within organised labour. 
While corruption was not unique to DCS, the scope and scale of the problem was of such a 
nature that the DCS remains the only Department where a judicial commission of inquiry was 
established to investigate corruption. Apart from Department-specific steps to address 
corruption and promote good governance, broader state-wide steps were also implemented by 
government through improved legislation to combat corruption, the development of 
minimum anti-corruption capacity requirements applicable to all Departments, numerous 
measures to improve financial management, and the establishment of an anti-corruption 
hotline by the Public Service Commission (PSC). In addition, the DCS entered into a multi-
year agreement with the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) to investigate corruption and 
developed its own internal capacity to address corruption and disciplinary-code enforcement. 
Effective leadership during reform is generally accepted as a critical component of success. 
In analysing the state of governance in the DCS, it is therefore necessary to assess the role of 
the senior leadership. A closer analysis is also required of management processes aimed at 
facilitating reform. In this regard, special attention is paid to the alignment of resources to the 
strategic objectives articulated in the 2004 White Paper and the obligations under the 
Correctional Services Act. Of particular importance are human resource management; the 
role of knowledge in decision-making; performance management; the nature of policy 
development; enforcing discipline; and the involvement of the private sector in the 
Department. A comprehensive analysis is therefore necessary to assess the Department’s 
overall attempts at promoting good governance and regaining control of its staff and 
subordinate structures. 
 
The third arena of reform assesses the situation in respect of human rights. It is fundamental 
to this enquiry that, from a human rights perspective, the prison system must be compatible 
with Constitutional requirements and standards in subordinate legislation. Included in this 
framework is international human rights law, specifically the human rights instruments that 
South Africa has ratified. Compliance with human rights standards is central to assessing the 
state of prison reform, because the denial of rights under the apartheid regime, especially the 
rights to dignity and equality, characterised that prison system. Giving full expression to 
enumerated rights in the Constitution and prescripts in the Correctional Services Act (111 of 
1998) is therefore a central requirement of a reformed prison system. In this regard, 
conditions of detention consonant with human dignity, the right to life, and the right to bodily 
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and psychological integrity are important. Furthermore, the rights and treatment of particular 
categories of prisoners form part of the enquiry, with specific reference to sentenced and 
unsentenced prisoners as well as imprisoned women and children. 
 
The fourth arena of reform concerns the responses from external stakeholders and 
interactions of the prison system with the broader political environment. More specifically, 
the focus is placed on the responsiveness of the DCS to external influences and its dedicated 
oversight structures. In this regard it is important to reflect on the history of the Correctional 
Services portfolio within the Government of National Unity (GNU) (1994-1999)
31
 as this 
appears to have been a critically important period in the history of prison reform in South 
Africa. Moreover, in successive governments since 1994 the role of the prison system in a 
broader crime-reduction strategy seems to have been poorly defined, and the 2004 White 
Paper’s emphasis on rehabilitation still remains at odds with successive ANC governments’ 
“law and order” approach and “tough on crime” rhetoric. Key to this enquiry is the envisaged 
role or roles of the prison system in a constitutional democracy and the question of whether 
or not the existence of such a vision has facilitated reform in the prison system itself.  
 
Prison reform was also influenced by civil society organisations that were concerned about 
the lack of progress being made in establishing a reformed prison system and which 
consequently intervened, or attempted to intervene, especially where it concerned prisoners’ 
rights. While civil society organisations were attempting to advance rights-based prison 
reform, organised labour in the DCS, especially between 1996 and 2001, followed a different 
agenda that was in many ways destructive. In post-1994 South Africa the media has become a 
formidable force on the political landscape, and the prison system and its failures featured 
regularly in this regard. In 2000 the Judicial Inspectorate for Prisons (later renamed the 
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services) was established as the dedicated oversight 
structure to monitor the treatment of prisoners and to report on dishonest and corrupt 
practices. Its role in advancing prison reform requires a critical assessment. The 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services emerged from a hiatus after 
2004 and took on a more forceful role in holding the DCS accountable; its influence on 
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prison reform since 1994 therefore also requires closer analysis.  
 
Prison systems, in order to function within the bounds of accepted human rights and 
governance standards, require effective oversight. While both human rights and governance 
are areas of specialisation, they are inextricably linked. On both these fronts the DCS has a 
chequered history, with qualified audits for ten consecutive years by 2010/11 and numerous 
human rights violations reported to the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. 
Formal oversight over the DCS since 1994 has been of varying quality, and there is little 
doubt that, negatively or positively, this has had a profound impact on how progress towards 
transformation has been made.  
5. Methodology 
 
The point of departure of this study is that South Africa is a society in transition towards 
compliance with the values and prescripts of the Constitution. With reference to prison 
reform, the nexus between governance and human rights is central to the analysis. At the 
theoretical level, it will be argued that the state must play a leading role in this process, but 
the extent to which the state has been able to achieve this requires critical examination. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that the state can and should be held accountable for the steps 
it takes or fails to take in transforming South African society and, more specifically, the 
institutions of the state itself. As much as the state should take a leading role in the process of 
transformation it is not the sole actor, and successful transformation depends on an inclusive 
dialogue between stakeholders regulated by Constitutional and legal requirements. It is 
therefore assumed that the South African Constitution and subordinate legislation provides an 
adequate framework for the transformation of society and, more particularly, the prison 
system. However, while the rule of law and a market economy are well-established, this did 
not result in the full realisation of democratic rights, and especially not in the prison system. 
 
Beneath the high-level view of South African society layers, there are, then, layers where 
democratic values and practices are contested by different stakeholders. Specifically in the 
case of substantive reform of the prison system, there seem to be fissures between different 
institutions of state about penal policy and the purpose of the prison system in an overall 
strategy to reduce crime. While the 2004 White Paper on Corrections argues for the 
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rehabilitation model, founded on the belief that imprisonment must serve a useful purpose, 
the sentencing regime that has emerged especially since 1997 stands in sharp contrast to this 
model. The harshness of the South African sentencing regime is testimony to the fact that it 
was politicians who recaptured penal policy from the judiciary and other professionals
32
 and 
used it in an attempt to appease an electorate that increasingly doubted their ability to deal 
with the high violent crime rate. Questions about penal policy and its underlying theory 
therefore remain and warrant further analysis. 
 
This thesis will review reform in the South African prison system by analysing past events in 
order to gain a better understanding of the challenges and achievements of the past 17 years 
and thereby extract lessons learnt and develop recommendations. The analysis will be 
undertaken from a socio-legal perspective and supported by concepts from a public service 
management perspective as well as, where appropriate, research from other jurisdictions. 
 
Although new information continues to emerge, the formal cut-off date for the purposes of 
the description and analysis is 31 December 2011. 
 
The thesis relies exclusively on the available literature, and a deliberate decision was taken 
not to engage in interviews with individuals who may have been influential in prison reform 
in South Africa. This decision was motivated by the fact that, since 2003, the author has been 
an active actor in the theatre of prison reform in South Africa by way of the Civil Society 
Prison Reform Initiative at the Community Law Centre (University of the Western Cape). 
Given this role, it was concluded that it would have created more problems than solutions to 
embark on a process of interviewing individuals who may have been influential in prison 
reform since 1994. The concern was that interviewees, especially those from government, 
would have been tempted to reconstruct events in a sanitised light, a temptation that was 
judged all the more likely given that the events described in this thesis frequently reflect 
negatively on the government. To counter this risk, the decision was taken to rely on the 
available literature instead. 
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5.1 Limitations 
 
The thesis provides a broad overview of the history of prison reform from 1994 to the end of 
2011; in addition, it reflects briefly on the period 1990-1994 in order to contextualise the 
transition to democratic rule. Covering a period more than 20 in length years yields an 
abundance of rich and detailed historical facts, but the risk is that the analysis itself might get 
lost amidst it all. To retain focus and sustain a meaningful analysis, a limited number of 
thematic issues were selected as a basis for structuring this thesis, which is therefore not a 
historical account of prison reform but rather an analysis that uses representative historical 
data as far as possible. 
Since the thesis uses data from the available literature, it is constrained by what is available in 
the public domain. Prisons are notoriously opaque institutions, and this was even more so the 
case prior to 1990. The daily minutiae of prison life across South Africa’s 240 prisons are not 
recorded and made accessible to public scrutiny. Very often information becomes available 
only when something has gone wrong and it develops into a scandal. Official reports, such as 
Departmental Annual Reports, invariably present a sanitised version of events; nonetheless, 
they remain the official document and must be treated as such. It is for the researcher to 
analyse them carefully, to make comparisons and seek inconsistencies. In this thesis the 
proceedings of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services are a valuable source of 
information; the records were obtained from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), a 
non-governmental organisation that documents the proceedings for public benefit. Although 
the PMG reports are not official minutes, they are widely accepted as reliable accounts of the 
committee meetings. 
5.2 Nomenclature 
 
In 2008 the Correctional Services Act was amended and its nomenclature changed.
33
 For 
example, the term “prisoner” was replaced by “inmate”, a “prison” became a “correctional 
centre” and a “sentenced prisoner” became an “offender”. For the sake of consistency and 
clarity, the terms “prisoner” and “prison” is used throughout this thesis unless there is a 
                                                            
33 Correctional Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008. 
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citation from a DCS publication employing the new terms. Furthermore, the Constitution, the 
international instruments and, generally, the academic literature use the term “prisoner”.  
6. Chapter outline 
 
Including the present chapter, the thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the 
theoretical framework and key concepts to be used in the thesis. Key concepts are reform, 
crisis, legitimacy and the nature of effective policy development. The chapter also outlines 
the requirements of a prison system in a constitutional democracy with reference to the South 
African Constitution. It is argued that such a prison system must have an underlying 
philosophy that is knowledge-based; there should be full recognition in law and practice of 
prisoners’ rights; the prison system should function in a transparent manner; and the officials 
working in the prison system and its leadership must be accountable. These four requirements 
are the anchor points of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 describes the crises as they unfolded in the DCS between 1994 and 2004, but the 
account is preceded by a discussion on governance and human rights in order to contextualize 
the crises. The chapter also provides a description of the prison system inherited from the 
apartheid government in 1994 and argues that the non-responsive nature of the DCS 
management prior to 1994 was at least in part responsible for later problems. The chapter 
offers a detailed description of the crises that pays particular attention to poor strategy and 
policy development, leadership instability, violence and intimidation, and corruption and 
maladministration. The argument is that crisis afforded opportunities for reform but these 
were not seized owing to poor leadership, a lack of vision and a loss of control over the 
Department. 
The next chapter deals with the Department’s response to the crises. It is argued that although 
the Jali Commission (and other investigations) uncovered both corruption and human rights 
violations, a decision was made to focus on addressing corruption alone. This was done in an 
effort to regain control of the Department and it entailed: redefining the employer-employee 
relationship; developing internal capacity to investigate corruption and enforce a revised 
disciplinary code; the involvement of external agencies to assist the DCS; and the 
development of a new policy framework (the 2004 White Paper). It is concluded that a 
number advances, if modest, have been made in addressing corruption and maladministration. 
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Furthermore, it is argued that the Head Office has regained some control over the Department 
but that the matter has not yet been completely resolved. Against the background of efforts to 
regain control and address corruption in the Department, there have also been a number of 
notable setbacks after 2004 that tainted the efforts and integrity of the Department and its 
leadership. The chapter establishes that, through concerted, focused and sustained efforts, 
advances were nevertheless made towards meeting the good-governance requirements 
articulated in the Constitution. 
Chapter 5 assesses the human rights situation in South Africa’s prisons; here, the implications 
of the strategic choice to focus on corruption (as described in Chapter 4) become evident. The 
chapter analyses the state of human rights across several thematic areas: overcrowding; 
deaths in custody; assaults and torture; the use of mechanical restraints, force and solitary 
confinement; super-maximum prisons; sexual violence; parole; children; women and 
unsentenced prisoners. Across all of these themes it was found that there remain substantial 
areas of non-compliance with the Constitution and the standards set out in the Correctional 
Services Act (111 of 1998). While the Department has made advances in addressing 
corruption and maladministration by implementing a range of remedial measures, the same 
was not done in respect of concerns about prisoners’ rights. Whereas a clearer understanding 
of constitutional obligations with reference to good governance developed in DCS after 2001, 
the same cannot be said of human rights standards.  
Chapter 6 assesses the role of external stakeholders and events on prison reform. In this 
regard the role of national government is analysed with reference to policy development and 
the priorities set by government in the period 1994 to 2000 in relation to crime, poverty and 
affirmative action. This created a particular milieu for the Department at the time and had an 
important effect on prison reform or, rather, the lack thereof. Civil society’s influence is also 
assessed. After initial activity between 1994 and 1996, its involvement became minimal until 
a resurrection took place in 2003. Civil society re-emerged as a critical stakeholder, 
especially through its relationship with the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 
which experienced a similar pattern of hiatus followed by re-emergence. The Portfolio 
Committee reasserted its authority over the DCS, and a number of gains were made thanks to 
more effective Parliamentary oversight.  
The last chapter presents an overview of the main conclusions of the thesis. It proceeds to 
synthesise them into a range of thematic issues that are related to: the importance of having a 
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constitutional imagination in prison reform; building consensus on what reform means and 
the agenda for reform; and the centrality of transparency in reform processes. The ideal of 
rehabilitation, set forth in the 2004 White Paper, is critically assessed and its appropriateness 
as guide to prison reform for the next 15 years is put into question. The chapter concludes by 
discussing several lessons that can be learnt from South Africa’s history of prison reform, 
lessons which may well be applicable in jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. 
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Chapter 2 - Key concepts and theoretical 
perspectives on prison and institutional 
reform 
1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents key concepts for the analysis. It reviews the domestic and international 
theoretical literature on prison and institutional reform and, as such, lays the analytical 
framework for the chapters to follow. The aim is not to present one all-encompassing theory, 
but rather to highlight and take note of theoretical constructs in understanding prison reform 
in the analysis covering the period 1994 to 2011, a period of 17 years. Efforts at prison 
reform in South Africa commenced prior to 1994, and the 2 February 1990 announcements 
by then President de Klerk
1
 are accepted as the starting-point for the commencement of 
fundamental reforms. On 27 April 1994 South Africa held its first democratic elections and 
the Interim Constitution2 came into force on that date. The Interim Constitution afforded 
prisoners extensive rights
3
and would place substantially different demands on the prison 
system.  
Key concepts to be explored in this chapter are: the nature of reform; crisis as a catalyst for 
reform; legitimacy, and the principles for effective policy development. These concepts are 
used to investigate the process of prison reform after 1994 in the newly established 
constitutional democracy. Given the demands of a new constitutional order after 1994, this 
chapter (in section 3) explores the requirements of the prison system in a constitutional 
democracy, focusing on four broad requirements. First, there should be an underlying 
philosophy; second, there should be legal and practical recognition of prisoners’ rights; third, 
the prison system and its officials must be accountable; and fourth, the prison system should 
                                                            
1 On 2 February 1990 President De Klerk announced wide reforms to bring apartheid to an end and enable 
reforms towards democracy. This included the unbanning of opposition organisations such as the ANC and the 
release of political prisoners and a moratorium on executions.  
2 Act 200 of 1993. 
3 s 11 and s 25 of Act 200 of 1993. 
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function in a transparent manner. These four requirements shape the remainder of the thesis 
and are thus the cornerstones of its analysis.  
2 Key concepts 
2.1 Reform 
 
In technical terms “reform” can be defined as the “intended fundamental change of the policy 
and/or administration of a policy sector”.4  The policy sector analysed here is the South 
African prison system and the efforts undertaken by the state to align the prison system with 
the Interim and 1996 Constitutions.
5
 Reform efforts in the prison system are therefore 
regarded as particular actions undertaken by the state and its stakeholders to change the 
prison system, actions necessitated by the large-scale socio-political changes taking place in 
South Africa from 1994 onwards. The scope of reform therefore includes, but is not limited 
to, policies, strategic direction, the legislative framework (including subordinate legislation), 
organisational structure, human resources, financial management, and day-to-day operations.  
Reforms of large organisations, in particular prison systems, may encounter numerous 
obstacles such as budgetary constraints, goals set by outsiders to the sector (e.g. Parliament or 
civil society), the sector’s dominant paradigm (which includes values dictating goals and 
practices for dealing with problems or avoiding them), internal resistance in the form of civil 
servants’ reluctance to implement reforms,6 and lack of political will.7 Once reform processes 
are deemed necessary, policy-makers may experience further constraints. Resodihardjo 
indentifies three such categories: individual, organisational and political constraints.8 
Because the existing policy creates benefits (e.g. financial or status benefits) for a number of 
individuals, they will attempt to keep the status quo intact. For example, the proposed 
demilitarisation of DCS was met with caution and suspicion, if not overt resistance, in the 
                                                            
4 Resodihardjo, S.L. (2009) Crisis and change in the British and Dutch prison service – understanding crisis-
reform processes, Surrey: Ashgate, p. 1. 
5 Act 200 of 1993, Act 108 of 1996. 
6 Resodihardjo, S.L. (2009), p. 1. 
7 Coyle, A. (2002) Managing prisons in a time of change. London: International Centre for Prison Studies, p. 
24. 
8 Resodihardjo, S.L. (2009), pp. 8-11. 
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1994 White Paper.
9
 The DCS responded to the call for demilitarisation by stating it would 
investigate the proposal yet simultaneously extolling the virtues of military structure and 
citing its perceived attractiveness for new recruits. The simple reason for this was that the 
existing staff corps benefited materially and otherwise from the existing dispensation.  
Organisational constraints are “routines, standard operating procedures and decision-making 
rules that characterise the policy sector”.10 According to Resodihardjo, decision-making rules 
in particular can present significant constraints in that any reform proposal has to go through 
a number of “veto points”, and the more of these points there are, the more opportunities arise 
for the proposal to be amended, diluted or stopped.11 Equally important as constraints are the 
norms, values and ideas characterising the organisation – its paradigm. The latter sets the 
parameters of what is acceptable or not when solving problems. Introducing ideas that fall 
outside the paradigm may be extremely difficult, if not at times impossible, to do. As such, 
the 1994 proposal to demilitarise the DCS not only mobilised individual constraints but fell 
beyond the pale of what the dominant paradigm considered acceptable. 
Political constraints are created by the policy sector’s political masters and by way of the 
particular goals that they set, the budgets they secure and the legacies they bequeath to their 
successors. A new minister is constrained by the budget he inherits from his predecessor as 
well as by large-scale pre-existing commitments such as long-term capital expenditure 
programmes. For example, the contracts for the two private prisons in South Africa 
(operational since 2000 and 2001 respectively 12 ) were signed by then Minister of 
Correctional Services, Sipho Mzimela (IFP), in 1997
13
 and thereafter placed a significant 
financial burden on the DCS, one it will have to shoulder for the full contract period of 25 
years.14 A further point made by Resodihardjo is that individual, organisational and political 
constraints do not operate in isolation from each other but are interlinked. It is also the case 
                                                            
9 Department of Correctional Services (1994) White Paper on the policy of the Department of Correctional 
Services in the new South Africa, Department of Correctional Services: Pretoria, p. 22.  
10 Resodihardjo, S.L. (2009), p. 9. 
11
 Resodihardjo, S.L. (2009), p. 9. 
12 The one prison is situated in Bloemfontein (Mangaung) and the other in Makhado (Kutama Sinthumule).  
13 Department of Correctional Services (1998) Annual Report 1997, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, Chapter 6. 
14 The budgetary provision for the 2011/12 financial year for the two privately operated prisons is R808.8 
million (US$133.5 million) or 4.8% of the total budget (National Treasury (2011) 2011 Estimates of National 
Expenditure Vote 21 Correctional Services. Pretoria, p. 24). 
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that certain interests groups may draw attention to particular constraints, such as limited 
financial resources, in order to protect individual interests and preserve the existing order. 
These and other challenges and constraints are explored in detail in later chapters and do not 
constitute an exhaustive list. Moreover, the situation in post-1994 South Africa was, and 
remains, in many ways unique compared to other jurisdictions. A transparently negotiated 
transition to democracy underpinned by a liberal constitution paying particular attention to 
prisoners’ rights is indeed not a common occurrence. 
Prison reform is further challenged by the very nature of the prison as an institution. Prison 
systems are regarded as static and hierarchical organisations.15 They are static because their 
goals and objectives are “clear and unchanging”, and they are hierarchical as their lines of 
communication are vertical and accompanied by an expectation that junior officials will 
simply implement the orders handed down by seniors.16 The reasons for this are twofold: 
prisoners must not escape, and there must be order. These two imperatives require that staff 
and prisoners alike know “their place in the hierarchy and obey operational instructions 
without question”.17 This was particularly the case in South Africa, where the DCS remained 
a militarised organisation until 31 March 1996.18 The demilitarisation of the DCS on 1 April 
1996 gave birth to a new set of reform challenges, to be discussed in subsequent chapters. It 
should be added that a static, hierarchical structure is acceptable and tolerable when the 
organisation is stable and not under pressure.19 This, however, was not the situation in South 
Africa in the mid-1990s. Not only was civil society under pressure to reform, but the state 
and its institutions were under a constitutional obligation to adapt themselves urgently to a 
democratic and non-racial order. 
As noted above, reform is intentional and not accidental, nor is it merely the destruction of 
the existing order. It therefore follows that when assessing reform, it is important to enquire 
how this intention came about. Reform processes commence for a number of reasons, 
according to Resodihardjo.20 First, political leaders and senior civil servants may introduce 
                                                            
15 Coyle, A. (2002), p. 11. 
16 Coyle, A. (2002), p. 11. 
17 Coyle, A. (2002), p. 11. 
18 Department of Correctional Services (1997) Annual Report of the Department of Correctional Services 1996. 
Pretoria: DCS, p. 1.  
19 Coyle, A. (2002), p. 12. 
20 Resodihardjo, S.L. (2009), p. 1. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
reform. Second, “reform is stumbled upon” through a process of small incremental changes 
that individually may not deviate substantially from current policies but which cumulatively 
amount to “drastic change that surprise policy-makers”. Third, the incremental process of 
policy-making is disrupted as a result of a crisis and this presents an opportunity for reform. 
The history of prison reform in South Africa from 1994 onwards falls primarily in this third 
category, and the concept of reform through crisis is explored in the next section. 
2.2 Crisis 
 
The concept of crisis is central to this thesis, as prison reform in South Africa after 1994 was 
indeed shaped by two major crises. In its briefest form, an institution is in crisis when nothing 
anchors the future.21 The first was the new constitutional order (initially the 1993 Interim 
Constitution and later the 1996 Constitution) which presented the prison system with an 
entirely new environment, a new set of demands, and fundamentally different operational 
requirements. In effect it delegitimized the existing order and required the reinvention of the 
prison system. The second crisis was the collapse of discipline and order in the DCS, which 
culminated in the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry (the Jali Commission) into 
corruption, maladministration and rights violations in the DCS. Chapter 3 will explore these 
two crises in more detail: the central issue is the manner in which the state in general, and the 
DCS management in particular, responded to them. 
For the purposes of this thesis, crisis refers to an “institutional crisis”. Such a crisis occurs 
when the institutional structure of a policy sector “experiences a relatively strong decline in 
(followed by unusually low levels of) legitimacy”.22 
In a review of the extant literature on the crisis-reform thesis, Resodihardjo identified a 
number of common conclusions. 23  During a crisis the policies, paradigm, goals and 
functioning of a policy sector are severely criticised, such that the crisis poses a “severe threat 
to the core values of a social system” requiring stakeholders to make quick decisions. 
According to the crisis-reform thesis, a crisis has two important results. First, policy-makers 
                                                            
21 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000) Institutional crises and reforms in policy sectors. In Wagenaar, H. (ed) 
Government institutions – effects, changes and normative foundations. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
p. 12. 
22 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 13. 
23 Resodihardjo, S.L. (2009), p. 2. 
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are under extreme pressure to find a solution to end the crisis. The media, civil society and 
Members of Parliament will critically question the functioning of the policy sector and 
demand better performance, and question the policy sector’s regulatory framework and 
operations procedures. The second result is that the critical examination of the existing 
paradigm, policies, goals and functioning leads to diminished support for them and thus the 
constraints imposed by them are eroded. As these constraints are eroded, it becomes easier 
for stakeholders to push for more substantial and broad-ranging reform and introduce new 
policies, goals and modes of functioning. Due to the crisis and the diminished constraints 
imposed by existing policies, “policy-makers looking to end the crisis will have more leeway 
to suggest measures that were hitherto unacceptable or even unheard of”.
24
 Therefore, within 
the context of a crisis, policy-makers are not only under pressure to find a solution to end the 
crisis soon because it threatens core social values, but they also have more freedom to 
propose alternative solutions. A crisis is therefore an opportunity for reform. 
A crisis should, however, be distinguished from general problems that any policy sector 
institutions may experience from time to time. For example, the poor service that one may 
receive at the municipal office during an attempt to rectify an accounting error does not mean 
that municipal services teeter on the brink of total collapse, even if such service is a common 
experience. An institutional crisis threatens core social values because of the extremely low 
levels of legitimacy experienced by the particular policy sector. When, for example, a prison 
system fails to implement the sentences imposed by the courts due to high numbers of 
escapes facilitated by corrupt officials, the crisis questions the general understanding that it is 
the responsibility of the prison system to detain those individuals society wishes to punish or 
who pose a particular risk. It therefore questions a key component in generally accepted and 
value-based notions of justice, punishment and the rule of law. As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, the South African prison system faced precisely such an institutional crisis.  
How a policy sector responds to a problem stems from the inherent tension between 
preservation (preserving existing values, traditional ways and adhering to institutional rules) 
and responsiveness (the ability to absorb new developments and adapt).25 Ideally there should 
be healthy and constructive tension between preservation and responsiveness, but an over-
                                                            
24 Resodihardjo, S.L. (2009), p. 2. 
 25 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 14. 
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emphasis on preservation leads to institutional rigidity whereas an overly responsive policy 
sector  
may see responsiveness win out over integrity – a proclivity for change is no longer 
balanced by conservatism. Taken to an extreme, this results in an under-
institutionalised sector, characterised by unstable coalitions, constant ad hocery, and 
lack of professional self-confidence by officials working in the sector. Everything 
flows, controversies abound, and there is not even a minimal set of shared beliefs 
guiding the policy agenda and problem-solving strategies. Trial and error becomes the 
order of the day; policy-making is exclusively reactive, and driven by incidents, 
mistakes and scandal. Consequently, overly responsive policy sectors are constantly in 
the grip of conflicts over their raison d’être, and are characterised by a sense of 
insecurity and value trade-offs.26 
A policy sector response to a crisis may also be influenced by endemic factors resulting in the 
further erosion of legitimacy. Boin and T’Hart distinguish three such endemic factors: crisis 
by ignorance, crisis by rigidity, and crisis by failed intervention.27 Depending on the level of 
institutionalisation in a policy sector, different responses may emerge. In a policy sector, 
“there can be a more or less detailed and historically rooted organisation of policymaking and 
a more or less encompassing policy paradigm”.
28
 When the main organisational practices and 
policy orientations have been in place for a long time, the institutional structure is 
established, taken for granted and seldom reviewed; this is characteristic of a high level of 
institutionalisation.
29
 In short, it is known what the sector does, how this is done and why it is 
done in that way. On the other hand, if a sector displays significant levels of uncertainty and 
doubt about the nature of desirable policies and mixes of policy instruments, this indicates 
low levels of institutionalisation.
30
 There is consequently constant discussion about what the 
sector does, ad hoc decision-making and fragmented analytical processes.31 
                                                            
26 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 15. 
27 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 14. 
28 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 14. 
29
 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 14. 
30
 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 14. 
31Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), pp. 14. 
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Crisis by ignorance may result when highly institutionalised sectors continue to look inward 
rather than outward for solutions; it has been termed “cognitive arrogance – a hermetic, 
chronically overoptimistic self-image that shuts out discrepant information”. 32  In sectors 
where institutionalisation is low, information cannot be assimilated in a useful manner as 
there is no agreed-upon interpretive framework to make sense of the large volume of 
information.33 Crisis by rigidity occurs in highly institutionalised sectors when changes in the 
environment are noted but little is done – the too-little-too-late phenomenon.
34
 In sectors with 
low levels of institutionalisation, the capacity to implement and consolidate reforms is absent 
and the sector experiences coordination problems, “zig-zag policies and inter-organisational 
friction”.
35
 Crisis by failed intervention can take on two forms: “applying the wrong solution 
to the problems, or applying solutions to the wrong problems”.36  
Because a crisis questions the fundamentals of a policy sector, crisis management should be 
seen as “governance at the cross roads” and a policy sector can respond in essentially two 
ways.37 The first is to take the sector back to a pre-crisis situation by restoring order or 
bringing back normalcy; the second is to renew and redesign the institution. Neither approach 
guarantees success. A failed conservative approach will result in a long period of stagnation, 
whereas a failed reformist approach leaves the sector “in limbo between a past that has been 
abolished and controversial designs for the future”.
38
 To be successful, the reformist approach 
requires de-institutionalisation followed by re-institutionalisation, but this must be done with 
great speed if “perverse consequences are to be avoided in the future”.39  Moreover, the 
consensus necessary to acknowledge and support the need for reform rarely lasts longer than 
the crisis.40 
                                                            
32 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 17, citing Kouzmin, A. and Jarman, A. (1989) ‘Crisis decision making – 
towards a contingent decision path perspective’. In Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T. and ‘T Hart, P. (eds) Coping 
with crises:The management of disasters, riots and terrorism. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, pp. 397-435. 
33
 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 17. 
34
 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 18. 
35
 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 18. 
36
 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 18. 
37 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 21. 
38 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 21. 
39 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 27. 
40 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 27. 
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With regard to the South African prison system, some initial comments can be made before 
they are elaborated upon in later chapters. It can be surmised that in 1994 the DCS was highly 
institutionalised, with fixed procedures, values, structures and so forth, but in the space of 
two years the pendulum swung in the opposite position. This was the result not so much of 
demilitarisation (in 1996) per se but the failure to re-institutionalise immediately. It can also 
be concluded that the DCS was initially a “preserving” or conservative institution but that this 
changed shortly after 1994 when it became overly responsive; the upshot was a myriad of 
chaotic endeavours, poor decisions and a reactionary approach to the ensuing scandals (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). The situation was not helped by the endemic factors present in the 
Department with reference to how, and if, decisions were based on knowledge; the ability to 
establish and sustain reform efforts, and the foci of the Department’s reform efforts. The DCS 
simultaneously experienced crisis by rigidity, ignorance and failed interventions. 
2.3 Legitimacy 
 
Fundamental to the transformation of South African society post-1994 is the question of 
legitimacy and specifically the legitimacy of the state. The state enjoys legitimacy by being 
accountable to the people that elected it: they are the “constant and rightful monitors of the 
state”.
41
 Legitimacy is also a dynamic process of public discussions and the assessing of 
alternative policies and actions in a self-reinforcing relationship where authority is vested in 
the state to mobilise collective power.42 However, without elections electing new leaders or 
affirming existing leaders and their policies, there can be no new alternatives.43 The 1994 and 
subsequent elections therefore vested legitimate power in the hands of a state clearly 
mandated to create and advance a constitutional democracy. However, elections alone do not 
make democracies, and as Picard notes, by May 1994 the public service faced a credibility 
problem because “the black majority quite understandably had come to regard public 
administration as something to be avoided, outwitted and, on occasion, sabotaged”.44 
                                                            
41 Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2009) Fixing failed states – a framework for rebuilding a fractured world. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 117. 
42 Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2009), p. 117. 
43 Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2009), p. 117. 
44 Picard, L.A. (2005) The state of the state – institutional transformation, capacity and political change in 
South Africa. Johannesburg: P&DM Wits University Press, p. 93. 
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The first dimension of legitimacy is therefore the external legitimacy of the prison system as 
a whole. For example, prison systems during Africa’s colonial period were not only 
exceptionally inhumane and cruel but primarily arranged for the purposes of forced labour for 
commercial gain and the entrenchment of racial segregation.
45
 These prison systems were 
imposed on populations without their support or approval, rendering them wholly 
illegitimate. It can thus be concluded that at the macro-level a prison system needs to have a 
clearly defined mandate that enjoys general support and aims which accord with generally 
accepted judicial, socio-cultural and political values.46 This may indeed be at an abstract 
level, despite problems at implementation level, but nonetheless assigns to the prison system 
a legitimate raison d'être.  
To turn to a second dimension of legitimacy, prisons and their regimes also require interior 
legitimacy, and in this respect a prison faces “special legitimation problems as it operates as 
an autocracy within a democratic polity”.47 While the prison system as a national institution 
of state may enjoy legitimacy at a societal level, this does not mean that each and every 
prison in the system has legitimacy or that, once it is attained, it remains secure. Sparks and 
Bottoms cite the work of Beetham (1991), which sets out three criteria of legitimacy as well 
as their opposites, i.e. forms of non-legitimate power:48 
Criteria of legitimacy Form of non-legitimate power 
• Conformity to rules (legal validity)  • Illegitimacy (breach of rules) 
• Justifiability of rules in terms of 
shared beliefs 
• Legitimacy deficit (discrepancy 
between the rules and supporting 
                                                            
45 Bernault, F. (2003) ‘The Politics of enclosure and confinement in colonial and post-colonial Africa’. In 
Bernault, F. (ed) A history of prison confinement in Africa. Portsmouth: Heineman.  
46 It is not within the scope of this thesis to assess the legitimacy of imprisonment as a penal sanction in a 
constitutional democracy. The South African Constitution and jurisprudence allows for imprisonment, but there 
is support, especially in the United States, for the abolition of imprisonment on the grounds that it is ineffective, 
inhumane and race- and class-based. See, for example, Knopp, F.H. (2005) Instead of prisons, New York: 
Critical Resistance; Mathiesen, T. (1986) The politics of abolition, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 10 No. 
1. 
47 Liebling, A. (2004) Prisons and their moral performance – a study of values, quality and prison life. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 472.  
48 Sparks, J.R. and Bottoms, A.E. (1995) Legitimacy and order in prisons, British Journal of Sociology, No. 46 
Vol. 1, p. 47. 
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beliefs, or absence of shared 
beliefs) 
• Legitimation through express consent • Delegitimation (withdrawal of 
consent) 
 
Based on this analysis, three questions are asked.49 First, legal scholars will ask if the power 
has been legally obtained and if it is being exercised within the bounds of the law. Second, it 
is asked, philosophically, if the power relations at play are morally justifiable. Third, from a 
sociological perspective, enquiry is made into the actual beliefs of subjects about power and 
legitimacy. 
Using this analysis, it is evident that legitimacy, especially at the interior level of the prison 
system, is fluid and may indeed be a “roller-coaster ride of waxing and waning legitimacy” 
for institutions of state.
50
 Legitimacy, once attained, needs to be sustained through effective 
implementation of reforms addressing the legitimacy deficit, and “unless implementation 
becomes the leaders’ business and strategy the concern of everybody within either an 
organisation or a nation, the gap between plan and implementation is likely to grow only 
larger”.51 Even in the day-to-day minutiae of prison life the actions of prison management 
and its officials should at least be perceived to be just, fair and legitimate by prisoners. It is in 
this context that Sparks and Bottoms offer the following remarks about threats to legitimacy: 
These include every instance of brutality in prisons, every casual racist joke, and 
demeaning remark, every ignored petition, every unwarranted bureaucratic delay, every 
inedible meal, every arbitrary decision to segregate or transfer without giving clear and 
well founded reasons, every petty miscarriage of justice, every futile and inactive 
period of time – is delegitimating. The combination of an inherent legitimacy deficit 
with an unusually great disparity of power places a peculiar onus on prison authorities 
to attend to the legitimacy of their actions.52 
 
                                                            
49 Sparks, J.R. and Bottoms, A.E. (1995), p. 48. 
50 Sparks, J.R. and Bottoms, A.E. (1995), p. 48, Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 13. 
51 Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2009), p. 197. 
52 Sparks, J.R. and Bottoms, A.E. (1995), p. 60. 
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Against the backdrop of poor conditions of detention and strained relationships between staff 
and prisoners, a particular incident (e.g. assault of a prisoner) may indeed give rise to a 
violent uprising by prisoners, thus delegitimising the power of those in charge variously by 
breaking the rules, accentuating a legitimacy deficit and/or withdrawing voluntary consent. 
The legitimacy deficit of the prison system under the apartheid government was patently 
evident: prisoners had very limited rights, racial segregation was enforced, the prisons were 
not open to public scrutiny, few services were rendered to prisoners, gross rights violations 
were commonplace with limited scope for recourse, and so on.53 The search for legitimacy in 
the South African prison system after 1994 thus has to contend with a deficit that had been 
created over several centuries. The deficit dates back to colonial times in general but more 
particularly – and recently – to 1959 and thereafter, this being the year in which the Prisons 
Act (8 of 1959) was adopted and thereby enabled apartheid policy to be implemented fully in 
the prison system.54 As Van Zyl Smit observes:  
 
Developments of the prison system in the 1950s were in many ways a move away from 
legitimacy. There was a deliberate break with the traditions and practices that had 
anchored the system in a wider social consensus, and towards a ‘hard’ prison 
administration based on the direct compulsion of military power.
55
 
 
The search for legitimacy in the South African prison system continues and has faced 
dramatic setbacks in the form of widespread corruption, maladministration and gross human 
rights violations from 1994 onwards. These are explored further in Chapters 3 to 5.  
2.4 Policy development 
 
In a reform process, especially one induced by crisis, it is critical that policy-makers develop, 
with a sense of urgency, a solution to the crisis in the form of new policy. In rapidly 
changing, or already changed, circumstances the new policy must provide a new vision, 
mission, policy goals, targets and so forth to guide ensuing decision-making in a manner that 
improves the situation and prevents the development of new crises, or prevents the current 
                                                            
53 For a more detailed description, see Foster, D., Davis, D., & Sandler, D. (1987) Detention and Torture in 
South Africa. London: James Currey. 
54 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992) South African Prison Law and Practice. Durban: Butterworth Publishers, p. 31. 
55 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 31. 
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one from escalating. The central aim is to stabilise the situation by presenting a solution that 
should not only solve the crisis but also present an attainable future state of affairs that would 
win and consolidate the support of implementers and guide their day-to-day actions in the 
relevant institution to establish (or restore) legitimacy. In the post-1994 period the DCS has 
gone through two such processes of policy development. The first resulted in the hastily 
drafted 1994 White Paper on the policy of the Department of Correctional Services in the 
new South Africa (“the 1994 White Paper”), and, the second, in the 2004 White Paper on 
Corrections in South Africa (“the 2004 White Paper”).  
Reflecting on both of these, it needs to be asked what good public policy should look like: 
Are there objective criteria that can be used to assess the quality of a given policy? Posing 
this question is important, for it is highly relevant to the enquiry into the nature, scope and 
success, or not, of prison reform in South Africa after 1994. It is necessary to ask if the 2004 
White Paper in particular is indeed good and appropriate policy for the South African prison 
system. While the White Paper describes itself as a “policy framework”56 and would thus 
guide subordinate policies, even at this superordinate level it is required that it set a particular 
standard and be developed according to the principles of good policy-making. Failure to do 
so would mean that the omissions and shortcomings in the policy framework are replicated in 
the subordinate policies. 
Several definitions of “public policy” are available in the extant literature,57  but for the 
purposes of this thesis the following is the accepted understanding: “Public policy is the 
broad framework of ideas and values within which decisions are taken and action, or inaction, 
is pursued by governments in relation to some issue or problem.”58 It should be added that 
there are various types of public policy: (1) broad policies which articulate government-wide 
direction; (2) sector specific policy; (3) issue specific policy; and (4) operational policy 
                                                            
56 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) White Paper on Corrections in South Africa. Pretoria: 
Department of Correctional Services, para 1.2.3. 
57 Auditor General Manitoba (2003) A Guide to Policy Development. Manitoba, Canada, p. 2. Smith, B. L. 
(2002) Public Policy and Public Participation Engaging Citizens and Community in the Development of Public 
Policy. Report prepared for Prepared for the Population and Public Health Branch Atlantic Regional Office 
Health Canada, p. 8.  
58 Smith, B. L. (2002) Public Policy and Public Participation Engaging Citizens and Community in the 
Development of Public Policy. Report prepared for Prepared for the Population and Public Health Branch 
Atlantic Regional Office Health Canada, p. 8. 
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which may guide decisions on programmes and project selection.
59
 It is generally the case 
that policies find expression and application in policy instruments such as legislation, 
regulations, and programmes.60 For the purpose of this thesis, the two White Papers (1994 
and 2004) are the key policy documents and are classified as sector-specific policies. It 
should also be noted that within the South African government there was, at the time of 
writing (December 2011), no consensus on the definition of “policy”, an issue raised by the 
legislature with the National Planning Commission in 2009.
61
 This lacuna will not, however, 
have a material effect on the current analysis, but points to a broader problem in respect of 
policy development in post-1994 governments.  
 
In 1999 the UK government adopted the Modernising Government White Paper which in turn 
resulted in a significant amount of research being undertaken in that country on policy and 
policy development processes.62 In a subsequent report the UK government identified nine 
features of modern policy-making,63 the usefulness of which was affirmed by later research.64 
The nine features of modern policy-making, as defined and developed by the UK 
government, are described below; they will be drawn upon for the purposes of policy 
assessment in subsequent chapters of the thesis, and specifically in Chapter 4.65 
 
Forward-looking: The policy-making process results in clearly defined outcomes that the 
policy is designed to achieve and takes a long-term view (five years), based on statistical 
trends and informed predictions of social, political, economic and cultural trends and the 
possible effect and impact of the policy. The following are examples: a statement of intended 
                                                            
59Auditor General Manitoba (2003), p. 2. 
60Auditor General Manitoba (2003), p. 2. 
61 National Planning Commission (2010) Revised Green Paper: National Planning Commission. Government 
Gazette 2 February 2010, No. 32928, Notice 101 of 2010, p. 4. 
62 Office of the Prime Minister UK (1999) Modernising Government White Paper. 
http://www.nationalschool.gov.uk/policyhub/docs/modgov.pdf Accessed 1 October 2011. 
63 UK Cabinet Office (1999) Professional Policy Making for the Twenty-First Century 
http://www.nationalschool.gov.uk/policyhub/docs/profpolicymaking.pdf Accessed 1 October 2011. 
64 Bullock, H, Mountford, J, and Stanley, R. (2001) Better Policy-Making, London: Centre for Management and 
Policy Studies. Curtain, R. (2000) Good Public Policy Making: How Australia Fares. Agenda: a Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Reform. Vol. 8 No. 1. 
65 Bullock, H, Mountford, J, and Stanley, R. (2001), p.14. 
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outcomes is prepared at an early stage; contingency or scenario planning is used; account is 
taken of government's long term strategy; and use is made of forecasting research. 
 
Outward-looking: National, regional and international influencing factors are taken into 
account, as are experiences from other countries. It also assesses how the policy will be 
communicated to the public and stakeholders. The following are examples: use is made of 
regional and international cooperation structures; policy-makers look at how other countries 
dealt with the issue; recognition is given to regional variation within the country; and a 
communications and presentation strategy is prepared and implemented. 
 
Innovative, flexible and creative: Flexibility and innovation characterises the policy-making 
process. Critically examining established ways of dealing with problems is encouraged as 
well as developing creative solutions. The process is open to comments and suggestions of 
others, and risks are identified and actively managed. The following are examples: the 
process uses alternatives to the usual ways of working (brainstorming sessions, etc.); it 
defines success in terms of outcomes already identified; consciously assesses and manages 
risk; steps are taken to create management structures which promote new ideas and effective 
team working; and it includes people from outside in the policy team. 
 
Evidence-based: Decisions of, and advice to, policy makers is based upon the best available 
evidence from a wide range of sources, and all key stakeholders are involved at an early stage 
and throughout the policy's development. All relevant evidence, including that from 
specialists, is available in an accessible and meaningful form to policy-makers. Key points of 
an evidence-based approach to policy-making include: reviewing existing research; 
commissioning new research; consulting relevant experts and/or use of internal and external 
consultants; and considering a range of properly costed and appraised options. 
 
Inclusive: The policy-making process directly involves key stakeholders to take account of 
the impact on and/or meet the needs of all people directly or indirectly affected by the policy. 
An inclusive approach may include the following aspects: consulting those responsible for 
service delivery and implementation; consulting those at the receiving end or otherwise 
affected by the policy; carrying out impact assessments; seeking feedback on the policy from 
recipients and front line deliverers. 
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Joined-up: The process takes a holistic view by looking beyond institutional boundaries to 
the government's strategic objectives and seeks to establish the ethical, moral and legal base 
for policy. There is consideration of the appropriate management and organisational 
structures needed to deliver cross-cutting objectives. The following points demonstrate a 
joined-up approach to policy-making: cross-cutting objectives are clearly defined at the 
outset; joint working arrangements with other departments are clearly defined and well 
understood; barriers to effective joined-up work are clearly identified with a strategy to 
overcome them; and implementation is considered part of the policy-making process. 
 
Review progress: Existing and established policy is constantly reviewed to ensure it is really 
dealing with problems it was designed to solve, taking account of associated effects 
elsewhere. Aspects of a reviewing approach to policy-making include: an ongoing review 
programme is in place with a range of meaningful performance measures; mechanisms to 
allow service deliverers and customers to provide feedback direct to policy-makers are set up; 
and redundant or failing policies are scrapped. 
 
Evaluation: Systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of policy is built into the policy 
making process. Approaches to policy-making that demonstrate a commitment to evaluation 
include: a clearly defined purpose for the evaluation is set at outset; success criteria are 
defined; means of evaluation are built into the policy making process from the outset; and 
pilot projects are used to influence final outcomes. 
 
Learns lessons: The process learns from experience of what works and what does not. A 
learning approach to policy development includes the following: information on lessons 
learned and good practice is disseminated; there is an account available of what was done by 
policy-makers as a result of lessons learned; there is a clear distinction drawn between failure 
of the policy to impact on the problem it was intended to resolve and managerial/operational 
failures of implementation. 
 
In summary, it is concluded that good policy-making commences with a thorough 
understanding of the problem and society’s needs; attention is paid to the process of policy-
making, a process emphasising inclusivity while maintaining a forward- and outward-looking 
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perspective that is outcome-focused and knowledge-based.
66
 In contrast, poor public policy-
making is “an ad hoc or short-term policy response to an immediate problem. Poor policy 
making often results from unintended consequences that a piecemeal approach has not taken 
into account”.
67
 This position was echoed by the British government in its efforts to 
modernise policy-making; according to the Modernising Government White Paper, “We will 
be forward-looking in developing policies to deliver outcomes that matter, not simply 
reacting to short-term pressures.”
68
 
3. A new democratic order and the requirements for the prison system 
 
3.1 The demands of the new constitutional order 
 
Imprisonment by definition implies a limitation of rights, and even democracies tend to be 
parsimonious in giving real expression to prisoners’ rights.69  The advocacy of increased 
prisoners’ rights is seldom met with sympathy. The high violent crime rate in South Africa70 
also did not work in favour of prison reform after 1994. However, society is not completely 
insulated from the prison system. The overwhelming majority of prisoners will ultimately be 
released, and every day thousands of DCS officials also return to their communities. In short, 
what happens inside prisons does not stay there. In addition, the officials working in prisons 
are not immune to their effects.  As Gibbons and Katzenbach note, “When people live and 
work in facilities that are unsafe, unhealthy, unproductive, or inhumane, they carry the effects 
home with them.” 71  Furthermore, high rates of imprisonment may aggravate the very 
problems that imprisonment is trying to solve.72 It must be concluded that the prison system 
                                                            
66 Curtain, R. (2000) Good Public Policy Making: How Australia Fares, Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Reform, Vol. 8 No. 1, p. 36. 
67 Curtain, R. (2000), p. 38. 
68 UK Cabinet Office (1999) para 2.2. 
69 Muntingh, L. (2007 b) Prisons in the South African constitutional democracy. Johannesburg: Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation, p. 5.  
70 Malby, S. (2010) Homicide. In Harrendorf, S., Keiskanen, M. and Malby, S. (eds) International Statistics on 
crime and justice. Vienna: UNODC, pp. 7-19 
71 Gibbons, J. and Katzenbach, N. (2006) Confronting Confinement. The Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America’s Prisons, Washington: Vera Institute of Justice, p. 11. 
72
 Clear, T. (2007) Imprisoning Communities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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and its ills (or successes) has a permeating effect on the overall state of democracy, even if it 
is small and insidious – rights violations, corruption, impunity and a host of ills associated 
with prisons spill over into the domain of free citizens on an ideological level.73 The way 
prisoners are treated and their experience of their rights shape particular constructs of the 
right to dignity and the duty (as well as ability) of the state to promote and uphold rights. 
Moreover, information and reports about what happens in prisons and to prisoners 
dynamically affects the shifting constructs of offenders, detained persons, punishment, and 
the use of force.74 
In the post-1994 era, then, the question should rightly be asked: What are the demands of a 
constitutional democracy on the prison system, or, more specifically, what does the 
Constitution mean for the prison system? It is acknowledged that prisons serve “a set of 
complex, mutually conflicting and hard-to-achieve goals”.75 Prisons must house people in a 
humane manner but simultaneously punish them; order and security have to be maintained so 
as both to provide an effective deterrent and yet appease political opinion.76 It is within this 
space of “inherent policy vagueness”77 that stakeholders (e.g. politicians, bureaucrats, and 
civil society) must seek a solution meeting the requirements articulated in the Constitution. 
As has been noted above, prisons are in themselves not democratic institutions but operate in 
the democratic polity.
78
 The requirement, then, is that if prisons are not democracies, they 
should at least not offend the values of a constitutional democracy. The issue at stake is a 
normative one rooted in the belief that prisons (and prisoners) 
will be better off if the values underpinning democracy find clear and tangible 
expression in the prison system: the rights of prisoners will be better protected, prisons 
will achieve better results, adherence to the rule of law will be maintained, and 
ultimately society will benefit through increased safety. The opposite of this position is 
                                                            
73 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 5. 
74Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 5. 
75
 Boin. A., James. O., and Lodge, M. (2005) New Public Management and Political Control: Comparing three 
European Correctional Systems, Paper prepared for the SCANCOR Workshop ‘Autonomization of the State: 
From integrated administrative models to single purpose organizations’, Stanford University, 1-2 April 2005, p. 
7. 
76 Boin. A., James. O., and Lodge, M. (2005), p. 7. 
77 Boin. A., James. O., and Lodge, M. (2005), p. 7. 
78 Liebling, A. (2004), p. 472. 
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that prisons are an enclave hidden from the reach of the Constitution – an intolerable 
position under the current South African constitutional framework.79  
The Preamble to the Constitution notes the importance of South African history in present-
day decisions and actions by emphasising the “injustices of the past” and the need for 
“healing the divisions of the past”. This is not unlike post-war Germany, where the aim of the 
Constitution was to define the spirit (Geist) of a new state that stood in total opposition to the 
one destroyed in May 1945.
80
 The effect of apartheid, however, was not only felt in respect of 
racial discrimination but included a range of violations and inequalities characterising South 
African history. Therefore, attention needs to be drawn to the fact that prisons across the 
world, including South Africa’s, are filled with the poor, socially excluded and marginalised, 
and that the highly unequal nature of South African society is an important factor in shaping 
crime and consequently the prison population.81 Prison reform in South Africa should thus 
reflect this “new spirit” derived from the values of the Constitution, and, more specifically, 
demonstrate the aspirations of a society emancipating itself from its violent, authoritarian and 
dehumanising past.82 Even in the prison system the promotion of human dignity, equality and 
the advancement of human rights and freedoms83 are central aims. The historical mission set 
for the state by the Constitution is, then, to establish, develop and promote a prison system 
fundamentally different in nature, processes and outcomes to one that was inherited from the 
previous regime,84 inasmuch as it should recognise rights, be transparent and accountable, 
and be based on knowledge. The Constitution enumerates a number of rights of particular 
relevance to those deprived of their liberty: the right to equality,
85
 the right to dignity,
86
 the 
right to life,87 the right to be free from torture and other ill treatment88 and, specifically, the 
                                                            
79 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 5. 
80 Lazarus, L. (2004) Contrasting Prisoners’ Rights. Oxford: Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice, 
p. 25. 
81 Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001) ‘Conclusion’. In Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. Imprisonment 
Today and Tomorrow. The Hague: Kluwer Law, p. 809. 
82 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 6; Mubangizi, J.C. (2001) Prisons and Prisoners' Rights: Some Jurisprudential and 
Historical Perspectives, Acta Criminologica, Vol. 14 No. 3. 
83 Constitution s 1(a) Act 108 of 1996. 
84 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 6. 
85 s 9. 
86 s 10. 
87 s 11. 
88 s 12(1)(d-e) 
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rights afforded to arrested and detained persons.
89
 These rights can be said to have placed 
particular transformative obligations on the prison system. 
In the subsequent sections, this demand for a prison system compatible with the South 
African constitutional democracy is further unpacked with reference to four thematic areas.
90
 
First, the prison system must have an underlying philosophical framework derived from the 
Constitution, setting out the justification and knowledge-defined purposes of imprisonment. 
Second, imprisonment must not violate the rights of prisoners, particularly not those rights 
listed in the table of non-derogable rights and the rights specifically afforded in the 
Constitution to arrested and detained persons. Third, the executive must be accountable in 
respect of the prison system and the treatment of prisoners, with that accountability being 
both vertical and horizontal. Horizontal accountability refers to institutions that the state 
develops for itself to hold governments accountable (e.g. Parliament); vertical accountability 
refers to institutions outside of the state (e.g. the electorate). Fourth, the prison system must 
function in a transparent manner. It will be argued that these four requirements have to be 
met if the transformative purpose of the Constitution is to be given concrete expression. 
 
3.2 An underlying philosophy 
 
For the South African prison system to be compatible with the requirements of a 
constitutional democracy, an underlying philosophy should exist to provide a compass for 
strategic direction and policy development. In this section the following are described as the 
key features of such an underlying philosophy: imprisonment should be used as a measure of 
last resort and this should find expression in a policy on imprisonment; there should be an 
acceptance and confirmation that the state has inescapable responsibility towards prisoners; 
imprisonment should be constitutionally justifiable; the prison regime should be humane and 
human rights-based; the prison system should render effective interventions to all sentenced 
offenders to reduce their chances of re-offending; and the prison system should be subject to 
judicial oversight and control.  
 
                                                            
89 s 35. 
90 The basis for this section was developed and first published in Muntingh, L. (2007 b). 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
3.2.1 A measure of last resort 
 
Imprisonment limits a number of rights immediately, such as the right to liberty,91 the right to 
freedom of assembly,
92
 the right to freedom of association,
93
 and freedom of movement and 
residence. 94  Fundamentally, imprisonment affects the right to dignity 95  and poor prison 
conditions may indeed have severe consequences for this right. Given that imprisonment 
automatically limits a number of fundamental rights, and further that other violations may 
ensue due to imprisonment, the point of departure should therefore be that imprisonment 
ought to be used only as a measure of last resort, meaning that all other options need to be 
assessed and exhausted before a person is deprived of his liberty.
96
 
 
In respect of children, this is a requirement of the Constitution97 that has been recently98 
given statutory effect by the Child Justice Act (75 of 2008). Section 30 of the Child Justice 
Act establishes numerous procedural and substantive safeguards relating to the detention of 
unsentenced children in a prison. Section 77 of the same Act sets similar safeguards to limit 
the use of imprisonment as a sentencing option for children. The Constitution does not make 
similar pronouncements in respect of adults, but in respect of unconvicted persons the right to 
be brought promptly before a court, the right to legal representation and the right to challenge 
the lawfulness of the detention must be read together and regarded as safety mechanisms to 
prevent, or at least limit, pre-trial detention. The effectiveness of these safeguards has been 
severely criticised in the light of the high number of pre-trial detainees who spend 
                                                            
91 s 12(1) Act 108 of 1996. 
92 s 17 Act 108 of 1996. 
93 s 18 Act 108 of 1996. 
94 s 21 Act 108 of 1996. 
95 s 10 Act 108 of 1996. Goldberg and Others v Minister of Prisons and Others 1979 (1) SA 14 (A); S v 
Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665; August v Electoral Commissioner 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
96 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 6. 
97 s 28(1)(g) of Act 108 of 2006. ‘Every child has the right – not to be detained except as a measure of last 
resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under section 12 and 35, the child may be detained 
only for the shortest appropriate period of time ...’ 
98 The Child Justice Act came into operation on 1 April 2010. 
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excessively long periods in detention before their trials commence.
99
 Pre-trial detention is 
discussed further in Chapter 5 (section 11). 
 
With regard to adult convicted offenders the Constitution is silent about punishment, save for 
providing for the right to appeal or review and entitling the offender to the least severe 
punishment if the prescribed punishment for the specific offence has changed since the 
commission of the offence.
100
 The sentence of imprisonment, so long as it is imposed by a 
court in respect of legislation that is constitutional, would not amount to a violation of the 
right to liberty or to be deprived of that right arbitrarily; that being said, the length of the term 
of imprisonment remains subject to the principle of proportionality.
101
  
 
3.2.2 A policy on imprisonment 
 
Following the abolition of the death penalty102 and corporal punishment,103 imprisonment is 
the most severe sanction that can be imposed by a court in South Africa. Guided by section 
36(1)(e), the sentence of imprisonment may be imposed only if no other less restrictive 
sanction would have been reasonably able to achieve the same results intended by the 
court.104 Given this open mandate granted by the Constitution to the courts, there remains a 
real risk that imprisonment may be used unnecessarily in the form of short prison sentences 
imposed without there having been a sufficient exploration of the alternatives. The problems 
with the wide discretion granted to courts in matters of sentencing have been well described 
                                                            
99 Ballard, C. (2011) Research report on remand detention in South Africa – an overview of the current law and 
proposals for reform. CSPRI Research Report, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
100 s 35(3)(n)-(o). 
101 Steytler, N. (1998) Constitutional Criminal Procedure – a commentary on the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996, Durban: Butterworths, p. 415. 
102
 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665. 
103
 S v Williams 1995 7 BCLR 861. 
104 s 36(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including - (a) the nature of the right; (b) 
the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. S v Scheepers 1977 
(2) SA 155(A); S v Phalafala [2011] ZANWHC 33. 
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in work by the SA Law Reform Commission (SALRC),
105
 which has made numerous 
recommendations for improving consistency and developing a sentencing policy.106 Such a 
policy needs to address the use of imprisonment within the context of scarce resources (i.e. of 
available space in prisons).
107
 
Imprisonment per se has been found to be ineffective in reducing re-offending rates; more 
importantly, longer terms of imprisonment are associated with higher recidivism rates, 
especially when used with low-risk offenders.
108
 Gendreau, Goggin and Cullen conclude that 
“the primary justification for use of prisons is incapacitation and retribution, both of which 
come with a ‘price’, if prisons are used injudiciously”. 109  What is needed to enable a 
judicious and sparing use of imprisonment is something which can be described broadly as an 
“imprisonment policy”. 110  Such a policy would define the purpose of imprisonment in 
relation to other sanctions, the overall function of prison in society, the known risks of 
imprisonment, and what can realistically be expected as the outcomes of imprisonment.111 
It is commonly the perception that the size of the prison population is the result of increasing 
or decreasing crime trends - the more the crime rate goes up, the more prisoners there will be 
and vice versa. In recent years this perception has been challenged by a number of scholars 
who argue that the size of a prison population is in fact attributable more directly to political 
sentiments and penal policy.
112
 In conclusion, to prevent the unnecessary deprivation of 
                                                            
105 For example, the Commission noted: ‘There is a clear absence of a structured sentencing policy and 
sentencing guidelines. Most sentencers appear to approach the question of sentencing in an intuitive and 
unscientific manner.’ (SA Law Reform Commission (1997) Sentencing - Mandatory Minimum Sentences. Issue 
Paper 11, Project 82. Pretoria: SALRC p. 31.) 
106 SA Law Reform Commission (1997). 
107 SA Law Reform Commission (1997), p. 35. 
108 Gendreau, P., Goggin, C. and Cullen, F.T. (1999) The Effects of Prison Sentences on Recidivism. Solicitor 
General: Canada.  
109 Gendreau, P., Goggin, C. and Cullen, F.T. (1999), p. 12; Cullen F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000) Assessing 
Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy Practice and Prospects in J Horney (ed) Criminal Justice 2000, Volume 3: 
Changes in Decision Making and Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, US Department of Justice, 
Washington, p. 155. 
110 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 7. 
111 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 7. 
112 Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001) ‘Conclusion’. In Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. Imprisonment 
Today and Tomorrow. The Hague: Kluwer Law, p. 825; Gardner, D. (2002) Finland is soft on crime. New 
Politics, XI No. 3; Tonry, M. (2006) Keynote address. Conference on Sentencing in South Africa, hosted by the 
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liberty as punishment, the use of imprisonment should be determined by targeted policy and 
constitutional imperatives, namely to curtail as far as possible the limitation of rights. Such a 
policy has not emerged in South Africa, and in this vacuum the courts have wide discretion in 
imposing punishments, including the sentence of imprisonment. 
 
3.2.3 A responsibility relationship 
 
The Constitution sets detailed standards in respect of the conditions of detention for detained 
persons, including sentenced prisoners. Every detained person and sentenced prisoner, has the 
right 
(e) to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least 
exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, 
reading material and medical treatment; and (f) to communicate with, and be visited by, 
that person's - (i) spouse or partner; (ii) next of kin; (iii) chosen religious counsellor; 
and (iv) chosen medical practitioner.113 
The rights enumerated in section 35 are, however, not the only rights applicable to prisoners; 
the rights to equality, dignity, life, freedom and security of the person, privacy, freedom of 
religion, freedom of expression, property, and access to information also apply. 114  The 
Correctional Services Act (Act 111 of 1998), especially in Chapter 2, describes in detail the 
minimum standards for the detention of all prisoners under conditions of human dignity. 
These standards deal with: the admission process to prison; the nature of accommodation; 
nutrition; clothing and bedding; exercise; health care; contact with the community; deaths in 
prison; development and support services; recreation; access to legal services; reading 
material; discipline; safe custody; searches by officials; identification of prisoners; the use of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Open Society Foundation (SA), Cape Town (2006, October 25-26); Lappi-Seppälä, T. (2000) ‘The Fall of the 
Finnish Prison Population’, Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, Vol. 1, pp. 
27-40.  
113 s 35 (2)(e-f) Act 108 of 1996. 
114 Schwikkard, P.J. (2005) ‘Arrested and detained persons’. In Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (eds) The Bill of 
Rights Handbook (5th edition) Cape Town: Juta, p. 740 
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mechanical restraints; and the use of force as well as lethal and non-lethal incapacitating 
devices.115 
The standards set by the Correctional Services Act for conditions of imprisonment are not 
relative to what is happening in free society;
116
 instead they are absolute and meant to be 
complied with whenever the state imprisons someone. The Constitution places a clear 
obligation on the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights,117 
a duty which has been the subject of a number of court decisions in recent years.
118
 The 
implication flowing from the standards set in the Constitution and the Correctional Services 
Act is that the state should use imprisonment with caution and mindful of the fact that 
standards are onerous. Moreover, the state’s duty to provide such conditions is inescapable. It 
is not a bystander when conditions of detention fail to meet these standards but is in the first 
instance the party responsible for these failures, given that it is the state which places people 
in conditions that may adversely affect their rights to dignity and safety. 119  The state’s 
relationship of responsibility towards the dignity and safety of prisoners is thus fundamental 
to an understanding of prisons in a constitutional democracy.120 
3.2.4 A constitutionally justifiable limitation 
 
For imprisonment (applying to both sentenced and unsentenced prisoners) to be 
constitutionally justifiable, since it limits several rights, a number of requirements need to be 
met from the outset, as measured against section 12(1)(a) (right to freedom and security of 
the person) and section 36 (the limitations clause) of the Constitution.
121
 The first 
                                                            
115 ss 2-21 Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998). 
116 Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001), p. 825. 
117 s 7(2) Act 108 of 1996. 
118 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2003 (12) BCLR 1384(C); Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 
1993(3) SA 131(A); B v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (6) BCLR 789 (C); Strydom v Minister of 
Correctional Services 1999(3) BCLR 342 (W); Minister of Correctional Services v Kwakwa 2002 (4) SA 455 
(SCA); August v Electoral Commissioner 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 2005 (3) SA 
280 (CC).  
119 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 7. 
120 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 7; Mubangizi, J.C. (2002) Some Reflections on the Promotion of the Rights of 
Prisoners in South Africa, Acta Criminologica, Vol. 15 No. 2. 
121 For a detailed discussion on the limitation of a right, see Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (2005) ‘Limitation of 
rights’. In Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (eds) The Bill of Rights Handbook (5th edition) Cape Town: Juta, pp. 163-
188. 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
requirement is, according to Ballard relying on De Lange v Smuts,
122
 that the limitation of a 
right may not be arbitrary and that there should thus be a “rational connection” between the 
limitation and “some objectively determinable purpose” – in other words, a just cause.123 In 
assessing arbitrariness, it has to be determining if the limitation has a source in law and 
whether it serves a legitimate government purpose.124 In respect of the just cause, it is also 
required that the limitation be proportional.125 The limitation must also not impose costs that 
are disproportionate to the benefits gained by limiting rights of great constitutional 
importance whilst achieving benefits of lesser importance.126 In addition, a law or action 
should not limit a right where the outcome could have been obtained through less restrictive 
means.
127
 
 
This distinction between the purpose of the limitation (i.e. punishment) and the benefits to be 
gained is also made in the Correctional Services Act. Section 36 of the Correctional Services 
Act assigns a quite specific purpose to a sentence of imprisonment, stating that, after having 
due regard that the deprivation of liberty serves the purposes of punishment, the purpose of a 
term of imprisonment is to enable the sentenced prisoner to lead a socially responsible and 
crime-free life in the future. Not only must the individual sentenced prisoner benefit – by 
avoiding future criminal activity and thus possible imprisonment – but so must society as a 
whole, by means of the reduction in crime. Imprisonment is therefore not an opportunity for 
the state to add additional and incidental punishments on the offender, for example through 
poor conditions of detention, but rather the opposite: to create the opportunities, and make 
available the means and resources, for preventing the offender from committing further 
crimes after his release from the sentence of imprisonment. There is thus a just cause for 
limiting the right to freedom, namely to enable the offender to lead a crime-free life in the 
future. It does mean, however, that the state should enable the achievement of this objective 
in some demonstrable way through various interventions with offenders. This objective 
should hence be seen as the constitutional justification for the rights limitations resulting 
                                                            
122
 De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC). See also the reasonableness test in Harksen v Lane 
NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 53. 
123 Ballard, C. (2011), p. 9. 
124 Ballard, C. (2011), p. 9. 
125 Ballard, C. (2011), p. 11. 
126 Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (2005), pp. 185. 
127 Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (2005), pp. 185. 
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from a sentence of imprisonment.
128
 The balancing of the limitation of a right (liberty) and 
the positive duty imposed on the state to assist individuals who, for whatever reason require 
assistance in their personal and social development, encapsulates the constitutional question 
regarding the sentence of imprisonment. 
 
3.2.5 A humane and human rights-based regime 
 
The Correctional Services Act articulates four objectives for the South African prison system: 
to implement the sentences of the court in the prescribed manner; to detain all prisoners in 
safe custody while ensuring their human dignity; to promote the social responsibility and 
human development of all prisoners and persons under community corrections; and manage 
remand detainees.129 Safety, dignity, social responsibility and human development are values 
derived from the Constitution
130
 and should be given expression in the daily functioning of 
prisons. Prisons should thus be managed and administered in a manner reflecting 
constitutional values, especially those facilitating the betterment of prisoners and giving 
expression to fostering social responsibility and human development.131 Fundamentally, this 
requires a human rights-based approach to prison management and daily practice.132 
Even if constitutionally justifiable, imprisonment is generally a painful experience and one 
should not lose sight of these pains. The pains of imprisonment, as coined by Sykes, are: 
• The loss of liberty through confinement, separation from family and friends; rejection 
by the community and loss of citizenship (a civil death resulting in lost emotional 
relationships, loneliness and boredom); 
• The deprivation of goods and services through limited choices, amenities and material 
possessions; 
                                                            
128 Lazarus, L. (2004), p. 38. 
129 s 2 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. The fourth objective, to manage remand detainees, was added by 
the Correctional Matters Amendment Act (5 of 2011) and was not yet operational at the time of writing 
(December 2011).  
130 Constitution Preamble: ‘Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person’ and s 
7(1). 
131 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 8. 
132 Coyle, A (2002), p. 3. 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
• The frustration of sexual desire by being figuratively castrated by involuntary 
celibacy; 
• The deprivation of autonomy imposed by the regime’s routine, work, activities, trivial 
and apparently meaningless restrictions, and lack of explanations; and 
• The deprivation of security through the enforced association with other unpredictable 
prisoners causing fear and anxiety, resulting in frequent violence.
133
 
Imprisonment comes with significant risks to the individual. Long-term imprisonment in 
particular leads to the phenomenon of institutionalisation, known more aptly as “institutional 
neurosis” and described by Barton as: 
 
. . . a disease characterised by apathy, lack of initiative, loss of interests more marked in 
things and events not immediately personal or present, submissiveness, and sometimes 
no expression of feelings of resentment at harsh and unfair orders. There is also a lack 
of interest in the future and an apparent inability to make practical plans for it, 
deterioration in personal habits, toilet and standards generally, a loss of individuality, 
and a resigned acceptance that things will go on as they are – unchangingly, inevitably 
and indefinitely.
134
 
While the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (UNSMR)135 predates 
the research findings of Barton and Sykes cited above, Rule 60(1) of the UNSMR 
states: “The regime of the institution should seek to minimize any differences between prison 
life and life at liberty which tend to lessen the responsibility of the prisoners or the respect 
due to their dignity as human beings.” Since section 36 of the Correctional Services Act (111 
of 1998) states that the deprivation of liberty is the punishment, minimising the differences 
between life inside and outside of prison – and balancing this against reasonable safety and 
security requirements – is not only feasible but desirable as well. 136  Prison systems in 
                                                            
133 Sykes (1958) cited in Liebling, A. and Maruna, S. (2005) ‘Introduction: the effects of imprisonment 
revisited’. In Liebling, A. and Maruna, S. The effect of imprisonment. London: Willan Publishing, p. 5-6. 
134 Barton (1966) cited in Liebling, A. and Maruna, S. (2005) ‘Introduction: the effects of imprisonment 
revisited’. In Liebling, A. and Maruna, S. The effect of imprisonment. London: Willan Publishing, p. 4. 
135 Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 
31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977. 
136 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 8. 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
northern Europe and Scandinavia that have given more tangible expression to this ideal have 
demonstrated good results without compromising public safety.137 For the South African 
prison system the challenge is therefore to create a prison environment inculcating the values 
and habits that enable released prisoners to fulfil their roles as constructive citizens.
138
 The 
creation of such a prison environment requires a fundamental redesign and development of 
how prisons function in order to undo the formal and informal regimes and sub-cultural traits 
inherited from the apartheid era. Indeed, Dünkel and Van Zyl Smit recommend that every 
opportunity should be investigated, explored and experimented with to develop, strengthen 
and enhance a liberal prison regime,139 for it is in this milieu that the values underpinning the 
Constitution can find expression – not in a repressive, paternalistic and quasi-military one. 
3.2.6 Effective interventions 
 
In a preceding discussion (section 3.2.4) it was already pointed out that (a.) there needs to be 
a legal justification for the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, and that (b.) such a 
justification is provided by section 36 of the Correctional Services Act, which states that the 
purpose of imprisonment is to enable the offender to lead a socially responsible and crime-
free life in the future. In other words, a sentence of imprisonment must serve a useful 
purpose 140  in a manner that is acceptable from a human-rights perspective. This useful 
purpose is understood to be that offenders will leave prison less likely to commit further 
offences. 141  Effective interventions with offenders, which are dealt with further below, 
require an appropriate institutional environment. According to Cullen and Gendreau,
142
 such 
an environment has to meet the six requirements of “evidence-based corrections”. First, the 
prison-system paradigm should embrace professionalism that is respectful of data. Second, 
                                                            
137 Gardner, D. (2002) Finland is soft on crime. New Politics, XI No. 3; Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001), 
p. 839. 
138 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 8. 
139 Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001), pp. 838 and 845. 
140 Cornwall, D.J. (2003) The role of criminology in custodial corrections – a multi-disciplinary approach, Acta 
Criminologica. Vol. 16 No. 5, p. 82. 
141 Muntingh, L. (2005) Offender rehabilitation and reintegration – taking the White Paper on Corrections 
forward. CSPRI Research Report. Bellville: Community Law Centre, p. 31. 
142 Cullen, F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000) Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy Practice and Prospects in 
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the training of practitioners is based on research which is, third, supported by the creation of 
correctional training academies. Fourth, programme implementation is informed by 
empirically-based theory of effective interventions. Fifth, the evaluation of programmes and 
interventions are regarded as part of delivery. Sixth, agencies and programmes are accredited 
and audited.  
From this it follows that for prisoners to better themselves and for the prison service to meet 
the objective of promoting social responsibility and human development, the relevant that are 
must have been proven to be effective or at least be supported by evidence indicating their 
effectiveness. 143  There is indeed a growing body of empirical evidence of effective 
interventions with offenders. 144  Based on an extensive meta-analysis by Cullen and 
Gendreau, a number of principles for effective interventions have emerged. These are 
presented below.145 
First, interventions should target the known predictors of crime and recidivism, also referred 
to as criminogenic needs and divided into static and dynamic needs. 146  The focus of 
interventions is on dynamic predictors in particular, namely: anti-social or pro-criminal 
attitudes, values, beliefs and cognitive emotional states; pro-criminal associates and isolation 
from anti-criminal others; and anti-social personal factors such as impulsiveness, risk-taking, 
and low self-control. Second, the treatment services should be behavioural in nature.
147
 In this 
regard it is important to match the interventions with the needs of offenders or to ensure 
“general responsivity”. Moreover, interventions should be intensive, lasting from three to 
                                                            
143Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 8. 
144 Muntingh, L. (2005), pp. 32 -39. 
145 Cullen, F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000). See also McKenzie, D.L. ‘Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention’ in 
LW Sherman et al (1997) Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising, National Institute 
of Justice, US Department of Justice, Washington. 
146 Williamson, P. et al (2003) ‘Assessing Offender Readiness to Change Problems with Anger’ Psychology, 
Crime and Law, Vol. 9 No. 4.Cullen F.T. and Gendreau P. (2000), p. 145. 
147 Deci, E.L. and Ryan, R.M. (2000) The ‘What’ and ‘Why’ of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self 
Determination of Behaviour, Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 11 No. 4; McMurran, M. and Ward, T. (2004) 
‘Motivating Offenders to Change in Therapy: An Organizing Framework’, Legal and Criminal Psychology, 
Vol. 9; Prochaska, J.M. et al (2004) ‘The Trans-theoretical Model of Change for Multi-level Intervention for 
Alcohol Abuse on Campus’, Journal of Alcohol and Drug Education, Vol. 47 Issue 3; Cullen, F.T. and 
Gendreau, P. (2000), p. 145. 
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nine months and occupying 40-70% of the offender’s time when on the programme.
148
 Short, 
generic, information-based, just-before-release interventions do not satisfy this principle.149 
Third, treatment interventions should be used with higher risk offenders and target their 
criminogenic needs to bring about for change.
150
 It requires accurate risk assessments 
resulting in targeting high-risk individuals for interventions; this potentially has the biggest 
pay-off when successful, since these individuals are responsible for a larger proportion of 
crime. Fourth, a range of other considerations, if addressed, will increase treatment 
effectiveness.151 The work by Cullen and Gendreau also identified a wide range of issues that 
contribute to intervention-effectiveness, such as community-based interventions 152  versus 
institutional interventions, ensuring well-trained staff and monitoring them, following up on 
and supporting offenders after they have completed the programme, and structured relapse-
prevention. Matching the treatment and programme style to the learning styles of offenders 
has also been shown to be critically important. Further programme considerations include a 
lack of motivation to participate, depression, anxiety and childhood trauma.  
 
Research has similarly identified the characteristics of interventions that are not effective and 
which should naturally be avoided. The following are noteworthy in this regard. Interventions 
that aim at greater control over offenders (e.g. various forms of supervision and probation) 
and which are regarded as by-products of the get-tough-on-crime approach are not effective 
in reducing recidivism.153 Moreover, in the same manner that effective programmes are based 
on sound theory and empirically-tested methods and interventions, control-inspired 
interventions appear to be based on “a common-sense-understanding that increasing the pain 
and/or the surveillance of offenders would make them less likely to commit crimes”.154 
                                                            
148 Shrum, H. (2004) No Longer Theory: Correctional Practice that Works, Journal of Correctional Education, 
Vol. 55 No. 4, p. 233. 
149 Muntingh, L. (2005), p. 34. 
150 Cullen, F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000), p. 147. 
151 Lawrence, S. et al (2002) The Practice and Promise of Prison Programming, Urban Institute, Washington, p. 
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Also ineffective are deterrence-oriented programmes,
155
 which in some instances actually 
increased the recidivism rate.156 The overall conclusion is that there is no evidence to suggest 
that greater deterrence or increased punitiveness will result in reduced re-offending; indeed, 
the opposite was found to be true in a number of evaluations of deterrence-based 
programmes. With regard to the specific style of a programme, treatment modalities that 
appear to be ineffective lack general responsivity, rely on an insight-oriented approach and 
are less structured, self-reflective and verbally interactive.
157
 
 
The above four principles are generally accepted in the authoritative literature on 
imprisonment;158 other finer points have also been noted by other researchers.159 For the 
purpose of the analysis in this thesis, the point has been made that the state needs to render 
effective service to reduce the risk of re-offending and that scientific research has established 
the principles for such effective interventions.  
 
3.2.7 Judicial oversight 
 
In a constitutional democracy it is essential that there is judicial oversight over the prison 
system. The Judicial Inspectorate for Prisons (in 2008 renamed as the Judicial Inspectorate 
for Correctional Services)160 was formally established with effect from 1 June 1998 in terms 
                                                            
155 Examples of such sanctions are ‘Scared Straight’, boot camps, shock probation, fines, and split sentences. 
156 Cullen, F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000), p. 155. McKenzie, D.L. (1997) Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention. 
In Sherman, L.W. et al Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising, National Institute of 
Justice, Washington: US Department of Justice. 
157 Cullen, F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000), p.146. 
158 Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001), p. 822. 
159 See Lawrence, S. et al (2002) The Practice and Promise of Prison Programming, Urban Institute, 
Washington, p. 9; Vacca, J.S. (2004) Educated prisoners are less likely to return to prison, Journal of 
Correctional Education, Vol. 55 No. 4, p. 199; Ubah C.B.A. (2002) A critical Examination of Empirical Studies 
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of section 25 of the Correctional Services Act (8 of 1959)
161
 and is headed by an Inspecting 
Judge.162 The lack of transparency of the pre-1994 prison system and the limitations imposed 
by the 1959 Prisons Act on judicial oversight,163 necessitated the creation of a structure that 
would give prisoners a right of access to complain to an independent body. International 
research indicates that judicial control over the prison system is even more important in 
developing countries as it has the power to make additional resources available to the prison 
system.
164
 Notwithstanding certain limitations in the mandate of the Office of the Inspecting 
Judge (see Chapter 4 section 2.4.3), the Inspecting Judge can still make a number of binding 
decisions and in principle renders status, independence and impartiality to the external 
complaints mechanism implemented through the Independent Prison Visitors.
165
 After 1990 
there has also been an increase in prisoners’ rights litigation in respect of a number of 
substantive issues relating to conditions of detention, access to medical treatment, parole, and 
the right to vote.166 They will be dealt with more extensively in Chapters 3 and 5. These 
developments demonstrate that maintaining and strengthening judicial oversight over the 
prison system is central to developing a rights-based approach. 
3.2.8 Summary of issues 
 
By way of concluding the discussion on the requirements of an underlying philosophy for a 
prison system in a constitutional democracy, the following are the salient points. The state 
has an inescapable duty to uphold and promote the rights of all persons in its jurisdiction, and 
                                                            
161 The Correctional Services Act (8 of 1959) was amended to provide for the establishment of the Judicial 
Inspectorate on 20 February 1997 by proclamation of the Correctional Services Amendment Act (102 of 1997). 
This legislation was further amended on 19 February 1999 by proclamation of sections 85 to 94 of the 
Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998).  
162 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2000) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons1999. Cape 
Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 2. 
163 The 1959 Act abolished the prescription that prisoners must be visited regularly by judges and boards of 
visitors. (Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 31.) 
164 Dünkel, F. and Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001), p. 828. 
165 Jagwanth, S. (2004) A review of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons of South Africa, CSPRI Research Report 
No. 7, Bellville, Community Law Centre. Gallinetti, J. (2004) Report on the evaluation of the Independent 
Prison Visitors (IPV) system, CSPRI Research Report No. 5, Bellville, Community Law Centre. Muntingh, L. 
(2007 b), p. 9. 
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because imprisonment inherently poses risks to the rights of prisoners, the state should only 
use imprisonment as a measure of last resort. This means that the prison system should have a 
clearly defined role in relation to other institutions of state and constitutional obligations with 
specified functions pursuing legitimate and justifiable goals and objectives. In the case of 
South Africa, there is a particular historical mission, namely the design, development and 
implementation of a prison system which is the antithesis of the one inherited at the start of 
the constitutional democracy. Furthermore, the constitutional justification for the imposition 
of a prison sentence is derived from the opportunities and assistance that should be rendered 
to offenders to better themselves and lead crime-free lives in the future. There are certain 
absolute minimum standards of detention and treatment – derived from the right to dignity –  
that are measurable and enforceable through judicial control over the prison system; the state 
is responsible for ensuring compliance with these standards. 
3.3 The recognition of rights requirement 
 
Section 35 of the Constitution (108 of 1996) grants detailed procedural and substantive rights 
to arrested and detained persons, including prisoners, and must be regarded as a consequence 
of the excessive use of detention and imprisonment by the apartheid regime. Even if prisoners 
do not evoke the same sympathy as other vulnerable groups, they are important because they 
are in “an unusually close relationship with the state”167 and at the receiving end of the state’s 
ability to exercise coercion.
168
 In this section the rights of prisoners, as afforded by the 
Constitution, are explored further to unpack constitutionalism within the prison context; a 
number of examples are used to illustrate individual points. The purpose of this exposition is 
to show what is indeed required of transformative constitutionalism in South Africa. 
Emphasis is placed on the right to dignity, the right to freedom and security of the person, the 
right to life, and the right to freedom from slavery and servitude. It is fortunately the case that 
a residuum principle in respect of prisoners’ rights was established in South African case law 
nearly a hundred years ago, and it is here that this enquiry will start. 
3.3.1 The residuum principle 
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The 1993 decision of Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr
169
 laid the foundation for subsequent 
jurisprudence on prisoners’ rights and indicated the direction of future decisions by the 
courts.170 The Appellate Division, as it was known then, used the opportunity in Hofmeyr to 
cite approvingly two earlier decisions, the 1912 decision in Whittaker and Morant v. Roos 
and Bateman
171
 and the minority judgment of Corbett JA in the 1979 Goldberg case.172 
Citing the Innes dictum, from Whittaker and Morant v. Roos and Bateman, the Appellate 
Division, per Hoexter J, affirmed the residuum principle and dismissed the appeal with costs:  
True, the plaintiffs' freedom had been greatly impaired by the legal process of 
imprisonment; but they were entitled to demand respect for what remained. The fact 
that their liberty had been legally curtailed could afford no excuse for a further illegal 
encroachment upon it. Mr. Esselen contended that the plaintiffs, once in prison, could 
claim only such rights as the Ordinance and the regulations conferred. But the directly 
opposite view is surely the correct one. They were entitled to all their personal rights 
and personal dignity not temporarily taken away by law, or necessarily inconsistent 
with the circumstances in which they had been placed. They could claim immunity 
from punishment in the shape of illegal treatment, or in the guise of infringement of 
their liberty not warranted by the regulations or necessitated for purposes of gaol 
discipline and administration. Any such punishment would amount to an injuria.173 
 
In the Goldberg case Corbett JA, in a minority decision, refers to a “substantial residuum of 
rights”: 
It seems to me that fundamentally a convicted and sentenced prisoner retains all the 
basic rights and liberties (using the word in its Hohfeldian sense) of an ordinary citizen 
except those taken away from him by law, expressly or by implication, or those 
necessarily inconsistent with the circumstances in which he, as a prisoner, is placed. Of 
course, the inroads which incarceration necessarily make upon a prisoner's personal 
rights and liberties (for sake of brevity I shall henceforth speak merely of ‘rights’) are 
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very considerable. He no longer has freedom of movement and has no choice in the 
place of his imprisonment. His contact with the outside world is limited and regulated. 
He must submit to the discipline of prison life and to the rules and regulations which 
prescribe how he must conduct himself and how he is to be treated while in prison. 
Nevertheless, there is a substantial residuum of basic rights which he cannot be denied; 
and, if he is denied them, then he is entitled, in my view, to legal redress.174 
Even though the Whittaker and Hofmeyr cases dealt with unsentenced prisoners and 
Goldberg dealt with sentenced prisoners, the court in Hofmeyr dealt with this distinction 
deftly and drew on the earlier decision in Cassiem and Another v Commanding Officer, 
Victor Verster Prison, and Others, concluding that the residuum principle had not been 
questioned by the courts and would therefore apply equally to sentenced and unsentenced 
prisoners.175 This approach was subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional Court in S v 
Makwanyane and no distinction was drawn between sentenced and unsentenced prisoners.176 
 
The residuum principle is thus well entrenched in South African prisoners’ rights 
jurisprudence and imprisonment per se is not a justification for the further limitation of 
rights, save for those rights that must of necessity be curtailed in order to implement the 
sentence (or order) of the court.
177
 The retention of this rights status is important to protect, as 
public opinion often bays for an erosion of this basic position. It has been demonstrated in 
respect of prisoners’ right to vote, a right which forms an important, albeit symbolic, bulwark 
against the erosion of other rights held by prisoners.
178
 It has also been shown in post-1994 
decisions, such as those dealing with the right to vote, that attempts by the executive to dilute 
                                                            
174 1979(1) SA 14 p. 139. 
175
 Cassiem and Another v Commanding Officer, Victor Verster Prison, and Others 1982(2) SA 547(C) 
‘Whether the same approach should be adopted when considering the rights of convicted prisoners (vide 
Goldberg and Others v Minister of Prisons and Others1979 (1) SA 14 (A), particularly per CORBETT JA at 38 
- 41) or of persons detained under other legislation (cf. Rossouw v Sachs 1964 (2) SA 551 (A)) does not arise 
and need not be considered in the present case. In respect of awaiting-trial prisoners, the correctness of the 
approach stated by INNES J as far back as 1912 has to my knowledge never been questioned.’ Page 166 of 
[1982] 4 All SA 162 (C). 
176
 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 CCT/3/94 para 142. 
177 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 10. 
178 Muntingh, L. and Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2009) The Ballot as a Bulwark: Prisoners’ Right to Vote in South Africa. 
In Ewald, A.C. and Rottinghaus, B. (eds) Criminal disenfranchisement in an international perspective, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 221-243. 
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the residuum principle have not been entertained by the Constitutional and other Superior 
Courts. 
3.3.2 The right to dignity 
 
The Constitution, in Section 1, identifies dignity as one of the founding values of the 
Republic and dignity ranks at least equally with the rights of freedom and equality. Human 
dignity is therefore the source of a person’s innate rights to freedom and to physical integrity 
from which other rights flow.179 Then Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, in an academic work, 
concluded that in a broad and general sense, respect for human dignity implies respect for the 
autonomy of each person, and the right of everyone not to be devalued as a human being or 
treated in a degrading or humiliating manner.180 He further pointed out that the right to 
dignity, as a foundational right, must be granted more weight than the other individually 
enumerated rights.
181
 The Constitutional Court has also recognised that imprisonment, and 
any other punishment, encroaches on the dignity of a person:  
 
Dignity is inevitably impaired by imprisonment or any other punishment, and the 
undoubted power of the state to impose punishment as part of the criminal justice 
system, necessarily involves the power to encroach upon a prisoner's dignity.182 
The Constitutional Court also agreed with the US Supreme Court that “even the vilest 
criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity” and the German 
Federal Constitutional Court’s statement that “respect for human dignity especially requires 
the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment”. 183  In S v Williams the 
Constitutional Court’s conclusion on punishment was as follows: 
The simple message is that the State must, in imposing punishment, do so in 
accordance with certain standards; these will reflect the values which underpin the 
                                                            
179 Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (2005) ‘Human dignity’. In Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (eds) The Bill of Rights 
Handbook (5th edition) Cape Town: Juta, p. 273. 
180 Chaskalson, A. (2002) Human dignity as a Constitutional Value. In Kretzmer, D., and Klien, E. (eds) The 
Concept of Human Dignity in the Human Right Discourse, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 134. 
181 See also S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 CCT/3/94, paras 144 and 329. 
182
 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 CCT/3/94, para 142. 
183 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 CCT/3/94, para 57 and 59. 
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Constitution; in the present context, it means that punishment must respect human 
dignity and be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.184 
While the Constitutional Court has had to deal with the issue of life imprisonment185 and 
sentence lengths,
186
 it has not yet had to deal with the constitutionality of imprisonment itself. 
Until a different view on this emerges from the Constitutional Court, it must accepted that 
prisoners have to tolerate greater limitations on their right to dignity than free persons, 
provided that such limitations are justifiable in respect of the objectives of their 
imprisonment, these being their rehabilitation and the prevention of crime.187 The threshold 
of tolerance is described in Section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution, which states that prisoners 
have a right “to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity”; this is further 
described in the Correctional Services Act, which requires that prisoners must be detained in 
safe custody “whilst ensuring their human dignity”.188 As noted above, Chapter 2 of the 
Correctional Services Act then sets out the operational standards for ensuring conditions of 
human dignity.  
Prisoners’ right to dignity found an unlikely route to the Constitutional Court in August and 
Another v the Electoral Commission and Others in 1999 when the Court had to determine if 
prisoners had a right to vote in national and provincial elections.189 For Justice Sachs, dignity 
in the context of imprisonment stretched beyond conditions of detention and extended into 
civil and political rights:  
 
The universality of the franchise is important not only for nationhood and democracy. 
The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and of personhood. Quite 
literally, it says that everybody counts. In a country of great disparities of wealth and 
power it declares that whoever we are, whether rich or poor, exalted or disgraced, we 
all belong to the same democratic South African nation; that our destinies are 
                                                            
184
 S v Williams and Others (CCT20/94) [1995] ZACC 6; 1995 (3) SA 632; 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) (9 June 
1995) para 38. 
185 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 CCT/3/94 para 171. 
186
 S v DodoCase CCT 1/01 para 27-38. 
187 Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (2005) ‘Human dignity’. In Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (eds) The Bill of Rights 
Handbook (5th edition) Cape Town: Juta, p. 276. 
188 s 2(b) Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998). 
189 1999 (3) SA 1; 1999 (4) BCLR 363. 
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intertwined in a single interactive polity. Rights may not be limited without justification 
and legislation dealing with the franchise must be interpreted in favour of 
enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement.190 
 
In the August case the Constitutional Court provided substantial clarification on the status of 
prisoners in South Africa, emphasising that they are not second-class citizens and remain, 
even though deprived of their liberty, members of a democratic society who can participate in 
elections.191 
 
The right to dignity also places a positive obligation on the state to “respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”.192 The purpose of a sentence of imprisonment, as 
alluded to above, renders further expression to the right to dignity by recognising the 
potential of each sentenced prisoner to contribute to society and be able to lead a “socially 
responsible and crime-free life”. To fulfil this duty, the state is thus obligated to provide 
access for sentenced prisoners to such services (e.g. education and therapeutic programmes) 
to enable them to fulfil their human potential,193 as discussed in section 3.2.6. The German 
Federal Constitutional Court regarded this in a transactional manner: while the state deprives 
the prisoner of his liberty, the prison administration is required to legitimise the limitations 
placed on prisoners through the services available to prisoners to enable them to lead socially 
responsible and crime free lives.194 The right to dignity in a prison environment should be 
regarded as an open-ended and expansive value, seeking new normative expressions in the 
daily regime. In the absence of such an approach and concomitant conditions, 
 … it is unlikely that prisoners will subscribe to the values of self-worth, respect for 
others, respect for the rule of law and so forth. Degrading and humiliating treatment 
and conditions do not create an environment supportive of the rehabilitative ideal; it 
actively undermines it. The right to dignity therefore lies at the core of prisoners’ rights 
in a constitutional democracy and should be understood in very tangible terms and 
                                                            
190 1999 (3) SA 1; 1999 (4) BCLR 363, para 17. 
191 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 10. 
192 s 7(2) Act 108 of 1996. 
193 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 10. 
194 Lazarus, L. (2004) Contrasting Prisoners’ Rights. Oxford: Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice, 
p. 44. 
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emphasising the positive measures undertaken to give effect to personal worth and 
autonomy.195 
3.3.3 Freedom and security of the person 
 
Under international law, the prohibition of torture carries the enhanced status of a peremptory 
norm (ius cogens) of general international law.196 The absoluteness of the ban means that it 
applies regardless of the status of the victim and the circumstances, be it a state of war, siege, 
emergency, or whatever.197 The revulsion with which the torturer is regarded is demonstrated 
by the very strong judicial rebuke, condemning the torturer as someone who has become 
“like the pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind”,198 and torture itself as an act of barbarity which “no civilized society condones”,199 
“one of the most evil practices known to man”200 and “an unqualified evil.”201 
                                                            
195 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 11. 
196 As a peremptory norm it ‘enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 
‘ordinary’ customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this higher rank is that the principle at issue 
cannot be derogated from by States through international treaties or local or special customs or even general 
customary rules not endowed with the same normative force.’ (Prosecutor v. Furundzija ICTY (Trial Chamber) 
Judgment of 10 December 1998 at para 147-157.) See the House of Lords decision in A (FC) and others (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004); A and others (FC) and others vs Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2005] UKHL 71 para 33. Also R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex 
parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147, 197-199. 
197 The prohibition of torture is prescribed in Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
(hereafter UDHR) and a number of international and regional human rights treaties, including ICCPR in Art. 7 
and Art.10, ECHR in Art.3, ACHR in Art.5(2), and ACHPR, Art. 5. Several treaties have been developed with 
the specific aim to combat torture. These are: UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT), the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1987 and the 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 1985. The prohibition is furthermore taken up in a 
number of legally non-binding, but morally authoritative instruments. These include: The Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975 (1975 Declaration), 
the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1955), the Basic Principles for the Treatment of 
Prisoners (1990), the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment (1988), the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990), 
and the Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2000). 
198 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala[1980] 630 F (2nd Series) 876 US Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit 890.  
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South Africa’s recent socio-political political history made the drafters of the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions alive to the crime of torture and the importance of including the right to be free 
from torture into the Constitution, and it was thus included into the Interim Constitution202 
and the final Constitution
203
 under the heading “Freedom and security of the person”.
204
 The 
right to freedom and security of the person is described in five subsections in the 
Constitution, two of which are non-derogable: the right not to be tortured and the right not to 
be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.
205
 Following from the 
discussion above on the right to dignity (section 3.3.2), it has been concluded that the right to 
dignity is at the heart of the right not to be tortured or to be treated or punished in a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading way.
206
 
In the post-1994 era it is important to understand torture in a broader sense and expand its 
historical association with political opponents of the state to include common law suspects 
and detainees, prisoners, children in secure care facilities, and all other situations where 
people are deprived of their liberty and at the mercy of state officials.207 With South Africa’s 
large prison population, the risk of torture and ill-treatment is significant. The former UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture (Prof. Nowak) regarded the deprivation of liberty as key to 
understanding and defining torture: “It is the powerless of the victim in a situation of 
detention which makes him or her so vulnerable to any type of physical or mental 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
199
 A (FC) and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department para 67. 
200
 A (FC) and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department para 101. 
201 A (FC) and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department para 160. 
202 s 11(2) Act 200 of 1993 
203 s 12(1)(e) Act 108 of 1996 
204 Muntingh, L. (2011) A guide to the UN Convention against Torture in South Africa. CSPRI Report, Bellville: 
Community Law Centre, p. 11. 
205 s 12(1)(d)-(e) 
206 Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (2005) The Bill of Rights Handbook, Juta, Cape Town, p. 276. See also S v 
Makwanyane (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 
(2) SACR 1. 
207 Muntingh, L. (2008) Preventing and combating torture in South Africa – a framework for action under CAT 
and OPCAT, CSPRI and CSVR, Bellville and Johannesburg, p. 4. 
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pressure”.
208
 Therefore any mental or physical pressure exerted on a person deprived of his or 
her liberty must be seen as an interference with the dignity of that person.209 
While the Constitution is clear on the right to be free from torture, enabling domestic 
legislation criminalising torture under domestic law has not been enacted as at December 
2011. The absence of legislation criminalising torture gives rise to three immediate 
problems.210 First, the definition of torture in United Nations Convention against Torture, and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) needs to be 
incorporated into domestic legislation reflecting that: torture inflicts severe mental and 
physical suffering; it is done intentionally; it is committed by a public official or at the behest 
of a public official; and excludes pain and suffering inherent in or incidental to lawful 
actions. Second, common law offences (e.g. assault and attempted murder) are inadequate to 
prosecute perpetrators of torture. Third, in the absence of a statutory crime, the punishment of 
perpetrators becomes problematic. UNCAT requires that states parties shall “make these 
offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature”.211 
Therefore, legislation criminalising torture needs “to reflect on the punishment of perpetrators 
of torture to the extent that the punishment should reflect the gravity of the offence and 
expresses the revulsion of torture”.212 
To date, the South African Police Service (SAPS) is the only government department that has 
developed a policy on the prevention of torture; no other government department, including 
                                                            
208 Nowak, M. and McArthur, E. (2006) ‘The Distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment’. Torture, Vol. 16 No. 3, p. 151. 
209 Nowak, M. and McArthur, E. (2006), p. 151. 
210 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 12. In General Comment No. 2 the Committee against Torture (CAT) expressed 
itself as follows on the issue of criminalisation: [para 11]. ‘By defining the offence of torture as distinct from 
common assault or other crimes, the Committee considers that States parties will directly advance the 
Convention’s overarching aim of preventing torture and ill-treatment. Naming and defining this crime will 
promote the Convention’s aim, inter alia, by alerting everyone, including perpetrators, victims, and the public, to 
the special gravity of the crime of torture. Codifying this crime will also (a) emphasize the need for appropriate 
punishment that takes into account the gravity of the offence, (b) strengthen the deterrent effect of the 
prohibition itself, (c) enhance the ability of responsible officials to track the specific crime of torture and (d) 
enable and empower the public to monitor and, when required, to challenge State action as well as State inaction 
that violates the Convention.’ (CAT/C/GC/2). 
211 Article 4(2). 
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the DCS, has developed such a policy. It remains the case that the language of the UNCAT 
and other key texts, such as the General Comments issued by UN Committee against Torture 
(CAT), has not entered the lexicon of the DCS.213 
A further issue to take note of in the discussion on torture is the extent to which the state is 
responsible for the actions of non-state actors, especially within the context of inter-prisoner 
violence and specifically sexual violence in prison settings.214 From CAT General Comment 
2 it is clear that the state’s responsibility in respect of safe custody and freedom from torture 
extends beyond its own officials to include responsibility for the actions of non-state actors, 
i.e. other prisoners: 
The Committee has made clear that where State authorities or others acting in official 
capacity or under colour of law, know or have reasonable grounds to believe that acts of 
torture or ill-treatment are being committed by non-State officials or private actors and 
they fail to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such 
non-State officials or private actors consistently with the Convention, the State bears 
responsibility and its officials should be considered as authors, complicit or otherwise 
responsible under the Convention for consenting to or acquiescing in such 
impermissible acts. Since the failure of the State to exercise due diligence to intervene 
to stop, sanction and provide remedies to victims of torture facilitates and enables non-
State actors to commit acts impermissible under the Convention with impunity, the 
State’s indifference or inaction provides a form of encouragement and/or de facto 
permission. The Committee has applied this principle to States parties’ failure to 
prevent and protect victims from gender-based violence, such as rape, domestic 
violence, female genital mutilation, and trafficking.215 
 
                                                            
213 Muntingh, L. And Fernandez, L. (2008) ‘A review of measures in place to effect the prevention and 
combating of torture with specific reference to places of detention in South Africa.’ South African Journal on 
Human Rights, Vol. 24 No. 1, p. 126. The word ‘torture’ appears nowhere in the Correctional Services Act, the 
Regulations to the Act, the White Paper on Corrections in South Africa or the Standing Orders. 
214 For a detailed discussion on sexual violence in prisons, see Muntingh L. and Satardien, Z. (2011) ‘Sexual 
violence in prisons – Part 1: the duty to provide safe custody and the nature of prison sex’. South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 1-18. 
215 Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2 (CAT/C/GC/2) para 18. 
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The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture is even more specific in this regard, noting that the 
Convention 
 
… goes beyond the traditional concept of State responsibility and includes acts which 
are not directly inflicted by the State officials, but executed with their active or passive 
agreement or were possible to occur due to their lack of intervention, which would have 
been possible. Under this extended responsibility, inter-prisoner abuse may fall under 
the definition of torture.216 
 
In summary, three issues are clear. First, the state has a constitutional obligation to promote, 
protect and uphold the right of prisoners to be free from torture and other ill-treatment. 
Second, this duty applies not only to the actions of its own officials but also to the actions of 
non-state actors (e.g. other prisoners) where such acts are committed through action, 
omission or acquiescence of officials. Third, in the absence of legislation criminalising 
torture and the lack of measures taken by the state to give effects to its obligations under 
UNCAT, the protection of the right to freedom and security of the person (and consequently 
the right to dignity) guaranteed by the Constitution, is substantially weakened in the case of 
people deprived of their liberty.  
 
3.3.4 The right to life 
 
The right to life was included in the Interim Constitution217  and ultimately in the 1996 
Constitution.218 The Constitutional Court dealt with the death penalty in S v Makwanyane and 
did so convincingly.
219
 Linking the right to life with the right to dignity, the Constitutional 
Court found that this linkage, seen together with the risk of arbitrariness and error, as well as 
                                                            
216 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture Add.5 para 39. Cited in Muntingh L. and Satardien, Z. (2011) 
‘Sexual violence in prisons – Part 1: the duty to provide safe custody and the nature of prison sex’. South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 24 No. 1, p. 10. 
217 s 9 of Act 200 of 1993. 
218 s 11 Act 108 of 1996. 
219 Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (2005) ‘Life’. In Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (eds) The Bill of Rights Handbook (5th 
edition) Cape Town: Juta, p. 280. 
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the availability of life imprisonment as an alternative, weighed more than the unproven 
deterrent value of execution and society’s assumed need for retribution. 220  In short, 
“retribution cannot be accorded the same weight under our Constitution as the rights to life 
and dignity”. 
221
 
The death penalty was also the focus of the Constitutional Court in Mohamed v President of 
the RSA,
222 where the court had to deal with the extradition of a terrorism suspect to the USA 
where he faced the risk of the death penalty. The Court found that the state had failed in its 
positive duty to protect the right to life by extraditing Mr. Mohammed to the United States 
where he might receive the death penalty, and more specifically that the state failed to seek 
assurances from the USA government that Mr. Mohammed would be protected from the 
death penalty.223 By handing Mohamed over to the USA, it was found that the South African 
immigration authorities failed to respect and protect his constitutional right to life, the right to 
dignity and the right to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.224  In a 
September 2011 decision the Mohammed case was used to refuse an extradition request by 
the Botswana government for two murder suspects who would face the death penalty if 
convicted.225 
The right to life also imposes a duty on the state to protect citizens from life-threatening 
attacks, 
226
 a duty which the Carmichele case
227
 delineates. Consequently, the state also has a 
duty to protect prisoners against such attacks by both officials and fellow prisoners.228 The 
Annual Reports of the DCS and the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services indicate 
that there are worryingly high numbers of unnatural deaths of prisoners as well as complaints 
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 Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC). 
224 Banda, J., Katz, A. and Hübschle, A. (2005) ‘Rights versus Justice – issues around extradition and 
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226 Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (2005) ‘Life’. In Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (eds) The Bill of Rights Handbook (5th 
edition) Cape Town: Juta, pp. 285-286. 
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alleging assault.
229
 This is discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5. The overall 
impression remains that South Africa’s prisons are extremely unsafe and that life-threatening 
situations are not uncommon, whether they are the making of prisoners or officials.230 
 
3.3.5 Right to be free from slavery and servitude 
 
Freedom from slavery and servitude enjoy non-derogable status in the Constitution. Given 
South Africa’s history with prison labour,231 it is necessary to make a number of observations 
insofar as the issue applies to the post-1994 era, an era in which questions have been raised 
about the constitutionality of compelling prisoners to perform labour.
232
 International law 
prohibits forced labour233 but key instruments make an exception in the case of prison labour. 
The International Labour Organisation Forced Labour Convention No. 29 (1930) permits the 
use of forced labour for prisoners serving a sentence, but prohibits the use of prison labour 
for private enterprises.234 The International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR) does 
not make a distinction between sentenced and unsentenced prisoners and permits forced 
labour for prisoners, provided that they are lawfully detained or under a lawful conditional 
                                                            
229 For 2010/11 the DCS reported a total of 51 such deaths and an estimated total of 5150 complaints of assault. 
In 2009/10 the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services recorded 3756 complaints regarding assaults of 
prisoner-on-prisoner, and 2189 assaults of official-on-prisoner. The DCS has in general been tardy in 
responding to the problem and gang management strategy was reportedly developed and operationalised in the 
2010/11 financial year. The influence of the prison gangs is discussed further in Chapter 4 (section 4.1). 
230 McCullum case. UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1818/2008. Delivered 2 November 
2010. 
231 While various forms of forced labour were used during colonial times, the 1959 Prisons Act created a system 
of release-on-parole for short-term African prisoners on condition that they enter into strict employment 
agreements with a farmer. The system was open to abuse as a parole violation would result in a return to prison. 
(Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 31.) 
232 On 11 August 2010 the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held public hearings on the issue of 
prison labour, and the submission by CSPRI dealt specifically with the constitutionality of prison labour as was 
requested by the Portfolio Committee. PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services of 11 August 2010, http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-
reintegration-adoption-minutes Accessed 6 October 2011. 
233 International Labour Organisation Forced Labour Convention No. 29 (1930) and the International Labour 
Organisation Abolition of Forced Labour Convention No. 105 (1957) and ICCPR Art 8. 
234 Art 2(2)(c). 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
release.
235
 The desirability of prisoners performing work appears to derive from common 
wisdom and a general wish that prisoners should be productive,236 a notion supported by the 
UNSMR.237 
While a sentenced prisoner may not be compelled to perform labour as a form of punishment 
or as a disciplinary measure,238 the Correctional Services Act reflects the general support for 
prison labour by stating that labour performed by prisoners is aimed at fostering habits of 
industry and at assisting with the training of prisoners.
239
 It is also a general principle of the 
correctional system to be, as far as possible, self-sufficient and operate on “business 
principles”, this being a further justification for using prisoner labour.240 Work opportunities 
for prisoners should also not be occasional or sporadic but “sufficient work must as far as is 
practicable be provided to keep prisoners active for a normal working day and a prisoner may 
be compelled to do such work”.241 Sentenced children enjoy additional protection in respect 
of labour. They may perform labour only for the purposes of training aimed at obtaining 
skills and for the benefit of their development, and may not may not perform labour that is 
inappropriate to their age or which places the child’s educational, physical, mental or social 
well-being at risk.242 
 
That prison labour has not been a source of litigation is hardly surprising.
243
 Finding work 
opportunities for prisoners inside the prison system is increasingly difficult due to overriding 
                                                            
235 De Jonge, G. (1999) Still ‘Slaves of the Sate’: Prison Labour and International Law. In Van Zyl Smit, D. and 
Dünkel, F. (eds) Prison Labour: Salvation or Slavery, Ashgate: Aldershot, p. 327. 
236 Gibbons, J. and Katzenbach, N. (2006) Confronting Confinement. The Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America’s Prisons, Vera Institute of Justice, p. 11. 
237 UNSMR Rules 71 to 76. 
238 s 40(5) Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
239 s 37(1) (b) Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
240 s 3(2)(b) Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
241 s 40(1) Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
242 s 40(3)(b)-(c) Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
243 Submission by the CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 2010, 
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security concerns.
244
 In 2007/8 only 10 349 out of approximately 115 000 sentenced prisoners 
were placed in work opportunities, amounting to less than 10% of the sentenced 
population.245  The pervasive idleness characterising South African prison life contributes 
significantly to generally poor conditions of detention (such as being in overcrowded cells for 
most of the day) and must place a heavy burden on the mental health of prisoners.246 Prison 
conditions and the treatment of prisoners are discussed extensively in Chapter 5. 
In respect of prison labour, three key issues are discussed below: access to work opportunities 
in prison and the right to work; the legal status of working prisoners and their payment; and 
meaningful and purposeful work.247  First, it can be assumed safely that the majority of 
prisoners would prefer to be active through work activities and other means (e.g. formal 
education, training, recreation and sport).248 However, the high unemployment rate in South 
Africa and other socio-economic realities militate against a possible claim by sentenced 
prisoners that they must have access to work. The low number of work opportunities 
currently available will, in all likelihood, persist for the foreseeable future. A more 
                                                            
244
 Most work opportunities are on the terrain of the prison, prison farms or at technical and production 
workshops. However, prisoners classified as maximum security are excluded from these opportunities. 
Following the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences and a general increase in sentence tariffs, the 
proportion of prisoners classified as maximum security increased substantially as the formula used to calculate 
the classification assigns a heavy weight to the length of the sentence imposed. 
245 Department of Correctional Services (2008) Annual Report 2007/8, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Service, p.51. It should be noted that the statistics provided for subsequent years, including 2010/11, reflect that 
there were in excess of 100 000 job opportunities provided. These figures do not accord with the statistics 
provided in earlier years and in all likelihood count ‘work sessions’ as opposed to sustained work opportunities, 
for example, being a cook in a prison kitchen. In view of this it is more likely still to be the case that 
approximately 10 000 sentenced prisoners are involved in sustained work opportunities.  
246 Submission by CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 
2010,http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-reintegration-adoption-
minutes Accessed 6 October 2011. 
247 The three issues identified are by and large overlapping with those identified by D. van Zyl Smit and F. 
Dünkel (1999) ‘Conclusion’. In Van Zyl Smit, D. and Dünkel, F. (eds) Prison Labour: Salvation or Slavery, 
Ashgate: Aldershot, p. 335-346. 
248 Submission by CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-reintegration-adoption-minutes 
Accessed 6 October 2011. 
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convincing claim, however, may be the right to access such services and opportunities to 
prepare them for their release as these are clear requirements in the Correctional Services Act 
and stand central to the purposes of the correctional system as described in the Act and the 
2004 White Paper.
249
 The Correctional Services Act also makes a clear connection between 
labour as part of rehabilitation and skills training and labour that would presumably assist 
prisoners to reintegrate into society once released. While prisoners cannot lay claim to a right 
to work, there are more grounds for a claim to access services that would prepare them for 
release and re-entry into society.250 
 
Second, while working prisoners are not employees of the DCS, their legal status remains 
uncertain due to their exclusion from the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (75 of 1997), 
Unemployment Insurance Act (63 of 2001) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (85 
of 1993).251 If a prisoner suffers an injury during the performance of labour and the injury 
was not due to the fault or negligence of the prisoner and is of such a nature and extent that it 
will affect his/her future income-earning ability, an ex gratia payment at the discretion of the 
National Commissioner can be made.252 Prisoners thus find themselves in a situation where 
they perform labour (e.g. working in a prison kitchen) but are not recognised as workers and 
excluded from the concomitant protections arising from this status.
253
 
 
                                                            
249 Submission by CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-reintegration-adoption-minutes 
Accessed 6 October 2011. 
250 Submission by the CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-reintegration-adoption-minutes 
Accessed 6 October 2011. 
251 Department of Correctional Services Standing Orders (B-Orders) Order 3 Chapter 4, section 6. 
252 Department of Correctional Services Standing Orders (B-Orders) Order 3 Chapter 4, section 6.  
253 Submission by CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-reintegration-adoption-minutes 
Accessed 6 October 2011. 
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Prisoners who are performing labour do receive a gratuity but this is far removed from what 
can be accepted as market-related.254 The privatisation of a number of prison kitchens also 
raises concerns when private operators are generating profits whilst using prison labour in the 
privatised kitchens, presumably at the same gratuity scales applicable to prisoners performing 
other non-privatised types of work. This raises not only serious ethical questions about 
decision-making in DCS, but could amount to a violation of Rule 73(1)255 of the UNSMR256 
and ILO Convention No 29 (1930). 
 
Third, international257 and domestic law is clear that work performed by prisoners should be 
meaningful and have purpose. The DCS provides little information about the exact nature of 
the work performed by prisoners, but it is known anecdotally that a large proportion of 
working prisoners are engaged in dull repetitive tasks of an unskilled nature.258 There is thus 
limited potential that the skills and abilities acquired through such labour will enable released 
prisoners to find employment in the market where they have to compete with a large pool of 
unskilled work-seekers. Addressing this will require that skills development in prisons should 
be aligned to market needs and that the DCS take the necessary steps on a sufficient scale to 
place released and paroled prisoners in employment positions.259 
 
                                                            
254 The gratuity (2006) was R87.12 (US$12.00) per month for the best paid working prisoner. Note that this may 
have been subject to adjustment. 
255 73. (1) Preferably institutional industries and farms should be operated directly by the administration and not 
by private contractors. 
256 Submission by the CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-reintegration-adoption-minutes 
Accessed 6 October 2011. 
257 The European Prison Rules, in line with the UNSMR, also requires that: Prison authorities shall strive to 
provide sufficient work of a useful nature (Rule 26(2)). 
258 Submission by the CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-reintegration-adoption-minutes 
Accessed 6 October 2011. 
259 Submission by the CSPRI on prison labour to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 11 August 
2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 August 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100811-public-hearings-inmate-labour-social-reintegration-adoption-minutes. 
Accessed 6 October 2011. 
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3.3.6 Summary of issues 
 
Reflecting on the post-1994 period, it should be asked what the relative importance was and 
is of prisoners’ rights, as provided for in the Constitution, in framing, discussing and debating 
social policy, or the “rights rhetoric”.260 The development of social policy can be driven by a 
number of concerns such as rights, managerialist concerns, or law and order objectives. There 
is a legitimate expectation that in a constitutional democracy emphasis should be on giving 
greater effect to rights and protecting citizens’ rights. This has, in the case of prisoners, been 
a fragmented discourse with often competing agendas261 and mixed messages. The mandatory 
minimum sentences legislation
262
 clearly communicates a punitive approach and does so with 
limited regard to the individual offender; on the other hand, government is supportive of 
restorative justice 263  – an approach diametrically opposed to retribution. In respect of 
prisoners’ rights it remains thus cause for concern that this collective of rights, as an 
expression of constitutionalism, frequently plays second, if not third, fiddle to other strategic 
and political priorities. Chapter 5 will provide a more detailed analysis in this regard. 
3.4 Accountability 
3.4.1 Overview 
 
The second broad aim of the Constitution, as articulated in the Preamble, refers to a 
“democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people”. From 
this aim the notions of transparency and accountability can be derived as requirements for a 
constitutional democracy; they are also the antithesis of the apartheid government and thus 
central to constitutionalism in South Africa. Although the terms “accountability” and 
“transparency” are frequently used in a pair, this section will deal only with the former; 
                                                            
260 Lazarus, L. (2004), p. 16. 
261 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 15. 
262 Act 105 of 1997. 
263 The 2003/4 DCS Annual Report states: ‘The Department holds a Restorative Justice Week every year in 
November where the focus is on reparation and restoration. To create awareness amongst personnel, offenders, 
victims, families and the community, DCS personnel and the community commemorated the 2003 Restorative 
Justice Week in all six regions. Offenders were encouraged and motivated to reach out to their victims to 
express their remorse and seek their forgiveness. Chaplains, social workers and other personnel worked together 
to organize restorative justice events and workshops with offenders and the community at various correctional 
centres.’ (p. 34). 
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transparency will be discussed in section 3.5 below. Accountability is understood to mean the 
relationship “between the bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and the agents or agencies 
responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right”.264 This means that a government must be 
able to and indeed explain how it executed its mandate.
265
 The point has also been made that 
the normal features of a democracy (e.g. multi-party elections and universal suffrage) are 
necessary but not sufficient to ensure healthy accountability between citizens and the 
government.
266
 Democratic elections therefore do not make for clean government and new 
democracies remain haunted by human rights violations, nepotism and corruption, which do 
not disappear with the advent of democratic elections.267 
The construct of accountability can be split into two dimensions: horizontal accountability 
and vertical accountability. According to Schacter, the state must be willing “to restrain itself 
by creating and sustaining independent public institutions to oversee its actions, demand 
explanations, and when circumstances warrant, impose penalties on the government for 
improper and illegal activity”.268 The accountability that the state imposes on itself and on 
governments is commonly referred to as horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability 
refers to the control external institutions exercise over a government, such as the electorate, 
the media and civil society.269 Accountability to international mechanisms, for example, UN 
Treaty Bodies, is also included within the vertical accountability relationship. 
The fact that a relationship exists between the state and another internal or external body does 
not automatically result in an effective accountability relationship, and three principles need 
to be adhered to, namely transparency, answerability, and controllability. Transparency is 
discussed in the following section (section 3.5) and the focus here is on answerability and 
controllability. The answerability requirement states that decision-makers must be able to 
justify their decisions and actions publicly in order to substantiate that they are reasonable, 
                                                            
264 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Corruption Glossary http://www.u4.no/document/glossary.cfm 
Accessed 6 October 2011. 
265 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 16. 
266 Schacter, M. (2001) When Accountability Fails – a framework for diagnosis and action, Isuma Vol. 2 No. 2, 
p. 1. 
267 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 16. 
268 Schacter, M. (2001), p. 2. 
269 Schacter, M. (2001), p. 2. 
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rational and within their mandate.
270
 Answerability (and transparency) will, however, be 
meaningless if there are not mechanisms in place to sanction actions and decisions in 
contravention of the given mandate; accountability institutions must therefore be able to 
exercise control over the institutions that they are overseeing.
271
 Failure to hold government 
and individuals accountable creates the conditions for impunity to exist.272 
3.4.2 Horizontal accountability 
 
The description below deals with two relevant aspects of horizontal accountability: 
governance and the treatment of prisoners. 
3.4.2.1 Horizontal accountability and governance 
 
The governance of the prison system and the treatment of prisoners are inextricably linked, 
and this link is aptly described by Tapscott:  
[T]he notion of governance is understood to encompass not only issues of 
administrative efficiency and probity, but also the extent to which the basic 
human/constitutional rights of offenders are recognised and respected. This relates both 
to the manner in which offenders are treated in the prison system and the opportunities 
which they are afforded to re-orientate their lives towards a more constructive future in 
society.273 
The accountability architecture in respect of the governance of the South African prison 
system is well-developed. The DCS is accountable by means of its internal auditing and 
control procedures, internal disciplinary procedures, the Departmental Investigative Unit 
(tasked with investigating corruption), the Auditor General, the Public Service Commission, 
Department of Public Service and Administration, Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 
the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services and the Standing Committee 
                                                            
270 U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre, Glossary, http://www.u4.no/document/glossary.cfm Accessed 6 
October 2011. 
271 U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre, Glossary, http://www.u4.no/document/glossary.cfm Accessed 6 
October 2011. 
272 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 16. 
273 Tapscott, C. (2005) A Study of Best Practice in Prison Governance, CSPRI Research Report No. 9, 
Bellville: Community Law Centre, p.3. 
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on Security and Constitutional Development. There is little unusual or unique in this 
arrangement, which is similar for all government departments, and these structures serve to 
hold the DCS accountable in respect of the budget, its strategic direction, management 
decisions, and to some extent, the behaviour of individual officials.
274
 
Post-1994 the DCS exhibited significant governance problems which ultimately led to the 
establishment of the Jali Commission in 2001,275 although there were very strong indications 
as early as 1996 that the state had lost control over the Department.
276
 In respect of financial 
accountability the DCS has received qualified audits from the Auditor General since 2000.277 
It was also later evident from the Jali Commission’s findings that the DCS had not responded, 
or had responded poorly, to earlier investigations undertaken by other institutions of state 
such as the Department of Public Service and Administration and the Public Service 
Commission; in addition, and crucially, it had failed to enforce its own disciplinary code. 
These and other problems around governance will be discussed further in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
In overview it can be said that a prison system which does not hold its own staff accountable 
will create the space for impunity to set in, leading to corruption and human rights violations: 
in effect it undermines in small and insidious ways the rule of law. 278 
3.4.2.2 Horizontal accountability and the treatment of prisoners  
 
In addition to accountability relating to governance, accountability must also exist in respect 
of the treatment of prisoners. Generally very little information in this respect is available in 
either the DCS Annual Reports or the Annual Reports of the Judicial Inspectorate for 
Correctional Services. This problem is not unique, and researchers from other jurisdictions 
have remarked that there is in fact very little reporting available in the public domain, be it in 
informal narrative or formal research, on “what is happening behind the prison walls”.
279
 
                                                            
274 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 16. 
275 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Corruption, Maladministration and Violence in the 
Department of Correctional Services (Proclamation No.135 of 2001). Hereafter ‘the Jali Commission’. 
276 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 18; PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services of 14 March 2000 http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=3591 Accessed 22 November 2011. 
277 See relevant DCS Annual Reports. 
278 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 18. 
279 Boin, A., James. O., and Lodge, M. (2005) New Public Management and Political Control: Comparing three 
European Correctional Systems, Paper prepared for the SCANCOR Workshop ‘Autonomization of the State: 
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In respect of horizontal accountability and the treatment of prisoners, four routes are 
distinguished. First, there is the internal complaints and requests mechanism of the 
Department to which prisoners are entitled to have daily access;280 however, concerns have 
been expressed about its effectiveness in dealing with gross rights violations or other 
sensitive matters.281 Second, the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) (Chapters 9 and 10) 
provides for the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services and the appointment of 
Independent Visitors assigned to each prison in South Africa. The task of the Inspectorate is 
to “facilitate the inspection of prisons in order that the Inspecting Judge may report on the 
treatment of prisoners in prisons and conditions in prisons”. 282  The Inspecting Judge 
“inspects or arranges for the inspection of prisons in order to report on the treatment of 
prisoners in prisons and on conditions and any corrupt or dishonest practices in prisons”.283 
The Inspectorate has not been without criticism, especially from the Jali Commission, and 
these matters will be examined in Chapters 4 and 6. The third layer in the accountability 
structure relating to the treatment of prisoners is made up of the so-called Chapter 9 
institutions,
284
 which have broad mandates that could include the treatment of prisoners; any 
of these institutions can deal with prisoner issues insofar as it relates to their focus area. 
Whilst the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has a stronger association 
with the treatment of prisoners than other Chapter 9 institutions,
285
 it appears that since the 
establishment of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services all prisoner-related 
complaints received by the SAHRC are referred to the Inspectorate.286 In a limited sense the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
From integrated administrative models to single purpose organizations’, Stanford University, 1-2 April 2005, p. 
10. 
280 s 21 Act 111 of 1998. 
281 Law Society of South Africa, (2004) Prison Report 2003, p.6; Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 18. 
282 s 85(2). 
283 s 90. 
284 These are the institutions created by the Constitution (in Chapter 9) designed to ensure transparency and 
accountability. 
285 Chapter 9 of the Constitution establishes ‘state institutions supporting constitutional democracy’ and they are 
the Public Protector; South African Human Rights Commission; Commission for the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; Commission for Gender Equality; Auditor 
General; Electoral Commission; and Independent Authority to Regulate Broadcasting (ss 182-192 of Act 108 of 
1996). 
286 Dissel, A. (2003) A Review of Civilian Oversight over Correctional Services in the Last Decade. CSPRI 
Research Report No. 4. Bellville: Community Law Centre, p. 53. 
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South African Police Services (SAPS) also serves an accountability function in respect of the 
treatment of prisoners as it is obliged to investigate all charges laid by prisoners, including 
charges laid against prison officials.287 Fourth, after 1990 there has been an increase in the 
use of litigation to address the treatment of prisoners, their access to health care services, the 
right to vote and the administration of the parole system.288 
In respect of the treatment of prisoners, an effective accountability structure would need to 
meet two basic requirements. First, it must be able to conduct effective investigations and 
thus have the necessary independence, impartiality and capacity (skills, authority and person-
power) to do so without interference and manipulation from the target(s) of the investigation. 
Second, such a mechanism needs to be able to make binding decisions that are enforced. The 
extent to which designated oversight structures have been effective in holding the DCS 
accountable, as measured against Constitutional and other statutory requirements, is 
discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 with specific reference to Parliament and the Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services.  
Horizontal accountability mechanisms are provided for in the Constitution (and subordinate 
legislation) and are hence fundamental to constitutionalism in South Africa. With regard to 
the prison system, the duty is therefore one of overseeing whether constitutional values and 
prescripts find expression and are complied with. 
3.4.3 Vertical accountability 
 
In respect of the state’s accountability relationship to external institutions, four categories of 
institutions are distinguished: the electorate, the media, civil society, and international treaty 
monitoring bodies.  
3.4.3.1 The electorate  
 
                                                            
287 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 19. 
288 De Vos, P. (2004) Prisoner’s rights litigation in South Africa since 1994: A critical evaluation, CSPRI 
Research Report No. 3, Community Law Centre, Bellville; Mujuzi, J. (2009) ‘Releasing Terminally Ill Prisoners 
on Medical Parole in South Africa’, South African Journal of Bioethics and Law, Vol. 2; Mujuzi, J.D. (2011) 
Unpacking the law and practice relating to parole in South Africa, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, Vol. 
14 No. 5. 
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While elections and the electorate are central to the democratic order, elections are a fairly 
blunt instrument of control in the hands of the voter.289 Political accountability exercised by 
the electorate is problematic for a number of reasons: it is not very discerning in pinpointing 
the source of the electorate’s dissatisfaction; it does not articulate what the electorate would 
prefer; and it may be misinterpreted by political actors.290 Moreover, prisoners not only form 
a small constituency, but their issues and problems do not evoke the same political support, 
for example, as access to education and health care. In view of these observations it must be 
conceded that the fate of prisoners is unlikely to be determined at the ballot box.291 
3.4.3.2 The media 
 
The role of the media in post-1994 in placing prison reform issues on the agenda has been 
substantial, and a more detailed assessment is given in Chapter 6 (section 2.2.4). Numerous 
media reports about corruption, rights violations and prison overcrowding have played an 
important role in educating the general public about what is happening in the prison system. 
In addition, other publications292 and art works,293  a secretly-made video by prisoners at 
Grootvlei prison recording corrupt and other practices,294 as well as the extensive media 
coverage of the Jali Commission’s public hearings, all served to educate the public about the 
South African prison system.  
Nonetheless, the media had not been consistent in its portrayal of prisoners, and three 
stereotypes emerged post-1994.295 The first, related to the high violent crime rate, portrays 
prisoners as “dangerous criminals that deserve all possible punishments and [who] are 
                                                            
289 Stanley, R. (2005) Controlling the Police in Buenos Aires – a case study of horizontal and social 
accountability. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 24 No. 1, p. 275. 
290 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 20. 
291 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 20. 
292 In 2004 Jonny Steinberg published The Number, providing a detailed description of the inner workings of the 
prison gangs in South Africa. The book received wide recognition domestically and internationally.  
293 A series of photographs about life at Pollsmoor prison by Cape Town photographer Mikhael Sobotsky 
attracted wide media attention, giving the public a rare glimpse of life inside. The photographs are accessible at 
http://www.subotzkystudio.com/die-vier-hoeke/ Accessed 15 October 2011.  
294 ‘Grootvlei prison head won't be moved’ Mail and Guardian, 1 January 2002, http://mg.co.za/article/2002-01-
01-grootvlei-prison-head-wont-be-moved, Accessed 15 October 2011.  
295 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 21. 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
incorrigible - they are indeed the personification of South Africa’s crime problem”.
296
 The 
media portrayal of violent criminals would play an important role after 1994 in shaping the 
response to crime. In contrast to this stereotype, a more sympathetic stereotype depicts 
prisoners as victims of the injustices of the prison system, especially its overcrowding. A 
third stereotypical portrayal is the rehabilitated prisoner – the prisoner who has used his 
opportunities and bettered himself. The stereotypes are important because in many ways they 
shape not only public opinion but the views of policy-makers and other influential 
stakeholders. These conflicting views of prisoners, and the prison system in general, should 
not be ignored in understanding how the contours of prison reform were shaped after 1994.  
Nonetheless, media reporting on the prison system after 1994 remains sporadic and scandal-
driven with few investigative reports. Reporting on prison-related issues is largely incident-
driven; it seldom contextualises these incidents within the broader reform challenges facing 
the prison system. This results in an “atrophied reflection” where many individualised facts 
are presented297 but where few reports delve beyond immediate epiphenomena to engage 
critically and in-depth with persistent systemic issues.298 
3.4.3.3 Civil society 
 
Public participation in the workings of government and the legislature is core to the South 
African constitutional order299 and inherited from a strong tradition of “protest politics” that 
contributed to the dismantling of apartheid. Civil society, in all its myriad of forms, has 
played, and continues to play, an important role in political and rights discourses. In respect 
of prisons and the rights discourse, this involvement would typically refer to rights-focused 
NGOs, faith-based organisations, service-delivery NGOs, the private sector and organised 
labour.
300
 While civil society organisations have indeed become more vocal about prison 
reform issues, especially since 2003 (see Chapter 6), it remains a fragmented and segmented 
                                                            
296 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 21. 
297 Filho, A. (2005) The Role of the media in the civilian oversight of the police in Brazil. Conference on Police 
Accountability and the Quality of Oversight, 19-21 October 2005, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, pp. 
3-4. 
298 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 21. 
299 Muntingh, L. (2011) The state of civil society participation in Parliament, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
300 Muntingh, L. (2008) A Societal Responsibility The role of civil society organisations in prisoner support, 
rehabilitation and reintegration, Pretoria: Community Law Centre and Institute for Security Studies. 
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sector. This is, however, not unique to the prison system and other sectors exhibit similar 
traits.  
Immediately after 1994, however, there was greater coherence, which led in early 1995 to the 
establishment of an inter-sectoral structure, the Transformation Forum on Correctional 
Services (TFCS), comprising of representatives from NGOs, Parliament, the DCS and the 
Ministry301 But the TFCS did not enjoy the support of the then Minister of Correctional 
Services (Mzimela), and by September 1996 it had dissolved.
302
 The TFCS is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6 (section 3.1). 
Even though the TFCS failed in the mid-1990s to provide an acceptable forum for inter-
sectoral dialogue, this does not negate the need for such a forum. Whether the approach taken 
by the TFCS was the correct one is debatable, but the need remains for civil society, the DCS 
and other stakeholders to engage on substantive strategic policy issues.303 Furthermore, there 
remains a need for a more inclusive and possibly consensus-building discourse in civil 
society on prison reform, whereby organisations representing a range of constituencies (e.g. 
children, health care and women) also become involved in prison reform.304 Lastly, whilst 
there has been a significant increase in the research out-put on prisons and prison reform 
since 2003,305 substantive areas continue to under-researched. The dissemination of reliable 
information is a “key function of civil society and serves to counter the often emotive or 
poorly informed responses encountered in the current discourse”.306 
3.4.3.4 Treaty bodies 
 
The Constitution, in section 39(1)(b), requires that when interpreting the Bill Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum “must” consider international law and this the Constitutional Court has 
                                                            
301 Giffard, C. (1997) Out of Step? The Transformation process in the South African Department of Correctional 
Services. Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of Science in Criminal Justice 
Studies, Scarman Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, pp. 33-34. 
302 Giffard, C. (1997), pp. 33-34. 
303 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 23. 
304 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 21. 
305 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2007) The state of the nation’s prisons. In Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R., Latchman, 
J. The State of the Nation 2007. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 
306 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 21. 
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done regularly,
307
 as have other courts in the South African judicial hierarchy.
308
 Within the 
prisons discourse three binding international treaties are of particular significance: the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), UNCAT, and the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(OPCAT). 309  In addition to these international instruments, there is also a host of other 
instruments in the form of guidelines, minimum standards and principles relevant to people 
deprived of their liberty.
310
 After re-entering the international community, South Africa 
                                                            
307 For example in S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 CCT/3/94. 
308 For example in Mthembu v S [2008] ZASCA 51 (10 April 2008). 
309 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 21. 
310 Resolution on Guidelines and measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or 
degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines on Torture – 2002), African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation, 
Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005. Basic Principles on the 
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Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. Basic Principles on the 
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ratified the CRC and UNCAT but has failed to meet its reporting obligations, indicating that 
government has not prioritised reporting on measures taken to give effect to obligations under 
these two treaties.311 
Particularly important in relation to the treatment of prisoners is OPCAT, which South Africa 
signed in September 2006 but by December 2011 had not yet ratified. OPCAT makes 
provision for two unique procedures in international law. First, states parties are subject to 
unannounced visits and unrestricted access by the international Sub-Committee on the 
Prevention of Torture (SPT) to any place of detention in the jurisdiction of signatories to the 
Protocol. Second, the Protocol obliges states parties to establish a National Preventive 
Mechanism (NPM) with essentially the same powers.312 In the development of human rights 
law, this is indeed a revolutionary procedure which could have significant implications for 
the South African prison system.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Executions Recommended by Economic and Social Council resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989. Safeguards 
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials, Approved by Economic and Social Council resolution 1984/50 of 25 May 1984. UN Principles on the 
Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading treatment or 
Punishment, Recommended by General Assembly resolution 55/89 of 4 December 2000. United Nations 
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines), Adopted and proclaimed by 
General Assembly resolution 45/112 of 14 December 1990. United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles 
Deprived of their Liberty, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/113 of 14 December 1990. United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rule for the Treatment of Prisoners, Adopted by the First United Nations Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the 
Economic and Social Council by its resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 
1977. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules), Adopted by 
General Assembly resolution 45/110 of 14 December 1990. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules), Adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/33 of 29 
November 1985, United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for 
Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 65/229 on 21 December 
2010. 
311 In the case of the CRC the first report was due in 1998 and submitted in 2000. The next report was due in 
2003 and is yet to be submitted. In the case of UNCAT, the first report was due in 1999 but an Initial Report 
covering the period 1999 to 2002 was submitted in 2005.  
312 Long, D. and Boeglin Naumovic, N. (2004) Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. San Jose and Geneva: APT and Inter-American institute for 
Human Rights. 
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The South African government’s response in respect of the CRC and UNCAT has been less 
than encouraging and the impact of international law has not been felt in any significant way 
in the prison system.313 The only noticeable engagement on the topic from the state has been 
the establishment of thematic committee on torture by the SAHRC.
314
 Civil society 
organisations, however, have shown more interest in using international law and engaging 
with the international treaty monitoring bodies; this is discussed in Chapter 6 (section 3.5).315 
Nonetheless, there appears to be limited awareness and knowledge of the international 
instruments and binding international law amongst officials in the South African prison 
system.316 This is discussed further in Chapter 5 (section 4).  
3.5 Transparency 
 
Nineteenth-century Europe saw the disappearance of public floggings, torture and executions, 
and the spectacle of punishment was removed from the public’s gaze and hidden behind 
prison walls as imprisonment replaced the physical excesses on the body of the offender.317 
However, the emergence of the prison as punitive institution also came with certain costs to 
democratic values, as punishment became an increasingly hidden part of the criminal justice 
system318 and has been characterised as opaque to outsiders, run by bureaucrats and more 
concerned with efficiency and technicalities than with justice.319 It is possibly a function of 
their purpose (detainment) and emphasis on security that prison systems have a natural 
tendency to gravitate away from a culture of transparency and openness; it is perhaps also 
because they have seldom had experience of the benefits of openness and transparency.320 
                                                            
313 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 24. 
314 SA Human Rights Commission (2010) Annual Report 2009/10. Johannesburg: SA Human Rights 
Commission, p. 48. 
315 Muntingh, L. (2008) ‘The betrayal of Steve Biko – South Africa’s initial report to the UN Committee against 
Torture and the response of civil society’. Law, Democracy & Development. Vol. 12 No. 1. 
316 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 24. 
317 Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish – the birth of the prison, London: Penguin, p. 14. 
318 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 25. 
319 Bibas, S. (2005) Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure. New York University Law Review, 
Vol. 86 No. 3, p. 912. 
320 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 26. 
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The apartheid government made sure that as little as possible was known about what was 
happening in South Africa’s prisons. For example, the 1959 Prisons Act made it an offence to 
publish any false information about prisons or prisoners and placed a heavy onus on 
commentators (e.g. journalists) to verify information with the authorities prior to 
publication.321 Failure to abide by this requirement could have resulted in criminal sanction. 
The combined effect of the DCS being a militarised prison service and the previous regime’s 
state security legislation made a transparent prison system impossible as it was deliberately 
kept from public view.322 Nonetheless, the democratisation of South Africa did not see a 
rapid reversal of this situation, and even the Jali Commission, in its final report, was left 
exasperated at the culture of silence and secrecy. 
323
 
With regard to interpreting the Bill of Rights, the Constitution emphasises “the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society”.324 This is given further specificity with reference 
to the principles of co-operative government, which require “effective, transparent, 
accountable and coherent government”.325 It is from this requirement that it is demanded 
from a constitutional democracy that the prison system must function in a transparent 
manner. In very blunt terms it means that officials in the prison system have a duty to act 
visibly, predictably and understandably.326 More specifically, the actions of officials must be 
predictable in that they should be guided by policy, legislation, regulations, standing orders 
and good practice. When called to account, officials must be able to motivate their decisions 
and actions in a manner that is rational and justifiable. In sum, it needs to be known what 
                                                            
321 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), pp. 341-343. 
322 The Department’s senior officials later adopted a deliberate strategy of aligning the Department with those 
sections of Government that made up the ‘securocracy’ as opposed to those providing social services. The 
reason for this was that there was an opportunity to secure an increased budget and possibly gain full 
Departmental status if, given the ‘prevailing political climate’, it were seen as a Department protecting the 
security of the State. Indeed, in 1959, the Department became a full State department when the Prisons Act No. 
8 of 1959 was promulgated. This alignment with the ‘securocracy’, however, encouraged a culture of secrecy in 
the way the Department performed its functions, and this has carried over into the post-1994 period. The culture 
had, and continues to have, a bearing on the extent of corruption and maladministration in the Department with 
the general public being oblivious to its existence (Jali Commission (2006), pp. 43-44). 
323 Jali Commission, pp. 944-945. 
324 s 39(1)(a) Act 108 of 1996. 
325 s 41(1)(c) Act 108 of 1996. 
326 Transparency International ‘What is transparency?’ 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq 
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officials are doing, and when asked, they must be able to provide an understandable and 
predictable answer.327 However, without knowing what officials are doing and how decisions 
are made, accountability is impossible: there can be no accountability without information.328 
Effective transparency also requires that information of a particular depth and quality must be 
available to oversight structures and the public. Issuing evasive statements such as “a 
thorough investigation was conducted” or “appropriate action was taken” without actually 
presenting the detailed facts does little to inform the public or oversight structure if an 
investigation was actually conducted or any action indeed taken.329 Even close observers and 
oversight bodies often find it difficult to penetrate the fog of the prison system, as has been 
demonstrated by the Jali Commission. 330  Frustrated and incomplete investigations or 
explanations increase the tension and suspicion between the officials inside the system and 
those on the outside of the system by widening the knowledge divide.331 
In the prison environment effective investigations into rights violations and corruption are of 
particular importance because they serve three purposes.332 The first is to clarify the facts and 
the acknowledgement of state and individual responsibility; second, to identify measures to 
prevent torture and ill-treatment of detainees; third, to facilitate the prosecution and 
disciplining of perpetrators, as well to ensure as full reparation and redress for victims. In 
addition, investigations should be conducted by impartial, independent and competent 
authorities promptly and be open, inclusive and participatory in manner.333 For investigations 
to enjoy legitimacy, they need to address the concerns, perspectives, and contributions of 
                                                            
327 Muntingh, L. (2007 b), p. 25. 
328 De Maria, W. (2001) Commercial-in-Confidence: An obituary to transparency? Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 60 No. 4, p. 92; Hammarberg, T. (2001) Searching the truth – the need to monitor human 
rights with relevant and reliable means. Statistical Journal of the United Nations, ECE 18, pp. 131-140. 
329 Gennaco, M. (2006) Towards Increased Transparency in the Jails and Prisons: Some Optimistic Signs. 
Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 22, p. 197. 
330 ‘Whenever the investigators got close to penetrating a problem, a shroud of silence was drawn around the 
person or the issue that was being investigated’ (Jali Commission, p. 35.). 
331 Bibas, S. (2005) Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure. New York University Law Review, 
Vol. 86 No. 3, p. 912.  
332
 UN Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading treatment or Punishment, Recommended by General Assembly resolution 55/89 of 4 December 
2000. See Principle 1 
333 Gennaco, M. (2006), p. 196. UNCAT Article 13. 
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outside agencies; the results also need to be made public as they serve to educate officials and 
the public about what is happening inside prisons and thereby promote transparency.334 
Reporting on measures taken to address human rights violations are of central importance in 
establishing a human rights-based regime in the prison system. As such, Article 19 of 
UNCAT expressly requires reporting on “the measures taken to give effect to [the state 
party’s] undertakings under this Convention” and this should be seen as distinct from creating 
a legislative framework aimed at promoting the protection of human rights.
335
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a number of key concepts to be used in the thesis and sketched the 
four fundamental requirements of a prison system in a constitutional democracy. As such, 
these can also be understood to articulate the expectations of transformative constitutionalism 
in South Africa. Purposefully the chapter used examples to illustrate particular issues, since 
the Constitution is indeed aimed at changing the nature of South African society as well as 
the institutions of state. In the subsequent chapters the analysis will draw on these in order to 
give an account of prison reform after 1994.  
Four key points have been made so far. The first is that reform through crisis is an 
acknowledged construct and that the reform-crisis thesis fits the events that unfolded in the 
prison system after 1994. These are described in Chapters 3-6. How the DCS responded to 
the crises would very much shape the history of prison reform after 1994. The new 
democratic order placed radically different demands on an organisation that was highly 
institutionalised, preserving and conservative in outlook and not responsive to external 
influences. In responding to crises, it was noted that organisations also have their own 
constraints which may aggravate the situation if not dealt with.  
Second, searching for, establishing and sustaining legitimacy is fundamental to prison reform. 
Prisons suffer from an inherent legitimacy deficit which can be addressed only by aspiring to 
and giving tangible and sustained expression to the values and prescripts of the Constitution. 
It was thus argued that there are certain basic requirements of a prison system in a 
                                                            
334 Gennaco, M. (2006), pp. 197-198. Muntingh, L. (2006 b) Approaches to investigating prison corruption. 
CSPRI Research Report No. 12, Bellville: Community Law Centre, pp. 46-48.  
335 CAT/C/ZAF/CO/1. 
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constitutional democracy. An underlying philosophy (and knowledge) must create the anchor 
points for justifying and using imprisonment. Furthermore, there should be a clear and full 
recognition of prisoners’ rights and this should be experienced in practice. Accountability and 
transparency are mutually reinforcing as key requirements for the democratic order – their 
absence leaves the recognition of rights and the underlying philosophy without substance and 
meaning. With reference to the research question, constitutionalism in South African prison 
reform can thus be understood to encompass these four requirements, namely an underlying 
philosophical and knowledge base, the recognition of rights, accountability of the executive, 
and transparency. 
Third, effective policy-making producing good policies is a carefully managed process that is 
highly reliant on knowledge and information. When faced by crisis, policy-makers must not 
only act with haste but develop effective policies. Poorly institutionalised organisations will 
struggle to implement reforms. Reform by crisis is not without challenges because of the 
fluidity of the situation. Effective policy-making and the re-institutionalisation of the 
organisation are thus key to bringing about stability and enabling meaningful reform that sees 
the intended fundamental change of the policy sector.  
Fourth, imprisonment and prison regimes impose rights limitations on prisoners and these 
limitations and the depth of limitations require rigorous monitoring and oversight on multiple 
levels. Prison systems generally lack transparency, and it is for this reason that effective and 
potent oversight is an inherent requirement of prison reform. The failure of oversight creates 
the risk that it will be “business as usual”, or worse, that perverse results, enabled by a crisis 
situation, may ensue. 
In the subsequent chapters it will be argued that the new constitutional order placed two 
broad demands on the post-1994 prisons system: adherence to good governance principles 
and compliance with human rights standards. While the expectation was that the Constitution 
would compel widespread and penetrative reform in respect of governance and human rights, 
in actuality a more complex history emerged. 
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Chapter 3 The crises in the prison system 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter defines and describes the crisis situation in the prison system as it unfolded after 
1994. In Chapter 2 it was argued that the South African prison system faced two crises after 
1994, the first being the demands placed on the prison system by the new constitutional and 
democratic order, and the second, the collapse of order and discipline, or rather the failure of 
governance. This found particular expression in the form of widespread corruption and 
violations of prisoners’ rights. Many of the dimensions of the crises of governance still exist, 
but the period 1994 to 2004 was definitive in this regard. Coming to grips with prison reform 
after 1994 requires a thorough appreciation of the nature of the crisis in the prison system as 
it unfolded during this period.  
In the first part of the chapter, the relationship between governance and crisis is explored in 
the light of the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2. The next section takes stock of the prison 
system which the new, democratically elected government inherited in 1994, and it will be 
argued that much of the crisis can be traced back to the structure, functioning and thinking 
present in the apartheid-era prison system as it existed in 1994. The section thereafter 
describes the features of the failure of governance as uncovered by various investigations into 
the affairs of the DCS. While corruption is prominent among those features, inadequate 
policy development as well as leadership instability also affected the state of governance. The 
chapter concludes with a number of observations about governance and corruption in the 
prison system. 
2. Good governance 
 
The crisis that developed in the DCS after 1994 should be seen against the constitutional 
requirements for good governance in the public service, which, as outlined in Chapter 1 
(section 3), is understood in this analysis as a key component of constitutionalism. In this 
section, the requirement is explored and augmented with further explanation from the 
literature. The aim is to establish a working definition of good governance principles against 
which to assess the failures of governance in DCS and the way in which they developed into 
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a crisis. Furthermore, it is argued that, especially in times of crisis, adherence to the 
principles of good governance is essential for ensuring the most constructive outcome from 
crisis-induced reform. 
2.1 Good governance is a constitutional requirement 
 
Good governance is a requirement of the Constitution. Section 195 of the 1996 Constitution 
improved substantially on the principles for a public service set out in the Interim 
Constitution.1 The 1996 Constitution sets out the basic values and principles to govern public 
administration derived from the democratic values and principles enshrined in the 
Constitution.2 A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained in the 
public service. Resources must be used in an efficient, economic and effective manner. The 
approach to public service and nature of services rendered should be development-oriented. 
There may be no discrimination, and services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably 
and without bias.3 The public service should respond to people’s needs and the public must 
be encouraged to participate in policy-making. The public service must be accountable and 
transparent through the timely and accessible provision of accurate information. Human 
resource management in the public service should enable career-development practices. The 
public service should be broadly representative of the South African population, with 
employment and management practices based on ability, objectivity and fairness, and aimed 
at addressing the imbalances of the past in order to achieve broad representation.  
It is furthermore a requirement of the Constitution that national legislation, such as the 
Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998), must ensure the promotion of the values and 
principles described above.
4
 The Public Service Act (Proclamation No. 103 of 1994) requires 
that the National Commissioner of Correctional Services, as is the case with other heads of 
departments, shall be responsible “for the efficient management and administration of his or 
her department, including the effective utilisation and training of staff, the maintenance of 
discipline, the promotion of sound labour relations and the proper use and care of State 
                                                            
1 s 212(2) Act 200 of 1993. 
2 s 195(1) Act 108 of 1996. 
3 s 195(1) (c-d) Act 108 of 1996. For a more detailed discussion, see Bolton, P. (2005) The legal regulation of 
government procurement in South Africa, Thesis submitted in (partial) fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree Doctor Legum, Faculty of Law of the University of the Western Cape, pp. 102-106. 
4 s 195(3) Act 108 of 1996. 
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property, and he or she shall perform the functions that may be prescribed”.
5
 The fiduciary 
duties of the accounting officer (i.e. National Commissioner in DCS) are set out in the Public 
Finance Management Act (1 of 1999) and emphasise efficiency, effectiveness, accountability 
and transparency.
6
 The Prevention of Corrupt Activities Act (12 of 2004) provides guidance to 
ensure that suspected corruption is reported to the police.7 
The Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) adds to these standards by requiring that the 
DCS should fulfil the purposes of the correctional system, be self-sufficient as far as 
practicable, operate according to business principles, and perform all work necessary for its 
effective management.8 Chapter 11 of the Correctional Services Act also stipulates 
requirements in respect of compliance monitoring, and obliges the National Commissioner to 
assess at regular intervals on all levels of the DCS the extent of compliance with regard to: 
the effectiveness of operations; the reliability of financial, operational and management 
information; the protection and safeguarding of assets and interests; the effective utilisation 
of human and other resources; and the degree to which programme objectives are being 
achieved.9 The powers of the National Commissioner to promote good governance are further 
enhanced by the Departmental Investigation Unit (DIU)10 and the Code Enforcement Unit 
(CEU).11 The DIU’s aim is to investigate theft, fraud, corruption and maladministration, 
while the CEU deals with disciplinary matters. The National Commissioner is also required 
to include in the Department’s annual report a report on compliance monitoring, 
investigations conducted by the DIU and disciplinary actions undertaken by the CEU.12 
                                                            
5 s 7(3)(b) Public Service Act (Proclamation No. 103 of 1994). 
6 ss 38 – 43. 
7 The Act requires that persons in positions of authority (i.e. the National Commissioner of Correctional 
Services) who know or suspect that a corrupt act (as set out in the legislation) has been committed or that theft, 
fraud, extortion, forgery or uttering a forged document involving an amount of R100 000 [US$14 500] or more 
has occurred, must report this to the police (s 34, Prevention of Corrupt Activities Act (12 of 2004)). 
8 s 3(2) of Act 111 of 1998, coming into force on 25 February 2000. 
9 s 95(2) Act 111 of 1998, coming into force on 19 February 1999.  
10 s 95A of Act 111 of 1998 inserted by s 70 of Act 25 of 2008. 
11 s 95B of Act 111 of 1998 inserted by s 70 of Act 25 of 2008. 
12 s 95C of Act 111 of 1998 inserted by s 70 of Act 25 of 2008. 
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The 2004 White Paper, in Chapter 14, sets out the governance and administration aims of the 
DCS, including the duties of the National Commissioner.13 As accounting officer the 
National Commissioner is responsible for ensuring: good governance; service evaluation 
against set targets; the implementation of anti-corruption and anti-fraud strategies; 
compliance with the Public Finance Management Act; and that the DCS functions on the 
basis of a clear of code of conduct, professional ethics and an enforceable disciplinary code.  
When assessing the state of governance in the DCS now, it is apparent that there exists a legal 
and policy framework to guide the Department’s operations and that this framework is 
derived from the principles for the public service set out in the 1996 Constitution, with the 
Interim Constitution as precursor. The current legal and policy framework, however, evolved 
over time and much of the national legislation referred to above was developed and came into 
force after 1999. Following the Jali Commission and other investigations, the DCS developed 
some internal capacity to address governance concerns (see Chapter 4 section 2.3). Moreover, 
efforts by external players (e.g. Public Service Commission-PSC and the Department of 
Public Service and Administration-DPSA) and the development of appropriate legislation 
have been important in shaping the Department’s response to corruption as one of the 
governance problems. However, the policy and legislative shortcomings that existed prior to 
1999 had a material effect on governance in the DCS, as was the case in other sectors of the 
public service. 
2.2Dimensions of good governance 
 
The analysis here will focus on governance in the public sector. As noted above, the 
Constitution requires that the public service must operate in a manner that is to the benefit of 
all the people of South Africa. Governance is therefore not about institutions or the ends of 
government but about the quality of processes of government14 and thus the manner in which 
power is exercised.
15
 
                                                            
13 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) White Paper on Corrections in South Africa. Pretoria: 
Department of Correctional Services, pp. 188-189. 
14Abdellatif, A.M. (2003) Good governance and its relationship to democracy and economic development. 
Paper delivered at the Global Forum III on fighting corruption and safeguarding Integrity, Seoul, 20-31 May 
2003, p. 3; Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (2008) What is quality of government? A theory of impartial 
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2.2.1 Definition of good governance 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) regards governance as “the exercise 
of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. 
It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their 
differences.”16 With its emphasis on human development, UNDP regards the following as 
definitive qualities of good governance: it is participatory, transparent and accountable; 
furthermore, it is effective, equitable and promotes the rule of law. As such, good governance 
ensures that “political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society 
and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over 
the allocation of development resources.”17 Good governance principles are thus particularly 
relevant to the prison system since prisoners are especially vulnerable to rights violations and 
other deprivations. 
The World Bank defines governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised.18 More specifically, this includes the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them.19 The World Bank also identifies six 
dimensions of governance: (1) Voice and Accountability – measuring perceptions of the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. (2) Political 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
government institutions. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, Vol. 
21 No. 2, pp. 165-190. 
15 Goran, H. and Dele, O. (2000) African perspectives on governance, Africa World Press, p. 6 cited in 
Abdellatif, A.M. (2003), p. 3. 
16 UNDP (1997) Governance for sustainable human development - A UNDP policy document, Good governance 
- and sustainable human development. http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/chapter1.htm#b Accessed 28 
October 2011.  
17 UNDP (1997)  
18 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2008) Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-2007. Policy Research Working Paper 4654, Washington: The World Bank 
Development Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth Team & World Bank Institute Global Governance 
Program, p. 7. 
19 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2008), p. 7. 
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Stability and Absence of Violence – measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. (3) Government Effectiveness – 
measuring perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. (4) 
Regulatory Quality – measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. (5) Rule of Law – measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. (6) Control of Corruption – measuring perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.20 
At the conceptual level, Rothstein and Teorell argue that impartiality is the core value 
underpinning good governance (which they refer to as quality of government).21 The 
selective or uneven implementation of policies (e.g. staff appointments based on concerns 
other than merit) are transgressions of the impartiality principle. The principle of impartiality 
is also a requirement in the 1996 Constitution, and is read together with the requirements that 
services must be rendered fairly, equitably and without bias.22 In its essence good governance 
requires that the state must exercise its powers in an impartial manner.  
2.2.2 Good governance and human rights 
If it is accepted that good governance is essentially about the processes of government and 
how power is exercised, it follows that it is indivisible from, and an essential element in, the 
realisation of human rights. Within the context of prison reform this is critically important. In 
a 2000 resolution the then UN Human Rights Commission recognised that “transparent, 
responsible, accountable and participatory government, responsive to the needs and 
aspirations of the people, is the foundation on which good governance rests, and that such a 
                                                            
20 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2008), p. 7. 
21 Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (2008), pp. 165-190. 
22 s 195(1)(d). 
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foundation is a sine qua non for the promotion of human rights”.
23
 This link has been 
confirmed in subsequent resolutions by the Human Rights Commission (and its successor, the 
Human Rights Council)24 and also reflected in the Millennium Development Goals. It is 
indeed difficult to conceive of a situation where human rights are upheld and even flourish 
that is not characterised by a substantive measure of compliance with good governance 
principles. Good governance and human rights are mutually reinforcing since human rights 
standards provide a set of values to guide government in its work and a set of standards for 
performance against which government can be held accountable. Human rights principles 
also inform the substance of efforts aimed at improving good governance, such as the 
development of legislative frameworks, policies, programmes, budgetary allocations and 
other measures.25 
Good governance and human rights are consequently linked in four ways.26 First, good 
governance reforms of democratic institutions enable formal and informal public 
participation in policy-development, decision-making and service delivery. Second, good 
governance reforms advance human rights when they improve the state’s capacity to fulfil its 
responsibility to provide public goods which are essential for the protection of a number of 
human rights. In particular this is advanced through improved transparency and 
accountability. Third, good governance reforms aimed at strengthening the rule of law afford 
better protection to citizens and increase the capacity of oversight institutions. Fourth, good 
governance reforms aimed at combating corruption rely on the principles of transparency and 
accountability to ensure that people are treated fairly and that state resources are used 
effectively and efficiently to promote a rights-based development agenda. Good governance 
and human rights converge through aspirations of legitimacy, transparency, accountability, 
adherence to the rule of law and the allocation and utilisation of resources to advance 
people’s development and quality of life.  
As noted in Chapter 2, Tapscott sees good governance in the prison system as requiring 
performance that goes beyond mere financial probity and administrative efficiency, but 
                                                            
23 E/CN.4/RES/2000/64 para 1. 
24 E/CN.4/RES/2005/68, A/HRC/RES/7/11. 
25 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008) Good governance practices for 
the protection of human rights. United Nations: New York, pp. 1-2. 
26 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008), pp. 1-2. 
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encompasses the extent to which prisoners’ rights are recognised and the system able to 
deliver on its mandate.27 It is in this sense that one can refer to the nexus between human 
rights and governance. 
This understanding of good governance emphasises the fact that, in the prison context, 
governance means adherence to human rights standards and compliance with legislative 
requirements, and that deviations from these have a direct impact on how prisoners 
experience imprisonment on a daily basis. Moreover, it requires from management a 
particular ambition to adhere to enumerated rights and legal prescripts and to achieve the best 
possible outcome for released offenders. The aim of good governance in the prison system 
therefore reaches beyond the prison walls into the community. 
 
2.2.3 Governance and crisis 
  
In Chapter 2 (sections 2.1 and 2.2) the link between reform and crisis has been described, and 
it was pointed out that a crisis presents a unique opportunity for reform as it unfetters policy-
makers to find new and creative solutions. Furthermore, an institutional crisis occurs when 
the institutional structure of a policy sector “experiences a relatively strong decline in 
(followed by unusually low levels of) legitimacy”.28 It is such a crisis that developed in the 
South African prison system. Establishing or re-establishing standards and practices adhering 
to good governance principles are thus required to respond to a crisis in a manner that holds 
the most potential for a positive outcome.  
                                                            
27 ‘Good prison governance is to a large extent determined by the existence of an enabling policy framework, 
necessary resources and the extent to which prison management has the ability to implement these policies on a 
day-to-day basis in a transparent, accountable and ethical manner. [In the context of this research, however,] the 
notion of governance is understood to encompass not only issues of administrative efficiency and probity, but 
also the extent to which the basic human/constitutional rights of offenders are recognised and respected. This 
relates both to the manner in which offenders are treated in the prison system and the opportunities which they 
are afforded to re-orientate their lives towards a more constructive future in society.’ (Tapscott, C. (2005) A 
Study of Best Practice in Prison Governance, CSPRI Research Paper No. 9, Bellville: Community Law Centre, 
p. 3.) 
28 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000) Institutional crises and reforms in policy sectors. In Wagenaar, H. (ed) 
Government institutions – effects, changes and normative foundations. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
p. 13. 
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The first point to be made in respect of governance and crisis is that compliance with good 
governance principles is effective in preventing a crisis. The risk of a crisis is significantly 
reduced if an institution adheres to good governance requirements. Reforms can therefore be 
undertaken in a controlled and incremental manner. While structural conditions, such as 
large-scale societal reform, may place all institutions at risk of crisis, it may indeed be 
management’s decisions that enable a crisis to develop, or what Habib describes as a 
“dialectical relationship between structural variables and agential behaviour”.
29
 How the 
leadership responds to the risk is critically important, for it is their intervention, or lack 
thereof, that will increase or decrease the risk of crisis in a particular situation. 
Second, the failure of governance may not only create a crisis but also exacerbate it, resulting 
in a malaise of successive problems and a deepening crisis. While a crisis has the potential to 
provide the impetus for reform, this is an optimistic view of a crisis situation and the opposite 
could indeed occur.30 Targeting one or a too narrow range of problems for reform may ignore 
others and result in unintended consequences, even creating new problems by solving the 
wrong problem.31 Equally, launching too many reforms on multiple fronts but lacking the 
political mandate and broad-based support (especially from operational functionaries) may 
further deepen the crisis.32 Left unattended, the result may indeed be worse than a crisis, 
namely a “mess” – a system of problems that are highly interactive and strongly coupled.
33
 A 
mess is not merely the sum of the individual problems themselves but rather the result of the 
interactions among the problems that constitute it. Moreover, the constituent problems of a 
mess are complex systems themselves which in turn are part of other complex systems, and 
so forth. For example, prison overcrowding in South Africa is both a symptom of systemic 
problems in the criminal justice system and a driver of problems in the prison system and 
elsewhere.
34
 
                                                            
29 Habib, A. (2001) The institutional crisis of the University of Transkei, Politikon, Vol. 28 No. 2, p. 173. 
30 Boin, A. and Otten, M. (1996) Beyond the crisis window for reform – some ramifications for implementation, 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 4 No. 3, p. 153. 
31 Mitroff, I.I., Alpaslan, M.C. and Green, S.E. (2004) Crises as ill structured messes, International Studies 
Review, Vol. 6, p. 178. 
32 Cheung, A. (2005) Hong Kong’s Post-1997 institutional crisis: problems of governance and institutional 
incompatibility. Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 5, p. 149. 
33 Mitroff, I.I., Alpaslan, M.C. and Green, S.E. (2004), p. 175. 
34 For example, prison overcrowding increases the risk for TB infection that may be transmitted by released 
prisoners into the general population; it thus incurs risks and costs for the national health care system. 
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Third, the decisions made by management during a crisis affect the trajectory of the 
institution. As such, managers should not see a crisis as a short-term event with particular 
start- and end-dates, but rather take a long-term view and be prepared to face problems that 
may manifest themselves in the form of “crisis after crisis” emanating from the original 
crisis.35 Such a long-term view requires a sense of managerial and political perseverance “to 
reinvigorate the basic institutions of governance and to reconfigure their interrelationships so 
as to create a new and viable basis of legitimacy, accountability, integration, and 
coordination, which in turn can facilitate and sustain performance”.36 
Fourth, crisis research has also shown there is an expectation from juniors in an organisation 
that “management will take charge”, resulting in the centralisation of decision-making.37 
However, the centralisation of decision-making may also have negative consequences. 
Decision-making may focus on short-term results important to the decision-makers to the 
detriment of long-term concerns. Furthermore, because organisational solidarity is rare in a 
crisis, centralised decision-making may indeed alienate management from operational 
functionaries in the organisation since a crisis may create the opportunity for existing and 
latent tensions to rise to the surface.38 This was particularly the case in South Africa, where 
racial divisions came to fore in the DCS after 1990. Operational functionaries may also hold a 
substantially different perspective on the crisis situation, and indeed dispute whether the 
institution is actually in a crisis. The width of this “appreciative gap” will be crucial in 
determining the extent to which management decisions are perceived to be legitimate and 
implemented.
39
A divergence of opinions between senior management and implementing 
officials on the nature of the crisis, if it is a crisis indeed, will by and large de-legitimate 
senior management’s policy decisions. This will consequently manifest itself as passive or 
active resistance from staff to reform efforts and policy decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Overcrowded conditions also place staff working at such prisons at risk of infection and hence their families too. 
Prison overcrowding is, however, caused not only by the inadequate capacity of the prison infrastructure but by 
external factors such as the number of suspects arrested and the time lapse before trials commence and the cases 
are adjudicated. The rate at which police officers arrest suspects may be related to crime trends and also to 
certain performance targets. Each of these presents a complex set of problems. 
35 Boin, A. (2004) Lessons from crisis research, International Studies Review, Vol. 6, p. 172. 
36 Cheung, A. (2005), p. 162. 
37 Boin, A. and Otten, M. (1996), p. 151. 
38 Boin, A. and Otten, M. (1996), p. 153. 
39 Boin, A. and Otten, M. (1996), p. 152. 
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Fifth, a prerequisite for responding to a crisis is the recognition of a crisis. Managers may 
have to decide whether they are dealing with the initial phase of a crisis or if they are already 
amidst the crisis.40 It is an ontological question, but one that must be answered when 
information is characteristically lacking and there is pressure to make decisions quickly and 
act accordingly. Discord between the definition of the situation and its actual major attributes 
will undermine the response.41 Even when a crisis is recognised as such, it should, 
furthermore, not be assumed that crisis management will ensue:
42
 it is not a logical 
consequence. Managers may, for example, not be equipped and skilled to crisis-manage.  
Strong adherence by managers and politicians, even in a crisis situation, to good governance 
principles and practices should enable them to avoid a cycle of ensuing crises that feed on 
each other and result in institutional collapse,43 or a mess. 
2.3 Summary of issues 
 
Reflecting on the South African context in the years immediately after 1994, a few 
observations are necessary following from the discussion above. There was large-scale 
structural and societal change as a result of democratisation, and this placed all public service 
institutions at risk of crisis. Constitutionalism demanded reforms across the public sector to 
transform the existing institutions of state to embody democratic principles in an accountable 
and transparent manner. The above discussion on governance described in more detail the 
nature of good governance, but also pointed to the importance of good governance in relation 
to human rights. Given the transformative nature of the South African Constitution, it is 
difficult to see how its aims can be achieved in a situation of poor governance.  
The manner in which the DCS management responded to the structural risks flowing from the 
new constitutional order (as is described in more detail in section 3 below) placed the 
Department on a particular trajectory which resulted in more problems and, ultimately, in a 
mess. Poor decision-making at an early stage, coupled with lack of appreciation for the fact 
that the prison system was already in a crisis, have had long-term consequences. Failure by 
the DCS leadership to use the basic managerial and administrative tools at their disposal to 
                                                            
40 Boin, A. (2004), p. 172. 
41 Boin, A. (2004), p. 171. 
42 Mitroff, I.I., Alpaslan, M.C. and Green, S.E. (2004), p. 179; Boin, A. (2004), p. 171. 
43 Habib, A. (2001), p. 172. 
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ensure accountability had the consequence that the Head Office lost control over the 
constituent parts of the Department and its staff. The most immediate result was that good 
governance failed because accountability failed.44 
3. The system inherited 
 
In Chapter 2 the point was made that the task set for post-1994 government (the Government 
of National Unity – GNU) was to design, develop and establish a prison system that would be 
the antithesis of the inherited system. This was, and remains, a daunting task, further 
complicated by South Africa’s large prison population which ranked in the top ten globally.45 
Expectations were also high that under a democratic dispensation, led by a large contingent 
of former political prisoners, prison reform would indeed be rapid and comprehensive. In 
1994 the GNU inherited a prison system formed by a regime renowned for its formidable 
capacity to create bureaucracies. Against this background it is necessary to describe more 
closely what this inheritance was. Four areas are discussed: the structure and functioning of 
the Department; the staff corps; the prison population; and the performance of the prison 
system. The intention is to reflect briefly on some of the inherent traits of the DCS as it 
existed in April 1994 and to lay the basis for a discussion on how these would influence 
prison reform. 
3.1 Structure and functioning 
 
From the Annual Reports for the period 1989 to 1994 it is difficult to ascertain if the 
Department had defined a strategic direction for itself. Mention of a strategic plan is made in 
the annual reports, but the content of the strategic plan is not disclosed. The Annual Reports 
of this period are extremely brief, and scant information is presented on how the imminent 
democratisation of South Africa was impacting on the Department and the steps taken to 
facilitate transition. Noticeable, too, is that the Annual Reports for the period 1989 to 1994 
                                                            
44 Schacter, M. (2000) When accountability fails – a framework for diagnosis and action, Policy Brief No. 9, 
Ottawa: Institute on governance, p. 2. 
45 International Centre for Prisons Studies, World Prison Brief, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poptotal Accessed 2 
November 2011. Luyt, W.F.M. (2008) Contemporary corrections in South Africa after more than a decade of 
transformation. Acta Criminologica, Vol. 21 No. 2, p. 176. 
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are virtual copies of each other, reporting in formulaic manner on the activities of the 
Department. The Department was indeed not forthcoming with information on what was 
happening; even developments that attracted significant media attention at the time (e.g. 
industrial action by DCS officials) received only brief factual mentions in the Annual 
Reports. If the senior management were problematising and deliberating on the socio-
political events of the time, it was not apparent in the Annual Reports. The conclusion must 
therefore be drawn that the staff and stakeholders of the Department were relying on other, 
probably informal, sources of information to gain the views of the senior management of 
DCS. 
In Chapter 2 (section 2.2.2.) it was argued that a policy sector’s response to a problem stems 
from the inherent tension between preservation (preserving existing values, traditional ways 
and adhering to institutional rules) and responsiveness (the ability to absorb new 
developments and adapt);46 furthermore, while it is desirable to have a healthy, constructive 
tension between preservation and responsiveness, an over-emphasis on preservation leads to 
institutional rigidity whereas an overly responsive policy sector may see integrity eroded and 
the desire for change no longer counterweighted by conservatism. Left unchecked, this would 
result in  
an under-institutionalised sector, characterised by unstable coalitions, constant ad 
hocery, and lack of professional self-confidence by officials working in the sector. 
Everything flows, controversies abound, and there is not even a minimal set of shared 
beliefs guiding the policy agenda and problem-solving strategies. Trial and error 
becomes the order of the day; policy-making is exclusively reactive, and driven by 
incidents, mistakes and scandal. Consequently, overly responsive policy sectors are 
constantly in the grip of conflicts over their raison d’être, and are characterised by a 
sense of insecurity and value trade-offs.47 
In the remainder of this chapter, it will be argued that in the period 1990 to mid-1996 the 
DCS can be characterised as a highly institutionalised, conservative and preserving 
organisation. The result was that the senior management failed to respond to the changing 
environment and found itself in a crisis borne of rigidity and ignorance. From mid-1996 
onwards the pendulum swung to the other extreme. The Department lost its well-
                                                            
46 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 14. 
47 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000). p. 15. 
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institutionalised structures and procedures, there was little in the form of policy or leadership 
to steer the change process, and discipline and order collapsed.  
3.1.1 The KwaZulu Prison Service 
 
On 2 February 1990, then President F.W. De Klerk announced the unbanning of liberation 
organisations, the release of political prisoners and the commencement of inclusive 
negotiations for a transition to a democratic order, thereby proclaiming the formal end and 
dismantling of the apartheid state.48 With this dramatic speech still echoing in the ears of 
South Africans, and Nelson Mandela having been released from prison for little more than a 
month, the prison function in KwaZulu was, in full pursuit of grand segregationist apartheid 
policies, handed over to the self-governing territory of KwaZulu49 on 1 April 1990.50 While 
this move was reversed a little more than four years later, the KwaZulu-Natal area would 
remain problematic within the DCS, as was later established by the Jali Commission.
51
 While 
the rest of South Africa was bracing itself for wide-scale reform and transformation under 
democratic rule, the DCS pressed ahead in 1990 and created for itself a little relic of an era 
that had been formally announced to have come to an end by then President De Klerk. The 
leadership of the Department had failed to recognise the changing environment and act 
                                                            
48 Address by President F.W. De Klerk to the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2 February 1990. 
49 The KwaZulu self-governing territory (or homeland) was formally created in 1972. Situated in the then 
province of Natal, it consisted of a smattering of unconnected geographical enclaves within the Natal province 
where Black people would, under apartheid grand policies, have the right to exercise political self-
determination. After 1994 the self-governing territories were dismantled and a new province, KwaZulu-Natal, 
was created.  
50 South African Prison Service (1990) Annual Report 1989/90, Pretoria: South African Prison Service p. 17. 
51 Three of the nine management areas that the Jali Commission would focus on in its investigation into 
corruption and maladministration were indeed located in KwaZulu-Natal: Pietermaritzburg, Durban-Westville 
and Ncome. From the Jali Commission’s report it is evident that the situation in the KwaZulu-Natal 
management areas presented a notable problem. Although the Commission emphasised the role of POPCRU 
(Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union), the root causes were probably overladen with the political divisions 
and tribal factionalism that characterises the province. (Jali Commission pp. 54-76.) 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
accordingly, and persisted with handing over of the prison service
52
 to a “homeland” 
government.53 
3.1.2 A new department 
 
On 28 November 1990 the De Klerk government announced that the Prison Service,54 which 
until then had been part of the Department of Justice, would become a Ministry and 
Department in its own right, a development which took effect on 21 December 1990.
55
 The 
separation was prompted, as is generally accepted, by the need to move the much-disliked 
Minister of Law and Order in the De Klerk Cabinet, Adriaan Vlok, from that portfolio to 
another. The Ministry and Department of Correctional Services were created with Vlok as the 
first Minister of Correctional Services. Prior to this there is no evidence from the Annual 
Reports that the Prison Service had any aspirations to become its own Ministry and 
Department. The unpopular Vlok would remain the Minister of Correctional Services until 
1994, when he was replaced by Sipo Mzimela (Inkatha Freedom Party - IFP) in May that 
year in the Mandela Cabinet. The appointment of apartheid-era hardliner Adriaan Vlok as 
Minister of Correctional Services did not elevate the new portfolio of Correctional Services 
to the appropriate status and was probably to its detriment. Moreover, it was a political 
decision not motivated by any justification from a public service management perspective. 
In April 1994 the GNU inherited a prison service still structured according to grand apartheid 
principles and the notion that “homelands” (or Bantustans) have their own prison services. 
There was, however, one exception relating to the internal organisation of prisons. Through a 
series of amendments to regulations, commencing in 1988, all references to race were 
                                                            
52 The prisons affected were Kandaspunt, Ingwavuma, Mapumulo, Nkandla and Nongoma (South African 
Prison Service (1990), p. 17). 
53 Created under the apartheid regime, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei were homelands designated 
for Black South Africans. 
54 The Prison Service, as it was known then, was established following the unification of South Africa as the 
Union of South Africa in 1910 and, shortly thereafter, the adoption on 1 October 1911 of the Act on Prisons and 
Rehabilitation Centres, Act 13 of 1911. Institutionally, the Prison Service existed as part of the Department of 
Justice. (Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992) South African Prison Law and Practice. Durban: Butterworth Publishers, p. 
25-26). 
55 Department of Correctional Services (1991)Annual Report 1990/1, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 1. 
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expunged from the regulations.
56
 After having being the case for more than a century, it was 
no longer required that white prisoners be detained separately from “non-white” prisoners or 
that a white official should automatically outrank a “non-white” official.57 This transition 
took place with relative ease and is not even mentioned in the 1988/89 Annual Report of the 
Department. The racial integration of prisoners happened with surprising rapidity and 
harmony, contrary to what would have been expected then in volatile South Africa. There are 
indeed no official or media reports of any racial conflict whatsoever amongst prisoners at the 
time, despite ongoing racial segregation outside the prison walls.  
The undoing of the apartheid prison system’s structural and institutional arrangements was 
completed by 1 July 1994. It was described as a “rationalisation process” for establishing one 
national Department of Correctional Services, the DCS, from the five homeland prison 
services.58 The new DCS reorganised itself according to the nine provinces and command 
areas in each province, with the Head Office (in Pretoria) responsible for policy directives 
and “supervision over the maintenance of uniform norms and standards countrywide”.59 
While the DCS management could not ignore the changes taking place in broader society, the 
Department’s highly institutionalised nature and its conservative, preservational culture 
(introduced conceptually in Chapter 2) restricted the way in which it could respond to these 
changes and their attendant problems. For example, when officials of the DCS embarked on 
industrial action in 1990 (the first time this had happened in the history of the Department), 
the response from management was to suspend 635 officials involved in the action. Citing 
unspecified guidelines from the International Labour Organisation and Prison Regulations 
(Reg. 71(i)(ii)(jj) and (kk)),60 management held the view that it was simply illegal for DCS 
members to embark on industrial action. Ultimately it took political intervention by the then 
Minister and Deputy Minister to lift the suspensions and, albeit temporarily, resolve the 
situation. A further indication of how the senior management responded to the socio-political 
developments was the release in 1991/2 of “a Motto, a Credo, a Code of Honour, a Code of 
                                                            
56 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 39. 
57 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 39. 
58 This was required by the Interim Constitution: s 237(3). Luyt, W.F.M. (2001) The transformation of 
corrections in the new South Africa. Acta Criminologica, Vol. 14 No. 3 p. 26. 
59 Department of Correctional Services (1995) Annual Report 1994, Pretoria, Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 1. 
60 South African Prison Service (1990), p.53. 
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Conduct and an Anthem” in an effort to inculcate a common culture in the Department.
61
 
This was a naïve, if not romantic, attempt at developing unity and solidarity amongst the staff 
corps despite the deep fault lines that were already visible as early as 1990 in the industrial 
action discussed above.  The impression one gains is that in the period 1990-1994, the DCS 
senior management failed to grasp that laying the foundations for successful prison reform 
would require more than the ritual invocation of politically correct phrases such as “non-
racialism”, “non-sexism” and “community involvement”. 
3.1.3 A militarised prison service 
 
In 1994 the DCS was a militarised prison service with highly centralised decision-making, 
uniforms, military ranks, parades and the accompanying military ceremony and protocols. 
Centralised decision-making made it difficult for outsiders, especially non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), to engage with the Department, and placed significant restrictions on 
efforts to make it more transparent and accountable. For civil society organisations, the 
militarised structure and functioning were unacceptable in the face of demands for a rights-
based prison system.62 When calls were made for its demilitarisation, the Department was 
very cautious about such a possibility, warning that it “is a sensitive issue which cannot be 
dealt with high-handedly or overnight”.63 The Department argued for the retention of the 
military structure by referring to the appeal that the military character and traditions had for 
the existing staff as well as for prospective recruits. What this response failed to interrogate 
was the critical question of whether or not a militarised prison structure was compatible with 
a constitutional democracy. By 1994, it appears, there were fundamental differences of 
opinion amongst the staff corps about demilitarisation and the achievability of a civilian 
prison service. Resistance by senior managers in the Department presented significant 
obstacles to demilitarisation.64 
                                                            
61 Department of Correctional Services (1992) Annual Report 1991/2, Pretoria, Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 30. 
62 Penal Reform Lobby Group (1995) An Alternative White Paper on Correctional Services. Johannesburg: 
Lawyers for Human Rights, p. 68-69; Luyt, W.F.M. (2001), p. 26. 
63 Department of Correctional Services (1994 b) White Paper on the Policy of the Department of Correctional 
Services in the new South Africa, Pretoria: Department of Correctional Services, p. 22. 
64 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b), p. 52. 
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There were, however, some concerns with the centralised decision-making processes within 
the DCS. Already in the 1989/90 Annual Report it was noted that “an investigation was 
launched into the development of a model for greater managerial autonomy and the 
management of the SA Prison Service according to commercial principles”.
65
 An example of 
devolution was the establishment of de-centralised staff appointment centres in each of the 
provinces from 1 August 1992.66 Although senior management did recognise the problems 
with centralised decision-making, it remained hesitant to address the demilitarisation of the 
Department, and at that stage there was insufficient pressure on the DCS to make it question 
its own paradigm. 
3.1.4 Greater transparency 
 
There are some indications that between 1990 and 1994 the Department attempted to engage 
with democratisation. Examples were the establishment of Correctional Boards
67
 for every 
prison and the institution of a National Advisory Board on Corrections68 in the 1991/2 
financial year to facilitate greater community involvement in the prison system.69 The media 
were also allowed greater access to prisons following the scrapping of section 44(f) of the 
1959 Act, which had placed severe restrictions on their ability to report on prisons and 
prisoners.70 In addition, in 1991 correctional supervision71 was instituted as a sentence option 
in an effort to address prison overcrowding.72 The DCS also expressed deep concern about 
the high number of children in prison, which indicates some awareness of rights issues.73 
Moreover, in the period 1990 to 1994 the Department engaged increasingly with international 
                                                            
65 South African Prison Service (1990), p.1. 
66 Department of Correctional Services (1992), p. 26. 
67 Although provided for in law, few of these were ever established (Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 137). 
68 The National Advisory Board was established to advise the Minister on key issues. 
69 Department of Correctional Services (1992), p.1; Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 133. 
70 Department of Correctional Services (1992), p. 1; Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 31. 
71 Correctional supervision is a community-based sentence requiring conditions such as house arrest, performing 
community service, attendance of programmes, and so forth. The Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977) and the 
Correctional Services Act make provision for a flexible range of options and combinations in respect of the 
conditions to be imposed and whether or not part of the sentence will be served in prison. Offenders placed 
under correctional supervision are monitored by the DCS. 
 72 Department of Correctional Services (1992), p.1; Luyt, W.F.M. (2001), p. 28. 
73 Department of Correctional Services (1992), p.1. 
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stakeholders and prison services in other countries.
74
 Some measures to improve transparency 
took effect, and in 1992 an agreement was signed with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross granting it access to visit prisons.75 The frequency of visits by judges and 
magistrates to prisons increased slightly in the period 1990 to 1994,
76
 indicating a renewed 
judicial interest in the prison system. The lifting of the state of emergency by President De 
Klerk in February 199077 also enabled greater access to prisons, since the state of emergency 
regulations imposed strong restrictions on access to prisons.
78
 In summary, it can be said that 
there was some recognition that transparency is part and parcel of democracy; for all that, 
though, the Department remained less than forthcoming about gross rights violations. It was 
carefully, if not cosmetically, adapting its habits and practices without changing key aspects 
of the institution. 
3.1.5 Legislative reform 
 
A number of legislative amendments were also pushed through between 1990 and 1994. Most 
notable among them were: the removal of any references to racial discrimination, which thus 
abolished de jure apartheid in the prison system in 1990 (as noted above in section 3.1.2); the 
renaming of the Prison Service to the Department of Correctional Services, and the Prisons 
Act to the Correctional Services Act; the introduction of legislative provisions on correctional 
supervision; the establishment of correctional boards; and a relaxation of the use of prison 
labour in order to enhance commercial activities.79 
In general, these various amendments t o the Correctional Service Act were highly specific in 
nature and made in order to enable particular operational changes; conversely, there is no 
evidence in the relevant Annual Reports that a need was identified to draft entirely new 
legislation. Given the general uncertainty and fluidity of the political landscape in the period 
                                                            
74 For example, in 1989/90 the Department of Correctional Services had contact with only the Swaziland Prison 
Service. By 1994 the Department of Correctional Services had visited, and received visits from, several African 
prison services.  
75 Department of Correctional Services (1992), p.1. 
76  See relevant Annual Reports of the Department of Correctional Services 1990 to 1994. 
77 The state of emergency was maintained in the then Natal province to deal with the violent conflict there 
between IFP and ANC factions. (South African History On-line http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/state-
emergency-lifted-natal Accessed 2 November 2011). 
78 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 277-279. 
79 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 42. 
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February 1990 to April 1994, this is not entirely surprising. The net result was that the 
Department was trying to tweak the 1959 Correctional Services Act to meet the requirements 
of the emerging democratic order. The need for new and comprehensive legislation was 
acknowledged only after the 1994 elections, in the Introduction to the 1994 White Paper by 
the National Commissioner, General H. Bruyn.80 What is perhaps indicative of the overall 
uncertainty about strategic direction is the fact that the 1994 Annual Report of the DCS does 
not contain vision and mission statements, whereas both the preceding reports, dating back to 
1990, and the subsequent ones invariably do.81 
3.1.6 Lack of problem analysis 
 
The preserving and inward-looking approach of the DCS senior management was also 
manifested in the absence of a basic analysis of the problems facing the DCS and an 
assessment of the internal constraints it would need to overcome in order to address them. 
The Annual Reports and 1994 White Paper presented opportunities for this self-reckoning but 
they were not utilised. Indeed, the 1994 White Paper was a hasty and limited response to the 
need for prison reform.
82
 After submissions from the public were invited in early July 1994, 
the final version was released on 21 October 1994.83 By contrast, the 2004 White Paper is 
remarkably honest about the internal challenges facing the DCS.84 A further indication of the 
lack of realism was that in the 1994 White Paper the Department associated itself with three 
“challenges of correctional systems the world over”, namely, overcrowding, soaring crime 
rates, and unrealistic expectations from the public as to what a prison system can achieve.85 It 
failed to individualise and take ownership of the problems it was facing or, more specifically, 
recognise that South Africa of the 1990s was a special situation – it was not the “world over”. 
                                                            
80 Department of Correctional Services (1994), p. 2. 
81 In the years to come, the vision and mission statements would frequently change, often subtly, but change 
nonetheless; the longest period in which the vision and mission statement remained entirely unchanged was 
between 2003/4 and 2007/8 (see relevant Annual Reports). 
82 Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004) Swimming against the tide. In Dixon, B. and Van der Spuy, E. Justice gained – 
crime and crime control in South Africa’s transition, Devon: Willan Publishing, p. 231. 
83 Department of Correctional Services (1994), p. 30. 
84 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2007) The state of South Africa’s prisons. In S. Buhlungu, J. Daniel, R. Southall &  
Lutchman, J. State of the Nation – South Africa 2007, HSRC Press, Cape Town, p. 393; Department of 
Correctional Services (2004 b), pp. 57-62 and 109-110. 
85 Department of Correctional Services (1994 b), p. 1. 
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The 1994 White Paper said little about corruption, gross human rights violations and the 
prison sub-culture created amongst both prisoners and staff under the apartheid regime. It 
preferred to speak in vague terms of “respect for human rights” and having a “professional 
staff corps”, but added that management will not hesitate to maintain discipline and order.
86
 
Fundamentally, but erroneously, it was assumed that there existed a unified prison service 
operating in solidarity. In the absence of a thorough problem analysis, the 1994 White Paper 
offered two solutions: (1) a smaller prison service in order to fund it properly, or (2) a re-
assessment of the prison system “in the national economy in relation to other services and 
backlogs in the country”.87 The emphasis remained very much on managerial and operational 
effectiveness and efficiency, and purported ignorance of wider political changes. In effect the 
DCS was asking for an increased budget without which the requisite standards could not be 
met in conducting business as usual. It was a simplistic and inadequate assessment of the 
situation. 
With the economy stagnant at the time,88 the emphasis on budgetary constraints was not 
altogether surprising. The Department proposed in the 1994 White Paper to respond to these 
in a number of ways: through a series of planned and existing programmes that would result 
in increased productivity; training of staff; increased self-sufficiency; performance audits; 
computerisation to increase efficiency; cost-effective prison architecture; and effective 
community corrections.89 These measures were derived from the policy requirement in the 
1994 White Paper that the Department would be run according to business principles.90 The 
DCS made the proposals with some confidence, given that in 1992 it had received a 
Certificate of Merit in the National Productivity Award Competition91 and was thus playing 
to its strengths. Against a backdrop of competing demands on the national budget, the DCS 
management virtuously proposed efficiency-increasing measures to improve on what they 
were doing already with limited resources. However, they failed to recognise and engage 
with the critical questions that were mounting up against their prevailing paradigm. 
                                                            
86 Department of Correctional Services (1994 b), p. 2. 
87 Department of Correctional Services (1994 b), p. 1. 
88 Picard, L.A. (2005) The state of the state – institutional transformation, capacity and political change in 
South Africa. Johannesburg: P&DM Wits University Press, p. 17. 
89 Department of Correctional Services (1994 b), p. 2. 
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3.1.7 Summary 
 
Essentially, the DCS management in the period 1990 – 1994 did not realise it was in the 
midst of a crisis that would require it to examine critically the foundational assumptions, 
goals, procedures and practices of the prison system in order to comply with the requirements 
of a constitutional democracy. There is little doubt that the process of rationalisation and the 
establishment of a new department took up a considerable amount of senior management’s 
time and energy.92 Moreover, both of these processes directed the focus of senior 
management inwardly and placed the emphasis on institution-building rather on developing a 
new institution aligned to the demands of the environment. In this respect, it was the pre-
1994 Prison Service that was taken up as the model for the new national Department of 
Correctional Services – a Service which lacked transparency and displayed imperviousness to 
external and critical views. As a result, the two processes (of rationalisation and the 
establishment of a new department) did not serve to create a reformed institution; instead, 
they replicated and fortified what was already, and problematically, in existence. 
3.2 Staff corps 
 
3.2.1 Failure to engage 
 
By 1994 the DCS had a staff establishment of 29 701 for a daily average prison population of 
113 856.
93
 Racial transformation of the staff corps and human rights issues became 
increasingly important between 1990 and 1994, as evidenced by staff of the Department 
being involved in various incidents of industrial action in which the trade union POPCRU 
(Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union) was frequently at the forefront.
94
 Some early 
                                                            
92 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) Developing a culture of good governance 
report of the presidential review commission on the reform and transformation of the public service in South 
Africa. Pretoria: Government of the Republic of South Africa, para 2.5.2. 
 93Department of Correctional Services (1995) Annual Report 1994, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, Table 8. 
94 See, for example: ‘POPCRU claims sit-in 3 are being denied facilities’. The Daily Mail, 8 August 1990; ‘3 
fired, 174 suspended after warder strike’. The Citizen, 20 March 1990; ‘Prison Crisis’. The New Nation, 14 June 
1990; ‘Sipiere los saakoorskorsing’. Die Burger, 5 June 1990. [Warders drop case over suspension]; ‘Robben 
Island warders ease crisis’. The Weekly Mail, 4 April 1990; ‘POPCRU children’s picket broken up’. The Argus, 
18 April 1990. 
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advances were made to remove the most offensive discriminatory practices. Shortly after 
1990, following industrial action, some reforms were introduced and black officials could 
include their families on their medical aid; a better than expected salary increase was given; 
night shift was no longer the preserve of black officials and subsequently shared with white 
officials; black staff could also fill administrative posts and promotions were open to all.95 
Despite these advances, the DCS management failed, in the period 1990 to 1994, to engage 
with POPCRU constructively and instead tightened up legislation to prohibit DCS officials 
from participating in industrial action or even showing sympathy with trade unions.96 
POPCRU would eventually become a formidable and destructive force in the DCS, as is 
described further in this chapter (section 4.3). 
3.2.2 Lack of racial transformation and low staff morale 
 
In respect of transforming the racial profile of the DCS staff corps, the DCS senior 
management was cautious, appearing virtually to ignore the writing on the wall. The 1994 
Annual Report acknowledges that there were fears around job security but that “most 
personnel members would not like to be branded as having been promoted in view of 
affirmative action”.97 This view was quite contrary to the affirmative-action approach 
increasingly acceptable to the ANC-led government in 1994.98 
The earliest reliable figures on the race and gender profile of the DCS staff corps is for 1996 
and presented in Table 1 below. These are assumed to reflect by and large the situation as it 
existed in 1994.99 In 1996 the three-member Executive Council of the Department (the most 
senior decision-making body in the Department) was an all white male structure and the 21-
member Management Board contained 14 white males.100 In short, while white males 
constituted 31.8% of total staff in 1996, they dominated the senior management. Even two 
years into the GNU there was little visible change in the top echelon of the DCS. 
                                                            
95 Mtshelwane, Z. (1993) Recognize POPCRU, SA Labour Bulletin, Vol. 17 No. 6, p. 71. 
96 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 41; Mtshelwane, Z. (1993), p. 70; Gillespie, K. (2007) Caught between union and 
state – warders’ place in transforming prisons, SA Labour Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 1. 
97 Department of Correctional Services (1995), p. 2. 
98 Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 17. 
99 Department of Correctional Services (1998)Annual Report 1997, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, Table 51. 
100 Department of Correctional Services (1998), Tables 52 and 53. 
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Table 1 Race and gender profile of DCS staff, 1996. 
 Male Female Total 
White 31.8 6.1 37.9 
Black 43.8 3.6 47.4 
Coloured 12.2 1.0 13.3 
Asian 1.3 0.1 1.3 
Total 89.2 10.8 100.0 
 
Negative sentiment and lack of confidence in the Department as an employer was also 
reflected in resignation figures. In 1990 a total of 1573 officials resigned, an increase of 
21.6% on the previous year.101 In the four years between 1990 and 1994, the Department lost 
3807 officials due to resignations, of whom 37% were officers and non-commissioned 
officers.102 There is little doubt that the loss of experienced and more senior staff had a 
negative impact on operational performance. Also reflective of staff morale is termination of 
employment due to medical boarding, a figure that increased from 60 in 1990 to 179 in 
1994.103 
By 1994 deep divisions within the staff of DCS were visible, but with the “old guard” 
remaining very much in control. Moreover, an acrimonious relationship had developed 
between the DCS management and the union POPCRU, resulting in several incidents of 
industrial action. POPCRU’s political agitation in support of prisoners’ rights between 1990 
and 1994104 was a thorn in the flesh of the Department and must have been regarded as an act 
of betrayal by senior management. The Department eventually signed a recognition 
agreement with POPCRU on 6 October 1994 and joined the Public Servants Association 
(PSA) and the SA Nursing Council (SANC) in the Departmental Negotiating Chamber.105 
 
                                                            
101 South African Prison Service (1990) Annual Report 1990, Pretoria: South African Prison Service, p. 53. 
102 South African Prison Service Annual Reports for relevant years. 
103 South African Prison Service Annual Reports for relevant years.  
104 Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into unrest in prisons (1995) (hereafter Kriegler Commission), p. 
40. Gillespie, K. (2007). 
105 Department of Correctional Services (1995), p. 45. 
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3.3 Prison population and system performance 
 
3.3.1 Overcrowding and releases 
 
Overcrowding at South African prisons dates back as far as 1965 and is not a new 
phenomenon.
106
 By 1994 the occupancy level was comparatively favourable at 118%.
107
 The 
reduction in occupation from 130% in 1989/90108 to 118% by 1994 was the result of two 
factors: first, a number of special remissions and amnesties were granted between 1990 and 
1994;109 second, the incorporation of the homeland prisons which were not overcrowded110 
led to more favourable national statistics. It was only from 1997 onwards that overcrowding 
would reach unprecedented levels.111 
After 1990, and against the backdrop of an increasing violent crime rate, the release policy of 
the Department came under severe criticism from judicial officers and the public because it 
was perceived as being too lenient and undermining sentences imposed by the courts.
112
 For 
example, it was reportedly the practice that prisoners sentenced to less than six months were 
released within 48 hours.113 In response, a new policy was developed and published as a 
White Paper, coming into effect on 1 March 1994
114
 after being signed into law.
115
 This did 
away with the automatic remission of sentence and provided that a prisoner must serve the 
                                                            
106 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2006) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
2005/6. Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 24. 
107 Department of Correctional Services (1995) Graph 2. 
108 Department of Correctional Services (1995) Graph 2. 
109 On 10 December 1990, 30 179 prisoners were released in an amnesty of seasonal goodwill; on 30 April 1991 
a six-month amnesty and one-third amnesty for first offenders on 1 July 1991 saw the release of 25 467 and 
9237 prisoners respectively (Kriegler Commission, p. 72). 
110 Department of Correctional Services (1995), p.3. 
111 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2006), p. 24. 
112 Lidovho, G.J. (2003) A critical look at the past and current release policy of the Department of Correctional 
services, SA Journal for Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, pp. 163-177; Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004), p. 235. 
113 Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004), p. 235. 
114 Department of Correctional Services (1994 a) Annual Report 1993, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 2. 
115 Correctional Services Amendment Act No. 68 of 1993. 
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entire sentence although part of it may be served in the community.
116
 However, a prisoner 
could be considered for earlier release on parole and that date could be moved forward 
through the earning of credits, granting relief for up to a maximum of one half of the 
sentence.
117
 In the case of prisoners serving sentences of six months or less, it was assumed 
that the prisoner has earned the maximum number of credits unless the Institutional 
Committee118 had determined differently.119 The new release policy did not appear to have a 
noticeable effect on the size of the prison population as it was indeed the unsentenced 
population that showed the most rapid increase. For example, at the end of 1993 there were 
21 540 unsentenced prisoners, and by 1999 this figure had increased to 58 231, an increase of 
170%.
120
 There was evidently no overarching strategy or policy, as changes to the release 
policy were made in an ad hoc manner. 
3.3.2 The erosion of security 
 
Security was, however, an increasing concern, and from 1989/90 to 1994 the number of 
annual escapes increased by 184%.121 Expressed as a ratio per 100 000 of the prison 
population, there were 79 escapes per 100 000 prisoners in 1989/90, but by 1994 this had 
increased to 110 per 100 000 prisoners.122 An increase in escapes from prison in South Africa 
can be correlated with large-scale socio-political upheaval as a similar trend was observed in 
                                                            
116 Department of Correctional Services (1994 a), p. 2. 
117 s 9 Correctional Services Amendment Act No. 68 of 1993. 
118 The Institutional Committees, located at each prison, were created by the 1959 Prisons Act and had wide 
ranging functions relating to, amongst others, the security classification of prisoners, transfer of prisoners to 
other prisons, work allocation, gratuities paid, appointment of monitors, isolation of prisoners, the remission of 
sentence, release dates and release on medical grounds. In most instances the Committee did not make final 
decisions but referred recommendations to other officials or structures, such as the Head of Prison (Van Zyl 
Smit, D. (1992), p. 134.) 
119 s 9 Correctional Services Amendment Act No. 68 of 1993. 
120 Muntingh, L. (2005) Surveying the prisons landscape – what the numbers tell us, Law, Democracy and 
Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, p. 32 
121 From 1989/90 to 1994 the number of escapes annually was 663, 746, 1126, 1 171 and 1 218 (see relevant 
Annual Reports). 
122 See relevant Department of Correctional Services, Annual Reports 1989/90 to 1994.  
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1975/6
123
 and 23 36 escapes were recorded in that year.
124
 The erosion of the strict security 
procedures, a deepening legitimacy crisis of the prison system, and political militancy 
amongst both prisoners125 and black staff (aligned to POPCRU) are regarded as core reasons 
for the increase in escapes. A growing awareness of human rights by prisoners, uncertainty 
about prisoners’ participation in the 1994 election and the expectation by prisoners that there 
would be a general amnesty after the election, made the situation in the prisons extremely 
volatile by 1994.
126
 
The volatility of the situation is demonstrated by the sharp increase in the number of unrest-
related incidents in prisons recorded between 1988 and 1994 (up to 8 November 1994), as 
shown in Figure 1 below.127 
 
Figure 1 Number of unrest related incidents reported in South African prisons 1988-1994 
 
The underlying tensions and strains came to the fore during the period February 1994 to June 
1994 in the run-up to, and aftermath of, the first democratic election in April1994. Between 
February 1994 and June 1994, there were 71 incidents of unrest at 53 prisons housing 77% of 
the total prison population, resulting in injuries to 750 prisoners and 145 DCS officials, as 
                                                            
123 In 1976 Black youths engaged in widespread protests across South Africa against the apartheid government, 
particularly against the policies of Bantu education; the protests are now known as the Soweto riots, after the 
township west of Johannesburg where they started. 
124 Department of Correctional Services (1992), p. 7. 
125 Kriegler Commission, p. 39 
126 Kriegler Commission, p. 20. 
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well as the death of 37 prisoners.
128
 Nearly a quarter of the country’s prisons experienced 
unrest and violence. In response to these events, President Mandela appointed a Commission 
of Inquiry headed by Judge Kriegler (hereafter the Kriegler Commission) to investigate the 
causes of the unrest in prisons and make recommendations to prevent a repeat of such a 
tragedy. 
In the run-up to the 1994 elections it was in question whether prisoners would be enabled or 
allowed to participate in the historic event. This gave rise to uncertainty and anxiety amongst 
prisoners, culminating in protest actions;129 ultimately, all prisoners were made eligible to 
participate in the elections. In their aftermath, there was an expectation among sentenced 
prisoners that a general amnesty would be granted by the new government, 130 and, in his 
inaugural address on 10 May 1994, President Mandela did indeed create grounds for this 
optimism.131 However, the newly elected government did not provide clarity on the issue and 
left prisoners in the lurch. Tensions thus continued to build up, and erupted in widespread 
unrest in prisons. It was only on 10 June 1994 that the government announced a six-month 
remission of sentence, but many sentenced prisoners saw it as a slap in the face and it only 
“acted as a trigger” for further unrest.132 It was the view of many prisoners, one with which 
the Kriegler Commission agreed, that a six-month remission of sentence did not reflect the 
historical significance of the transition to democracy.
133
 
The events between February and June 1994 were unprecedented and brought to the surface 
the deep-seated problems in the Department amongst both staff and prisoners as well as the 
broader community. If there were ever any doubt about it, it was by now clear that the prison 
system was in crisis. While the granting of amnesties and extending the franchise to prisoners 
                                                            
128 Kriegler Commission, p. 26. 
129 Muntingh, L. and Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2009) The Ballot as a Bulwark: Prisoners’ Right to Vote in South Africa. 
In Ewald, A.C. and Rottinghaus, B. (eds) Criminal disenfranchisement in an international perspective, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 230; Kriegler Commission, p. 19-21. 
130 Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004), p. 237. 
131 ‘As a token of its commitment to the renewal of our country, the new Interim Government of National Unity 
will, as a matter of urgency, address the issue of amnesty for various categories of our people who are currently 
serving terms of imprisonment.’ (Statement of the President of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, 
at his Inauguration as President of the Democratic Republic of South Africa, Union Buildings, Pretoria, 10 May 
1994.) 
132 Kriegler Commission, p. 75. 
133 Kriegler Commission, pp. 99-100. 
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did not lie within the discretion of the DCS, it was nevertheless clear that fundamental 
legitimacy problems required urgent attention. As Van Zyl Smit has pointed out, the Kriegler 
Commission had the opportunity to conduct a thorough investigation and make far-reaching 
recommendations (as the British Woolf Commission of 1991 did in response to riots at 
Strangeways prison) but failed to rise to the occasion.134 The Kriegler Commission was able 
to identify various problems underlying the unrest (e.g. the nature of accommodation, 
treatment of prisoners, conditions of detention and a sense of injustice), but it held back on 
making weightier recommendations about the challenges facing the DCS and the appropriate 
responses to them. The Kriegler Commission should therefore be regarded as something of a 
missed opportunity.  
3.3.3 Improved self-sufficiency 
One often-neglected feature of the prison system at the time gives a good indication of senior 
management’s inward focus: the DCS’s advanced level of self-sufficiency. Essentially this 
refers to the ability of the Department to meet its own needs in respect of consumables (e.g. 
food and clothing) and non-consumables (e.g. furniture). The aim of greatest possible self-
sufficiency existed for the prison system before and after 1994, and was ultimately included 
as a goal in the 1998 Correctional Services Act. By 1993/4 the Department reported that it 
was able to meet more than 60% of its own needs in respect of vegetables, fruit, red meat, 
and pork.135 Closer analysis of the reported production figures indicates that self-sufficiency 
was indeed on the increase between 1988 and 1994,136 but in the years to follow it would 
stagnate and, in some instance, decline.137 The prison farms would also become the focus of 
investigation by the Special Investigations Unit into corruption. 
3.3.4 Summary of issues 
 
By 1994 the internal performance of the prison system had been severely weakened in respect 
of staff-management relations and security. The prison population and Black officials had 
also become more politically aware and assertive, challenging the old regime and its vestiges. 
It was the case, too, that certain functions (e.g. agricultural production) remained intact, 
                                                            
134 Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004), p. 237. 
135 Department of Correctional Services (1994 a), p. 22. 
136 See relevant Annual Reports of the Department of Correctional Services. 
137 See relevant Annual Reports of the Department of Correctional Services 1994 to 2009/10. 
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which is regarded as a consequence of senior management’s overt emphasis on improving 
efficiency and minimising further strain on the national budget. However, this also points to 
the inward-looking and preserving approach of the Department’s leadership at the time. The 
DCS senior management maintained its focus on that with which it was familiar, and resisted 
being drawn into the political changes shaping South Africa at the time. The entrenched 
bureaucratic system developed under apartheid produced officials who worked within tightly 
defined procedural and regulatory frameworks; there was little room for deviation from 
procedure because apartheid policies had to be implemented without question.138 The prison 
system, by 1994, showed an increasing number of fault lines created, on the one hand, by the 
need and calls for reform, and, on the other, by the lack of strategic vision from the senior 
management, which remained rigidly stuck in the prevailing institutional culture. 
4. The nature of the crises in DCS 
 
This section provides a closer description of the nature of the crisis in the prison system after 
1994. Two issues are important in this regard. First, the DCS was not unique in facing 
problems of corruption and maladministration, as these were also experienced in other public 
service institutions (see Chapter 6 section 2.1). Second, when President Mbeki appointed the 
Jali Commission this was not the first time the DCS was investigated: to name but a few, 
there had been earlier investigations by the DPSA, Public Service Commission (PSC) and the 
Auditor General.139 The DCS was, however, substantially different from other public 
institutions in two ways. First, it was part of the justice and security cluster140 and thus 
important to the state’s ability to maintain law and order. Second, the state had patently lost 
control of the DCS, a development reported as such to Parliament in 2000.141 
                                                            
138 McLennan, A. (2009) The delivery paradox. In McLennan, A. and Munslow, B. (eds) The politics of service 
delivery, Johannesburg: Wits P&DM Governance Series, p.25. 
139 The Jali Commission noted that there had been 20 earlier investigations into the DCS. (Jali Commission, p. 
885). Unfortunately, the Jali Commission does not in its final report indicate the time period over which these 
investigations were undertaken, but it can be assumed that they were relatively recent. 
140 DCS, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and the South African Police Services. 
141‘Staat het allebeheeroor DKD verloor, sê DG’. Die Burger, 15 April 2000. [State has lost all control over 
DCS, says DG (Director General) - own translation.]; PMG Report of the meeting of the Portfolio Committee 
on Correctional Services of 14 April 2000, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20000413-audit-department-
correctional-services accessed 18 December 2011. 
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This section will primarily focus on the period 1994 to 2004, and will do so for a number of 
reasons. First, much of the Jali Commission’s investigations focused on it, and its final report 
presents a comprehensive description of developments during this period. Second, in March 
2004 the DCS adopted the White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, setting out a new 
policy framework and strategic direction for the prison system. Third, by October 2004 the 
full Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) was brought into force,142 thus providing the 
prison system with a legal framework aligned to the Constitution. This historical 
differentiation should not be interpreted to mean that the crisis in the DCS was resolved by 
2004, but rather that a turning point was reached through institutional, legislative and policy 
developments. Policy and legislative clarity and certainty were and remain important 
requirements for prison reform. It is definitely the case that some of the problems manifested 
during the period 1994 to 2004 remain in existence. It is also the case that, especially since 
2004, DCS senior management and other government structures are engaging with these 
challenges in a manner that should, at least at face value, be considered as sincere and aimed 
at bringing about a prison system free from corruption and maladministration. 
 
The scope and extent of the collapse of discipline and order in the DCS after 1994 is only 
truly appreciated when a more detailed description is provided of how this crisis manifested 
itself. Merely stating that there was “a collapse of order and discipline” or that “corruption 
was rife” does not fully convey the seriousness of the situation, nor does it give insight into 
the persistent reform challenges with which the Department continues to struggle. The crisis 
manifested itself on various levels involving individuals, organised labour and the senior 
management. The remainder of this section sets out the dimensions of the crisis, paying 
special attention to: failures at strategy and policy levels; leadership instability; the actions of 
organised labour; the manipulation of service benefits; the use of violence and coercion by 
certain factions in the staff corps; and rights violations perpetrated against prisoners. An 
important failure was the seeming directionlessness of policy initiatives: this is addressed in 
the following section.  
4.1 Strategy and policy development 
 
                                                            
142 Some parts came into force in July 2004 and the remainder, in October 2004. 
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In Chapter 2 it was noted that during a crisis, policy sectors with low levels of 
institutionalisation lack the capacity to implement and consolidate reforms, with the result 
that the sector experiences coordination problems, “zig-zag policies and inter-organisational 
friction”.
143
 Policy development in DCS after 1994 until 2004 can indeed be described as 
zigzag – there was little coherence, a central vision was lacking and policy developments 
were detached from the then applicable core policy document, the 1994 White Paper.144 It 
was indeed as Sloth-Nielsen observed: “[P]olicy changes that have in fact occurred during the 
eight years subsequent to the release of the [1994] White Paper cannot for the most part be 
linked in any way to it.”145As previously noted, the 1994 White Paper was an inadequate 
response to the situation at the time as it failed to deal with the fundamental issues of 
transformation in the new democratic and constitutional order. It consequently failed to seize 
the opportunity to reinvent the prison system as an institution founded on fundamental human 
rights, the rule of law, transparency and accountability.  
The policy initiatives that emerged thereafter were not necessarily inherently flawed, but it 
can be safely assumed that, since they were detached from a coherent policy framework, they 
created confusion and frustration among the staff and the public. What appeared was a range 
of initiatives that were not always clear in their purpose and long-terms goals; the initiatives 
also blurred management’s focus by frequently making promises and raising expectations 
beyond what could be delivered. Moreover, in the course of having senior management 
embark on so many different policy initiatives with so few results, confidence in their 
leadership abilities came to wane. 
The policy initiatives should also be seen against the backdrop of chronic overcrowding 
experienced by the prison system from 1994 onwards,146 which was frequently used as a 
convenient scapegoat for the prevailing problems as well as for providing an all-too handy 
excuse for not implementing recommendations. 
                                                            
143 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 17, citing Kouzmin, A. and Jarman, A. (1989) ‘Crisis decision making – 
towards a contingent decision path perspective’. In Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T. and ‘T Hart, P. (eds) Coping 
with crises: the management of disasters, riots and terrorism. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, pp. 397-435. 
144 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003) Overview of Policy Developments in South African Correctional Services. CSPRI 
Research report No. 1, Bellville: Community Law Centre, p. 5. 
145 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003), p. 5. 
146 Pete, S. (2000) ‘The good the bad and the warehoused’: The politics of imprisonment during the run-up to 
South Africa’s second democratic election, SA Journal for Criminal Justice, Vol. 13, p. 2. 
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4.1.1 Unit management 
 
The concept of unit management first appeared in the Annual Report of 1997 after a DCS 
delegation visited the US on a study tour to investigate unit management in January 1997.147 
Unit management would see prisoners accommodated in smaller units (of less than 60 
prisoners) to facilitate direct supervision, custody and control, and to contribute to 
rehabilitation.
148
 The central aim was to move away from the warehousing of prisoners in 
large communal cells and enable direct and active supervision of prisoners so as to facilitate 
an integrated mode of service delivery. In 2000, the then Minister of Correctional Services, 
Ben Skosana (IFP), saw unit management as key to the Department’s transformation: 
This new system [unit management] of prison management is a fundamental 
transformation of our prison system, in line with international best practice, to move 
away from the prison-focused management approach to a prisoner-focused 
management method. The new system provides for the management of prisoners in 
smaller units, with greater interaction between correctional officials and prisoners. 
Extensive training workshops are currently under way in the various provinces to 
prepare prison staff for unit management. It is envisaged that the system will be 
implemented in 27 prisons around the country during the course of this year. All the 
recently built prisons have been designed along the lines of unit management.149 
The Department would spend significant time and resources to promote unit management,150 
and by 2002 reported that it had been implemented at 42% of prisons (an estimated 100 
prisons).151A point frequently raised by commentators was that unit management required 
particular prison architecture to enable the accommodation of prisoners in smaller units but 
that the overwhelming majority of South Africa’s prisons were instead designed to warehouse 
people in large communal cells. Slowly, more accurate information about the implementation 
                                                            
147 Department of Correctional Services (1998), p. 55. 
148 Dissel, A. and Ellis, S. (2002) Reform and Stasis: Transformation in South African Prisons, Johannesburg: 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, p. 5. 
149 Minister of Correctional Services (Hon. Skosana), Proceedings of the National Assembly, 12 May 2000, p. 
109. 
150 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003), p. 14. 
151 Department of Correctional Services (2003) Annual Report 2002/3, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 123. 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
of unit management emerged. In 2004 it was reported that a training manual for unit 
management had been developed152 and that it would be tested at 36 so-called Centres of 
Excellence.153 In other words, four years after this innovation had been announced in 2000 
and reportedly implemented at 42% of prisons, the Department revealed that it had developed 
a training manual on unit management; it is consequently unclear what training Minister 
Skosana had been referring to in 2000. In 2007 it was reported that unit management had 
been implemented at the 36 Centres of Excellence, but that there were “challenges with 
regard to adherence to national norms and standards”, and that it had been implemented at 
50% of other prisons to “varying degrees”.154 The “challenges” and “varying degrees” of 
implementation are not explained in official publications, but it can be assumed that it is an 
understatement of the problem and that the roll-out was far less extensive than had been 
optimistically forecast.  
At a time when the prison system was severely overcrowded and facing serious governance 
and leadership problems as well as allegations of rights violations, as is described in more 
detail below, unit management was an attempt to solve the wrong problem. It did not address 
the fundamental nature of the prison system but rather attempted to import a prison-
management model from abroad. The focus should have been more modest, such as meeting 
the minimum standards of humane detention. 
4.1.2Super-maximum prisons 
 
South Africa has two super-maximum security prisons, C-Max Pretoria155 and Ebongweni in 
Kokstad (KwaZulu-Natal), both established in the 1994 – 2002 period. Both prisons were 
designed to be “escape-proof” and house the “worst of the worst”. It was envisaged that 
prisoners detained there would be subject to an extremely harsh regime, and this was widely 
condemned by human rights groups156 and later the Jali Commission.157C-Max is the former 
                                                            
152 Department of Correctional Services (2005) Annual Report 2004/5, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 41. 
153 Following the adoption of the 2004 White Paper, the DCS identified 36 prisons that would be the vanguard 
to implement the 2004 White Paper; these are known as Centres of Excellence. 
154 Department of Correctional Services (2007) Annual Report, 2006/7, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 18. 
155 C-Max stands for Closed Maximum Security. 
156 Pete, S. (2000), p. 5-6. 
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death row cells at the Pretoria Central Prison that were converted after the abolition of the 
death penalty in 1994. It now has capacity for 281 prisoners under C-Max conditions of 
detention. Ebongweni, built over a period of four years, has space for 1 440 inmates and 
became operational in 2002.  
The need for super-maximum facilities in the South African prison system was substantially 
overestimated and both prisons remain underutilised. For example, in February 2011 C-Max 
was 45% full and Ebongweni a mere 37% full.
158
 Super-maximum prisons were also not part 
of the 1994 White Paper.159 C-Max was an initiative from inside the DCS (Gauteng region) as 
a specific response to the high level of violence experienced in the prisons of that province.160 
Ebongweni was, however, the brainchild of then Minister of Correctional Services, Sipo 
Mzimela (1994-1998), and his advisors.161 Planning of Ebongweni commenced prior to 
planning for the conversion of death row into C-Max, but C-Max was completed well before 
Ebongweni. Not only was the need for Ebongweni misguided, but the location of the facility 
in the remote town of Kokstad and its specific locality there compounded problems. This 
resulted in significant construction delays and additional costs. Ultimately, Ebongweni prison 
would only be partly functional.162 Costing R450 million to build, 194% over budget, 
Ebongweni did little to address any of the problems the DCS was experiencing.163 
An important reason forwarded for the construction of super-maximum facilities was the high 
number of escapes, as discussed above in section 3.3.2. For example, in 1994 a total of 1218 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
157 Jali Commission, pp. 351-368. 
158 Department of Correctional Services Management Information System (MIS) 
159 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003), p. 14. 
160 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming) Super-maximum prisons in South Africa,In Ross J (ed) 
Globalization of Supermax Prison, Chapel Hill: Rutgers University Press. 
161 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming). 
162 The physical structure and terrain of Ebongweni presented numerous difficulties that were not properly 
investigated and assessed, and to date the prison is beset with practical and logistical problems. Amongst others, 
poor ventilation at Ebongweni has resulted in a situation where large parts of the prison cannot be used (Sloth-
Nielsen, J. (2003), p. 21. Report of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on its 2-6 August 2010 
oversight visits to the Leeuwkop, Pretoria Female, Rustenburg, New Kimberley, Durban Westville and 
Ebongweni correctional centres - dated 26 January 2011. 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2011/comreports/110201pccorrectreport.htm) 
163 Sloth-Nielsen (2003, p. 21) reflects the construction cost of Ebongweni as R360 million, but the DCS 
website notes the final cost as R450 million (DCS website “Ebongweni Centre of Excellence, 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/AboutUs/COE/centre/KZN/EbongweniMaxCC.aspx Accessed 16 December 2011). 
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prisoners escaped from custody.
164
 Escapes attracted significant negative media attention 
directed at the DCS and added to public insecurity. However, a closer analysis of escape 
statistics indicate a decline by the time C-Max opened (1997) and these had already stabilised 
at much lower levels by the time Ebongweni admitted its first prisoners in 2002.
165
 There is 
thus little reason to believe that the creation of super-maximum facilities reduced escapes. 
The main reason for escapes was, according to the Jali Commission, not the inadequate 
infrastructure, but rather collusion between officials and prisoners and/or negligence by 
officials to adhere to security procedures.166 The DCS by its own admission acknowledged 
that negligence was the major cause of escapes and that in some instances officials assisted 
escapes.
167
 The policy decision that saw the creation of super-maximum security prisons to 
reduce escapes was not only misdirected but also resulted in wasteful and fruitless 
expenditure. Moreover, it directed resources towards the wrong solution and distracted the 
Department from the real challenges that were thwarting reform of the prison system.  
 
4.1.3 Privatisation 
 
Privately operated prisons were also not featured in the 1994 White Paper and must be seen 
as a consequence of the national government’s policy decision to see wider private sector 
involvement in public service procurement as a means to improve the economic position and 
influence of black citizens.168 It was also the case that Minister Mzimela favoured private 
sector involvement in the prison system. Following a trip in 1997 to the US and UK, Mzimela 
observed: “Wherever the private sector got involved, they have delivered a better service, and 
have done it at less cost to the taxpayer.”169 There appears to have been very little debate 
about the principle of private sector involvement in the prison system.
170
 Support for private 
                                                            
164 Department of Correctional Services (1995). 
165 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming). 
166 Jali Commission, pp. 365. 
167 Department of Correctional Services (2002) Annual Report 2001/2, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, pp. 64-65; Department of Correctional Services (2003), p. 44; Jali Commission, pp. 275-389. 
168 Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 333. 
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sector involvement in the prison system was also found in his successor, Ben Skosana (IFP), 
who signed the agreements in 2000 for two privately designed, developed, built and operated 
prisons, known as Apops (Asset Procurement and Operating Partnership System) and with 
each housing nearly 3 000 prisoners.
171
 The terms of the contracts were extremely favourable 
to the contractors: not only were they signed for a 25-year term but guaranteed profits (25% 
and 29%, respectively) linked to inflation were built in.172 Numerous other problems have 
also been noted in respect of the manner in which the contracts were awarded,
173
 including 
corruption. However, in an address to the National Assembly in 2000 Minister Skosana 
makes a number of astonishing admissions: 
 
It is important to mention that in order to provide for the financing of Apops projects 
within the MTEF [Medium Term Expenditure Framework] budgetary allocations, 
financed posts of 4 404 and 1 424 will be frozen in budgetary terms in the 2001-02 and 
2002-03 financial years respectively. This will result in a declining financed personnel 
establishment of 39 534, 35 936 and 34 512 from those financial years respectively. 
This freezing of posts will result in a very high correctional official-prisoner ratio 
which will adversely affect the management of the department in the following specific 
areas: Firstly, the implementation of the new unit management system; secondly, the 
prevention of escapes by prisoners, which will impact on the safety of the community; 
thirdly, the security of correctional officials and prisoners; and, fourthly, service 
delivery.
174
 
Knowingly, the DCS had entered into an agreement that would be to its direct and immediate 
detriment at a time when overcrowding and security were in a critical state. The anticipated 
consequences of the Apops agreements Minister Skosana cites, are indicative rather of the 
reasons not to enter into the agreements. The two privately operated prisons would remain a 
                                                            
171 Minister of Correctional Services (Hon. Skosana), Proceedings of the National Assembly, 12 May 2000, p. 
110. 
172 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003), p. 18. 
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contentious issue in the DCS because of the costs involved;
175
 attempts at renegotiating the 
contracts to terms more favourable to the partners also failed (see Chapter 5 section 4.4). 
Apart from this manifestly poor decision-making, the Apops contracts also raised numerous 
questions about the integrity of the contracting process and whether there were corrupt 
influences and manipulation when the contracts were awarded. This has never been 
confirmed, but the entire episode added to the poor image of the DCS and its senior 
leadership. While the two private prisons may showcase superior standards in service 
delivery,176 it remains doubtful if they produced any benefits for the wider system and may 
indeed have been detrimental due to the costs involved and the controversy created. The two 
private prisons remain as somewhat unwanted, but irremovable, appendices to the prison 
system.  
 
4.1.4 Electronic monitoring 
 
Electronic monitoring of parolees was not mentioned in the 1994 White Paper and is another 
example of ad hoc planning. Presumably electronic monitoring of parolees is a cost-effective 
and efficient way to keep track of offenders placed in the community. Using a transmitter, it 
enables remote monitoring of offenders to verify that they are abiding by their conditions of 
release, such as house arrest. Electronic monitoring therefore, its proponents argue, reduces 
the need for officials physically to visit offenders on parole to monitor compliance with their 
conditions of release from prison, specifically house arrest. To verify the cost-effectiveness of 
electronic monitoring, the DCS conducted a pilot project from September 1997 to August 
1998 in Pretoria.177 The results were reportedly so encouraging that it was decided to roll out 
electronic monitoring to the rest of the country. This would, apparently, have enabled 
electronic monitoring of 10 000 parolees and probationers, with savings amounting to R100 
million (US$14.7 million). The main benefit of electronic monitoring would, according to the 
DCS, be that more prisoners could be placed on parole and correctional supervision and thus 
                                                            
175 By 2004/5 the DCS was spending more than 6% of the total budget on 3% of the prison population 
accommodated in the two private prisons (National Treasury (2004) National Medium Term Expenditure 
Estimates: Vote 21 Correctional Services). 
176 Cavadino, M. and Dignan, J. (2006), p. 321. 
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alleviate prison overcrowding by reducing the demand for prison space.
178
 On 31 March 1999 
Cabinet approved the national roll-out of electronic monitoring.179 Nearly two years later, in 
January 2001, a tender was advertised for the implementation of electronic monitoring in the 
DCS, but a month later the tender was withdrawn due to some confusing phrases in the tender 
document.180 
 
The project was, however, fatally flawed from the start as the technology used was not 
suitable for South African conditions. The technology tested in the pilot project was landline-
based and dependent on electricity. Access to both a telephone landline and electricity 
remains the preserve of the small South African middle class. This was even more so the case 
in the late 1990s. Effectively, the poor, people living in rural areas, and people in the informal 
settlements surrounding South African cities would be excluded from electronic monitoring. 
However, it is indeed poor and Black South Africans that make up the overwhelming 
majority of the prison population. 
 
The inappropriateness of the technology was ultimately acknowledged in 2002: “The 
electronic monitoring system should be effective in both the underprivileged and privileged 
communities. A system that will only be operational in areas that have access to electricity 
and telephone connections is not acceptable.”181 The last mention of electronic monitoring of 
parolees and probationers is in the 2002/3 Annual Report, noting that a feasibility study needs 
to be undertaken.
182
 In June 2003 the DCS reported to the Portfolio Committee that there had 
been a reassessment of electronic monitoring and that, first, the tendering process did not 
comply with Public Private Partnership process and, second, it was found that such 
monitoring was effective in only 26% of urban areas and 19% of rural areas.
183
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After five years of testing, investigating and singing its praises, electronic monitoring of 
parolees and probationers appears to have been shelved. The limitations of the technology 
were evident from the start and would thus have rendered it inappropriate to the majority of 
South African parolees and probationers at the outset, yet the Department persisted with 
further investigations and testing, presumably at some cost.  
 
4.1.5 Accommodation for prisoners 
 
With the prison population rising rapidly from 1994 onwards, overcrowding soon took on 
crisis proportions and solutions had to be found. One proposal that was briefly floated in 
1997 was that disused ships could be converted into prisons, and in October 1997 Minister 
Mzimela announced that negotiations to this end were well underway.184 In the end this 
retrogressive idea never materialised.  
Conditions of detention deteriorated rapidly, with some prisons being more than 200 per cent 
full.185 In the late 1990s two new prisons were completed (Malmesbury and Goodwood), but 
the construction costs were extremely high.186 In August 2002 Minister Skosana unveiled his 
plan for the construction of ten 3 000-bed prisons that would cost half as much to construct as 
conventional prisons.187 These so-called New Generation prisons would not only reduce 
construction costs by relying on low-technology solutions but would also require less staff to 
operate as a result of innovative design features, according to the architect, Mr. Paul Silver.188 
Less than a month after the Minister announced the New Generation prisons, the DCS 
presented the prototype design to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services.189 
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The prototype design presented to the Committee sounded like a panacea to the problems of 
the Department: it was cheap to build and operate; rehabilitation would be possible; it 
adhered to unit management principles; and the construction process created employment for 
small local contractors (to name a few). Notwithstanding these benefits, the proposal 
immediately ran into resistance from the Portfolio Committee, which questioned the integrity 
of the Department. Some members of the Committee dismissed the Department’s proposal as 
“simply another marketing strategy” whilst others questioned the need for new prisons since 
overcrowding was, as they explained, the result of the growing awaiting trial population, 
indicating systemic problems in the criminal justice system. After the initial excitement about 
New Generation prisons, the issue seems to disappear. 
However, in 2003/4 the Department announced that four sites (Leeuwkop, Klerksdorp, 
Kimberley and Nigel) had been identified for the new prisons and that the tender process was 
being finalised.190 Yet progress was slow, and in 2006 it became apparent that the low 
construction costs claimed by the architect Paul Silver in 2002 had little basis in reality. 
When the Department briefed the Portfolio Committee in 2006 on the planned four new 
prisons, the focus was on a procurement methodology.191 Two of the three methodologies192 
that were proposed involved co-financing by the private sector, indicating that the state did 
not have sufficient funds to build the prisons. In the following five years there would be 
numerous debates on the prison construction programme and, more specifically, about private 
sector involvement.193 The Department would frequently change its position and the Portfolio 
Committee would remain sceptical on the issue. Ultimately in 2011, the proposed four public 
                                                            
190 Department of Correctional Services (2004) Annual Report 2003/4, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 17. 
191 PMG Report of the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 6 June 
2006.http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060605-procurement-methodology-new-generation-prisons-briefing-
department Accessed 13 November 2011. 
192 (1) A conventional procurement by DCS more commonly known as a Public Sector Comparator 
procurement; (2) A complete Public Private Partnership with full services required rendered by the private 
partner; and (3) A project finance model (partial Public Private Partnership) where specific core functions will 
be provided by DCS and the balance by the private partner. (PMG Report of the meeting of the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services of 6 June 2006.http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060605-procurement-
methodology-new-generation-prisons-briefing-department Accessed 13 November 2011) 
193 Muntingh, L. (2010) ‘Love Me, Love Me Not’ – Public Private Partnerships in the Department of 
Correctional Services, Paper delivered at seminar hosted by Institute for Security Studies, Cape Town, 28 July 
2010. 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
private partnerships prisons which had already been placed out on tender would be 
scrapped,194 to the ire of the bidders who had submitted costly bids. The only prison that was 
ultimately built from this nearly decade-long saga was Kimberley’s new prison, for which the 
budget was R250 million (US$ 36.7 million) but which ended up costing R857 million (US$ 
126 million), that is, 243% over budget.195 
The prison construction debacle demonstrated the Department’s difficulties in following 
through on policy decisions and executive orders. Even though the construction of eight new 
prisons was approved, funds made available and announced by President Mbeki in his 2005 
and 2006 State of the Nation Addresses,196 the DCS was unable to deliver on these.  
4.1.6 The policy gaps 
 
The preceding discussion outlined the generally misdirected and frequently poorly executed 
policy responses of the Department to the problems it was facing after 1994. Notwithstanding 
the shortcomings of these policy initiatives, it is also notable that the Department failed to 
respond to a number of critically important problems it was facing in the period 1994 to 
2001. In this regard, three proverbial elephants were standing in the room: prisoners’ rights, 
HIV and AIDS, and corruption. From the perspective of the Constitution, these were 
fundamental problems requiring urgent and comprehensive action. Failure to address them 
would mean a material failing on the transformative aspiration of the Constitution.  
4.1.6.1 Human rights 
 
In 1998 the DCS launched a human rights training programme aimed at re-training DCS 
officials to inculcate a culture of human rights in the prison system. The training programme 
(run by two NGOs and a tertiary education institution)197 was piloted at four prisons, namely 
Rustenburg, Kroonstad, Nylstroom and Krugersdorp, and it is reported that “[i]f the results 
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prove to be satisfactory, the project will be implemented at all prisons”.
198
 However, in the 
following year no mention is made of it in the Annual Report, and it appears that the initiative 
came to an end.199 While successive Annual Reports abound with phrases such as “upholding 
the fundamental rights of offenders”, there is little evidence that the DCS was taking any 
meaningful and targeted steps to train its staff on prisoners’ rights, prevent rights violations 
and hold perpetrators accountable. In the new democratic order where prisoners are afforded 
detailed rights by the Constitution,
200
 the DCS did little, save in rhetoric, to see that its 
officials are trained on prisoners’ rights and that the necessary structures are set up to monitor 
and respond to rights violations. Even after the Judicial Inspectorate for Prisons became 
operational in 2000 and raised numerous problems about the treatment of prisoners, the 
Department generally failed to respond. The role of the Judicial Inspectorate is discussed 
further in Chapters 4 and 6.  
 
There is equally little to indicate that the DCS paid any real heed to the international human 
rights law instruments pertaining to prisoners such as the UN Standard Minimum Rules for 
                                                            
198 Department of Correctional Services (1999) Annual Report 1998, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 52. 
199According to Ms Amanda Dissel, then based at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(CSVR) and intimately involved with the training programme, 20 000 copies of a human rights training manual 
were printed and given to the DCS, but she could not confirm if these were in fact distributed and supported 
with training (telephonic interview, 17 November 2011). 
200 Section 35(2) ‘Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right  
a. to be informed promptly of the reason for being detained;  
b. to choose, and to consult with, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
c. to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state and at state expense, if 
substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
d. to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to 
be released;  
e. to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the 
provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical 
treatment; and  
f. to communicate with, and be visited by, that person's  
i. spouse or partner;  
ii. next of kin;  
iii. chosen religious counsellor; and  
iv. chosen medical practitioner.’ 
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the Treatment of Prisoners and the UN Convention Against Torture. It remains the situation 
that the DCS still does not have a policy on the prevention and eradication of torture.201 The 
results of this policy gap would manifest itself in continued assaults on prisoners as well as 
significant numbers of unnatural deaths in prisons, discussed below in section 4.14. 
 
4.1.6.2 HIV and AIDS 
 
After 1994 the mortality rate of prisoners increased from 1.65 per 1000 in 1995 to 9.2 per 
1000 in 2005, a near six-fold increase.202 It was commonly accepted that this was as a result 
of AIDS. Moreover, it was well known that coerced sex is common amongst prisoners and 
forms part and parcel of the prison gang culture (see Chapter 4 section 4.1), yet a policy 
response to sexual violence remained lacking. In respect of HIV and AIDS, policies and 
practices of the Department frequently fell short of desired standards in the past 17 years.
203
 
The first HIV and AIDS policy, formulated in 1992, required that HIV-positive and high-risk 
prisoners be segregated from the general population, but this changed two years later to bring 
it into line with World Health Organisation guidelines; the segregation of prisoners was 
removed from the DCS policy.204 A policy amendment was issued in 1996 to provide for a 
number of specific programmes, one of which was the establishment of Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases (including HIV and AIDS) clinics at all prison hospitals. The clinics would be run 
by nursing staff who would provide testing, counselling, treatment, and information about 
STDs.205 An additional policy prescribed condom distribution, which required that condoms 
would be distributed on request and following the prisoner receiving information and/or 
counselling from a nurse trained as an AIDS counsellor regarding the use of condoms and 
high-risk behaviour.206 Having to request condoms obviously created a substantial barrier due 
                                                            
201 Muntingh, L. and Fernandez, L. (2008) A review of measures in place to effect the prevention and combating 
of torture with specific reference to places of detention in South Africa, South African Journal on Human 
Rights, Vol. 24 No. 1, p. 126. 
202 Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009) HIV/Aids and the prison system, In Rohleder, P. et al HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa 25 years on. New York: Springer, p. 315. 
203 Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009), p. 314. 
204 Goyer, K.C. and Gow, J. (2001) Confronting HIV/AIDS in South African prisons, Politikon, Vol. 28 No. 2, 
pp.195–206. 
205 Goyer, K.C. and Gow, J. (2001), pp.195–206. 
206 Goyer, K.C. and Gow, J. (2001), pp.195–206. 
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to the stigma associated with male-on-male sex in prison. Notwithstanding the aims of this 
policy, the mortality rate of prisoners accelerated. The 1996 policy remained in place until the 
Framework for the Implementation of Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Programmes and 
Services for Offenders and Personnel 2007-2011 was adopted in 2007.  
 
Prisoners’ access to antiretroviral medication (ARV) remained elusive, and it was only after a 
group of prisoners at Durban Westville prison in KwaZulu-Natal embarked on litigation in 
2005207 that the situation changed.208 Even when the KwaZulu-Natal High Court ordered the 
Department to provide deserving prisoners with access to ARV, the Department appealed the 
decision and wanted the order already granted suspended until the appeal was heard. The 
request was not granted and after much foot-dragging the DCS commenced with setting up 
accredited antiretroviral therapy (ART) centres. DCS staff was also not spared the effects of 
HIV and AIDS, and the mortality rate of officials increased from 3/1000 in 1995 to 6.1/1000 
by 2001.209 Despite the attrition of staff 210 there is little evidence that the DCS responded to 
the situation in any meaningful way. It was only in the 2007 Policy Framework that both staff 
and prisoners are targeted.211 
 
By 2000 HIV and AIDS had become a highly politicised issue domestically and 
internationally. The DCS had in its care a segment of the population known globally to have 
a higher HIV prevalence rate than the general population,212 and since 1995 the mortality rate 
of prisoners had climbed sharply. With an estimated 350 000 people moving through the 
prison system annually,213 the Department had an important task to fulfil as prisons are 
recognised vectors for HIV, AIDS and TB.214 Their responsibility was not only to the people 
                                                            
207
 EN and Others v Government of the RSA and Others (2007) (1) BCLR 84 (SAHC Durban 2006). 
208 Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009), pp. 306-307. 
209 Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009), pp. 315. 
210 A DCS-commissioned survey found, for example, that 23% of officials in KwaZulu-Natal were HIV-positive 
(Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009), pp. 315).  
211 Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009), pp. 314. 
212 World Health Organisation (1993) WHO guidelines on HIV infection and AIDS in prisons, New York: 
UNAIDS. UNODC (2007) HIV and Prisons in sub-Saharan Africa: Opportunities for Action, Vienna: UNODC. 
213 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2006) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Prisons 2005/6, Cape 
Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, pp. 12-13. 
214 UNODC (2006) HIV/AIDS Prevention, Care, Treatment and Support in Prison Settings A Framework for an 
Effective National Response, New York: United Nations. 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
inside prison but to the broader community. Later research would establish that the 
prevalence rate amongst male sentenced prisoners in South Africa is just below 20%, or 
roughly one in five sentenced prisoners.215 Moreover, coerced sex between male prisoners 
was a known phenomenon and strongly linked to the prisons gangs (see section 4.13 and 
Chapter 5 section 7). Addressing HIV and AIDS in prisons was critically important, yet the 
Department did little to prevent transmission and it was only after litigation that it 
commenced with more tangible steps by providing access to ARV.  
 
4.1.6.3 Corruption 
 
In July 1996 the DCS established it own internal Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) following a 
Cabinet Committee decision requiring cooperation between different security agencies to 
combat corruption.
216
 The ACU would report directly to the Commissioner and its main 
purpose was to investigate corruption. When the DCS briefed the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Service on the performance of the ACU in 1998, it was already evident that it 
was encountering significant problems, but most importantly it noted that “[m]anagers are in 
some instances reluctant to act against transgressors”.217 This should have been a clear 
indication that the maintenance of discipline and order was in a poor state. The results 
reported on were paltry: 28 officials were subjected to departmental disciplinary action and 
six to criminal prosecutions. The results from 1999 looked slightly better, with 366 cases 
reported, 202 being investigated and 30 cases referred to the police for investigation.
218
 Yet 
the DCS proclaimed that the “prevention and eradication of corruption is a priority for the 
                                                            
215 Lim’Uvune Consulting (2007) DCS HIV prevalence survey 2006, Unpublished report, Pretoria. 
216 PMG Report of the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 13 May 1998, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/19980512-inspecting-judge-overcrowding-and-anti-corruption-unit-briefing-0 
Accessed 13 November 2011. 
217 PMG Report of the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 13 May 1998, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/19980512-inspecting-judge-overcrowding-and-anti-corruption-unit-briefing-0 
Accessed 13 November 2011. Other problems noted were: ‘Not sure that all corruption related matters are being 
reported to the ACU (Anti-Corruption Unit); People withhold information; Personnel as well as prisoners are 
afraid of being victimised; People are reluctant to give evidence at disciplinary hearings and court cases and 
therefore prefer to stay anonymous; Some cases take time to investigate as it requires monitoring and 
surveillance; Disciplinary steps are not always taken timeously.’ 
218 Department of Correctional Services (2000), p. 83. 
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Department.”
219
 By 2000 the ACU had been reduced to five investigators for a department 
employing more than 32 000 officials.220 It was evident that the Department’s rhetoric about 
the prevention and eradication of corruption was at odds with reality.  
 
External investigations into DCS would uncover widespread corruption, and notwithstanding 
it being known to senior management that corruption was a problem by the late 1990s, the 
overwhelming impression is that little more was done than establishing the ACU and then 
assigning it so few resources that it was by and large rendered ineffective. Senior 
management failed to address at policy level the biggest challenge that the Department was 
facing, yet it was dabbling in other distractions such as unit management and electronic 
monitoring. 
 
4.2 Leadership instability 
 
Instability at the most senior level of the Department severely undermined the functioning of 
the Department and consequently prison reform. From 1994 to 2011 the DCS has had eleven 
National Commissioners, of which seven were permanent appointments and the others acting 
National Commissioners, as shown in Table 2 below.  
Table 2 
Name Status Start End Duration 
General Henk Bruyn Permanent April 1994 ? 1996 2 years 
Mr. Khulekani Sithole Permanent ?1996 Nov 1999 2 ½ years 
Mr.Thami Nxumalo Acting Nov 1999 May 2000 7 months 
Rev. Lulamile Mbete Permanent May 2000 March 2001 10 months 
Mr. Watson Tshivase Acting April 2001 July 2001 3 months 
Mr. Linda Mti Permanent Aug 2001 May 2007 6 years and 9 months 
Ms Jabu Sishuba Acting May 2007 May 2007 1 month 
Mr. Vernon Petersen Permanent May 2007 Oct 2008 1 year and 5 months 
Ms Xoliswa Sibeko Permanent Oct 2008 Feb 2010 9 months active. She was 
suspended in mid-July 
2009 and remained 
suspended until her 
contract was terminated in 
February 2010. 
                                                            
219 Department of Correctional Services (2000), p. 83. 
220 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 3 October 2000, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20001003-overcrowding-prisons-release-prisoners-escapes-anti-corruption 
Accessed 13 November 2011. 
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Name Status Start End Duration 
Ms Jenny Schreiner Acting Feb 2010 May 2010 3 months 
Mr. Tom Moyane Permanent May 2010 Present  
 
The longest serving National Commissioner was Linda Mti, a former Member of Parliament 
(ANC) and coordinator of the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee. He was 
appointed shortly before the Jali Commission was established. Under Mti, the first 
comprehensive strategic plan of the Department (known as Mvelaphanda) was developed in 
2001 and the 2004 White Paper also published under his watch. Mti would, however, after his 
departure from the DCS, be implicated in corruption indulged in whilst he was National 
Commissioner (see Chapter 4 section 4.2).221 
The period 1994 to 2001 saw DCS sinking deeper into crisis. This can be ascribed at least in 
part be to the high turnover of National Commissioners: five in seven years, of whom two 
were acting in that capacity. Of particular significance during this period was Khulekani 
Sithole. Prior to joining the DCS in the early 1990s, he was an inspector with the Free State 
Department of Education and one of the first external appointments to the Department. He 
was rapidly promoted from director level and subsequently appointed as National 
Commissioner.222 Sithole would ultimately resign amidst allegations of financial 
mismanagement and corruption, and was called unfit for public office by Parliament’s 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA).223 The DPSA would also be extremely 
critical of Sithole and placed the blame on him for the chaotic state of human resources 
management of the Department. Sithole is perhaps best remembered for his proposals that 
disused mines be converted into prisons in order to alleviate overcrowding.224 The proposals 
alienated him from human rights groups.
225
 
                                                            
221‘The SIU’s case against Linda Mti’. City Press, 20 March 2011, http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/The-
SIUs-case-against-Linda-Mti-20110320 Accessed 13 November 2011. See Chapter 5 for a fuller description. 
222Telephonic interview with Mr. Gideon Morris, former employee of the DCS and erstwhile secretary to Mr. 
Sithole (17 November 2011). 
223 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 10 November 1999, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/19991109-closure-sitole-matter-overseas-trip Accessed 13 November 2011. 
224 ‘Mine-shaft prisons slammed: African bishops shocked by plan to lock up “animal” prisoners in underground 
jail’. Anglican Journal, April 1997, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7042/is_4_123/ai_n28700589/ 
Accessed 13 November 2011. ‘There are criminals within our system who have made it clear that they are not 
prepared to conform to the norms of a democratic society ... People like murderers, rapists, armed robbers who 
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Leadership instability was not restricted to the National Commissioner’s position. Senior 
officials in the Head Office and Regional Commissioners would frequently be in acting 
positions, or being transferred from one position to another. Moreover, persons in senior 
positions frequently lacked the skills and experience to deal with the problems the 
Department was facing between 1996 and 2001. Leadership instability continues to be a 
problem in DCS, and following Mti’s departure in 2007 and at the time of writing (December 
2011), there have again been three permanently appointed National Commissioners in four 
years while four of the seven Regional Commissioners were acting in that position.226 
4.3 Operation Quiet Storm, Operation Thula and CORE 
 
4.3.1 The Department of Public Service and Administration investigation 
 
The decision taken by the Minister of Public Service and Administration in 1999 to have a 
management audit conducted of the DCS was in part motivated by events in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The audit team’s final report describes these as follows: 
Comments by the CCMA227 arbitrator in the case [of] Bhengu v Department of 
Corrections: " … (the documentation) reads like something reminiscent of the goings 
on in the most basic of banana republics. It is quite clear that in the Province of 
KwaZulu-Natal from the beginning of December 1998 until February 1999 the situation 
amongst top level management could only be described as absolutely chaotic … on its 
own version. The respondent has shown a clear inability to properly manage itself in 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
repeatedly transgress, they are animals. They must never see sunlight again.’ – Department of Correctional 
Services commissioner Khulekani Sithole, suggesting that dangerous criminals should be thrown down disused 
mine shafts. (‘The words of wisdom, the wit, the bloopers’. Mail and Guardian, 23 December 1997, 
http://mg.co.za/article/1997-12-23-the-words-of-wisdom-the-wit-the-bloopers Accessed 13 November 2011)  
225 Pete, S. (2000), p. 22. 
226 Department of Correctional Services (2011) Annual Report 2010/11, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 4. 
227 Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration. It is a statutory mechanism established by the 
Labour Relations Act to deal with disputes between employers and employees. 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
KwaZulu-Natal…. Management at both national and provincial levels had simply 
ceased to function effectively….228 
There were thus early signs that in respect of human resources management, serious 
governance problems had developed in the DCS and it was unable to manage its human 
resource function according to the applicable policies and procedures. The DPSA 
management audit traced the timeline of causation back to the appointment of National 
Commissioner Khulekani Sithole (from mid-1996). He set, according to the DPSA, a 
particularly poor example as the most senior official of the Department: 
The beginnings of a breakdown of proper procedures in HR [human resources] matters 
appear to coincide with the appointment of Commissioner Sithole. From the outset of 
his tenure of office the new Commissioner apparently took full advantage of all the 
powers of his office to the extreme in a campaign to surround himself with “place 
men”. It is alleged that, with scant regard for the published criteria contained in 
advertisements for posts, short lists were doctored and panel recommendations were 
ignored or manipulated to select the “preferred” candidates.229 
The DPSA observed further that he used his authority to transfer staff to punish those who 
opposed him to ensure that he was surrounded by his “favourites”. When this attracted 
attention from investigators, records were altered to frustrate inquiries into the audit trail of 
staff movements, appointments and promotions. The situation was aggravated by the 
collusion between union elements and senior managers who were former office bearers, or 
even still holding office, in the same unions and who remained union members.
230
 Evidence 
was also found of properly appointed officials being physically removed from their offices 
and inspectors of the DCS refused permission to enter prisons to fulfil their official duties. It 
was ultimately the assassination of a whistleblower that prompted the appointment of the Jali 
Commission.  
4.3.2 The Jali Investigation 
 
                                                            
228 Department of Public Service and Administration (1999) Management Audit of the Department of 
Correctional Services, Department of Public Service and Administration, Presented to the Portfolio Committee 
on Correctional Services, 19 April 2000, p. 3. 
229 Department of Public Service and Administration (1999), p. 15. 
230 Department of Public Service and Administration (1999), p. 15-16. 
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When the Jali Commission started its investigations some two and half years after the DPSA, 
it found that in almost all the management areas investigated, including the Head Office, that: 
[r]ecruitment drives, appointments, promotions and merit awards are constantly tainted 
with allegations of malpractices, irregularities, nepotism and even corruption. The 
common feature of these allegations is the manipulation of the processes by senior 
officials in the employ of the Department.231 
In the Jali Commission’s investigations it became clear that the manipulation of appointments 
and promotions was not being done in an ad hoc manner by individuals or small groups of 
uncoordinated individuals.232 Evidence was submitted that the labour union POPCRU 
planned to fast-track affirmative action in KwaZulu-Natal by removing “reactionary forces” 
from senior positions and replacing them with “progressive people”.233 A meeting to develop 
such a plan was held in 1996234 and attended by POPCRU members from KwaZulu-Natal and 
surrounding regions as well as a representative from the POPCRU National Office. At this 
meeting a plan was developed and code-named “Operation Quiet Storm”. A former office 
bearer of POPCRU in KwaZulu-Natal, Mr. P. Ntuli, described Operation Quiet Storm as 
follows to the Jali Commission: 
In essence, ‘Operation Quiet Storm’ entailed the forcible removal of ‘reactionary 
forces’ from their positions of power. This aim was to be achieved in stages, which 
followed one another rapidly. Certain strategic and influential posts were to be targeted. 
Once the incumbents were removed, our choice would be deployed to the vacant post. 
In order to ensure the speedy implementation of ‘Operation Quiet Storm’, among the 
strategies which would be employed were the following: 
8.1 We would engage in long and arduous meetings with management – making 
certain demands. The idea was to frustrate management to the point where they 
would simply cave into our demands. 
8.2 In certain instances, we would take management personnel as hostages – 
refusing to allow them to leave the rooms in which we would detain them. 
                                                            
231 Jali Commission, p. 189 and p. 249. 
232 Jali Commission, pp.56-98. 
233 The Jali Commission interpreted ‘progressive people’ to mean POPCRU members. 
234 The Commission estimated that it was held before October 1996, but a precise date was not established. 
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8.3 In other instances, we would prevent management from entering their offices: 
we would lock the doors and ban entry by the use of doorstoppers. 
8.4 We would embark on protest action and go-slows. 
8.5 Some members would woo the secretaries of senior officers so that we would 
gather inside information.235 
Operation Quiet Storm primarily affected management areas in KwaZulu-Natal,236 but was 
also rolled out to the Eastern Cape, Free State and Gauteng Provinces.
237
 This was evidenced 
by similar unrest in the management areas of Upington, Bloemfontein, St Albans, 
Johannesburg, Modderbee, and Krugersdorp.238 A similar operation was launched in the 
Eastern Cape, known as Operation Thula.239 Operation Thula240 was to achieve its objectives 
by making the prisons ungovernable and would be achieved by: ignoring instructions from 
senior management; proliferating the conveyance of contraband into the prisons; ignoring 
escapes; organising members to take leave simultaneously to make it difficult to run the 
prison; and turning the prison into a “G Hostel” (a filthy institution).241 
 
The Commission reported on numerous instances where POPCRU manipulated the 
appointment of staff. At secret meetings the fate of officials would be decided and POPCRU 
members then appointed into strategic positions in the DCS. Also on the agenda at these 
secret meetings was the identification of persons perceived to be stumbling blocks to 
“transformation” and therefore in need of removal.242 
 
The Jali Commission conceded that a trade union may have campaigns or programmes of 
action, but it was concerned about the criminal nature of Operation Quiet Storm.243 In essence 
it blamed Operation Quiet Storm (and thus POPCRU and its leadership) for introducing a 
culture of lawlessness in the Department as “it became the norm for unwanted members to be 
                                                            
235 Jali Commission, p. 57. 
236 Pietermaritzburg, Ncome, Eshowe, Durban Westville, Sevontein, Waterval, Empangeni and Stanger. 
237 Jali Commission, p. 73. 
238 Jali Commission, p. 75. 
239 Jali Commission, p. 76. 
240 Thula is isiXhosa for “keep quiet”.  
241 Jali Commission, p. 76. 
242 Jali Commission, p. 249. 
243 Jali Commission, p. 62. 
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forcibly removed from their positions and for unlawful actions to occur with impunity. This 
culture spilled over to other provinces.”244 Operation Quiet Storm deliberately and flagrantly 
ignored legal prescripts and established procedures for employer-employee negotiations and 
the appointment of staff. 
4.3.3 CORE 
 
The manipulation of appointments and promotions were, however, not limited to the regions 
and management areas of DCS. From evidence presented to the Jali Commission it was 
apparent that since 1997 there had existed a small and secret group of senior officials in the 
Head Office who would effectively control the Department, especially where this concerned 
staff appointments at senior level.245 The group became known as CORE, referring to a core 
of officials who would oversee and advance racial transformation in the DCS. The Jali 
Commission could not establish the identity of CORE’s leader but evidence pointed to three 
DCS officials, one of whom was the National Commissioner at the time, Khulekani Sithole. 
By the time the Jali Commission concluded its work in 2006, it pondered whether CORE was 
still in existence and observed that while it may have changed membership, it was more than 
likely still in existence. Evidence about CORE is sketchy, as many witnesses were not willing 
to disclose their identities for fear of workplace victimisation or being murdered. CORE 
wanted to see the appropriate persons appointed and had the power to do so since they were 
operating at the most senior level of the Department. It held its meetings in secret, and since 
there was no legal basis for such a structure within the management of the Department, no 
minutes were kept. The Jali Commission described it as follows: 
Thus began a process in which key appointments, promotions and removals were 
determined at these secret meetings. Invariably, the CORE leaders refused to restrict 
themselves to existing posts and positions. To the extent that it was necessary to 
promote their ends, they created and abolished posts as well. 
 
Implementing such decisions was not difficult since one of the CORE members headed 
the work-study section in the Department and would act in terms of the resolutions 
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taken at these secret meetings. Not only were the members of CORE intelligent, they 
were also scheming and ruthless.246 
 
In a very short period, from 1996 to 1998, POCRU had introduced a culture of lawlessness 
into the Department. Secret and criminal programmes of action, covert meetings, violence, 
intimidation and ultimately murder had become the trademark of staff appointments in the 
DCS. Prison reform and reinventing the prison system on the basis of constitutional values 
was by then entirely impossible.  
 
4.4 Manipulation of appointments, promotions and merit awards 
 
Against the background of Operation Quiet Storm and the culture of lawlessness thereby 
introduced, interference and manipulation in the appointment of staff were essentially 
motivated by four objectives:247 first, to secure employment for friends and family to 
positions in the DCS;
248
 second, to see the appointment of union-aligned staff to key human 
resource management positions which would then enable further manipulated 
appointments;249 third, to reward corrupt officials for corrupt acts through promotions;250 and 
                                                            
246 Jali Commission, pp. 85-86 
247 Muntingh, L. (2006) Corruption in the prison context, CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law 
Centre, p. 32., Jali Commission Chapter 5 
248 Jali Commission, p. 251. An example in this regard is the following. M.Kosana, former head of Personnel 
Provision in the Free State DCS, supervised the employment of two relatives and other people close to him, the 
Jali Commission heard. He allegedly refused to recuse himself from the recruitment drive. His ex-wife, common 
law wife, sister and another relative were appointed as candidate warders, according to evidence leader Vas 
Soni. In a further recruitment drive, his brother was short-listed although he did not have a matriculation 
certificate, which is a minimum requirement. Provincial Commissioner Willem Damons conceded that the 
problem was not dealt with effectively when allegations of nepotism involving Kosana surfaced. (‘Nepotism in 
Grootvlei – testimony’, News24.com, 25 July 2002, http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Nepotism-in-
Grootvlei-testimony-20020725 Accessed 9 November 2011, Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 34.) 
249 Jali Commission, p. 251. An example in this regard is the following. T Matshoko (a former POPCRU shop 
steward) testified before the Jali Commission that former Eastern Cape Personnel Head, Meshack Mpemva, then 
Deputy President of POPCRU, and St Alban’s Assistant Head, Erik Nweba, led the coup in the province that 
resulted in MrsTseane’s (Regional Commissioner) ousting and enabled them ‘to treble their salaries from lowly 
warders’. Mpemva allegedly told a (secret) house meeting that he had to be appointed as head of personnel so 
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fourth, to receive personal (monetary or sexual) gratification from the corrupt appointment.
251
 
These appointments were effected through the manipulation of shortlists for vacancies; 
manipulation of selection committees (decisions and members); presentation of fraudulent 
qualifications; payment of bribes to secure appointments; and granting of sexual favours in 
exchange for appointments.252 
 
In its investigations into the DCS, which concluded in August 2000, the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) found evidence of 427 officials being appointed without the necessary 
qualifications or when holding fraudulent qualifications.253 The Department failed to follow 
up on the submission of qualifications by new appointees and did not authenticate 
qualification certificates proactively. In response, the PSC made extensive short-term and 
long-term recommendations. The critical failure was a departure from established and well-
defined procedures for appointments in the public service.  
The issue of merit awards came to the fore in 1999 when the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services asked the then National Commissioner, Sithole, to explain the merit 
awards he had given to himself and a group of selected officials.254 Whilst not of such high 
monetary value, the awards had significance because of the seniority of the officials 
concerned. Sithole explained that he had sought legal advice on the matter and the advice he 
received allowed him to grant merit awards. However, a second opinion from the state law 
advisor came forth after the awards had been made, and he realised that the awards were 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
that he could influence the appointment of POPCRU members. (The Sunday Times, 15 September 2002; 
Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 34) 
250An example in this regard is the following. T Matshoka, a former POPCRU shop steward, testified before the 
Jali Commission that Mdantsane Prison’s assistant head was appointed to the post in exchange for assistance 
rendered in the ousting of Eastern Cape Provincial Commissioner, MrsTseane. (‘Jali told of “jobs for favours”, 
News24.com, 18 September 2002, http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Jali-told-of-jobs-for-favours-
20020918, Accessed 9 November 2011; Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 34). 
251 Ex-POPCRU shop steward, T Matshoko, testified before the Jali Commission that personnel officer Louis 
Tshatsu granted people jobs in exchange for sex. He also said that Tshatsu sold jobs to the public. For example, 
a woman was sent to him with R1000.00 so that he could secure her a job. (‘Jobs at prison sold for sex and 
money’. The Herald, 11 September 2002) 
252 Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 32. 
253 Jali Commission, pp. 196-197. 
254 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 10 November 1999, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/19991109-closure-sitole-matter-overseas-trip 
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unlawful. Sithole explained that all monies were paid back on the day he had appeared before 
SCOPA. It was, however, at that meeting that SCOPA concluded he was unfit for public 
office and asked for his removal; he resigned shortly thereafter. Despite this debacle, it 
appears that nothing was done at the time to rectify the situation with regard to the granting 
of merit awards. 
 
The Jali Commission concluded that the granting of merit awards was a problem in all the 
management areas it investigated.
255
 As was the case with the recruitment of staff, established 
policies were not adhered to and controls were not in place. Results of these failures were 
manifested in officials who did not qualify for merit awards receiving them; nepotism and 
favouritism influenced decision-making; no records of assessments were kept; moderation 
committees were unlawfully constituted; and recommendations made by the PSC were not 
implemented.  
4.5 Management and planning 
 
Problems in the DCS were evident not only in respect of human resources management and 
the treatment of prisoners (see sections 4.9 to 4.15 below), but also in the management, 
planning and specifically financial management of the Department. In 2001/2 the DCS 
received a qualified audit from the Auditor General based on the problems relating to the 
medical aid scheme for the Department’s employees (Medcor) (see section 4.6.1 below). The 
qualification was based on the continuing forensic investigation of Medcor, poor internal 
controls and non-compliance with the Medical Aid Schemes Act (131 of 1998).
256
 The 
Auditor General also raised a number of matters of emphasis, and these should be regarded as 
strongly indicative of poor financial management: problems around the awarding of merit 
awards; problems around leave administration and failure to implement recommendations 
made the previous year; the high vacancy rate in the Department’s finance management unit; 
non-compliance with internal auditing standards; poor internal controls; human resource 
management problems; and poor management at prison pharmacies.257 What was already 
                                                            
255Jali Commission, pp. 254-255. 
256 Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on the financial statements of Vote 19 – Correctional Services 
for the year ended 31 March 2002. In Department of Correctional Services (2002), p. 118-119. 
257 Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on the financial statements of Vote 19 – Correctional Services 
for the year ended 31 March 2002. In Department of Correctional Services (2002), pp. 120-124. 
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evident in this report by the Auditor General, as had been found by other external 
investigations, was that the Department seemed either to ignore recommendations or lack the 
ability to implement them. In the following year the Auditor General concluded: “An overall 
comparison of this report with that of the previous report for 2001/2002 would clearly 
indicate no improvement with regard to the financial and administrative management of the 
department.”258 Since then, the DCS has received successive qualified audits from the 
Auditor General, including 2010/11. A more detailed discussion of this is provided in 
Chapter 4 (section 2.4.2). 
 
The fundamental problems underlying the qualified audits were, however, already identified 
in the Management Audit conducted by the DPSA and released in 2000, and must have been 
available to the Department earlier.259 These related to poor planning and budgeting, limited 
skills and urgent need for training amongst the leadership cadre; the absence of a service 
delivery improvement programme; human resource management problems; standards of 
service delivery; and the enforcement of standards and discipline. The overall situation in 
respect of management and governance, as it stood at the end of 1999, is astutely summarised 
in the DPSA report: 
 
The Department has an impressive strategic plan with clearly formulated objectives, 
measurable targets and a strategic management information system that allows the 
monitoring of performance. By their own admission, management nevertheless still 
struggles to align the strategic planning and budgetary processes. Macro planning 
processes also appear to have little impact on the way that prisons are run. A serious 
concern is the involvement of unions in the strategic planning process. There appears to 
be no clear definition of roles and responsibilities between management and organised 
labour.260 
 
The picture sketched is of an organisation that was neither under the control of its political 
heads nor in control of itself: authority had become fragmented.  
                                                            
258 Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on the financial statements of Vote 20 – Correctional Services 
for the year ended 31 March 2003. In Department of Correctional Services (2003), p. 78. 
259 Department of Public Service and Administration (1999), pp. 1-2. 
260 Department of Public Service and Administration (1999), p. 7. 
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4.6 Manipulation of service benefits 
 
Service benefits refer normally to those benefits that an employee receives in addition to 
normal salary or wages, such as medical aid, pension fund, payment for overtime worked, 
housing subsidies and vehicle allowances. Manipulating these benefits dishonestly and/or 
beyond their original intention would amount to corruption. Even if this form of corruption 
does not have a direct influence on prisoners, planned expenditure is misdirected. This type 
of corruption is reflective of a culture of unethical behaviour that would indirectly affect 
prisoners. Historically, four issues dominate the manipulation of service benefits in the DCS, 
namely merit awards (discussed above), medical aid fraud (Medcor), sick leave, and payment 
for overtime worked. The scale of corruption relating to these was indeed shocking.  
 
4.6.1 Medical Aid 
 
In its second interim report the Jali Commission reported on widespread and large-scale fraud 
related to the DCS’s medical aid fund (Medcor), especially in KwaZulu-Natal. In response 
the Directorate Special Operations (formerly the Scorpions) of the National Prosecuting 
Authority started investigations; later the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) and the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit also became involved. 261 Since DCS employees did not contribute to the fund 
and there was no ceiling on how much a fund member could claim, it was an open invitation 
for fraudulent claims. 
 
Reportedly, a medical practitioner and a colluding official would co-operate to charge an 
innocent member’s medical aid account. The colluding official would obtain relevant 
information that was required for the claim, which the medical practitioner would submit to 
the fund. Once the fund paid out, the benefit was shared between the official and the medical 
practitioner. Typically claims would be false, excessive and/or for non-medical goods. When 
investigations started, the findings and the results were spectacular. For example, the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit seized assets to the value of R31 million (US$4.5 million) from two 
individuals and they were charged with more than 75 000 counts of fraud. The Scorpions 
instituted prosecutions against 700 DCS officials and the SIU would also refer hundreds of 
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officials for criminal prosecution or disciplinary action. As a result of the investigations, the 
number of fraudulent claims dropped dramatically and the SIU estimated that in the two years 
after investigations started (2002/3 and 2003/4), savings of nearly R500 million (US$72.5 
million) were made.
262
 
 
4.6.2 Sick leave 
 
Feigning illness occasionally can probably not be regarded as serious corruption, but when 
the utilisation of sick leave takes on proportions above the norm, the impact should be 
regarded in a cumulative sense. A 2005 report by the Auditor General found that between 1 
January 2001 and 31 December 2003, staff of the DCS took 952 160 days sick leave at a cost 
of R263 061 403 (US$ 38.7 million).263 Per capita the DCS had the second highest rate of 
sick leave per employee, only outdone by the equally problematic Department of Home 
Affairs.264 The coordinated and collective taking of sick leave was indeed a tactical part of 
Operation Quiet Storm to make prisons ungovernable. 
 
A more sympathetic view is that due to staff shortages, overcrowding and general poor 
working conditions, DCS staff experienced a significant amount of stress. Officials were 
taking stress and sick leave in significant numbers, but this only increased the workload on 
officials who were on duty.265 In short, it fed a vicious cycle of absenteeism. 
 
4.6.3. Overtime 
 
Historically it has been the case that the DCS operated a five-day establishment and work 
performed over weekends and public holidays qualified as overtime. The daily weekday staff 
worked office hours. To enable staff to leave work at 16h00, prisoners were locked up by 
                                                            
262 Jali Commission, pp. 914 – 916. 
263 Auditor General of South Africa (2005) Report of the Auditor General on a performance audit of the 
management of sick leave benefits at certain national and provincial departments, PR 2005, p. 6, 
http://www.agsa.co.za/Reports/Our%20Reports/AG%20reports-
National/Specialised%20audits/Performance/2005/Performance%20audit%20on%20management%20of%20sic
k%20leave%20benefits%20at%20certain%20national%20and%20provincial%20departments%20%282005%29
.pdf Accessed 18 December 2011. 
264 Auditor General of South Africa (2005), p. 6. 
265 Pete, S. (2000), p. 23. 
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approximately 14h30 in the afternoon after they had received lunch and dinner 
simultaneously. The cells were re-opened the next morning from 07h00 onwards. From 
16h00 to 07h00 the next morning only a skeleton staff, in two shifts, would be on duty. 
 
On the issue of overtime, the Management Audit published by the DPSA in 2000 found the 
following: 
 
In common with many other organisations, the DCS is finding that a system that 
depends upon overtime and premium weekend payments to cover a 7-day operation 
soon faces difficulties and can be held to ransom. Because staff members rely on 
overtime to boost a low basic income there is always the motivation to corrupt the 
system to create unnecessary hours. This is often accompanied by unfair distribution of 
overtime to favour individuals in positions of power in unions or other non-managerial 
groups. There is a need to replace the current system with a fresh package that will at 
once provide fair remuneration and benefits to staff members and remove overtime 
from the service.266 
 
In 2000 an investigation by the PSC noted irregularities with the payment of overtime and 
recommended the creation of a Seven Day Establishment (SDE). However, for reasons that 
the Jali Commission could not fathom, nothing was done about the PSC recommendations 
until 2003 when the DCS established a task team to investigate the issue.
267
 In its 2001/2 
report the Auditor General expressed concern that the monthly overtime paid to DCS officials 
exceeded 30% of their basic salaries, which was contradictory to Public Service 
Regulations.
268
 In 2001, the DPSA also reported to the Portfolio Committee on Public 
Service and Administration that “it was clear that remunerated overtime was being abused on 
a large scale. This was evident in employees' practice of taking Mondays to Wednesdays off 
sick and then claiming overtime by working on weekends.”
269
 
                                                            
266 Department of Public Service and Administration (1999), pp. 15-16. 
267 Jali Commission, p. 796. 
268 Auditor General of South Africa (2002) Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on the Financial 
Statements of Vote 19 – Correctional Services for the year ended 31 March 2002, para 5.2.3(i). 
269 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration meeting on 16 
March 2001,http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20010315-department-correctional-services-investigation-and-
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Evidence before the Jali Commission established that the overtime system was widely 
misused, there was no control over the overtime payment system and that attempts to bring it 
under control (as proposed by the PSC)
270
 and curtail expenditure were ignored by 
managers.271 A typical practice was that senior staff members would undertake weekend 
duties performing the functions of an ordinary prison warder, but then be remunerated on 
their existing (higher) rank. This was contrary to the policies and procedures of the DCS but 
not enforced. 
 
Expenditure on paying staff for overtime work grew to astronomical proportions and by 
2004/5 had increased to R770 million per annum,272 or an estimated 14% of the salary 
budget. In 2004, the DCS also reported continued overspending on this item for the preceding 
three years.273 It was clear that the system was widely abused by employees to supplement 
their basic salaries, but it also had the effect that, as a result of staff being absent during the 
week, prisoners’ safety, access to services and un-locked time were compromised. Moreover, 
the involvement of senior staff members in the exploitation of overtime benefits added to a 
culture of unethical behaviour amongst the staff corps.  
4.7 State resources 
 
The misuse or redirection of state assets for private gain diverts these resources from their 
intended purpose, which is to run an effective and efficient prison system in line with human 
rights standards. Whilst individual acts of theft or misuse of state assets and resources can be 
petty, their collective effect is significant.
274
 The extensive investigations by the SIU
275
 and 
                                                            
270 Jali Commission, pp. 808-810 
271 Jali Commission, p. 805. 
272 PMG report on the meeting of SCOPA on 10 November 2004, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20041109-
department-correctional-services-hearing Accessed 9 November 2011. 
273 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 10 August 2004, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20040809-overtime-budget-and-related-industrial-action-briefing Accessed 9 
November 2011.  
274 Muntingh, L. (2006). 
275 The SIU visited 179 correctional centres and interviewed 143 887 inmates and 33 132 DCS officials (PMG 
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Jali Commission identified three areas of risk: vehicle fleet management; using state assets 
(especially technical workshops) for personal gain; and poor stock control. The SIU’s 
investigations into vehicle fleet management focusing on the misuse of credit card facilities 
for fuel purchases resulted in 145 officials being recommended for disciplinary action.
276
 The 
Jali Commission found evidence of technical workshops being used for private work277 and 
even criminal enterprises.278 Stock control was also problematic at technical workshops and 
kitchens.
279
 Pharmacies were found to be a serious problem, and the SIU established a 
number of procurement irregularities or fraudulent activities in the supply of medicines to 
prisons or in the dispensing of medicines to prisoners. These included: the supply to prisoners 
of grey medicine (medicine that is illegally manufactured domestically or smuggled into the 
country and repackaged by professional criminal syndicates); the repackaging of expired 
medicine and its dispensing to correctional centres; the theft and repackaging of state 
medicines and its subsequent retailing through private pharmacies; the stockpiling of 
medicine at some prisons, which resulted in the expiry of medicines; the flouting of 
procurement policies; and the forging of prescriptions by DCS officials.
280
 
 
4.8 Undermining the investigation of corruption, ill-discipline and other matters 
 
                                                            
276 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 20 May 2008, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080520-briefing-special-investigations-unit-investigation-department Accessed 
14 November 2011. 
277 Jali Commission, pp. 853-872 
278 In KwaZulu-Natal it was found that a panel-beating workshop established by the DCS some years earlier 
turned into a criminal enterprise. It was reported as follows by the Mail and Guardian: Then things apparently 
started to go wrong. ‘We've been told that prisoners have been given 'shopping lists' of desirable vehicles and 
then let out for the night by corrupt officials,’ says chief investigator for the commission Jerome Brauns SC. 
‘They return with stolen cars, and the chassis and engine numbers are doctored in the prison workshop while 
the cars are given a re-spray prior to resale. These are just some of the allegations we've had, but hard evidence 
is difficult to come by. We've been given the names of some of those allegedly involved, but they, of course, deny 
all knowledge. Intimidation is very high in these circles and people will talk to us in confidence, but are afraid 
to speak on the record. Of course, it all makes sense — those people best qualified to do the job are already 
housed in Westville Prison. Mail and Guardian Supplement, 25 February 2002. 
279 Jali Commission, pp. 876-879. 
280 Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 50. 
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As noted previously, since 1998 there were a number of investigations into the affairs of the 
DCS by external agencies as well as through internal inspections. However, these efforts 
would frequently be frustrated and undermined by corrupt groups and individuals in the 
Department. The officials had significant interests to protect and would not merely roll over 
and cooperate. Official investigators of the DCS281 and SAPS282 were at times refused entry 
into prisons and denied access to information. In the course of investigations, witnesses were 
also intimidated
283
 and investigations undermined through the fabrication or disappearance of 
evidence.284 Several attempts were also made by POPCRU to discredit the Jali Commission 
publicly.285 Delay tactics were used to frustrate investigations, and witnesses would suddenly 
go on leave or choose to work out of town.
286
 Internal investigations into misconduct and 
criminal offences were also done selectively. The “stumbling blocks to transformation” 
would very soon find themselves the target of disciplinary action,287 but serious violations 
(e.g. assault of prisoners) would not be attended to.288 
 
4.9 Assaults, assassinations and intimidation of staff 
 
At one stage, factions within the DCS were so intent on achieving their objectives that 
killing, intimidating and forcibly removing colleagues from their positions became part of 
                                                            
281 Department of Public Service and Administration (1999), p. 16. 
282 Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 43. 
283 Jali Commission, pp. 24-25; ‘Sex slaves, drugs and video tape’ IOL, 18 June 2002, 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/sex-slaves-drugs-and-video-tape-1.88292 Accessed 9 November 2011. 
‘Following the discovery of the [Grootvlei] video, one of the prisoners involved in the filming was severely 
assaulted and had to be taken to hospital. On the same day, a prisoner was caught with poison, apparently 
supplied by a warder, meant to kill the injured prisoner.’ 
284 Jali Commission, pp. 24-25.  
285 Jali Commission, p. 25. 
286 Jali Commission, pp. 24-25. ‘Prison official abusing Jali Commission'. The Argus, 3 December 2002. 
287 The case of Ms A and Mr. B was of this nature. Ms A was seen as a stumbling block but Mr. B was 
influential and her protector. Soon they were charged with abusing their travel claims. Unfortunately for them, 
there was evidence to support the charge and both were forced out of the Department (Jali Commission, pp. 87-
88). 
288 Head of Pretoria Local prison testified before the Jali Commission in April 2004 that there were 251 charges 
against officials at his prison for assault on prisoners. However, not a single warder had been disciplined or 
criminally prosecuted (‘Jail boss grilled by Jali’. Pretoria News, 21 April 2004). 
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tactic to ensure that the “right people” were in decision-making positions. The situation in 
Pietermaritzburg (KwaZulu-Natal) was particularly bad at the height of Operation Quiet 
Storm, and the Jali Commission reported seven confirmed murders there in addition to people 
being shot at, assaulted and having their property damaged.
289
 At Middeldrift prison in the 
Eastern Cape, the assassination of the head of the prison was narrowly averted when the 
National Intelligence Agency intervened.290 A gun was reportedly smuggled in by warders 
and given to prisoners with the instruction to kill the Head of Prison. Similar reports from 
other prisons (e.g. Leeuwkop) were also made.291A key witness to the Jali Commission (P. 
Ntuli) had to be placed in a witness protection programme after receiving death threats.292 
 
4.10 Trade in contraband 
 
The security objective of the prison system prohibits the possession of a range of goods in 
addition to those usually considered illicit.293 The prohibition of these goods and substances 
therefore creates a market with warders being the logical suppliers. Lifestyles and addictions 
developed prior to imprisonment create further demand for a range of commodities. Trading 
in drugs and alcohol is undoubtedly financially very rewarding for those involved. For 
example, a warder at Grootvlei prison allegedly made an average profit of R9 000 (US$ 
1200) per month from selling brandy to prisoners at hugely inflated prices.294 The smuggling 
of drugs is, according to the Jali Commission, prevalent in the prison system and very 
profitable for both warders and prison gangs.295 The now infamous Grootvlei video296 
showed how a firearm was sold inside the prison for R6 000 (US$900).297 Drugs, alcohol, 
                                                            
289 Jali Commission, pp. 282-283. 
290 ‘Commission told of host of problems at E-Cape jail’. The Herald, 14 August 2002. 
291 Pete, S. (2000), p. 40. 
292 ‘Prisons spokesperson resigns’. SABC News, 21 February 2002, 
http://196.35.74.234/south_africa/crime1justice/0,2172,41280,00.html Accessed 9 November 2011. 
293 ss 119-121 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
294 ‘Warder likely to lose assets over illicit booze deals’. The Star, 16 July 2002. 
295 Jali Commission, pp. 169-170; Painter-Morland, M. et al (2003) Final Consolidated Report – focused 
assessment of anti-corruption capacity within the Department of Correctional Services, UNODC, Pretoria. 
296 A group of prisoners cooperated in secretly filming corrupt acts committed by warders at Grootvlei prison. 
The video was aired on national television and generated a tremendous public outcry.  
297 ‘Grootvlei warder sacked’. news24.com, 28 November 2002, 
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food and weapons are high value commodities and, assessed across the prison system as a 
whole, trade in contraband must be worth millions of rand every year; smuggling these items 
will probably always be part of any prison system.298 It was already noted, with reference to 
Operation Thula (section 4.3), that flooding the prison with contraband was a deliberate tactic 
to make it ungovernable. However, when warders collude with prison gangs the situation is 
reason for deep concern, for it not only undermines the legitimacy of the prison system but 
elevates the status of the prison gangs.
299
 
4.11 Trafficking in people 
 
Although allegations of trafficking in people in prisons had surfaced from time to time in the 
past, the Grootvlei video demonstrated with horrific clarity the nature of the practice. The 
video showed how a young prisoner from the juvenile section was brought to an older 
prisoner by a warder for payment and then made to have sex with the older prisoner.300 This 
was not an isolated incident, because the Jali Commission found evidence at Grootvlei prison 
that the sale of young prisoners for sex with older prisoners was commonplace and that a sex 
ring involving juvenile prisoners existed amongst warders.301 The Jali Commission described 
the situation at Grootvlei prison as follows: 
 
The witnesses were consistent about the fact that none of these abuses would have 
taken place if it were not for the warders, who either abused them or constantly assisted 
the prisoners to abuse them. For example, Mr. Joseph Rampano, a twenty (20) year old 
inmate, testified before the Commission that he played for the Pirates soccer team, 
which is composed of both juveniles and adults. He stated that one of the adult 
prisoners wanted him to be “his baby”. This particular prisoner, who was the chief cook 
in the kitchen, enticed him with food and sodomised him in the storeroom of the 
kitchen. The most disturbing fact is that Mr. Rampano would never have gained access 
to the kitchen if it had not been for the warders who took him there and opened the 
gates for him. All the circumstances of this matter showed that the warders had full 
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knowledge of what was going on. It also showed lack of commitment to stamp out 
sexual abuse.  
 
As a result of the incestuous relationship that existed between warders and adult 
prisoners, the environment was not conducive for these young victims to report the 
sexual abuse. 
 
The Jali Commission’s findings accord with earlier findings by Gear and Ngubeni that some 
warders were part of an organised trade in sex in male prisons.302 Corrupt prison officials are 
ideally placed to regulate the movement of people between sections in a prison based on the 
discretionary powers they have.
303
 They can also arrange for privacy as required. Collusion 
between warders and prisoners (as the clients) also ensures that complaints by victims will 
not go very far and be smothered by either the warders or by accomplice prisoners through 
bribes, intimidation and coercion.
304
 
 
4.12 Access to services and utilities 
 
The Correctional Services Act sets out the minimum requirements of detention in prisons and 
further describes the services to which prisoners are entitled.305 Demanding payment from 
prisoners for services would constitute a corrupt act and violate constitutional rights. The 
same would also apply when payment is demanded from a prisoner to have expanded, 
additional, manipulated or lengthened access to a right or amenity. 
 
Findings from the Jali Commission indicated that at Durban-Westville prison the extortion of 
money from prisoners or former prisoners by warders was prevalent for the purposes of 
obtaining remission of sentence, the conversion of sentences to periods of correctional 
                                                            
302 A prisoner described it as follows: ‘You give [the warder] money and tell him that you want a certain boy in 
your cell . . . He will agree and he will tell the other warders some story.’ (Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002) Daai 
Ding – Sex, Sexual Violence and Coercion in Men’s Prisons, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, p.67.) 
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supervision, and for allowing an inmate amenities to which he or she would not normally be 
entitled.306 Warders were also extorting money from inmates or their families to ensure the 
safety of the inmate. Other examples of this included prisoners having to pay a bribe to make 
a phone call, to have their complaint attended to, and to access services.
307
 The abuse of 
power through, for example, asking for small bribes, has an insidious and extremely 
damaging impact on the prison system and undermines in a very real way any claims to 
legitimacy. Moreover, even if only a small number of warders engage in such criminal 
behaviour, prisoners tend to generalise this behaviour to all warders. On a systemic level it is 
highly damaging to prisoners’ perceptions of the prison system and its officials. 
 
4.13 Sexual violence in prisons 
 
Sexual violence in prisons amongst prisoners is a worldwide phenomenon, and in South Africa it 
is strongly associated with the prison gangs308 which use rape as an instrument of control and 
dominance within the prison system.
309
A more detailed analysis of sexual violence in prisons as 
a phenomenon is provided in Chapter 5, and the focus is here on the findings from 1994 to 2004. 
The Jali Commission regarded the issue of sexual violence as so important that it dedicated an 
entire chapter of its final report to the issue, calling it a “horrific scourge … that plagues our 
prisons where appalling abuses and acts of sexual perversion are perpetrated on helpless and 
unprotected prisoners”.
310
 Despite the reported prevalence of sexual violence in prisons, the 
official position of the DCS has been one of general denial and at best, uneasy acceptance.311 It 
                                                            
306 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 20 August 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20020819-jali-commission-briefing; 
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309 See generally Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002); Steinberg, J. (2004) Nongoloza’s Children: Western Cape Prison 
Gangs During and After Apartheid, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation; Mashabela, 
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was only in 2008 that the DCS publicly acknowledged that sexual violence, including male rape, 
in prisons was a problem, and subsequently the DCS has commenced work on developing a 
policy framework on the prevention of sexual violence in prisons.312 
 
The cases of sexual violence investigated by the Jali Commission paid particular attention to the 
actions of officials, either as perpetrators or as the persons with a legislated duty to respond to 
the needs of the victims. The following are two examples, and by no means exhaustive of the 
issue. The case of Louis Karp, a transsexual presenting as a woman and detained in a male 
prison, made it clear that at Pretoria Local prison the officials (medical staff included) had no 
idea of how to deal with sexual violence and also exploited the prisoner further.
313
 Karp, 
detained in 2001, was sold to other prisoners for sex, forced to perform oral sex on a warder, 
repeatedly raped, and when he complained, locked in solitary confinement. When he sought 
medical help, he was effectively ignored and no HIV tests were done. At Grootvlei prison the 
Commission heard the case of a prisoner, Kenneth Busakwe, who had been raped by two other 
prisoners and, when he complained to a warder, was raped by the warder in turn. The same 
warder also had young prisoners brought to his office regularly, where he would rape them.314 
The Commission was deeply concerned about the manner in which investigations were 
conducted once a complaint of rape had been laid by a prisoner. It was clear that DCS officials 
interfered with and manipulated investigations with the aim at frustrating any outcome. 
 
From these two cases it is evident that the officials directly or indirectly concerned had little 
regard for prisoners’ rights and instead used their positions of authority to exploit them further. 
Moreover, management appeared unconcerned about the sexual exploitation of prisoners. 
4.14 Assisted escapes and irregular releases 
 
In section 3.3.2 above it was noted that by 1994 escapes from prisons had taken on crisis 
proportions. The overall impression gained is that no matter how much security hardware 
(e.g. closed circuit television, metal scanners and electrified fences) was installed, the greatest 
security risk remained the integrity of the staff. This was patently the case when officials 
assisted prisoners to escape. This took on several forms, such as warders directly assisting 
                                                            
312 Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. (2011 a). 
313 Jali Commission, pp. 404-408. 
314 Jali Commission, pp. 409-410. 
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escapes; irregular releases; allowing escapes for ulterior motives (i.e. as part of Operation 
Quiet Storm); and illegally leaving a prison. The Jali Commission found that one particular 
warder at Johannesburg prison was associated with 75 escapes or “disappearances” from that 
prison.
315
 In 2002 the Jali Commission reported to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services that it was clear the Parole Board at Durban Westville prison was being used merely 
to rubber-stamp sinister decisions made elsewhere, with the Board itself appearing not to 
apply its mind to the merits of the applications before it.
316
 It also noted that sentence 
remission procedures were found to be open to abuse, with reports of good conduct by 
prisoners being at times mere fabrications or having been done by some inmate other than the 
prisoner applying for remission. In 2004, the police uncovered a syndicate at Barberton 
Prison that was facilitating early parole releases for R7 000 (US$1020) each.317 At Durban 
Westville, the Jali Commission found that prisoners were leaving and returning to the prison 
with the full knowledge and assistance of warders.318 One prisoner made numerous visits to 
his spouse and another stayed at various city hotels while still a prisoner. In 2006 it was 
reported to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services that in November 2005 warders 
at Zonderwater prison assisted escapes by either smuggling in a firearms and toy pistols or 
deliberately not performing the necessary security checks in two escape incidents.319 
 
4.15 Assault and killing of prisoners 
 
The assault and murder of prisoners by officials are extremely serious human rights 
violations. Assaults and deaths in custody remain worryingly common, as was found by the 
Jali Commission
320
 and also reported in the Annual Reports of the DCS and the Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services. Table 3 below lists the reported deaths due to 
                                                            
315 Jali Commission, pp. 284-285.  
316 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 20 August 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2002/appendices/020820jali.htm Accessed 12 November 2011. 
317 ‘Freedom for sale’. The Star, 9 February 2004. 
318 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 20 August 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2002/appendices/020820jali.htm Accessed 12 November 2011. 
319 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services of 1 February 2006, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060131-zonderwater-incidents-new-generation-prisons-committee-reports 
Accessed 12 November 2011. 
320 Jali Commission, Chapter 7, pp. 324-389. 
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unnatural causes and assaults (in respect of three categories) as reported in the Department’s 
Annual Reports for the period 1994 to 2003/4. Assaults were reported only from 1997 
onwards. Deaths due to unnatural causes fluctuated significantly from 84 in 1991/2 to three in 
2002/3, and it can be concluded that these have been incident-driven. It must also be added 
that the figures reported in the Annual Reports should be regarded with healthy scepticism, as 
problems in death classification were later identified by the Judicial Inspectorate for 
Correctional Services. In respect of assaults, it is noted that the number of officials assaulted 
by prisoners is comparatively low – on average 20 prisoners were assaulted for every one 
official assaulted by a prisoner. The figures also indicate high levels of inter-prisoner 
violence. The overall impression gained is that the prisons exhibited high levels of violence 
and that personal safety was not guaranteed. 
Table 3 
Year Deaths 
unnatural 
(murders, 
accidents and 
suicides)  
Assault: official on 
prisoner 
Assault: 
prisoner on 
prisoner 
Assault: 
prisoner on 
official 
1990/1 48    
1991/2 84    
1993 49    
1994 77    
1995 62    
1996 76    
1997 75 1193 3050 40 
1998 68 612 2361 39 
1999 61 545 2204 26 
2000/1 12 619 2361 15 
2001/2 10 624 2301 48 
2002/3 3 575 2410 47 
2003/4 45 508 2125 42 
 
 
4.16 Summary of issues: the failure to maintain discipline 
 
The basic argument put forward in Chapter 2 is that the history of prison reform post-1994 is 
characterised by two crises, the first being the demands placed on the prison system as a 
result of the new constitutional and democratic order, and the second, the collapse of order 
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and discipline in the DCS. In section 3.3.4 it was noted that fault lines were already visible in 
the DCS during the transition period (1990 to 1994). These became more pronounced 
immediately after 1994, but the available evidence indicates that from 1996 onwards, the year 
in which the Department was demilitarised, the situation became uncontainable. Regardless 
of what went wrong with demilitarisation, it must be accepted that it signalled the start of the 
transformation process in the Department,321 a process that became perverted. The transition 
to a new management style was poorly planned,
322
 if at all, and its execution resulted in 
confusion and lack of direction. If done correctly, a new management structure and style 
derived from the new constitutional order should have replaced the military hierarchy and 
procedures, but the process of re-institutionalisation failed and left a void. New management 
principles and procedures did not emerge to replace the system that staff had been familiar 
with. Indeed, the Jali Commission found little evidence to indicate that DCS senior 
management made any attempt to train staff and members to function under a civilian 
management structure.323 
After demilitarisation the Department was not equipped to deal with the influence of unions 
or the demands of the new democratic order. This opportunity was seized by unionised 
labour, in particular POPCRU, to take control of the DCS and its processes and distort them 
for its own purposes. This was achieved through Operation Quiet Storm and similar 
activities. With the unions exerting so much control over the Department’s day-to-day 
operations, it became impossible to enforce any decisions regarding employees’ conditions of 
employment (e.g. performance and disciplinary matters) as these would only end up being 
frustrated by union sympathisers higher up in the management hierarchy of the 
Department.324 The appointment and promotion of staff based on union patronage as opposed 
to skills and competence saw the rapid erosion of the disciplinary system. 
It was, and remains, primarily the Heads of Prison that are responsible for the enforcement of 
discipline,325 but with 60% of heads of prison belonging to POPCRU by 2001 (and 35% 
being members of the Public Servants’ Association - PSA),
326
 it is hardly surprising that 
                                                            
321 Jali Commission, p. 48. 
322 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003), p. 13; Luyt, W.F.M. (2001). 
323 Jali Commission, p. 51. 
324 Jali Commission, p. 98. 
325 Jali Commission, p. 761 
326 Jali Commission, p. 110. 
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disciplinary action was seldom taken. Even when instituted, it was frequently manipulated or 
resulted in disproportionately light sanctions.327 Even in respect of external investigations 
into the affairs of the Department, of which there were 20 in the ten years preceding the Jali 
Commission,
328
 these recommendations were by and large ignored.
329
 
With the disciplinary system in shambles, it was relatively easy for opportunists to exploit the 
situation and engage in a wide range of corrupt and criminal activities. Ultimately, the 
consequences of Operation Quiet Storm ran away from the POPCRU leadership, resulting in 
the beneficiaries of Operation Quiet Storm abusing their ill-begotten authority to benefit 
themselves and their families even further. The collapse of order and discipline should also 
be seen against the background of poor administrative, financial and asset control systems.330 
The weaknesses of these systems created a legion of opportunities for corrupt officials to 
benefit financially and otherwise. The collapse of order and discipline, and the decent into a 
malaise of corruption and maladministration, saw the DCS forsaking the reform of the prison 
system. The new Constitution had little impact on reforming governance in the Department. 
5. Corruption in the prison context
331
 
 
The Jali Commission’s establishment was a turning point in the history of the Department 
and indicated that the government could no longer ignore the continued allegations and 
findings that corruption and maladministration had taken on unprecedented levels. In effect, 
the state had lost control of the DCS. The numerous previous investigations and 
pronouncements about corruption332 were, however, sidelined by the Department’s leadership 
                                                            
327 Jali Commission, pp. 762-763. 
328 Jali Commission, p. 97. 
329 Jali Commission, Chapter 19, pp. 881-908. 
330 Department of Public Service and Administration (1999), pp. 1-2. 
331 This section is based on Muntingh, L. (2006). 
332 As early as 2 September 1996, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services and its 
counterpart on Health signed a joint resolution requesting ‘an immediate independent national investigation into 
corruption’ (Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 1). Also Report of the Auditor General on the financial statements of Vote 
10 for the year ended 31 March1998 and the Performance Management Audit on the management of Prisons 
(RP 181/1998). Report of the Auditor-General on Findings Arising from a Special Investigation into Alleged 
Irregularities Among Senior Officials of the Department Of Correctional Services. Published by Authority RP 
123/1999. Department of Public Service and Administration (1999). 
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and this could no longer be tolerated. The impact of corruption, maladministration and the 
violation of prisoners’ rights (as primarily uncovered by the Jali Commission) on the 
trajectory of prison reform after 1994 has been profound. Against this background, it is 
necessary to assess the phenomenon of prison corruption in a more generalised sense. It 
should also be borne in mind that the scope of the Jali Commission’s investigations was 
primarily aimed at the period preceding 2002 and thus predates the policy and legislative 
reform brought about by the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (2002) and the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (12 of 2004).  
 
5. 1 Definition of corruption 
 
In its simplest form, corruption in the public service is defined as the use of public office for 
private gain. The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, however, cautions that this 
definition needs to be expanded to reflect the essential characteristics and components of 
corruption, these being the abuse of power and trust, the fact that it occurs in the public, 
private and non-profit sectors, and that private gain is not the only motive.333 The Public 
Service Anti-Corruption Strategy thus concludes that corruption is “any conduct or behaviour 
in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in public office which violates their 
duties as public officials and which is aimed at obtaining undue gratification of any kind for 
themselves or for others”.334 While the list is not exhaustive, the strategy document also 
describes the various dimensions of corruption: bribery; embezzlement; fraud; extortion; 
abuse of power; conflict of interest; insider trading and abuse of privileged information; 
favouritism; and nepotism.
335
 
 
Two years after the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy was released, the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (12 of 2004) was passed and signed into law, replacing 
the Corrupt Activities Act (94 of 1992). The new legislation goes to some length to define 
corruption and provides firstly for the general crime of corruption.336 The Act also does not 
                                                            
333 Department of Public Service and Administration (2002) Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, pp. 10-11. 
334 Department of Public Service and Administration (2002), p. 11. 
335 Department of Public Service and Administration (2002), pp. 7-8. 
336 3. Any person who directly or indirectly – 
(a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person, whether for the benefit of 
himself or herself or for the benefit of another person; or 
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deal with those persons falling under its scope as a homogenous group and describes the 
crime of corruption in respect of public officers, foreign public officials, agents, members of 
the legislative authority, judicial officers, and members of the prosecuting authority.337 
Corrupt activities are further defined as they relate to offering or receiving unauthorised 
gratification, as well as to specific matters, to possible conflict of interest and to other 
unacceptable conduct.338 To make this legalistic definition more accessible, the DPSA 
Guidelines on Minimum Anti- Corruption Requirements describes it as follows: Where one 
person (A) gives someone in a position of power (B) something (called gratification339 in the 
Act) to use that power, illegally and unfairly, to the advantage of A.340 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification whether for the benefit of that other 
person or for the benefit of another person, in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, 
in a manner - 
(i) that amounts to the- 
(aa) illegal, dishonest, unauthorized, incomplete, or biased; or 
(bb) misuse or selling of information or material acquired in the course of the exercise, 
carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or function arising out of a constitutional, 
statutory, contractual or any other legal obligation; 
(ii) that amounts to- 
(aa) the abuse of a position of authority; 
(bb) a breach of trust; or 
(cc) the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules; 
(iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or 
(iv) that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not to do anything, is 
guilty of the offence of corruption. 
337 Sections 4 to 9 Act 12 of 2004. 
338 Section 10, 11 and 17 to 19 
339 Gratification is defined in the Act as (a) money, whether in cash or otherwise; (b) any donation, gift, loan, 
fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in property of any description, whether movable or 
immovable, or any other similar advantage; (c) the avoidance of a loss, liability, penalty, forfeiture, punishment 
or other disadvantage; (d) any office, status, honour, employment, contract of employment or services, any 
agreement to give employment or render services in any capacity and residential or holiday accommodation; (e) 
any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability, whether in whole or in 
part; (f) any forbearance to demand any money or money‘s worth or valuable thing; (g) any other service or 
favour or advantage of any description. Including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or 
apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil or criminal nature, whether or not already 
instituted, and includes the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of any right or any official power or 
duty; (h) any right or privilege; (i) any real or pretended aid, vote, consent, influence or abstention from voting; 
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In the prison context, with the unequal distribution of power between warders and prisoners, 
and the wide discretionary powers of the former, it is useful to understand corruption as a 
formula: 
 
Corruption = (Monopoly + Discretion) – Accountability.341 
 
When officials hold the monopoly over a function and have significant discretion in the 
absence of accountability, corruption is near-guaranteed. Prison managers and warders 
overseeing prisoners hold the legally mandated monopoly over every aspect of prison life. 
Moreover, they have an express mandate to maintain and not relinquish this monopoly, in 
terms of the security mandate. Even within the regulatory framework governing prisons, the 
prison management and warders have wide discretionary powers in respect of daily 
operations. The movement of prisoners, lock-up times, dealing with incidents of conflict, or 
citing disciplinary infractions are examples of such discretion. However, accountability in the 
prison environment, and in other closed institutions, has always been notoriously difficult to 
enforce. It has to be concluded therefore that prisons will always present a high risk of 
corruption and abuse of power. 
5.2 The prison context and corruption 
 
Given the structural risks for corruption in prison, three other contextual factors are important 
in respect of prison corruption: the existence of a unique sub-culture, the commodification of 
time and authority, and the connection prisons have with criminals and the criminal world. 
These three factors are elaborated on below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
or (j) any valuable consideration or benefit of any kind, including any discount, commission, rebate, bonus, 
deduction or percentage. 
340 Department of Public Service and Administration (2006) Anti-corruption Capacity requirements – 
Guidelines for Implementing the Minimum Anti- Corruption Capacity requirements in Departments and 
Organisational Components in the Public Service, Pretoria: Department of Public Service and Administration, 
p. 3. 
341 Hassan, S. (2004) Corruption and the Development Challenge, Journal of Development Policy and 
Practice, Volume 1 No. 1, p. 34. 
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First, prisons are total institutions;
342
 they are highly controlled environments and are not 
exposed to the same societal influences, positive and negative, as other sites of government 
service delivery. Over time prisons also develop their own sub-culture, one which is unique 
and not experienced in other parts of the public service. Because working inside a prison is 
potentially dangerous, staff members depend on each other for safety and security, especially 
in times of emergency. Prisoners also depend, at least in theory, on staff for safety and 
security, as well as for access to services and communication with the outside world. 
However, existing in such close relationships with an unequal power distribution over 
prolonged periods of time discourages the reporting of improper practices to management and 
oversight bodies, as this may result in marginalisation and possible victimisation.
343
 The risk 
for whistleblowers was indeed significant in the South African situation, as evidenced by the 
murders that took place in the Pietermaritzburg management area and which led, as reported 
in section 4.9, to the establishment of the Jali Commission.  
 
Second, an important manifestation of prison corruption is the (illegal) commodification of 
the state’s control function over imprisoned individuals. A warder engaging in corrupt 
activities with prisoners (e.g. smuggling in contraband) effectively re-sells his time, authority 
and function, for which the state has already paid, to a prisoner or organised group of 
prisoners, such as a gang. The ease and regularity with which this occurs is normally 
associated with the factors identified as causative of corruption, such as a lack of ethical 
guidelines, poor salaries, weak control systems, and a lack of transparency. 
 
Third, since the prison exists as an institution for purposes of social control, it has a special 
connection with crime. Prisons do not serve a fairly representative cross-section of society in 
the way that hospitals or offices of the Department of Home Affairs do. In prisons are present 
a range of offenders and suspected offenders who do not necessarily cease their criminal 
activity because they are imprisoned. While prisoners may continue their criminal activities 
on an individual basis, organised crime syndicates pose a particular threat in this regard. 
                                                            
342 Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish – the birth of the prison, New York: Vintage Books; Goffman, E. 
(1957) ‘Characteristics of Total Institutions,’ in: Symposium on Preventative and Social Psychiatry, sponsored 
by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, the Walter Reed Army Medical Centre, and the National 
Research Council, Washington, (Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 43-93. 
343 Criminal Justice Commission (2000) Queensland Prison industries – A Review of Corruption Risks, 
Brisbane: Criminal Justice Commission, 2000, p. 1. 
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Collusion between prison gangs and officials poses a particularly serious threat to the 
legitimacy of the prison system. 
 
In summary, three issues are relevant to corruption in prisons: the existence of a prison sub-
culture that makes it distinct and separate from other sectors of the public service; the 
commodification of control when the control function and authority of the state is effectively 
re-sold to prisoners; and the established association prisons have with crime and the external 
criminal world. 
 
5.3 Perceptions of corruption in the DCS 
 
Evidence before the Jali Commission alluded to a particular perception of corruption in the 
DCS and, more importantly, a tolerance by management for corrupt and dishonest practices, 
especially when committed at the expense of prisoners. In April 2003, the then DCS Gauteng 
Provincial Commissioner, Zacharia Modise, explained to the Jali Commission that corruption 
was a new concept to the Department and that officials had difficulty in understanding it: 
“The term corruption is a new word in the Department of Correctional Services and officials 
have serious difficulty in understanding it. … There is, however, a word that everybody is 
familiar with and it is the word 'smuggling'."344 He went on to explain that “smuggling” was 
pervasive and referred to trading in contraband as well as stealing prisoners’ food and money 
or asking them to perform duties such as polishing shoes or altering warders’ uniforms. He 
added that, in his view, warders caught “smuggling” had always been treated leniently by the 
DCS, but insisted that serious transgressions such as sodomising or assaulting prisoners had 
always been regarded in a serious light.  
 
Modise’s testimony gives insight into two important aspects of how “corruption” was 
perceived by DCS officials. First, management exhibited a measure of tolerance for acts or 
behaviour based on the abuse of power. Second, these acts or behaviour were not regarded as 
corrupt and therefore criminal. Euphemistically called “smuggling” or more likely “smokkel” 
in the lingua franca of Afrikaans, corruption, as it is defined in the Act, had been de-
criminalised, according to Modise. His observations may indeed have been more astute than 
                                                            
344 'Corruption a new concept'. News24.com, 10 April 2003, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Corruption-a-new-concept-20030409 Accessed 9 November 2011. 
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it was initially appreciated, for they explain in many ways the pervasive nature of corruption 
in the prison system as is described in section 4 above. Uncertainty amongst DCS officials as 
to what constituted corruption was confirmed in a 2003 survey, which found that a range of 
unethical forms of behaviour were regarded as corruption by the respondents.
345
 These 
included acts ranging from nepotism and bribery to being rude and sleeping on duty. In the 
absence of legal and ethical certainty, there were substantial grey areas to be exploited.  
5.4 Maladministration, incapacity, and inefficiency 
 
Corruption should be distinguished from maladministration. Using the concept “corruption” 
interchangeably with maladministration, incapacity, and inefficiency simply because they all 
relate to the use of public resources provides too broad an ambit to be useful for analysis.346 
The following example from the 2000 DPSA management audit of the DCS illustrates the 
differences between corruption and maladministration, incompetence and inefficiency: 
 
The holding of young offenders in custody under conditions that clearly violate the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Beijing Rules and other international 
instruments. For young offenders, the generally poor alignment between departments of 
this sector (especially in relation to policy), the lack of co-ordinated and synchronised 
strategy, and the lack of prison population control result in the: 
• late arrival of young offenders in court so that hearings are missed and children are 
kept in the custody of correctional services for unduly long periods; 
• inability to trace children under correctional services supervision as children 'get 
lost' within the system due to poor administrative control; 
• remanding into custody of non-scheduled offences for long periods; 
• blocking of access for Welfare and NICRO officials to correctional services 
facilities; 
• slighting of the role of probation officers in the assessment of young and petty 
offenders and the lack of a shared ethos regarding justice and reform between the 
departments of Welfare and Justice, result in a reduced impact of diversion 
programmes for the system;  
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• lack of training amongst magistrates and their resultant insensitivity and ignorance 
in dealing with young offenders;  
• long delays in children's court inquiries;  
• inappropriate placement of young offenders in correctional facilities;  
• difficulties in identifying and determining ages of young offenders.
347
 
 
The example shows that children’s rights were violated as a result of poor performance, 
incompetence and bad management, and that public funds were being wasted, thus denying 
children the services to which they were entitled. However, there was no indication that this 
was motivated by corrupt interests or any other activity that may be construed as corrupt. 
Corruption therefore should be seen as separate and distinct from maladministration and 
mismanagement even though corruption is often associated with them.  
 
5.5 Petty and grand corruption 
 
In debates on corruption the distinction is often made between grand and petty corruption, 
with the former presumably being more serious than the latter. It will be argued here, though, 
that this distinction – and the implied value-judgment about their relative seriousness – 
should be made with some care. The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre defines the two 
concepts as follows: 
 
High level or “grand” corruption takes place at the policy formulation end of politics. It 
refers not so much to the amount of money involved as to the level in which it takes 
place: grand corruption is at the top levels of the public sphere, where policies and rules 
are formulated in the first place. [It is] Usually (but not always) synonymous to political 
corruption. 
 
Small scale, bureaucratic or petty corruption is the everyday corruption that takes place 
at the implementation end of politics, where the public officials meet the public. Petty 
corruption is bribery in connection with the implementation of existing laws, rules and 
regulations, and thus different from “grand” or political corruption. Petty corruption 
refers to the modest sums of money usually involved, and has also been called “low 
level” and “street level” to name the kind of corruption that people can experience more 
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or less daily, in their encounter with public administration and services like hospitals, 
schools, local licensing authorities, police, taxing authorities and so on.348 
 
Rigid definitional boundaries between grand and petty corruption may not be possible as 
corruption takes on many forms. Rather, cases should be assessed on their individual merits 
to determine what level of corruption is involved. Four variables may assist in typifying a 
particular corrupt act. First, questions pertaining to scale should be asked to determine the 
value of a corrupt transaction. A smaller value normally tends to indicate petty corruption and 
larger amounts, grand corruption, but this may not always be the case. Second, petty 
corruption tends to be more opportunistic, less planned or premeditated, and probably more 
reactive. Grand corruption, on the other hand, tends to be more co-operative, collusive, and 
less extortive.349 Third, the seniority of officials involved can play an important role, since 
higher-ranking officials wield more power and therefore more control over resources. The 
impact of their corrupt decisions, actions, or inaction therefore tends to be wider than those of 
the low-ranking official with a far smaller locus of control (e.g. controlling visiting hours at a 
prison).350 Fourth, the impact of the corrupt act on the core business of the institution needs to 
be examined.351 In the case of prisons, security is a key concern and central to all operations. 
Escapes therefore reflect extremely negatively on the public image of the Department and its 
ability to perform its core business. The fact that relatively small amounts of money may be 
involved in an assisted escape is of little importance in this case. The recent history of the 
DCS shows that escapes from prison had wide-ranging political and internal ramifications for 
the DCS and affected public perceptions of the prison system and its ability to contribute to 
public safety.352  
 
Categorising corrupt acts as “petty corruption” should also be done with caution as the term 
could be construed as trivialising them. Such corrupt acts should be considered firstly in 
terms of their collective impact rather than the individual loss which they bring about. A 2003 
                                                            
348 Utstein U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre, Glossary on corruption, 
http://www.u4.no/document/faqs5.cfm#pettycorruption Accessed 9 November 2011. 
349 What is petty corruption? U4 Utstein Anti-Corruption Resources Centre: ‘Petty corruption and 
shadow economies’, http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query72.cfm , p. 2. 
350 Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 15. 
351 Muntingh, L. (2006), p. 15. 
352 Oppler, S. (1998) Correcting Corrections: Prospects for South Africa's Prisons, ISS Monograph No. 29, 
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victimisation survey found that corruption was the third most frequent form of victimisation 
in South Africa.353 On such a scale even small amounts of money or gifts add up to vast 
sums. Furthermore, it is predominantly poor and marginalised people who fall prey to so-
called petty corruption, and the relatively low monetary value belies the impact on people’s 
lives.354 The limited or absent choices available to poor people expose them to direct corrupt 
acts such as payment of bribes, as well as to the longer-term and more enduring results of 
corruption. It may be argued that, as a result of their deprivation of liberty and consequent 
loss of power, prisoners are in a situation analogous to that of the poor in society, who have 
limited resources and thus limited choices; by that same token, then, prisoners, too, are 
disproportionately at risk of bribery and corruption.  
 
The pervasive influence of even the smallest acts of corruption should consequently not be 
underestimated. The impact of all acts of corruption must be regarded as serious since “they 
lead to the establishment of patterns of undesirable behaviour, patterns that cannot be undone 
easily, and which thereby lower the ethical standards within a society however 
incrementally”.355 The widespread nature of corruption in the DCS inculcated a culture of 
unethical behaviour. 
 
5.6 The reasons for corruption and factors contributing to it 
 
In general, for corruption to occur three basic conditions need to be present and acted 
upon.356 First, there must be a target, such as cash, equipment or consumables. Second, access 
and opportunity must be available to the officials concerned, and this may vary according to 
particular functions in an organisation. Third, motivation to commit the corrupt act must be 
present; in most instances this will be greed, but could also be revenge or political dynamics. 
In the case of Operation Quiet Storm, quasi-political motivations were indeed at play. 
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At the operational level, numerous reasons for corruption can be discerned, such as greed, 
ignorance of the applicable laws, personal financial problems, and so forth.357 These are 
generic reasons for unethical and corrupt behaviour and are not specific or unique to prisons. 
A 2003 survey at Pollsmoor and Durban Westville prisons provided further description of the 
reasons for corrupt behaviour at operational level in the DCS.358 It was found that there was a 
lack of buy-in into the Department’s strategic direction and that staff members lacked respect 
for rules and regulations. Senior personnel did not set an example to more junior staff 
members in their conduct. Evidence was found of peer pressure (amongst staff) to participate 
in corrupt activities. Furthermore, that there was a lack of respect between staff and prisoners. 
Prisoners threatened staff members who did not help them to “beat the system”, even though 
                                                            
357 The DPSA list the following as reasons for corruption:  
• Good intentions - Some public officials do things that they are not supposed to do (or fail to do things 
that they are meant to do) in an attempt to help others. 
• Ignorance of laws, codes, policies and procedures - Many public officials simply do not know the laws 
and directives that deal with what is right and wrong in their work. 
• Ego power trips - Some employees think they know what is best, regardless of what the department has 
decided. 
• Greed - Some individuals exploit their position at work to enrich themselves. 
• It comes with the territory - Some staff members feel there is nothing wrong with using opportunities at 
work to enrich themselves. 
• Friendship - In some cases, employees abuse their position in the public service to assist their friends 
out of a misplaced sense of loyalty. 
• Ideology - People with strong ideological convictions might believe that any means can be justified as 
long as it leads to the right outcome for them. 
• Post-employment “revolving door”- Some public servants engage in unethical behaviour in an attempt 
to secure a job outside the public service – for example, awarding tenders to certain companies that 
they hope will employ them in future. 
• Financial problems and pressures - People with financial problems at home sometimes engage in 
unethical practices to cope with their problems. 
• Exploiting the exploiters - Some staff feel that they are being exploited by their bosses and so believe 
that they are entitled to do anything to turn the tables on their exploiters. 
• Going along - Some people feel that, since others act unethically at work, they are entitled to join in. 
• Survival - Some would do anything to ensure that they maintain and defend their current positions. 
(Department of Public Service and Administration (2006) Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements – 
Guidelines for Implementing the Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements in Departments 
and Organisational Components in the Public Service, DPSA, Pretoria, p. 24.) 
358 Painter-Morland, M. et al (2003), p. 7-8. 
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there were many gaps and loopholes to be exploited. Some staff members had informal 
relationships with prisoners, and prison gangs negatively affected discipline in the prison.  
 
The same study also found that, apart from these particular issues raised at the two prisons, 
there were general contributory factors to corruption and unethical behaviour in the DCS: 
physical conditions and overcrowding; a lack of buy-in into the DCS code of conduct; 
inconsistency in discipline and performance appraisals; policies and procedures were not well 
communicated; whistleblowers were not protected; there was a lack of skills and capacity in 
general; there was uncertainty and a lack of training in the new approach to rehabilitation; 
low morale and a lack of professional ethics; personal variables (e.g. financial trouble); and a 
mutual lack of respect between staff and inmates.359 Poor governance did not only result in 
widespread corruption, but also added to the legitimacy deficit by rendering the Department 
incapable of fulfilling its mandate as required by the Constitution. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the period 1994 to 2004 and set out the scope and nature of the crisis 
in the prison system. Contrary to expectations in 1994, there was not rapid reform of the 
prison system but rather the opposite. During this period a pattern of governance failures 
emerged that resulted in the collapse of order and discipline. In the ensuing years, the DCS 
management was unable to reinvent and re-institutionalise the prison system. The result was a 
near-intractable mess of operational challenges (e.g. overcrowding), poor skills levels, 
management inexperience, misdirected policy initiatives, poor financial management, lack of 
strategic vision, unionisation, corruption, human rights violations, resistance to reform, and 
so on.  
In overview, a number of conclusions can be drawn from the period 1990 to 2004. The first 
was the lack of strategic vision of the pre-1994 DCS management. Notwithstanding the 
democratic reforms already under way or anticipated, the DCS management at the time failed 
to recognise it was already in a crisis. A more realistic, progressive and responsive approach, 
                                                            
359 Painter-Morland, M. et al (2003), p. 7-8. 
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giving full recognition to the situation at hand, would have improved the chances for a 
constructive reform process, but as things stood, the DCS’s stance was one of denialism. 
Second, when the opportunity presented itself to articulate far-reaching reforms following the 
adoption of the Interim Constitution in the 1994 White Paper, this did not happen and the 
DCS management remained inward-looking and institutionally preserving. Moreover, it 
failed to problematise the relationship between the Constitution and the state of the prison 
system. The 1994 White Paper was woefully inadequate to steer the post-1994 reform task of 
the newly-elected government to fulfil its historical mission in respect of the prison system. 
The 1994 White Paper did not engage the Interim Constitution, and when the 1996 
Constitution was adopted, there was a similar lack of engagement. Drafting of the 1998 
Correctional Services Act appears to have taken place as a distinct and detached process from 
the DCS. There is little evidence to indicate that either the drafting of the new legislation or 
its adoption had any noticeable bearing on the operations of the Department. Moreover, the 
1998 Act would only come fully into force in 2004.  
Third, in Chapter 2 it was argued that reform is the intended fundamental change of a policy 
sector and that the scope of reform needs to address a wide range of aspects of the policy 
sector, these including (at least) the policies, strategic direction, legislative framework (as 
well as subordinate legislation), organisational structure, human resources, financial 
management, and day-to-day operations. Clear intentions in this regard did not emerge 
between 1994 and 2004. During this period senior management engaged in a number of 
policy initiatives that were either cosmetic or so fundamentally ill-conceived or poorly 
implemented, frequently with unintended consequences, that they detracted from reform 
efforts. Given the state that DCS was in from a governance perspective, it is hard to see how 
any new policies could have been successfully implemented. Stable and credible leadership 
to drive policy reform efforts were equally absent at least until late 2001. Even though the 
new constitutional framework lifted previous constraints, this opportunity was not seized. 
Instead, lack of leadership and poor strategy resulted in the perverse consequences described 
in this chapter. In short, these initiatives did not address the fundamental challenges facing 
the prison system. 
Fourth, the prison system inherited by the GNU was a highly institutionalised organisation 
characterised by a conservative, preserving, non-responsive, and inward-looking approach. 
These traits remained dominant at least until mid-1996. This description accords with Boin 
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and t’Hart’s definition of crisis by ignorance, showing “cognitive arrogance – a hermetic, 
chronically overoptimistic self-image that shuts out discrepant information”.360 However, 
from 1996 onwards levels of institutionalisation eroded rapidly as a consequence of the 
failure to implement a new management system replacing the military command structure 
abandoned on 1 April 1996. Coordination problems emerged, basic discipline was not 
enforced, and the Department was increasingly unable to implement reforms even if it wanted 
to do so.  
Fifth, the legitimacy crisis of the prison system deepened as corruption, poor delivery of 
services and maladministration became increasingly prevalent. Although the events in DCS 
should be contextualised by the general state of the public service, corruption and 
maladministration attained exceptional dimensions to such an extent that Parliament was 
informed in 2000 that the state had lost control of the Department. It is clear that, from 1996 
to the appointment of the Jali Commission in 2001, there was a widening chasm between 
what the Constitution demanded and what was happening on the ground. Even though 
previous investigations were undertaken into the affairs of the DCS and Parliament had 
expressed concern, the Department offered little response to the recommendations made. It 
was only with the appointment of the Jali Commission that full recognition was given to the 
crisis in discipline and order. In the eyes of the public and Parliament, the prison system had 
become deeply corrupted and far removed, ideologically and in practice, from an institution 
that should provide safe custody and enable offenders to become law-abiding and responsible 
citizens.  
Sixth, by mid-1996 the lack of re-institutionalisation and the shambolic demilitarisation of 
the DCS had created a management void into which organised labour (POPCRU in 
particular) could move with impunity. Consequently, the distinction between management 
and labour became blurred. The role of then Commissioner Sithole in aggravating the 
situation should not be underestimated. Through purposefully designed campaigns and 
actions, POPCRU took control of key functions in the Department and this was supported, 
through action or omission, by senior officials in the Head Office. The key objective of these 
                                                            
360 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000), p. 17 citing Kouzmin, A. and Jarman, A. (1989) ‘Crisis decision making – 
towards a contingent decision path perspective’. In Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T. and ‘T Hart, P. (eds) Coping 
with crises: the management of disasters, riots and terrorism. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, pp. 397-435. 
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campaigns was the rapid implementation of affirmative action by all means necessary, and at 
least in some management areas a culture of fear and intimidation prevailed. 
The campaigns launched by POPCRU also had unintended consequences in the sense that a 
general culture of lawlessness and impunity permeated the Department. This may not have 
been the original aim of Operation Quiet Storm, but it is an outcome which could have been 
anticipated. As a result, a wide range of corrupt activities aimed at personal enrichment took 
place or were permitted to continue. Moreover, this culture of lawlessness placed prisoners in 
a particularly vulnerable position, given that the wide-ranging failure to adhere to principles 
of good governance made compliance with human rights standards near impossible. 
Lastly, in Chapter 2 it was argued that four broad requirements need to be met for a prison 
system compatible with a constitutional democracy: the existence of an underlying 
philosophical framework; the recognition of prisoners’ rights; accountability; and 
transparency. The first ten years of democratic rule saw very little progress in this regard. 
Government had failed to closely define the role and purpose of the prison system in the 
criminal justice system and, more particularly, its role in response to crime. Prisoners 
remained the victims of widespread rights violations despite constitutional protections. The 
Department continued to lack transparency, and impunity prevailed at all levels in the DCS. 
In short, constitutionalism had little impact at all on the prison system. 
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Chapter 4 Governance, corruption and a 
new strategy - regaining control and the 
challenges faced 
1. Introduction 
 
The crisis in the DCS, as described in Chapter 3, required responses in two broad domains: 
addressing governance concerns and addressing human rights concerns. This chapter will 
describe and analyse how the Department responded in respect of the first domain, 
governance, looking specifically at what steps were taken to eradicate corruption and reassert 
control over the Department. Governance and human rights are inextricably linked, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 (section 2.2.2), but the distinction is made here for analytical 
purposes. It will also be argued in this chapter and the following one that the DCS made a 
strategic choice to focus on corruption and maladministration and not on human rights, or at 
any rate that it did not give the same prominence to the Jali Commission’s recommendations 
on human rights violations as it did to those relating to corruption. A further important 
distinction in the Department’s approach to these two domains is that, while it actively sought 
assistance from external agencies (e.g. Special Investigations Unit) to deal with corruption, it 
did not do so in respect of human rights violations. For example, it did not approach the 
Judicial Inspectorate to assist it with the human rights concerns raised by the Jali Commission 
and other stakeholders. On the contrary, it regarded the recommendations made by the 
Judicial Inspectorate in its Annual Reports as tangential. This point will be explored further 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The decision to focus on governance may have been motivated by three reasons that would 
prioritise it over human rights concerns. First, the Department could not implement its 
policies and mandate if the senior management was not in control of its subjects; solving this 
problem required the re-institutionalisation of the Department. Second, the extent of the 
corruption had significant political, financial and public-image implications, with the result 
that there was urgent pressure from senior government for corruption both to be addressed 
and be seen to being addressed. Third, so the reasoning would go, once a state of good or 
acceptable governance was attained, human rights issues would, as a consequence, be 
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addressed. But irrespective of whether the decision to focus on governance and corruption 
was well-motivated rather than co-incidental, the effect was the same. Furthermore, in the 
case of other departments in the justice and security sector (such as SAPS and the 
Department of Defence
1
), firm government action on allegations and evidence of high-level 
corruption would come to the fore only from 2010 onwards; by contrast, the situation in the 
DCS was more immediate. The investigations undertaken by the Department of Public 
Service and Administration (DPSA), the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Jali 
Commission compelled the DCS to take action at an earlier stage than other departments in 
the justice and security sector. 
This chapter addresses a number of matters. First, it assesses the Department’s strategy-level 
anti-corruption response and, more specifically, the manner in which these strategy objectives 
came to be assimilated into the Department’s overall Strategic Plan. It is argued that the 
strategy implementation emphasised law enforcement and that other components (such as 
prevention) were underplayed and lacked coherence. Second, many of the problems 
identified by the Jali Commission and others related to the employer-employee relationship. 
The disciplinary system had collapsed, senior managers were unionising, and a generally 
strained – at times, confrontational – relationship had developed between employers and 
employees. It was a problematic state of affairs, and it had to change. Third, in line with the 
Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, the DCS attempted to address corruption both by 
                                                            
1 In December 2011 the former National Commissioner of Police, Jackie Selebi, was imprisoned for 15 years 
after he was convicted on several counts of corruption and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment (Selebi v State 
(240/2011) [2011] ZASCA 249 (2 December 2011)). Selebi’s appeal was unsuccessful in the Supreme Court of 
appeal and he was imprisoned in December 2011. A further long standing allegation of corruption concerned the 
procurement of arms. In December 2011 President Zuma announced, after protracted legal proceedings, the 
appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry into the arms deal (Zuma announces member of arms deal 
commission, 7 December 2011, Mail and Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-12-07-zuma-announces-
member-of-arms-deal-commission/ Accessed 14 December 2011). Also in 2011 President Zuma dismissed two 
ministers; the Minister of Public Works, Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde, and Minister of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs, Sicelo Shiceka. The latter’s dismissal relating to the misuse of public funds. Mahlangu-
Nkabinde’s dismissal and the suspension of National Commissioner of Police, General Bheki Cele, followed the 
Public Protector’s (Adv Thuli Madonsela) report entitled “Against the rules and Against the rules too”, which 
exposed extensive corruption and maladministration in the processing of leasing deals for office space to be 
used by the South African Police Service (SAPS). (‘Zuma wields the axe “for the good of SA”’, Mail and 
Guardian, 24 October 2011, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-24-zuma-wields-the-axe-for-good-of-sa accessed 15 
December 2011). 
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developing internal capacity to do so and by seeking assistance from external agencies. 
Fourth, in 2004 the Department adopted a White Paper that would define rehabilitation as its 
new core business. This ambitious policy framework created a new language with new 
conceptual reference points for the Department, but implementation has been limited. The 
reasons for this lie in both the inherent deficiencies of the White Paper as well as the inability 
of the Department to align the budget to the strategic objectives of the White Paper. While 
notable advances have been made in addressing corruption and maladministration, especially 
since 2004, this period has not been without “embarrassing incidents” that cast suspicion over 
its anti-corruption efforts and intimated that the struggle against corruption in the DCS was 
far from over. The conclusion that is drawn is that while efforts to address governance 
concerns have had a positive impact, control of the Department has not been entirely regained 
and the process has had mixed results. 
2. Addressing corruption and maladministration 
 
2.1 An anti-corruption strategy 
 
The corruption uncovered by the Jali Commission and, subsequently, the Special 
Investigations Unit (SIU) was committed on a large scale and caused substantial losses to the 
state, as described in Chapter 3. The impact of corruption and maladministration on the DCS 
was far-reaching, particularly in that it prevented the prison system from undergoing reform. 
The development of a response to corruption in the DCS should, however, be seen in the light 
of the somewhat pedestrian and tentative response by national government to corruption in 
the 1990s, as discussed below. 
Even though the ministers responsible for the South African National Crime Prevention 
Strategy established a Programme Committee in March 1997 to work on corruption, evidence 
of firm action was limited. In June 1997 the Code of Conduct for the Public Service became 
applicable to all public servants. A year later, in 1998, the Programme Committee’s work 
resulted in the government’s approval of a National Campaign against Corruption. However, 
many uncertainties remained, and a Public Sector Anti-corruption Conference was held in 
November 1998. Resolutions emanating from the conference addressed issues such as the 
definition of corruption, the restoration of a public service ethos, the role of civil society, the 
responsibilities of public sector managers, financial management and controls, and co-
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ordination of anti-corruption structures.
2
 From this it was evident that a significant amount of 
consensus-building was required to formulate an effective response. Four years later, in 2002, 
the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy was published.3 Ultimately, new anti-corruption 
legislation would be enacted only in 2004.
4
 It should also be borne in mind that government’s 
slow response to corruption was also a result of its own prioritisation of service delivery, 
especially affirmative action, above institution-building and addressing corruption.5 
By 2004 the DCS senior management could draw upon a number of resources to inform its 
response to corruption: the Code of Conduct for the Public Service; the National Campaign 
against Corruption; resolutions from the Public Sector Anti-corruption Conference; the Public 
Service Anti-Corruption Strategy; the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act; 
and the findings and recommendations of the Jali Commission’s interim reports.6 Additional 
assistance became available two years later when the DPSA published the Minimum Anti-
Corruption Capacity Requirements.7 This section will therefore assess the DCS response to 
corruption with specific reference to the Department’s anti-corruption strategy. However, to 
make such an assessment it is necessary to clarify a number of the general requirements of a 
national anti-corruption strategy and also to provide a brief description of the Public Service 
Anti-Corruption Strategy. 
2.1.1 The required strategy components and its context
8
 
 
                                                            
2 National Anti-Corruption Forum website, http://www.nacf.org.za/government/index.html Accessed 5 
December 2011. 
3 Department of Public Service and Administration (2006) Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements – guidelines 
for implementing the minimum anti-corruption capacity requirements in departments and organisational 
components in the public service, Pretoria: Department of Public Service and Administration. 
4 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
5 Picard, L.A. (2005) The state of the state – institutional transformation, capacity and political change in South 
Africa. Johannesburg: P&DM Wits University Press. 
6 The Interim Reports of the Jali Commission are not dated and it is therefore not possible to ascertain exactly 
how many interim reports had been given to the DCS by 2004, but the decision to publish interim reports (a 
somewhat unusual step for a judicial commission) had already been taken by August 2002 (PMG report on the 
meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 20 August 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20020819-jali-commission-briefing Accessed 5 December 2011). 
7 Department of Public Service and Administration (2006). 
8 This section is largely based on Muntingh, L. (2006) Investigation prison corruption in South Africa, CSPRI 
Research Report No. 12, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
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A national anti-corruption strategy must aim to address corruption holistically and be 
inclusive in its focus and application; this is so because corruption is generally not an 
individual but an organisational problem. Such a strategy needs to contain four broad 
components: prevention, law enforcement, public awareness and institution-building.
9
 
Successful approaches to fighting corruption are aimed not at removing the proverbial rotten 
apple from the barrel but at tackling the barrel itself.10 Therefore, the aim should be to fix the 
system that created the conditions for corrupt acts to be committed.  
Investigations into corruption played a prominent role in the DCS response, but in the context 
of an anti-corruption strategy, a focus on investigations requires a degree of circumspection. 
An over-reliance on law reform, enforcement and investigations is no guarantee of changes in 
behaviour and may lead to repression, the abuse of enforcement power and, ultimately, to 
further corruption.11 It has also been suggested that over-emphasising law enforcement and 
control functions can create a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that “having been placed 
continuously under suspicion, treated like quasi-criminals or probationers, public employees 
will behave accordingly”.12 As much as the rhetoric of “being tough on crime” and “zero 
tolerance” is popular among politicians, law enforcement demands a carefully considered and 
sufficiently resourced approach sensitive to the fact that it is but one component of what 
should be a comprehensive strategy. 
Law enforcement as a strategy component, in the form of investigations, therefore needs to be 
appropriately proportional to the other spheres of the strategy, namely prevention, public 
awareness and institution-building.
13
 The appropriateness of this proportional relationship 
depends on the circumstances and the overall strategic objectives, but, more importantly, on 
                                                            
9 Pope, J. (1999) Elements of a successful anti-corruption strategy. In Stapenhurst, R. and Kpundeh, S.J. 
Curbing corruption – toward a model for building national integrity, Economic Development Institute of The 
World Bank, Washington. Centre for Democracy and Governance (1999) A Handbook on Fighting Corruption, 
Washington: Centre for Democracy and Governance. 
10 Van der Beken, T. (2002) ‘A Multi-disciplinary approach for detection and investigation of corruption’ 
Fijnaut, C. and Huberts, L. (eds) Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague. p. 273. 
11 Pope, J, (1999), p. 101 
12 Fijnaut, C. and Huberts, L. (2002) “Corruption, integrity and law enforcement” in Fijnaut, C. and Huberts, L 
(eds) Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement, Kluwer Law International, The Hague. p. 14. 
13 Pope, J. (1999), p. 99. 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
the priorities that have been set for the short, medium and long term.
14
 Different 
constituencies will identify different priorities, and the challenge lies in reaching a workable 
consensus on what will deliver the most constructive results in the shortest possible period in 
the most efficient manner. The potential for tension in this process is evident. Setting 
priorities remains an inherently political task and one in which trade-offs have to be made 
between different constituencies.15 
In the case of the DCS, as part of the law enforcement apparatus of the state, investigations 
were prioritised in order to regain some legitimacy, as a prison system publicly known for 
high levels of corruption is a morally corrupt one. Moreover, the state had suffered significant 
financial losses, but these could possibly be recovered as a result of investigations. Lastly, it 
created the means by which management could exert its authority and regain control over the 
Department. It can be argued furthermore that investigations are more likely to yield quicker 
and more visible results than other strategy components such as prevention and public 
awareness. Investigation results can thus be used in media profiling, showing that 
government is serious about addressing corruption. 
  
2.1.2 The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 
 
As noted above, strategic priorities need to be located between the four pillars of the anti-
corruption strategy, namely prevention, public awareness, law enforcement and institution-
building. Published in January 2002, the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy came at an 
opportune time when the Jali Commission had only started its investigations. It therefore had 
an important influence on the DCS Anti-Corruption strategy presented to Parliament in 
November of that year. The Public Service Anti-corruption Strategy has nine “strategic 
considerations”.16 With reference to the four pillars, they can be grouped as follows: 
prevention: managing professional ethics; public awareness: social analysis, research and 
advocacy, and awareness-raising and education; law enforcement: review and consolidations 
                                                            
14 Grindle, M.S. (2004) Good enough governance – poverty reduction and reform in developing countries, 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 17, No. 4, p. 537 
15 Grindle M.S. (2004), p. 539. 
16 Department of Public Service and Administration (2002) Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, 
http://www.dpsa.gov.za//macc/Public%20service%20anti_corruption_strategy.pdf , p. 12-21 
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of the legislative framework; improved access and protection of whistleblowers and 
witnesses; prohibition of corrupt individuals and businesses; Institution-building: improved 
management policies and practices; partnerships with stakeholders; increased institutional 
capacity. The principles underpinning the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy reflect the 
desire to find the right balance between prevention, public awareness, law enforcement and 
institution-building.17 
The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, under the second strategic consideration, 
“Increased institutional capacity”, placed a number of obligations on departments. It required 
departments to develop the internal capacity to fulfil the following four functions: to conduct 
risk assessments; to investigate allegations of corruption and detect risks at a preliminary 
level; to assist the process of conducting further investigation, detection and prosecution, in 
terms of prevailing legislation and procedures; and to receive and manage allegations of 
corruption through whistle-blowing or other mechanisms.18 
To assist government departments to develop a minimum capacity to address and investigate 
corruption within their respective spheres of control, the DPSA published in 2006 a practical 
resource guide entitled Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements.19 The guide provides a 
useful resource to departments, supported by examples, on how to develop and implement a 
departmental anti-corruption strategy. It identifies the four key components of an anti-
                                                            
17 The strategy is informed by the following principles:  
a. The need for a holistic and integrated approach to fighting corruption, with a balanced mixture of 
prevention, investigation, prosecution and public participation as the platform for the strategy. 
b. Constitutional requirements regarding the criminal justice system and public administration. 
c. The requirement for tailor-made Public Service strategies that operate independently but that 
complement national strategies, particularly with regard to detection, investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication of acts of corruption, as well as the recovery of the proceeds of corruption. 
d. Acts of corruption are regarded as criminal acts that can be dealt with either in the administrative or 
criminal justice system or both if need be. 
e. Domestic, regional and international good practice and conventions. 
f. All aspects of the strategy must be: 
i. supported by comprehensive education, training and awareness 
ii. co-ordinated within Government 
iii. subjected to continuous risk assessment expressed in terms of measurable and time-bound 
implementation targets. (Department of Public Service and Administration (2002), p. 11.) 
18 Department of Public Service and Administration (2002), pp. 14-15. 
19 Department of Public Service and Administration (2006). 
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corruption strategy as preventing, detecting, investigating and resolving corruption. The Anti-
Corruption Capacity Requirements cites several good practice examples from the DCS, and it 
must be accepted that as a result of the Jali Commission and other investigations the DCS 
was in some ways ahead of other government departments in developing internal capacity to 
deal with corruption. In this sense the crisis in the Department compelled it to act with greater 
urgency than other government departments in addressing corruption. 
2.1.3 The DCS anti-corruption strategies 
 
The first DCS Anti-Corruption Strategy was presented to the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services in November 2002
20
 and a revised version tabled in June 2005.
21
 It is 
thus necessary to reflect on these two strategies and assess how they were incorporated into 
the Department’s general strategic plan.22 The 2002 Anti-Corruption Strategy outlined a 
three-pronged approach. First, corruption would be prevented by: addressing management 
weaknesses; the identification and management of opportunities for corruption and risks; and 
the development and promotion of a code of conduct. Second, corruption would be 
investigated by the Jali Commission, the SIU, SAPS and Directorate Special Operations in 
the National Prosecuting Authority, and supported by the intelligence community. Third, 
sanctions for corrupt acts would be imposed through the DCS internal disciplinary system; 
there would also be external sanctions (that is, criminal prosecutions). 
 
Given the history of the Department in respect of corruption and emerging findings from the 
Jali Commission at the time, the emphasis on law enforcement is not altogether surprising. 
Two of the three strategy components focused on law enforcement in the anti-corruption 
strategy. Understandably, it was important to demonstrate a “get tough on corruption” 
approach. The DCS acknowledged to the Portfolio Committee that a longer-term and more 
proactive approach would be required to eradicate corruption but that it was imperative to 
                                                            
20 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 5 November 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20021104-anti-corruption-strategy-and-new-insignia Accessed 9 January 2011. 
Department of Correctional Services (2004 a) Annual Report 2003/4, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 10. 
21 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 5 November 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20021104-anti-corruption-strategy-and-new-insignia Accessed 9 January 2011. 
22 Both strategies were presented to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services in the form of PowerPoint 
presentations. If there are more detailed strategy documents, they are not available in the public domain. 
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communicate the message that perpetrators will be held accountable.
23
 The 2002 Anti-
Corruption Strategy can thus be accepted as an interim strategy even though it was never 
termed as such. An audit of the DCS anti-corruption capacity24 was completed only towards 
the end of 2003, which provided further reason for the anti-corruption strategy’s emphasis on 
investigation and law enforcement at the time. The audit recommended action on a broader 
front.  
A little more than two and a half years later, in June 2005, the DCS presented a new anti-
corruption strategy25 to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services. The brief 
presentation was quite candid in its analysis of the problem, describing the preceding decade 
as involving the “contested transformation of Correctional Services” and noting weaknesses 
in internal controls, ethics and corruption prevention measures.26 It was evident that the new 
strategy was better informed and aimed at finding a balance between the different strategic 
components outlined in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. The 2005 anti-corruption 
strategy, as presented to the Portfolio Committee, stated at the outset that “corruption is 
inherent in all correctional systems” and located the problem primarily at the levels of area 
management and prisons in the DCS hierarchy.27 Locating the problem at management area 
and prison levels echoed the Jali Commission’s scope of investigations, as defined by its 
terms of reference which excluded Regional Offices and the Head Office. The Jali 
Commission did conduct some investigations, albeit superficially, of the Head Office. Indeed, 
it was there that serious allegations emerged about the Department being run by a secret and 
                                                            
23 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 5 November 2002 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20021104-anti-corruption-strategy-and-new-insignia Accessed 9 January 2011 
24 Painter-Morland, M. et al (2003) Final Consolidated Report – focused assessment of anti-corruption capacity 
within the Department of Correctional Services, Pretoria: UNODC. 
25P MG report on the meeting of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 7 June 
2005, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20050606-special-investigations-unit-and-department-corruption-
briefings Accessed 22 November 2011. Department of Correctional Services (2006) Annual Report 2005/6, 
Pretoria: Department of Correctional Services, p. 20. 
26 PMG report on the meeting of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 7 June 
2005, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20050606-special-investigations-unit-and-department-corruption-
briefings Accessed 22 November 2011. 
27 The DCS is managed in terms of six regions - these represent provinces but with two exceptions: Limpopo, 
Mpumalanga and North West are treated as one region, and Free State and Northern Cape as another. The next 
level is Management Areas, where there are 53 management areas in total. Areas are subdivided into individual 
prisons.  
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inner group known as CORE (see Chapter 3 section 4.3.3). According to the DCS leadership, 
the approach to prevent corruption would be decentralised and target area management and 
prison levels in the Department, this because fighting corruption is a collective responsibility 
and not the preserve of the Head Office. 
The overall strategy was graphically represented as a wagon-wheel with “anti-corruption 
awareness” as the hub and the spokes consisting of 15 anti-corruption areas of intervention: 
risk management; internal auditing; physical and information security; fraud detection; 
corruption trend analysis; investigation of corruption; disciplinary code and procedure; 
systems, policy and procedure; internal controls; integrity testing; whistleblowing policy; 
obligation to report corruption; code of conduct; ethics training; and communication strategy. 
The 15 areas of intervention are comprehensive but seem to be at odds with the central aim of 
“anti-corruption awareness”. Moreover, this central aim of anti-corruption awareness does 
not feature in the strategic plans of the Department.  
The focus of the DCS to address corruption, as described in successive strategic plans, 
appears to vacillate between the 2002 strategy and components of the 2005 strategy. 
Evidently, the more comprehensive 2005 strategy contains elements that are relevant not only 
to dealing with corruption alone but which have broader application. For example, the 
improvement of systems, policies and procedures is aimed at enhancing performance in 
general and is not confined to dealing with corruption. Specific anti-corruption efforts are 
noted in the DCS Strategic Plans under the departmental objective: “To ensure effective, 
legally sound policy compliance and corruption-free management of Correctional 
Services”.28 For this purpose, the Strategic Plan for 2006/7 - 2010/11 emphasises three 
outputs under the heading “Strategy Implementation Plan”, namely: trend analysis; effective 
and efficient investigations resulting in prosecutions and sanctioning; and effective and 
efficient delivery on and updating of the integrity and vetting plan.29 In the subsequent 
strategic plans for 2009 and 2010, the emphasis is placed on prevention, investigations and 
sanctioning, as contained in the Anti-Corruption Strategy of 2002.
30
 The two most recent 
                                                            
28 Department of Correctional Services (2006 b) Strategic Plan for 2006/7 to 2010/11, Pretoria: Department of 
Correctional Services, p. 30. Department of Correctional Services (2011 b) Strategic Plan for 2011/12 -2015/16, 
Pretoria: Department of Correctional Services, p. 21. 
29 Department of Correctional Services (2006 b), p. 30. 
30 Department of Correctional Services (2009 b) Strategic Plan for 2009/10-2013/14, Pretoria: Department of 
Correctional Services, p. 40. 
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strategic plans (2010/11 and 2011/12) do not provide for specific outputs in relation to the 
attainment of the relevant outcome.31 Whilst the performance targets and annualised targets 
over a five-year term are clearly defined and measurable, it is unclear what actions will be 
implemented to attain these targets. The extent to which the DCS is able at both strategic and 
implementation levels to find a balance between the four pillars of an effective anti-
corruption strategy thus seems unclear.  
The emphasis on law and rule enforcement, as articulated in the Department’s Strategic 
Plans, may indeed be done at the cost of the other areas of intervention, such as prevention. 
With specific reference to the DCS, Painter-Morland cautioned that an over-emphasis on 
investigations (and enforcement-related activities such as vetting) could create the impression 
that broader issues of ethics are of lesser importance: 
It creates the perception that ethics can be managed merely by ensuring that dishonest 
people do not enter the department, and it loses sight of the important role that current 
staff within the department, as well as the organisational culture within the department, 
play in the continuation of corrupt behaviour. Even if one could ensure that only honest 
people are recruited and appointed, the attitude and practices of long-term staff and the 
corrupting organisational environment could still create a “rotten barrel” that would 
corrupt the most ethical individuals.
32
 
This risk has subsequently manifested itself in the performance measurement of the relevant 
objective (To ensure effective, legally sound policy compliance and corruption-free 
management of Correctional Services). Two performance indicators are used in the 2011/2-
2015/16 Strategic Plan: (1) Number of DCS personnel detected for corruption, and (2) 
Percentage of officials charged with fraud, corruption and serious maladministration and 
found guilty of at least one count.
33
 The two performance indicators continue to emphasise 
law enforcement in anti-corruption efforts, and it is unclear how the two performance 
indicators are linked and aligned to the other three pillars of an effective anti-corruption 
strategy. For example, increased proactive and preventive measures may see a decrease in the 
number of officials detected for corruption; on the other hand, improved investigative 
                                                            
31 Department of Correctional Services (2010 b) Strategic Plan for 2010/11 -2014/15, Pretoria: Department of 
Correctional Services; Department of Correctional Services (2011 b).  
32 Painter-Morland, M. et al (2003), p.27 
33 Department of Correctional Services (2011 b), p. 21. 
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capacity and skill may result in an increase in the number of officials detected for corruption. 
As it is presented in the 2011/12 -2015/16 Strategic Plan, it is unclear what result is being 
sought.  
The Department’s strategic direction in addressing corruption is further confounded by the 
information reported in the Annual Reports. Synchronicity and alignment between the 
strategic plans and the Annual Reports have been an ongoing problem, and a number of 
outputs that could be related to the 2005 Anti-Corruption Strategy are not necessarily 
reported on with reference to the objective “To ensure effective, legally sound policy 
compliance and corruption-free management of Correctional Services”. Examples include an 
anti-corruption communication strategy;34 training workshops on anti-corruption policies and 
distribution of promotional material;35 development of vetting policy;36 compliance 
inspections;37 and development of a fraud prevention plan.38 The overall impression is that 
while the Strategic Plan places the emphasis on law enforcement and detection, a broader 
range of activities, generally supportive of addressing corruption, are indeed undertaken, 
especially activities seen as proactive and preventive; however, these seem to be disjointed 
and not integrated, as required. 
2.2 A new relationship between the DCS and its employees 
 
In Chapter 3 the powerful, and at times destructive, influence of the labour unions was 
described. Efforts at regaining control over the Department, improving governance and 
addressing corruption would continue to be thwarted, undermined and frustrated unless a new 
employer-employee dispensation could be established. Either in response to the Jali 
Commission’s recommendations or as a result of a DCS initiative, four areas were redefined. 
The first related to senior management union membership. This was an issue of great concern 
                                                            
34 Department of Correctional Services (2007) Annual Report 2006/7, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 25. 
35 Department of Correctional Services (2008 a) Annual Report 2007/8, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 24. Department of Correctional Services (2010 a) Annual Report 2009/10, Pretoria: Department of 
Correctional Services, p. 47. 
36 Department of Correctional Services (2008 a), p. 25. 
37 Department of Correctional Services (2008 a), p. 43. 
38 Department of Correctional Services (2009 a) Annual Report 2008/9, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 79. 
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to the Jali Commission as it fundamentally undermined the authority relationship between 
employer and employee. Second, and in response to the collapse of discipline and order, the 
disciplinary code and procedure were renegotiated. Third, in an effort to establish an 
employer-employee relationship which was less strained and more mutually beneficial, the 
Department adopted a relationship-by-objectives approach. Fourth, following from the DPSA 
audit of 2000 and the Jali Commission’s recommendations, overtime payment was abolished 
and a Seven Day Establishment (SDE) adopted. These four areas are discussed in this section.  
2.2.1. Union membership and senior management 
 
The Jali Commission found that 99% of DCS employees belonged to a trade union.
39
 At least 
part of the incentive for belonging was the result of an agency shop agreement requiring all 
employees, regardless of union membership to pay fees to the representative unions.40 The 
Jali Commission established that, contrary to what the Labour Relations Act stipulates,
41
 that 
the fees deducted from non-unionised staff were indeed higher than fees deducted from 
officials belonging to a union.42 The general approach to union membership, the Jali 
Commission observed, would then be skewed because an employee who has no real intention 
of belonging to a union may do so in any case in order to pay lower fees. It is unclear how 
and when this arrangement came about, but it does indicate unusually close cooperation 
between DCS senior management and union leadership at the cost of non-unionised staff. The 
                                                            
39Jali Commission, p. 120. 
40 Section 25 of the Labour Relations Act (66 of 1995) creates a mechanism whereby, as part of a collective 
agreement, an employer may deduct fees from an employee who does not belong to a union but who is eligible 
to belong to a union. The logic is that non-union employees should not benefit from union negotiations without 
contributing to the union(s) which acts as their agent during negotiations. In the case of DCS such an agreement 
was signed in the Public Service Bargaining Council on 26 May 1998. The agreement stipulated that that the 
employer must deduct 1% of the employee’s basic salary to a maximum of R60.00 from all employees who do 
not belong to a union that is a signatory to the agreement (Jali Commission, pp. 106-107). 
41 Section 25(3)(b) of the Labour Relations Act states that, where there is more than one union recognised by the 
employer, the fee deducted from non-union staff must be lower than or equal to the fee of the union with the 
highest fees.  
42 Jali Commission p. 118. Unfortunately, the Jali Commission’s report does not give details on the amounts 
concerned.  
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issue was ultimately resolved and the fees deducted from non-union members have been 
reduced in order to be consistent with the Labour Relations Act.43 
An issue of particular concern to the Jali Commission was that senior departmental officials 
were also office bearers in the unions. According to the Jali Commission, this bedevilled not 
only the enforcement of discipline but the granting of merit awards as it blurred the line 
between managerial and union responsibilities.44 The Jali Commission recommended that 
senior and junior staff should belong to two different unions. Although the Jali Commission’s 
concerns had not been addressed entirely by 2011, some progress was made in that direction. 
As the question of senior management’s union membership had broader ramifications across 
the public service, the DCS did not deal with it directly. However, the DPSA policy 
guidelines on the establishment of the Senior Management Service (SMS) make provision for 
the removal of all conditions of service of senior managers and executives from the ambit of 
the Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC).45 Consequently, their 
conditions of service, including remuneration, are handled separately and determined through 
ministerial determination issued by the Minister of Public Service and Administration. In 
respect of union membership of the SMS, the DPSA was at the time of writing (December 
2011) investigating the possibility of a professional association for SMS members and it had 
not been finalised.
46
 However, the DCS had made it clear to Parliament that it would be 
unconstitutional to bar any employee, including senior management, from belonging to a 
particular union, or to dictate to employees to which union they should belong.47 The problem 
of senior management being office bearers in unions was further addressed by the General 
Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council Resolution 3/2001, which stipulates that 
employees on salary level 8 (Senior Correctional Officer) may not be appointed as full-time 
                                                            
43 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e) Department of Correctional Services implementation of the 
recommendations of the Jali Commission of Inquiry on Systems and Policies – Section A, Report presented to 
the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on 7 September 2011, p. 7. 
44Jali Commission, pp. 119-123. 
45 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 5. Department of Public Service and Administration (2000) 
Policy statement on the establishment of a senior management service in the public service, 
http://www.dpsa.gov.za/dpsa2g/documents/acts&regulations/frameworks/sms-policy.pdf Accessed 23 
November 2011. 
46 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 5. 
47 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 7. 
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shop stewards.
48
 As a result, Assistant Director and upwards are excluded from being shop 
stewards but may still represent junior employees in disciplinary hearings.49 
Whether these changes will place sufficient distance between the unions and DCS senior 
management remains to be seen. Nonetheless, there has been an acknowledgment that the 
situation as it stood was unacceptable and recognition was given to the potential conflict of 
interest. In the long run, a professional association of the sort contemplated by the DPSA may 
be the only solution to ensure integrity and dispel suspicions of impropriety and undue union 
influence on the DCS. 
 
2.2.2 The disciplinary code and procedure 
 
By the late 1990s the failure to enforce the disciplinary code in the DCS was at the heart of 
the crisis in the Department. The Jali Commission had so little faith in the DCS management 
at the time that it recommended that the enforcement of the disciplinary code (i.e. initiating 
and conducting disciplinary hearings) be outsourced to an external agency such as the PSC.50 
Fortunately, the DCS did not accept this recommendation as it pointed out, correctly, that the 
enforcement of discipline is integral to the management function and this responsibility rests 
with all managers.51 
The Disciplinary Code and Procedure was reviewed and agreed to at the Departmental 
Bargaining Council by Resolution 1/2006 between the unions and the Department and, 
according to DCS, addressed all of the Jali Commission’s concerns.52 The revised 
disciplinary code and procedures were also ratified by the General Public Service Sector 
Bargaining Council53 on 4 December 2006.54 
 
                                                            
48 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 73. 
49 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 73 
50Jali Commission p. 770. 
51 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 71. 
52 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 72. 
53 The General Public Service Sector Bargaining Council (GPSSBC) was designated in terms of the PSCBC 
Resolution 10 of 1999 as the bargaining council of the general public sector. http://www.gpssbc.org.za/ 
Accessed 25 November 2011. 
54 Department of Correctional Services (2007), p. 35. 
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An important change to the Disciplinary Code was that allowing a case to fall away because 
of prescription or lapse of time was included as misconduct.55 Under the previous disciplinary 
code the deliberate lapsing of time (three months) was abused extensively to evade 
disciplinary action against officials, especially when the transgressing employee belonged to 
the same union as the manager.56 
A number of steps were also taken to train staff on the revised disciplinary code. Five-
hundred targeted officials were trained as chairpersons and initiators in disciplinary actions in 
2007/8.57 A training programme on the Disciplinary Code and Procedure was developed in 
conjunction with SAMDI (SA Management and Development Institute) and the first training 
was done in 2007/8, with refresher training reportedly being conducted on a continuous 
basis.58 In the DCS the Directorate Employee Relations and the Directorate Code 
Enforcement were established after the Jali Commission concluded its work.59 The former 
deals with, among other matters, discipline management and monitoring of discipline, while 
the latter specialises in disciplinary code enforcement. Both structures render support to the 
regions and management areas in disciplinary matters. 
From 2006 onwards, the DCS took a number of measured and important steps to establish the 
internal capacity to maintain discipline and order. Creating support structures, specialist 
training to managers and establishing a new regulatory framework that addressed important 
loopholes, placed the Department on a footing to deal more effectively with disciplinary 
infringements. The results of this approach are encouraging, as is described in section 2.2.5 
below.  
2.2.3 Relationship by objectives 
 
From 2005 it was clear that the DCS senior management wanted to improve the generally 
strained and at times confrontational relationship it had with its employees. The promises 
made in 1994 when DCS signed a recognition agreement with POPCRU had failed to 
materialise. Continued industrial action by DCS staff reflected negatively on the Department 
and also had consequences for operations, especially with regard to the maintenance of 
                                                            
55 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 73. 
56 Jali Commission, pp. 700-701. 
57 Department of Correctional Services (2008 a), p. 35. 
58 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 72. 
59 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 73. 
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security.
60
 The then Minister of Correctional Services, Ngconde Balfour (ANC), announced a 
new approach, namely “relationship by objectives”, in the 2005/6 Annual Report: 
 
This financial year also ushers in the beginning of a new era – the Age of Labour Peace 
in Correctional Services – following the settlement of a long standing labour dispute 
with unions. The Memorandum of Understanding we have signed with labour, affirms 
the Department as an essential service institution that acknowledges and promotes the 
exercise of people’s and workers’ rights. This marks a new phase of labour relations 
maturity in the Department. An outstanding feature of the agreement is taking labour 
relations to a higher level through the introduction of a relationship building by 
objectives model.61 
 
To facilitate this new approach, the relationship agreements with unions were revised and 
Labour Relations Forums established in all regions and management areas.62 Regional and 
Management Area Labour Relations Forums were established and launched in five regions in 
2006/7,63 and by 2009/10 were functioning across the Department.64 Training and support 
were also rendered to the members of the forums.65A Ministerial Consultative Forum was 
established to facilitate high-level interactions between the Minister, Commissioner and 
union representatives. While the Ministerial Consultative Forum met twice in 2006/7, there is 
no information from the Department’s Annual Reports whether it still exists or functions.  
                                                            
60 In June 2004 there were illegal strikes at Barberton and Nelspruit prisons (Balfour: Statement on illegal strike 
at Barberton & Nelspruit correctional centres), Polity.org.za, 28 June 2004, 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/balfour-statement-on-illegal-strike-at-barberton-amp-nelspruit-correctional-
centres-28062004-2004-06-28 Accessed 23 November 2011). In February 2004 warders at the private prison in 
Makhado threatened to go on strike (‘Prison warders threaten with strike’ Zoutnet, 20 February 2004, 
http://www.zoutnet.co.za/details/20-02-2004/prison_warders_threaten_with_strike/905 Accessed 23 November 
2011). 
61 Department of Correctional Services (2006 a) Annual Report 2005/6, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 7. 
62 Department of Correctional Services (2006 a), p.22. 
63 Department of Correctional Services (2007), p. 11. 
64 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a) Annual Report 2009/10, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 39. 
65 Department of Correctional Services (2009 a) Annual Report 2008/9, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 38. 
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A number of additional steps were also taken to improve the employer-employee 
relationship. Strike Management Guidelines were developed and issued to managers and the 
Departmental Bargaining Chamber in 2007/8.
66
 A year later the Strike Management 
Guidelines were revised and training sessions conducted with 390 employees. Strike 
Management Committees were also established in all Management Areas of DCS.67 In 
2007/8 a Suspension Policy and Procedure and a Grievance Procedure were developed and 
submitted to the Departmental Bargaining Council,68 but by 2011 both had been revised and 
not yet finalised.69 In 2008/9 and Employee Relations Policy and Procedure was submitted 
for approval,
70
 but it is uncertain if progress was made as there is no further reference to it in 
the Annual Reports. Regardless of this, compared to the 1994 recognition agreement with 
POCRU, a far more structured, focused and mature approach had emerged since 2005 to 
improve the relationship between DCS and its employees. These were important 
achievements in the efforts to improve governance in the Department. 
 
2.2.4 Medical aid, over-time payment and the Seven Day Establishment 
 
The initial focus of the SIU was on the medical aid scheme of the DCS (Medcor). Because it 
was a non-contributory fund with no limitations on claims by members, it resulted in 
widespread fraud and corruption. The situation was rectified by 2004 and since then DCS 
employees contribute one-third and the employer two thirds.
71
 All indications are that this 
step, combined with the implementation of recommendations made by the SIU, addressed the 
systemic shortcomings of the medical aid fund.  
The DPSA management audit released in 2000 already recommended the implementation of 
a Seven Day Establishment (SDE) that would do away with overtime payment (see Chapter 3 
section 4.6.3). To the Jali Commission it was evident that the overtime payment system was 
                                                            
66 Department of Correctional Services (2008 a), p. 34. 
67 Department of Correctional Services (2009 a), p. 27. 
68 Department of Correctional Services (2008 a), p. 35. 
69 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a) Annual Report 2010/11, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 28. 
70 Department of Correctional Services (2009 a), p. 27. 
71 Department of Correctional Services (2005) Annual Report 2004/5, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 30. 
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grossly abused and that it resulted in significant expenditure for the Department. By the 
Department’s own admission, the overtime system was abused: “Non-compliance with the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (Act no. 75 of 1997) resulted from poor budget 
control practices and entrenched mismanagement of overtime.”
72
 In an effort to resolve this 
problem the Department entered into an agreement with all recognised unions in 2004 to 
regulate management and expenditure related to overtime.73 The substance of the agreement 
is, however, not described in the relevant Annual Report. In 2004 an agreement was also 
reached between the Department and unions to implement an SDE scheduled to commence 
on 1 June 2005.74 
The implementation of the SDE, however, suffered serious delays, and when it was finally 
implemented it had adverse consequences on operations. One reason for the delay was that 
monies allocated to the SDE were re-allocated to fund other departmental programmes.75 The 
SDE was ultimately implemented with effect from 1 July 2009, some four years late but with 
immediate and substantial savings to the tune of R900 million (US$ 132 million).76 It, too, 
ran into difficulties.  
 
At operational level, problems soon emerged with the SDE as different permutations of the 
shift system were tested and each created different challenges. Contrary to what may be 
logically expected, the SDE did not propose a uniform shift system for all prisons. The 
instruction was, after initial problems, that Regions may adopt a system that suits their 
particular needs and context.
77
 The requirement was essentially that it should not exceed 45 
hours worked in a week. As a result, three systems have emerged: (1) 10 hours over a 5-day 
period in a 7-day cycle; (2) 12 days on and 2 days off in a 14-day cycle; and (3) 10 days on 
and 4 days off in a 14-day cycle.
78
 
                                                            
72 Department of Correctional Services (2006 a), p. 47. 
73 Department of Correctional Services (2006 a), p. 47. 
74Department of Correctional Services (2005), pp. 18 and 47. 
75 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 17 February 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100217-problems-within-department-correctional-services Accessed 8 
December 2011. 
76 Department of Correctional Services (2009 a) Annual Report 2009/10, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 20. 
77 Government Gazette, No. 34034, Notice 135, 25 February 2011. 
78 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), p. 31. 
 
 
 
 
197 
 
In the absence of overtime payment, the incentive to work longer hours disappeared. From 
Johannesburg Medium A Prison it was reported that there were 132 officials for 6 000 
awaiting trial detainees and that as a result of the shift system, seven officials would 
supervise 1 500 prisoners. From Baviaanspoort Medium B prison it was reported that three 
officials had to lock up 1 500 prisoners.79 From a security- and staff-safety-perspective these 
staff-to-prisoners ratios are intolerable, placing both staff and vulnerable prisoners at risk. 
The Judicial Inspectorate saw the impact of the shift system on a wider level affecting general 
service delivery:  
The implementation of the so-called shift system has had a negative impact effect on 
staffing at operational levels within most correctional centres which in turn has affected 
the treatment of inmates in that recreational and rehabilitative programmes have been 
suspended.80 
 According to the Public Servants Association (PSA), the SDE resulted in a reduced monthly 
salary of between R1 000 and R3 000 per employee and, “to add insult to injury”, increased 
working hours from 40 to 45 hours per week.81 The PSA argued that the DCS did not have 
enough staff to implement the SDE. It estimated, conservatively, that between 8 000 and 14 
000 more officials were required, assuming that prisons were not overcrowded and at least 
80% of posts are filled.
82
 The overall situation has created significant security risks for both 
prisoners and staff,83 and it has further been alleged that officials would exploit the shift 
                                                            
79 Public Servants Association (2009) Submission by the Public Servants Association on the 2009/10 Annual 
report of the Department of Correctional Services to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Service, PMG 
report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Service, 28 October 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091028-department-correctional-services-briefing-its-20082009-annual-report 
Accessed 23 November 2011. 
80 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
2009/10, Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 38. 
81 Public Servants Association (2009). 
82 Public Servants Association (2009). 
83 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 13 October 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101013-department-correctional-services-claims-parole-staffing-levels-and-ot 
Accessed 5 December 2011. 
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system so that they can do private work to earn additional income.
84
 Moreover, it had 
severely compromised the Department’s capacity to render services to prisoners. 
 
Increased resistance by staff to the SDE developed quickly and one of the unions (POPCRU) 
turned to the Labour Court for relief. In September 2010 it was granted, in KwaZulu-Natal, 
an interim interdict against the implementation there of the third option listed above (10 days 
on and 4 days off in a 14 day cycle).
85
 In February 2011 POPCRU was granted a further 
interdict in the KwaZulu-Natal matter by the Labour Court, effectively preventing the 
implementation of a changed shift system for prison-based staff and specifically prohibiting 
the National Commissioner from acting against any DCS official who refuses to work 
according to the changed shift system.86 In view of this, the parties returned to the 
Departmental Bargaining Council in April 2011 to deal with the matter on a national basis. 
By November 2011 a draft agreement had emerged but the details were not available. 
Indications are, however, that the DCS may indeed need to employ as many as 12 000 more 
officials to fully implement the SDE.
87
 
 
                                                            
84 MG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 13 October 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101013-department-correctional-services-claims-parole-staffing-levels-and-ot 
Accessed 5 December 2011. 
85 Press release by the DCS ‘Correctional Services says court interdict has not affected the fundamentals of 
seven-day establishment’ 10 September 2010, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=12877&tid=17840 Accessed 23 November 
2011. 
86 The interdict stipulated the following: (1) Interdicting and restraining all officials lower in rank from 
implementing any shift system in the Department or any part thereof [including all management Areas, 
Correctional Centres, Correctional Facilities, Divisions or Offices],in terms of which the work hours of centre-
based correctional officials are changed, (2) Interdicting and restraining the National Commissioner as the 
respondent from instituting, or continuing with, disciplinary proceedings against any centre-based correctional 
officials, who failed and/or refused to perform work in accordance with the shift system implemented by any 
official of a lower rank other than the National Commissioner. (3) Interdicting and restraining the National 
Commissioner as the respondent from making or continuing to make deductions in respect of unpaid leave, from 
the salaries of officials who failed and/or refused to perform work in accordance with a shift system 
implemented by any official if a lower rank other than the National Commissioner as the respondent. (Press 
release by POPCRU, ‘POPCRU’s Urgent Labour Court Application granted on Shift System’ 11 February 2011, 
http://popcru.org.za/?p=249 Accessed 23 November 2011). 
87 Telephonic interview with Mr. Simon Madini, HOD: Collective Bargaining, POPCRU, 24 November 2011. 
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Six years after the initial implementation date, the DCS is still struggling to get the SDE off 
the ground. Regardless of what technical and practical difficulties there may be, it is evident 
that this initiative was not properly planned and costed. The employment of thousands of 
more officials would add significantly to the already bloated budget of the Department. 
Moreover, merely employing more staff may not solve the problem if they are not properly 
trained and monitored to perform the tasks they are required to do by law and policy.  
 
The effective and efficient utilisation of state resources is a constitutional requirement88 and 
includes the utilisation of human resources. While the situation in respect of medical aid in 
DCS was resolved, the SDE (a matter of governance) has proven to be a more complex. 
Moreover, it has clear rights implications with reference to safe custody and the services 
provided to prisoners.  
2.2.5 Re-establishing the disciplinary code and procedure 
 
In Chapter 3 detailed information was presented on the collapse of discipline and order in the 
DCS, and section 2.2.2 above described the re-negotiation of the disciplinary code and 
procedure. The overall impression gained from the Jali Commission’s findings is that 
managers, in particular Heads of Prisons, were reluctant or unable to enforce the 
Department’s disciplinary code, and further, that when this was done, extremely light 
sanctions were imposed. To restore discipline and order in the DCS it was required that the 
disciplinary code be revised, the necessary structures and support be put in place (as 
described above) and, ultimately, that the code be enforced. The trends in respect of 
enforcing the disciplinary code are presented in Figures 1 to 3 below and provide some 
reason for optimism. 
Figure 1 shows the number of disciplinary actions initiated by the Department against 
employees per 1 000 employees for the period 2002/3 to 2010/11. In 2002/3 this stood at 48 
disciplinary actions for every 1 000 employees. By 2010/11 this ratio had increased to 106 
disciplinary actions for every 1 000 employees. The result is that by 2010/11 nearly one out 
of every ten DCS employees was the subject of a disciplinary action in that year.  
                                                            
88 s 195(1)(b) Act 108 of 1996. 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 shows the profile of sanctions imposed as a result of disciplinary actions per year 
from 1997 to 2010/11. Two categories of sanctions are presented, namely dismissals from the 
employ of the Department and Other.89 
Given the findings of the Jali Commission and the work of the SIU, one would have expected 
a consistent, if not growing, trend in disciplinary actions against DCS officials and a 
significant proportion of dismissals. However, as shown in Figure 2, the trends point in a 
different direction at least until 2007/8.90 The most obvious of them is the see-saw figure in 
total disciplinary sanctions imposed, standing at nearly 2 500 in 1998, dropping below 1 000 
the following year but then climbing above 2300 in 2000/1. The high number of disciplinary 
actions in 1997 and 1998 were the result of the investigations undertaken by the PSC and the 
DPSA. The spike in 2001 to 2003 can again be attributed to the early work of the Jali 
Commission and the SIU. During the first three years of the SIU’s involvement in the DCS 
(2002-2005), the total number of disciplinary actions did, however, drop to just above 200 
cases in 2004/5. But the fruits were harvested the following year when disciplinary sanctions 
imposed climbed again to above 1200. These were cases primarily related to medical aid and 
social grant fraud. Dismissals, nonetheless, remain rare events in the DCS. The highest 
number of dismissals was 264 in 2005/6. In the following year, 2006/7, the total number of 
disciplinary sanctions imposed dropped to 253, with only 33 dismissals. An encouraging 
                                                            
89 ‘Other’ refers to the following: corrective counselling; verbal warning; written warning; final written warning; 
dismissal; demotion; and suspension without pay. 
90 The data used in Figure 2 were extracted from the various annual reports of the DCS of the period covered. It 
should be noted that the report for 2000/1 covers a 15-month period when the Department changed its reporting 
period from a calendar year to a financial year. 
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trend is visible from 2007/8. A sharp increase in disciplinary sanctions imposed has been 
sustained since then, and the period 2009 to 2011 saw the highest-ever number of disciplinary 
sanctions imposed against employees – more than of 2 500 per year. The trend from 2007 
onwards also shows that code enforcement had become less a function of external 
investigations and increasingly the result of DCS internal actions, demonstrating that internal 
capacity and commitment to enforce the code has improved. 
Figure 2 
 
Notwithstanding the widespread findings of corruption, fraud and theft, the number of 
disciplinary actions initiated in response to this group of offences remains relatively low. It, 
too, describes a see-saw pattern, as shown in Figure 3. Between 2002/3 and 2007/8, this 
category constituted between 9% and 15% of initiated disciplinary actions, but thereafter its 
proportional share had dropped to as low as 2% by 2009/10. A possible explanation could be 
that corrupt officials had been prosecuted and disciplined, an explanation warranted by the 
repairs that have been made to systemic weakness and loopholes that have been closed; 
improvements in the general employee culture in the Department could also be contributing 
to the trend. A more pessimistic explanation is that after the SIU ended its investigations in 
2009, the DCS found itself bereft of the specialised skills and additional capacity needed to 
investigate the more forensically complex cases of fraud and corruption. If the latter is indeed 
the more accurate explanation, it would mean that the Department is at risk of an increase 
again in corruption. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
2.3 Developing internal capacity to address corruption 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 2.1), the Correctional Services Act mandates the National 
Commissioner to investigate corruption and dishonest practices in the Department. The Act 
also enables the establishment of internal capacity to investigate corruption and enforce the 
disciplinary code. This section describes and assesses the measures that were implemented in 
fulfilment of that mandate.  
2.3.1 The legislative mandate 
 
The National Anti-Corruption strategy requires, as described in section 2.1, the development 
of an internal capacity in all national departments.91 This is expanded on further in the 
Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity Requirements. The legislative mandate to establish the 
internal capacity to investigate theft, fraud and corruption was originally provided for in the 
Correctional Services Act in Chapter 11 “Internal service evaluation and eradication and 
prevention of corruption”.92 This mandate was originally created by the 2001 amendment to 
                                                            
91 Department of Public Service and Administration (2002), pp. 14-15. 
92 Sections 95(2)(f) and 95(2)(g) prior to Act 25 of 2008. 
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the Correctional Services Act.
93
 Following the 2001 amendment, sections 95(2)(f) and 
95(2)(g) specifically provided for developing measures to combat theft, fraud and corruption 
and for investigating such practices as well as dishonesty in general. The 2001 amendment 
provided for the establishment of a unit in the DCS to deal with matters of this kind.
94
 The 
unit was further mandated to initiate disciplinary action resulting from any investigation 
related to theft, fraud, corruption or dishonest practices.95 
The Correctional Services Amendment Act (25 of 2008) replaced the provisions in section 
95(3)A for an investigative unit with two specifically named structures, the Departmental 
Investigation Unit (DIU)96 and the Code Enforcement Unit (CEU).97 The mandate of the DIU 
is to investigate theft, fraud, corruption and maladministration by correctional officials. The 
CEU is tasked with instituting disciplinary proceedings emanating from investigations 
undertaken by the DIU. The Correctional Services Amendment Act also requires the National 
Commissioner to include in the Departmental Annual Report a report on compliance 
monitoring, investigations undertaken by the DIU and disciplinary proceedings initiated and 
concluded by the CEU.98 The DIU and CEU were already established by 2006, and the 
purpose of the amendment to the legislation was thus to bring the law in line with practice.99 
A more detailed description of the two units is provided below in sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4.  
 
2.3.2 Risk Management and Fraud Prevention Committees 
 
 
Even though a risk management strategy was developed in 2002, a Risk Management 
Committee was created only in 2004 and it is responsible for conducting risk assessments in 
the DCS.100 The Risk Management Committee is chaired by the Chief Deputy Commissioner 
(CDC) Central Services and further comprises six Deputy Regional Commissioners, the 16 
Deputy Commissioners, the Director: Inspectorate and the Director: Internal Audit. It is 
                                                            
93 Act 32 of 2001. 
94 s 34(s) of Act 32 of 2001 inserted s 95(3A) into the principal act. 
95 s 95(3A). 
96 s 95A. 
97 s 95B. 
98s 95C. 
99 Muntingh, L. (2006).  
100 Department of Correctional Services (2005), p. 67. 
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evidently representative of the Department’s most senior officials and its main task is to 
identify risks based on information emanating from the internal audit, the Inspectorate’s 
report, Strategic Plan reviews and reports from external bodies such as the Auditor 
General.
101
 Risk assessment is done annually - in time to inform the Department’s strategic 
plan. As part of the strategic plan, it is the responsibility of management at all DCS facilities 
and all branches to implement the strategy. Identified risks and mitigating measures are 
integrated into the strategic plans of the Department. 
 
While it is accepted that risk assessment is a dynamic process requiring constant updating, it 
is also the case that the identified risks, as reflected in the DCS Annual Reports, show 
continuous shifts in their nature and the priority given to them.102 For example, in the 2007/8 
Annual Report the number-one rated risk was “Non-compliance with directives, policy and 
procedures; lack of internal control and supervision; and resultant repeated audit queries”.103 
Three years later, the top- rated risk was “Inadequate contract management”.104 Such fluidity 
in risk assessment may perhaps undermine a sustained focus on specific and long-term risks. 
 
In 2007/8 the DCS also developed a Fraud Prevention Strategy and established a Fraud 
Prevention Committee.
105
 The Fraud Prevention Committee cooperated closely with the SIU 
during its investigations and was tasked amongst other to monitor the implementation of the 
                                                            
101 Department of Correctional Services (2006 a), p. 12. 
102 For example, the 2010/11 DCS Annual Report (p. 111) lists the following as the top ten risks for the 
Department:  
1. Inadequate contract management 
2. Inadequate HR Provisioning in order to deliver the core mandate of the department 
3. Ineffective functioning of Case Management Systems 
4. Inadequate IT Systems security 
5. Inadequate basic IT infrastructure 
6. Lack of integrated planning on infra-structural needs 
7. Lack of comprehensive, accurate and reliable data for decision making 
8. Ineffective implementation of HRD (human resource development) Strategy 
9. Inadequate Asset Management 
10. Overcrowding.  
103 Department of Correctional Services (2008 a), p. 18. 
104 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), p. 111. 
105 Department of Correctional Services (2008 a), p. 82. 
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SIU’s recommendations, since this had been identified as a problem area.
106
 The extent to 
which the Fraud Prevention Committee remained optimally functional is questionable as the 
2010 DPSA audit of the DCS noted that meetings of the Committee were poorly attended.107 
 
Both of these structures place the emphasis on prevention through risk-identification – a 
significantly different approach to ones taken in the past, when there was little control over 
corruption and even less concern about it. 
2.3.3 The Departmental Investigations Unit 
 
While the corruption prevention strategy is decentralised, the investigation and sanctioning 
functions are centralised. The investigative function resorts under the Deputy Commissioner 
Legal and Special Operations, which resides under the Chief Deputy Commissioner: Central 
Services. The Chief Directorate Legal and Special Operations has three directorates: Code 
Enforcement (CEU), Legal Services, and the Departmental Investigations Unit (DIU).108 The 
DIU has 20 funded posts of which one was vacant by the end of September 2011.109 
The DIU was specifically created to deal with the detection and investigation of corruption, 
fraud and serious maladministration. Although overseen by Central Services and Legal and 
Special Operations, it has relative autonomy in the Department regarding investigations.110 
The approach is that all managers should provide the DIU with full support in the course of 
its investigations. Within the DIU there are two sub-units, namely the Investigation Unit and 
Analytical and Prevention Desk.111 
                                                            
106 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 20 May 2008, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080520-briefing-special-investigations-unit-investigation-department Accessed 
25 November 2011. 
107 Department of Public Service and Administration (2010) An audit of the internal anti-corruption capacity of 
the Department of Correctional Services, Pretoria: DPSA, p. 10. 
108 Department of Correctional Services (2011 f) Information on the component Legal and Special operations 
for the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services. Presented to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services on 18 October 2011. 
109 Department of Correctional Services (2011 f). 
110 Department of Public Service and Administration (2006), p. 16. 
111 Department of Correctional Services (2011 f). 
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The DIU is responsible for investigating allegations of corruption. It has a Director, 12 
investigators, and two administrative support staff. The DIU is located in Pretoria but its 
mandate is national. Apparently, this arrangement is a beneficial one, as investigators are not 
close to the targets of investigation and therefore at a reduced risk of intimidation or undue 
influence.112 
The Analytical and Prevention Desk is responsible for maintaining a database on incidents, 
doing trend analysis and reporting on this line function to the executive management 
committee.113 Information from the database is used to identify high-risk areas and prisons 
with high levels of reported incidents in order to advise the relevant managers. It is argued 
that this flow of information back to the implementation level places the responsibility of 
strategy implementation in the hands of the Area Managers and Heads of Prisons. The sub-
unit has a director and three analytical and prevention staff members. 
2.3.4 The Code Enforcement Unit 
 
The CEU has two sub-units, Prosecutions and Sanctions. The Prosecutions sub-unit is 
responsible for initiating disciplinary investigations and prosecuting cases. The Sanction sub-
unit is responsible for training chairpersons for disciplinary proceedings. The CEU has 11 
funded posts of which one was vacant by end September 2011.114 After the DIU has 
completed an investigation, the file is given to the Prosecutions Unit of the CEU, which deals 
with disciplinary prosecutions. The CEU is also responsible for handing cases over to the 
police or other external agencies, which should happen as soon as there is reason to believe 
that a criminal case may emanate from an investigation. 
2.3.5 Other units 
 
Two other units in the department are also important to the investigation of corruption.115 The 
first is the Human Resource Department, which is responsible for doing pre-employment 
screening and verifying the qualifications of recruited staff. The second is the Finance Unit 
that is part of the Risk Management Committee, which is responsible for allocating additional 
                                                            
112 Department of Public Service and Administration (2006), p. 16. 
113 Department of Public Service and Administration (2006), p. 16. 
114 Department of Correctional Services (2011 f). 
115 Department of Public Service and Administration (2006), p. 18. 
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resources when external assistance is required, such as the SIU, forensic auditors, or expert 
witnesses.  
2.3.6 Assessment of performance of internal capacity 
 
In response to the widespread occurrence of corruption and maladministration, the DCS 
developed a number of polices and created internal structures to improve governance in the 
Department. Assessed against technical compliance, meaning whether particular measures 
are in place to prevent and address corruption, the DCS was rated very highly in a 2010 audit 
of minimum internal anti-corruption capacity requirements and received an overall rating of 
86.3%.
116
 The rating should, however, be contextualised. The audit assessed the extent to 
which measures were put in place, such as mandates established, policies developed, and 
structures created. It did not assess their effectiveness. Moreover, some of the scores given in 
the audit report are perhaps indulgent of shortcomings or unsupported by other findings. For 
example, on the indicator “Review of internal controls” a rating of 100% is given, yet the 
quality of internal controls has been a long-standing issue noted by the Auditor General and 
raised as a matter of emphasis since 2001 (see discussion below at section 2.4.2). 
Staff capacity also places further limitations on the extent to which the Department can 
successfully address corruption and maladministration. The DIU and CEU illustrate this well. 
Collectively the staff establishment of the DIU and the CEU is 29 filled posts as at September 
2011, but it is doubtful if this is sufficient for a department with more than 40 000 employees 
and a known risk of corruption and other transgressions. Figures presented to the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services in 2011 confirmed this, indicating that nearly half of the 
DIU’s cases are awaiting investigation.117 Of the cases already investigated, 84% were closed 
due to lack of evidence,
118
 the implication being that time and resources are spent on 
investigations but few proceed to the next step of disciplinary or criminal action. In respect of 
the CEU, the situation is somewhat better but a significant proportion of cases remain 
                                                            
116 Department of Public Service and Administration (2010), p. 9. 
117 Department of Correctional Services (2011 f). 
118 Department of Correctional Services (2011 d) Annual trend analysis on corruption, fraud, theft and 
maladministration in the DCS – 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011, Presented to the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services on 18 October 2011. 
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pending from year to year. It is evident that the current capacity of the DIU and CEU is 
insufficient to deal with the volume of cases.119 
There is little doubt that the Department has made notable progress in addressing corruption 
and considerable momentum has been attained in this effort. This is reflected, for example, in 
the number of disciplinary actions taken against officials in recent years, as well as by the 
establishment of internal anti-corruption capacity. However, limited staff capacity in these 
internal units – along with limited leadership commitment to maintaining a sustained focus 
on eradicating corruption – may weaken the existing momentum, a prognosis reflected in the 
growing backlog of cases. 
2.4 External agencies 
 
There is no single anti-corruption agency in South Africa. As Van Vuuren points out, it was 
decided to mandate a number of agencies with the powers to address corruption – “a one-
dragon-with-many-heads approach” – rather than have a single agency.120 These agencies are 
categorised as follows: (1) Constitutional and oversight bodies that have a special mandate in 
respect of Chapter 9 of the Constitution, such as the Auditor General, Public Protector, PSC 
and the Independent Complaints Directorate; (2) Criminal justice agencies such as SAPS, 
SIU, National Prosecuting Authority, Asset Forfeiture Unit; and (3) Other stakeholders such 
as the Department of Public Service and Administration, National Intelligence Agency, South 
African Revenue Service and the cross-sectoral National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF).121 
Two of these agencies have had a more direct involvement than others in assisting the DCS to 
address corruption and maladministration: the SIU and the Auditor General, which are 
discussed below. While the Auditor General has a constitutional mandate to conduct audits, 
the investigations by the SIU are focused and time-limited and, in the case of the DCS, took 
the form of two multi-year agreements. 
2.4.1 The Special Investigations Unit 
 
                                                            
119 Department of Correctional Services (2011 f). 
120 Van Vuuren, H. (2005) National Integrity Systems – Transparency International Country Study Report – 
South Africa, Final Draft, Transparency International, p. 71. 
121 Van Vuuren, H. (2005), p.71. 
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The Special Investigations Unit (SIU) is the only state agency that is specifically dedicated to 
combating corruption.122 The SIU was originally created in terms of the Special 
Investigations Units and Tribunals Act.123 Following a decision from the Constitutional 
Court,
124
 the new SIU was established by Presidential proclamation in July 2001.
125
 The SIU 
is an independent structure and accountable to Parliament. Investigations are conducted at the 
request of the President to whom investigation outcomes are reported. In short, the mandate 
of the SIU is to investigate fraud, corruption and maladministration, and to institute civil 
litigation to recover losses suffered by the state, or to prevent further losses.126 The President 
may refer a matter to the SIU for investigation if it relates to serious maladministration and 
corruption.
127
 
The SIU is also mandated to take civil legal action to recover losses, cancel contracts if 
procedures were not followed, and stop transactions and actions that are not properly 
authorised. In order to expedite this process of civil litigation, the SIU litigates in a Special 
Tribunal that focuses only on these matters. While the emphasis falls on civil litigation, it has 
the powers to arrest and prosecute. In the event that criminal activity is uncovered, the SIU 
will hand over a court-ready docket to the National Prosecuting Authority (Directorate 
Special Operations).The SIU may also investigate private sector matters that may cause 
significant harm to public interests. 
                                                            
122 Van Vuuren, H. (2005), p. 72. 
123Act 74 of 1996. 
124 The SIU was originally headed by Judge Heath until he had to resign in June 2001 after the Constitutional 
Court ruled that a judge could not head the SIU (South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 
and Others (CCT27/00) [2000] ZACC 22; 2001 (1) SA 883; 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (28 November 2000). 
125 Special Investigations Unit (2005) Annual Report 2004/5, Pretoria: Special Investigations Unit, p. 2. 
126 Special Investigations Unit (2005), p. 2. 
127 More specifically, the president can refer the following matters: 
• serious maladministration in connection with the affairs of any state institution;  
• improper or unlawful conduct by employees of any state institution;  
• unlawful appropriation or expenditure of public money or property;  
• any unlawful, irregular or unapproved acquisitive act, transaction, measure or practice that has a 
bearing on state property;  
• intentional or negligent loss of public money or damage to public property;  
• corruption in connection with the affairs of any state institution;  
• unlawful or improper conduct by any person who has caused or may cause serious harm to the 
interest of the public or any category thereof. (Special Investigations Unit (2005), p. 2.) 
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Following the findings of widespread corruption in the DCS by the Jali Commission, the 
Department approached the SIU for assistance and a three-year agreement was signed in 
October 2004.128 Since then, the scope of investigations into the DCS has been broadened and 
formed the basis for a productive partnership between the DCS and the SIU.
129
 After an 
initial agreement that the project would last for three years, the SIU agreed to extend it 
beyond 2006 and the agreement came to an end in 2009. Despite being urged by Parliament’s 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) to renew the agreement, this was not 
done.130 The scope of investigations under the first agreement focused primarily on medical 
aid fraud and corruption at prisons. Under the second agreement the focus was on 
procurement, asset management at prison farms and pharmacies. The scope of the second 
agreement was expanded to investigate high-value contracts and was referred to the SIU by 
the Auditor General and the PSC (see section 4.2). Increasingly, the SIU’s focus of 
investigations targeted procurement in the DCS and significant advances were made to 
identify corrupt contracts as well as improve the procurement system and practices.131 
An important shift in the nature of the engagement with DCS was that while the focus during 
the first agreement was primarily on criminal investigations, under the second agreement 
more emphasis was placed on identifying and addressing systemic and institutional 
weaknesses. Over time the SIU developed the capacity and experience to provide a broad 
range of forensic services, and it relied on this to assist the DCS not only to investigate 
                                                            
128 Briefing by Special Investigations Unit to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services.PMG report on 
the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 20 May 2008, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080520-briefing-special-investigations-unit-investigation-department Accessed 
24 November 2011. 
129 Briefing by Special Investigations Unit to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services.PMG report on 
the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 17 November 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091117-special-investigations-unit-findings-their-investigation-department-c 
Accessed 24 November 2011. 
130 PMG report on the meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) of 30 January 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100128-department-correctional-services-and-special-investigating-unit-annua 
Accessed 7 December 2011. 
131 Special Investigations Unit (2009) Annual Report 2008/9, Pretoria: Special Investigations Unit, p. 26. 
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crimes but fix systemic weaknesses and develop capacity within the DCS.
132
 The SIU also 
assisted with setting up the DIU through the transference of skills and capacity.133 
There is no doubt that the DCS and SIU co-operation has been very productive and resulted 
in enormous savings.
134
 The systematic and focused approach followed in respect of grand 
corruption cases ensured that results were of a concomitant magnitude in respect of the 
monetary value of recoveries and future savings. Despite the investigations being wide-
ranging and intensive, a characteristic reflected in the number of prisoners and staff members 
interviewed and the number of complaints followed up,135 the number of criminal convictions 
has been comparatively low. Of 157 criminal referrals between 2002 and 2005, there have 
been only five convictions, with 96 investigations still pending in 2006 and another 19 cases 
on trial.136 
 
The SIU has been instrumental in uncovering fraud and corruption in the DCS as well as in 
addressing systemic weaknesses and thus preventing fraud, corruption and maladministration. 
In 2002, the circumstances at the time necessitated that an independent body with highly 
skilled and dedicated staff undertake the investigations. It was evident then that neither the 
Department’s own investigative unit nor that of the SAPS would be able to investigate 
properly the allegations emanating from the Jali Commission’s investigations. The successive 
                                                            
132 Briefing by Special Investigations Unit to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services.PMG report on 
the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 17 November 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091117-special-investigations-unit-findings-their-investigation-department-c 
Accessed 24 November 2011. 
133 Special Investigations Unit (2007) Annual Report 2006/7, Pretoria: Special Investigations Unit, p. 24. 
134 According to the Special Investigations Unit, the investigation into medical aid fraud alone yielded the 
recovery of R22 million (US$ 3.2 million) and savings amounting to R3.4 billion (US$ 500 million) (Briefing 
by Special Investigations Unit to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, PMG report on the meeting 
of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 17 November 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091117-special-investigations-unit-findings-their-investigation-department-c 
Accessed 24 November 2011). 
135 The 2004/5 Annual Report of the Special Investigations Unit (p. 8) reflects that 161 prisons were visited, 103 
496 prisoners interviewed, 16 927 DCS staff members interviewed, 8 091 complaints followed up, 244 cases 
referred for criminal prosecution and 398 disciplinary actions against officials instituted.  
136 Special Investigations Unit, Fact sheet on the National Investigation into corruption, fraud and 
maladministration at various Correctional Centres, p. 10. 
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agreements between the SIU and DCS did much to regain control over a department where 
corruption had become endemic and widespread. 
2.4.2 The Auditor General 
 
The Auditor General of South Africa (the Auditor General) is a Chapter 9 institution 
established in terms of s 181 of the Constitution with its functions set out in s 188. The 
Auditor General must audit and report to the National Assembly on the accounts, financial 
statements and financial management of all national and provincial state departments and 
administrations; all municipalities, and any other institution or accounting entity required by 
national or provincial legislation to be audited by the Auditor General. The Auditor General 
performs a number of different audits and supporting activities in respect of its mandate, 
including regularity auditing, performance auditing, computer auditing, environmental 
auditing and forensic auditing.
137
 
The Auditor General reports annually on the DCS in respect of the annual auditing process 
and comments on the budget vote. In addition to these functions, the Auditor General has 
prepared a number of focused reports on the DCS relating to a performance audit (1998),138 
alleged irregularities among senior officials (1999),139 progress in implementing the White 
Commission recommendations (1999),140 and the use of sick-leave benefits (2003).141 The 
three reports produced before 2000 were part of the motivation for the management audit 
                                                            
137 Van Vuuren, H. (2005), p. 45. 
138 RP 181/1998. 
139 RP 123/1999. 
140 The White Commission (formerly the Browde Commission) was established to review complaints submitted 
to it by any interested party regarding, amongst others, irregularities in respect of promotions in the public 
service which occurred between 27 April 1993 and 30 September 1994. In the case of DCS 1651 such cases in 
the former Transkei were uncovered by the White Commission (Auditor General (1999) Overview of the status 
of the implementation of the findings of the Judge White Commission (formerly Browde Commission), and the 
resultant recoveries as at 30 June 1999, Pretoria: Auditor General, RP 173/1999). 
141 Auditor General (2005) Report of the Auditor General on a performance audit of the management of sick 
leave benefits at certain national and provincial departments, 
http://www.agsa.co.za/Reports/Our%20Reports/AG%20reports-
National/Specialised%20audits/Performance/2005/Performance%20audit%20on%20management%20of%20sic
k%20leave%20benefits%20at%20certain%20national%20and%20provincial%20departments%20(2005).pdf. 
Accessed 24 November 2011. 
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ordered by the Minister of Public Service and Administration in 1999 and presented to 
Parliament in 2000.  
Over the years, the Auditor General has expressed concern about the Department’s financial 
management and accounting, and has given the Department qualified audit reports since 
2000/1.142 While this does not allege or imply corruption or any illegal activity, it creates risk 
areas that need to be managed more effectively. 
The reasons for the qualified audits since 2000/1 are summarised and set out in Table 1 
below. While the majority of issues raised by the Auditor General as reasons for qualification 
remained as such for a period of one to three years and were subsequently resolved, concerns 
regarding the medical aid scheme and asset management have been reasons for qualified 
audits for five and six years respectively. The medical aid scheme problems were finally 
resolved in 2006/7, but asset management was by 2011 still a concern to the Auditor General 
and resulted in the tenth consecutive qualified audit. While still a qualified audit result, the 
number of qualifications has been reduced significantly, especially since 2006/7, and by 2011 
there remained only one issue to be addressed, namely asset management. 
Table 1 
Reason for 
qualification 
Description 
2
0
0
1
/2
 
2
0
0
2
/3
 
2
0
0
3
/4
 
2
0
0
4
/5
 
2
0
0
5
/6
 
2
0
0
6
/7
 
2
0
0
7
/8
 
2
0
0
8
/9
 
2
0
0
9
/1
0
 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
 
Medical services 
(Medcor) 
  
  
  
On-going forensic 
investigation 
                    
Internal control systems                     
Non-compliance with 
Medical Aid Scheme Act 
                    
Payments made on face 
value 
                    
Paymaster General 
Reconciliation 
Lacking supporting 
documentation 
                    
Receivables 
  
Staff debt                     
Inter-departmental debt                     
APOPS (Asset 
Procurement and 
Operating 
Partnerships System) 
Financial lease versus 
operational lease 
                    
                                                            
142 See relevant Department of Correctional Services Annual Reports containing the audit reports of the Auditor 
General. 
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Reason for 
qualification 
Description 
2
0
0
1
/2
 
2
0
0
2
/3
 
2
0
0
3
/4
 
2
0
0
4
/5
 
2
0
0
5
/6
 
2
0
0
6
/7
 
2
0
0
7
/8
 
2
0
0
8
/9
 
2
0
0
9
/1
0
 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
 
Asset management 
  
  
  
  
3 computer programmes 
used for asset register and 
management 
                    
Capital assets                     
Buildings and other fixed 
structures 
                    
Intangible assets - no asset 
register 
                    
Movable tangible minor 
assets 
                    
Housing loan 
guarantees 
Lack of internal controls & 
verification of information 
                    
Accruals                      
 
The Auditor General also raises matters of emphasis that may or may not affect the financial 
statements. Matters not affecting the financial statements deal by and large with systemic 
issues, such as the quality of internal controls, an issue emphasised by the Auditor General 
since 2001 in successive reports. Despite these concerns, the overall impression gained is that 
the quantum of matters of emphasis raised by the Auditor General has been declining. 
However, significant concerns remain, especially in relation to internal controls, performance 
management and the quality of reporting on programme performance.143 With reference to 
performance indicators in three of the seven DCS programmes,144 the Auditor General noted 
in 2011 that there were problems with the clarity and specificity of the indicators, the 
measurability of the indicators, and fact that the targets were not time-bound.145 
While the DCS has shown notable progress in improving financial management and 
accounting, as reflected in the number of qualifications and their scope, non-financial issues 
relating to performance monitoring and reporting on performance remain problems. The 
quality of reporting, as reflected in the Annual Report, was already noted as a problem in the 
                                                            
143
 Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on vote 20: Department of Correctional Services, In 
Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), p. 126. 
144 The three programmes were Corrections, Security and Social Integration. 
145
 Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on vote 20: Department of Correctional Services, In 
Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), p. 126. 
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2009/10 financial year by the Auditor General
146
 and non-governmental organisations 
commenting on the annual report of that year.147 
A closer reading of the 2009/10 DCS Annual Report gives reason for concern as it is reported 
in a number of instances that the responsible official did not submit the required 
information.148 In one instance the required information related to performance monitoring, 
and the Annual Report notes that “reporting on quarterly performance information [is] poor 
due to non-submission of reports against performance indicators”.
149
 Two important 
conclusions can be drawn from this: first, officials lower down the hierarchy can apparently 
ignore instructions from the Head Office to submit required information, and second, the 
quality and integrity of the information on performance in the Annual Report must be treated 
with caution. The quality of internal performance reporting and thus accountability is also 
noted in the Auditor General’s report: “The quarterly reports of the department did not track 
progress against targets as per the approved strategic annual performance plan and therefore 
did not facilitate effective performance monitoring and evaluation, as required by Treasury 
Regulation 5.3.1.”150 The Auditor General is even more specific, noting that the Department 
does not have “effective, efficient and transparent system and internal controls regarding 
performance management, which describe and represent how the institution’s processes of 
performance planning, monitoring, measurement, review and reporting will be conducted, 
organised and managed, as required in terms of section 38(1) (a) (i) and (b) of the PFMA” 
(Public Finance Management Act).151 However, the Annual Report notes that the 
Performance and Development Management system is aligned to the Occupation Specific 
Dispensation (OSD)152 and that Performance Agreements are aligned with the Strategic 
                                                            
146
 Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on vote 20: Department of Correctional Services, In 
Department of Correctional Services (2010 a), p. 132. 
147 Muntingh, L. (2010 b) Submission by the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative on the Department of 
Correctional Services Annual Report 2009/10, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
148 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a), pp. 61 (A.4.5), 66 (B.1.3), 72 (C.1.1), 73 (C.1.9),  
149 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a), p. 61 (A.4.5). 
150 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a), p. 132. 
151 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a) Auditor General Report pp. 131-132. 
152 The Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) refers to revised salary structures that are unique to each 
identified occupation in the public service. These unique salary structures will: be centrally determined through 
grading structures and broad job profiles; develop career pathing opportunities for public servants based on 
competencies, experience and performance; provide for pay progression within the salary level; and consolidate 
certain benefits and allowances into the salaries of employees (Press release by the Issued by the Department of 
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Plan.
153
 This appears to be a clear contradiction of the Auditor General’s analysis of the 
situation. The implications of the Auditor General’s statements are significant because in the 
final analysis the Department has to account for the use of public funds. Moreover, it has to 
account that it has used these funds in an appropriate manner on agreed upon results that will 
contribute to the overall objectives of the prison system as described in the Correctional 
Services Act.154 
 
Staff capacity in Department’s financial management unit has been a long-standing problem 
and accordingly noted so by the Auditor General and SCOPA.155 Not only has the financial 
management unit been understaffed but there has been an unhealthy turn-over of Chief 
Financial Officers, resulting in the position remaining vacant for long periods.156 In one 
instance it was filled by an unqualified internal appointment157 who was later implicated in 
corruption.158 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Public Services and Administration, 12 June 2007, http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07061811451001.htm 
Accessed 24 November 2011.) 
153 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a), p. 41 (A.2.4). 
154 s 2 Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998). 
155Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on vote 21: Department of Correctional Services. In Department 
of Correctional Services (2005), p. 83. Report of the Auditor General to Parliament on vote 20: Department of 
Correctional Services. In Department of Correctional Services (2006 a), p. 63. Report of the Auditor General to 
Parliament on vote 20: Department of Correctional Services. In Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), 
p. 128. PMG report on the meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) of 7 November 
2007, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20071106-department-correctional-services-national-agricultural-
marketing-council-sa-wine-in Accessed 7 December 2011. 
156 PMG report on the meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) of 30 January 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100128-department-correctional-services-and-special-investigating-unit-annua 
Accessed 7 December 2011.PMG report on the meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
(SCOPA) of 19 November 2008, http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20081119-department-correctional-services-
national-prosecuting-authority-20070 Accessed 7 December 2011. 
157 PMG report on the meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts of 10 November 2004, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20041109-department-correctional-services-hearing Accessed 18 December 
2011. 
158 Basson, A. (2011) Prisons graft – here’s the proof, Minister. In Harber, A. and Renn, M. (eds) 
Troublemakers: The Best of South Africa's Investigative Journalism, Johannesburg: Jacana Media, p. 182.  
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2.4.3 The Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services and corruption 
 
The mandate and structure of the Office of the Inspecting Judge and Judicial Inspectorate was 
briefly described in Chapter 2 (section 3.7.2). It was noted that the Inspecting Judge, who 
heads the Judicial Inspectorate, inspects or arranges for the inspection of prisons in order to 
report on the treatment of prisoners, on conditions of detention and any corrupt or dishonest 
practices.
159
 The mandate to investigate and report on corrupt and dishonest practices was 
originally also part of the Judicial Inspectorate’s mandate but was removed when the 
Correctional Services Act was amended in 2001.160 The result is a strange one where the 
Inspecting Judge can report on corrupt and dishonest practices, but the Judicial Inspectorate is 
not mandated to investigate it. Moreover, for the purposes of conducting an investigation the 
Inspecting Judge may also may make any enquiry and hold hearings, the latter of which is 
regulated by the Commission Act (8 of 1947).
161
 The removal of corrupt and dishonest 
practices from the Judicial Inspectorate’s mandate was at the request of the Judicial 
Inspectorate in 2000.162 
Where others saw a synergy created by investigating both corruption and the treatment of 
prisoners,163 the Inspectorate saw a clear line of division between corruption and the 
treatment of prisoners, opining that each should be dealt with a by different institutions. It 
argued that corruption calls for “a criminal investigation whilst the latter is concerned with 
the humane treatment of prisoners and ensuring their human dignity”.164 The reasoning is 
blatantly flawed as the link between corruption (i.e. governance) and the treatment of 
prisoners (i.e. human rights) has been well demonstrated, for example, by the Jali 
Commission, and confirmed by the Human Rights Council (see Chapter 3 section 2.2.2). The 
Inspectorate motivated further that its Independent Visitors and Inspectors were reliant on the 
“good relationship that exists between the officials on the one hand, and our inspectors and 
visitors on the other hand”.165 If the Inspectorate were to investigate corruption and dishonest 
                                                            
159 S 90(1) of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998). 
160 Section 31 of Act 32 of 2001 amended section 85 (2) of the Correctional Services Act.  
161s 90(5-6) Act 111 of 1998. 
162 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2001) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Prisons 2000, Cape 
Town, pp. 18-19. 
163 Testimony of Prof Dirk Van Zyl Smit before the Jali Commission, Jali Commission, p. 568. 
164 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2001), p. 18. 
165 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2001), p. 18. 
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practices, the argument went, it would create suspicion and thus jeopardise the “good 
relationship”. Moreover, the Inspectorate argued that the DCS had an Anti-Corruption Unit in 
place and if necessary, allegations of corruption would be reported to it or to the police. As an 
afterthought the Inspectorate added, “It would appear that the presence of Independent Prison 
Visitors has an inhibiting effect on corruption and dishonesty.”166 No evidence to substantiate 
the claim was presented. However, the Director of the Office of the Inspecting Judge testified 
before the Jali Commission that the change in mandate was also motivated by a fear for the 
safety of the Independent Prison Visitors if they were to report on and investigate 
corruption.167 Again no evidence was submitted to substantiate this fear. 
The Jali Commission was critical of the Judicial Inspectorate’s actions, observing that it was 
“more concerned about the safety of its staff than about its mandate”168 and that “since it 
opened, the Office of the Inspecting Judge has never investigated corruption. Instead of 
pursuing its mandate to investigate corruption as required in the Act, it sought instead to 
amend the Act.”169 When testifying before the Jali Commission in November 2002, less than 
a year after the amendment came into force,170 the Director of the Office of the Inspecting 
Judge conceded that the distinction between corruption and the treatment of prisoners, as 
made in the Judicial Inspectorate’s 2000 Annual Report, may in some instances be non-
existent or, if it is there, imprecise.
171
 
It should be borne in mind that at the time when the Judicial Inspectorate requested the 
change in mandate (2000), the Jali Commission had not yet been established and neither had 
the SIU started its investigations. There was indeed no external institution investigating 
corruption in the DCS, and the Department’s own Anti-Corruption Unit had been reduced to 
five investigators.172 Yet it was well known that corruption was rife, given that in April 2000 
the Director General of the PSC declared to Parliament that the state had lost control of the 
                                                            
166 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2001), p. 19. 
167 Jali Commission, p. 571. 
168 Jali Commission, p. 571. 
169 Jali Commission, p. 575. 
170 Act 32 of 2001 came into force on 14 December 2001. 
171 Jali Commission, p. 575. 
172 PMG report of the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 3 October 2000, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20001003-overcrowding-prisons-release-prisoners-escapes-anti-corruption 
Accessed 13 November 2011. 
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DCS.
173
 Parliament was thus well aware of the situation pertaining to corruption and 
maladministration, but acceded to the Judicial Inspectorate’s request and passed the 
amendment that saw corruption removed from the Judicial Inspectorate’s mandate.  
The Inspectorate’s desire to be relieved of the mandate to investigate corruption had no basis 
in fact or logic; instead that basis was strategic, and even possibly political. The Inspectorate 
adopted a very narrow interpretation of its mandate, namely to monitor the treatment of 
prisoners. In its analysis of the prison system and the root causes of the problems there, it did 
not identify poor departmental governance or poor staff performance – or, indeed, anything 
else that the DCS happened to be doing or not doing – as the source of these difficulties. It 
identified rather the less politically sensitive issue of prison overcrowding.174 By focusing on 
overcrowding, attention was diverted from the failings of the Department and this suited the 
Department well. The DCS was keen to be regarded as a victim of overcrowding while in fact 
it was crowded by virtue of its own misdeeds, in the form of corruption, maladministration 
and poor management. Moreover, the DCS had limited control over the size of the prison 
population, and to address prison overcrowding the Judicial Inspectorate had to focus on 
systemic problems in the criminal justice system, particularly at the level of the courts.  
While the drafters of the Correctional Services Act saw a clear link between governance and 
human rights, the Inspectorate forced a distinction to avoid a confrontational relationship 
with the DCS. The Jali Commission did not have much hope for the Inspectorate and 
concluded that it had been rendered ineffective and appeared to be reluctant to investigate 
corruption.
175
 The Commission made a number of recommendations, focusing on 
amendments to the Correctional Services Act to strengthen its independence and grant it 
more powers, but still believed that this was not sufficient.176 It consequently recommended 
the creation of another national agency which it called the Prison Ombudsman with powers 
                                                            
173 ‘Staat het alle beheer oor DKD verloor, sê DG’. Die Burger, 15 April 2000. [State lost all control over DCS 
says DG - Own translation.] 
174 In his opening paragraph to the 2000 Annual Report, Judge Fagan states: ‘In executing its statutory mandate 
of monitoring the conditions in which prisoners are held, this office found that prisoners in certain prisons were 
being kept under the most awful conditions. The cause was overcrowding.’ (Office of the Inspecting Judge 
(2000) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, Cape Town: Office of the 
Inspecting Judge, p. 3.) 
175 Jali Commission, p. 589. 
176 Jali Commission, pp. 590-593. 
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similar to that of the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD)
177
 to investigate corruption, 
maladministration and dishonest practices.178 The Jali Commission favoured the mandate and 
powers of the ICD and did not assess its efficiency and effectiveness, despite it being well 
known that there is room for substantial improvement. 
Ultimately, few of the Jali Commission’s recommendations in respect of the Judicial 
Inspectorate would be implemented, and the proposals for the establishment of a Prison 
Ombudsman were rejected by the DCS, as reported in 2011 to Parliament. The DCS 
explained that the Department concluded memoranda of understanding with SAPS, the SIU 
and the National Prosecuting Authority’s Directorate: Special Operations (or Scorpions as 
they were known) to secure their intervention in dealing with complicated corruption cases 
that cannot be dealt with by the DIU;179 furthermore, it said, these agencies were more than 
competent to investigate corruption.  
The Department’s explanation presented in 2011 was not entirely truthful. First, the 
agreement with the SIU had come to an end in 2009 and had not been renewed, even though 
SCOPA recommended the extension of the agreement.180 Second, the quality of 
                                                            
177 The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) is a government department, established in 1997, to 
investigate complaints of brutality, criminality and misconduct against members of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS), and the Municipal Police Service (MPS). It received its mandate from the Section 53(2) of the 
South African Police Act (Act 68 of 1995). It operates independently from the SAPS in the effective and 
efficient investigation of alleged misconduct and criminality by SAPS members. The ICD investigates the 
following: 
• deaths of persons in police custody or as a result of police action (such as shooting, assault). 
• the involvement of SAPS members in criminal activities such as assault, theft, corruption, robbery, 
rape and any other criminal offences. 
• police conduct or behaviour which is prohibited in terms of the SAPS Standing Orders or Police 
Regulations, such as neglect of duties or failure to comply with the police Code of Conduct. 
• dissatisfaction/ complaints about poor service given by the police 
• failure to assist or protect victims of domestic violence as required by the Domestic Violence Act 
• misconduct or offences committed by members of the Municipal Police Services (MPS). (ICD Website 
http://www.icd.gov.za/about%20us/legislation.asp Accessed 7 December 2011) 
178 Jali Commission, p. 614. 
179 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 59. 
180 PMG report on the meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts of 28 January 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100128-department-correctional-services-and-special-investigating-unit-annua 
Accessed 9 January 2011. 
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investigations conducted by SAPS is generally poor if the investigation of prisoner deaths 
serves as a gauge of this ability.181 SAPS had also not developed any proven experience in 
investigating prison corruption or forensically complex cases and would probably suffer from 
its own legitimacy problems in the eyes of the prison population. Third, the Directorate: 
Special Operations had been dissolved by January 2009 and absorbed into the SAPS 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI).182 More than two years after the 
dissolution of the Directorate: Special Operations, the DCS informed Parliament that there 
was a memorandum of understanding in place with the Directorate: Special Operations to 
deal with the investigation of corruption. Moreover, the two pieces of legislation that enabled 
the dissolution of the Directorate: Special Operations and the creation of the DPCI
183
 do not 
make any provision for the continuity or transfer of memoranda of understanding. Fourth, 
even if it is assumed that the DPCI could be called upon to investigate prison corruption, it is 
unlikely that it will investigate the cases that directly affect prisoners’ treatment, such as 
having to pay bribes for basic amenities. The mandate of the DPCI is to prevent, combat and 
investigate national priority offences and any other offence or category of offences referred to 
it by the National Commissioner of Police.184 Consequently, the focus is on serious organised 
crime, corruption and commercial crime. 
The Jali Commission’s recommendation to create a structure similar to that of the ICD was 
aimed in particular at filling the gap created by the Judicial Inspectorate declining to 
investigate corruption cases reported by prisoners and the high-level, but time-limited, 
investigations being undertaken by the SIU. The Prison Ombudsman would have filled that 
gap by forging the link between governance and human rights.  
2.5 Summary of issues 
 
                                                            
181 For example, the 2009/10 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate notes a number of prisoner deaths that 
were investigated by SAPS. Not one of these has resulted in criminal prosecutions at the time. 
182 The NPA Amendment Act (Act 56 of 2008) and the SAPS Amendment Act (Act 57 of 2008) provided for 
the dissolution of the DSO. The DSO and SAPS Organised Crime Unit became a single agency known as the 
Directorate: Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), within the SAPS. (National Prosecuting Authority of South 
Africa, SA Government Information, http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/justice/npa.htm Accessed 25 November 
2011). 
183 NPA Amendment Act (Act 56 of 2008) and the SAPS Amendment Act (Act 57 of 2008). 
184 s 2(a) SAPS Amendment Act (Act 57 of 2008). 
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In respect of the DCS anti-corruption strategy, questions remain about its clarity of focus and 
the extent to which it finds a suitable balance between the four pillars of an effective anti-
corruption strategy. It is particularly in respect of prevention that there may be shortcomings. 
The focus continues to stay on law enforcement. 
The relationship between employer and employees in the Department saw significant and 
substantial changes for the better. However, the SDE has the potential to derail much of what 
has been achieved to date if it is not resolved with urgency. It was poorly planned and 
executed. What appears to be the favoured solution (the employment of as many as 12 000 
additional DCS officials) will not sit well with Parliament and may in fact not be affordable. 
But even if this is pursued it would not guarantee a resolution of the problematic shift system. 
The more effective enforcement of the disciplinary code can be ascribed to the increase in 
internal capacity. This saw a remarkable increase in the volume of disciplinary actions 
initiated against DCS officials, but the still-limited capacity and growing backlog of cases 
may undermine what has been one of the Department’s more notable achievements after 
2004.  
The SIU and Auditor General made significant contributions to improving governance, 
financial management and addressing corruption. The Auditor General’s relentless raising of 
matters of emphasis and qualified audits placed the Department under increasing pressure to 
rectify problems, so much so that an unqualified audit in the near future has become a real 
possibility. Despite these generally positive developments, though, the prison system remains 
without an independent oversight and investigative institution that would, as part of its 
mandate, investigate the nexus between corruption and human rights. This remains a 
challenge to prison reform of critical importance. 
3. A new strategic framework and the budget 
 
The requirements for effective interventions with offenders aimed at rehabilitation were set 
out in Chapter 2 (section 3.2.6). The 2004 White Paper defined offender rehabilitation as the 
core business of the Department but, as it will be argued here, there is little to indicate that 
this new vision is supported by the evidence on effective interventions. A further problem 
that has emerged is the difficulties the Department has experienced in aligning the budget to 
the 2004 White Paper. Assessed against an objective set of criteria (presented in Chapter 2 
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section 2.4), it is argued in this section that there are material shortcomings in the 2004 White 
Paper and that the realities of the South African prison system demanded a reform agenda to 
be both more modest and more closely aligned to Constitutional prescripts and the 
requirements of the Correctional Services Act.  
 
3.1 The 2004 White Paper 
 
The 2004 White Paper was, similar to the 1994 White Paper, rushed through Parliament with 
limited opportunity for civil society organisations to provide input.
185
 When the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services was initially briefed by the DCS on the Green Paper in 
November 2003, it was informed that Cabinet had already approved it, despite the 
Department not having consulted with external stakeholders and especially Parliament.
186
 
The Committee regarded this as a procedural irregularity but did not pursue it any further. In 
early February 2004 the Portfolio Committee held public hearings on the Draft White Paper 
and 13 submissions were made by civil society organisations.187 The submissions had little if 
any impact on the draft White Paper, and the version tabled in Parliament became, with a few 
minor editorial changes, the final version. The public hearings in February 2004 were nothing 
                                                            
185 It appears that on 19 December 2003 the Green Paper on Corrections in South Africa was announced in the 
Mail and Guardian but copies were not made available. Electronic copies became available and were circulated 
on 13 January 2004. Public hearings on what had become the draft White Paper were held by the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services on 3 February 2004 (PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services of 3 February 2004, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20040202-draft-
white-paper-corrections-south-africa-hearings Accessed 4 January 2012). 
186 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 25 November 2003, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20031124-white-and-green-paper-process-briefing-minister Accessed 4 January 
2012. 
187 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 3 February 2004, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20040202-draft-white-paper-corrections-south-africa-hearings Accessed 4 
January 2012.PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 4 February 
2004, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20040203-draft-white-paper-corrections-south-africa-hearings Accessed 
4 January 2012. 
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more than window-dressing and the 2004 White Paper was formally launched on 30 March 
2004 at a conference hosted by the Department.188 
3.1.1 Is the White Paper good policy? 
 
Notwithstanding the problems with the consultative process, the 2004 White Paper is the 
official policy framework of the Department and thus represents an important achievement in 
the Department’s efforts to create a new strategic vision to guide reform. From a governance 
perspective it represents a milestone. The White Paper is candid about the problems faced by 
the Department, internal and external, and also provides a useful historical overview of the 
Department. As such it is an attempt to build consensus about the prison system, its history 
and its challenges. However, given the prevailing realities of the South African prison 
system, it needs to be asked if the 2004 White Paper created an appropriate and attainable 
vision for the prison system, namely the rehabilitation of offenders.
189
 It is in answering this 
question that the White Paper exhibits a number of more substantive problems. Even though 
the White Paper sets a 20-year time-frame for implementation, it is extremely optimistic and 
in many ways looks like a wish list. 
The White Paper deals with a wide range of issues, but it is only nearly halfway through that 
it starts describing the “nuts and bolts” of the envisaged prison system.190 Chapter 4 
articulates the objectives of the prison system as being:  
 
• implementation of sentences of the courts; 
• breaking the cycle of crime; 
• security risk management; 
• providing an environment for controlled and phased rehabilitation interventions; 
• providing guidance and support to probationers and parolees within the community; 
• provision of corrective and development measures to the offender; 
• reconciliation of the offender with the community; 
• enhancement of the productive capacity of offenders; 
                                                            
188 Address by the Minister of Correctional Services, Mr. B.M.N Balfour, MP, at the Policy and Research 
Conference held on 30 - 31 March 2004, Krugersdorp. 
189 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, Pretoria: 
Department of Correctional Services, para 2.9.7. 
190 Chapter 9 The needs-based intervention plan. 
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• promotion of healthy family relations; and, 
• assertion of discipline within the correctional environment. 
 
The ten objectives are significantly more detailed and more onerous than the three objectives 
of the correctional system described in the Correctional Services Act.191 The White Paper is 
also replete with descriptions stating that rehabilitation is the core business of the 
Department, for example:  
 
The responsibility of the Department of Correctional Services is first and foremost to 
correct offending behaviour, in a secure, safe and humane environment, in order to 
facilitate the achievement of rehabilitation and avoidance of recidivism.192 
 
The high, if not unrealistic, ambitions of the White Paper were quickly recognised by external 
stakeholders when the draft was considered by the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services in 2004.
193
 
 
Central to achieving rehabilitation is the development of a “needs-based intervention plan”194 
for each offender. The needs-based intervention plan should cover the following areas: 
 
• needs in terms of correcting offending behaviour (Corrections plan); 
• security needs taking into account the human rights of the individual (Security plan); 
• needs in terms of the physical and emotional well-being of the offender (Care plan); 
• education and training needs (Development plan); 
                                                            
191 Section 2 Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998): ‘The purpose of the correctional system is to contribute to 
maintaining and protecting a just, peaceful and safe society by: (a) enforcing sentences of the courts in the 
manner prescribed by this Act; (b) detaining all prisoners in safe custody whilst ensuring their human dignity; 
and (c) promoting the social responsibility and human development of all prisoners and persons subject to 
community corrections.’ 
192 Para 4.1.2. 
193 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 3 February 2004, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20040202-draft-white-paper-corrections-south-africa-hearings Accessed 8 
November 2010. See, for example, the submissions by the Centre for Conflict Resolution and the Civil Society 
Prison Reform Initiative.  
194 It is called a ‘sentence plan’ in an earlier version of the White Paper and also identified as such in the 
Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 s 38. 
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• needs in terms of allocated physical accommodation (Facilities plan); and, 
• needs in terms of the support required for the successful social reintegration of the 
offender (After-Care plan).195 
 
It should be noted that the White Paper does not make any distinction between different 
categories of sentenced offenders, while the Correctional Services Act requires that only 
sentenced offenders serving sentences of longer than 24 months have a sentence plan.
196
 
Although those serving sentences of less than 24 months constitute less than 11% of the daily 
average, they constitute nearly 60% of released sentenced offenders and are thus excluded 
from the benefit of a sentence plan and the services to which it may give rise.
197
 The 
implication is that nearly two-thirds of the Department’s out-put (i.e. released sentenced 
prisoners) are excluded from the rehabilitation objective. 
 
3.1.2 The nine principles of good policy-making 
 
In Chapter 2 (section 2.4) reference was made to the nine features of modern policy-making, 
as defined and developed by the UK government. These are used below to assess the quality 
of the 2004 White Paper as central policy framework for the DCS.198 
 
Forward-looking: The policy-making process results in clearly defined outcomes that the 
policy is designed to achieve and takes a long-term view (five years), based on statistical 
trends and informed predictions of social, political, economic and cultural trends and the 
possible effect and impact of the policy. The following are examples: a statement of intended 
outcomes is prepared at an early stage; contingency or scenario planning is used; account is 
taken of government's long-term strategy; and use is made of forecasting research. 
 
While the White Paper identifies the ten objectives of the correctional system (see section 
3.1.1 above), these cannot be regarded as clear outcomes.199 Some are broad statements of 
                                                            
195 Para 9.7.2. 
196 Section 38(1)(A) Correctional Services Act. Prior to the 2008 amendment of the Act, the limit was 12 
months.  
197 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services.  
198 Bullock, H., Mountford, J. and Stanley, R (2001) Better Policy-Making, London: Centre for Management 
and Policy Studies, p.14. 
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intent (e.g. breaking the cycle of crime), some are definitional descriptions without 
articulating an outcome (e.g. Security risk management),200 and others approach clarity but 
fall short (e.g. providing an environment for controlled and phased rehabilitation 
interventions).
201
 
 
Section 7.3 of the White Paper superficially reflects on changes in the offender population, 
indicating that certain categories (e.g. life imprisonment and children) are rapidly increasing. 
Apart from this brief mention, there is little reliance on any forecasting research in the White 
Paper. The White Paper also did not use any scenario planning. For example, while offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment have continued to increase, the number of children in prison 
has dropped dramatically and by February 2011 there were 846 children in custody, 
compared to the more than 4 000 in 2002/3.202 Moreover, the decline in the number of 
children in prison was already well under way by the time the White Paper was adopted in 
2004. More importantly perhaps, the White Paper’s assertions about changes in the offender 
population are not critically assessed in terms of their potential impact on the objectives of 
the prison system.  
 
While good practice, as described by Bullock, Mountford and Stanley, considers a long-term 
view as a period of five years into the future, the White Paper sets itself a 20-year time-frame. 
With such a long time-frame it is difficult, if not impossible, to articulate clear and firm 
outcomes, and the real risk is the creation of a wish list instead of a policy document. Over a 
20-year period senior leadership will change several times, institutional memory will be lost 
and the environment can change fundamentally. Indeed, the past 17 years attest to the fluidity 
of the context in which the prison system functions as well as the volatility of its own inner 
workings. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
199 In Chapter 4 these are referred to as ‘objectives’ but in the executive summary as ‘strategies’.  
200 Para 4.4.3: Security risk management: The correctional system is tasked to provide appropriate measures to 
ensure that the public is protected from offenders. While this forms part of the rationale of the particular 
sentence handed down in court, the Department must balance this responsibility with the need to provide 
circumstances appropriate to rehabilitation. Security risk management and needs-based correction inform 
incarceration classifications and the community correctional supervision classifications of the offenders.  
201 Para 4.4.4 Providing an environment for controlled and phased rehabilitation interventions: The function of 
incarceration or correctional supervision is, while ensuring public safety, to create a controlled environment for 
intense and needs-based rehabilitation, correction and development. 
202 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. 
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Outward-looking: National, regional and international influencing factors are taken into 
account, as are experiences from other countries. Modern policy-making also assesses how 
the policy will be communicated to the public and stakeholders. The following are examples: 
use is made of regional and international cooperation structures; policy-makers look at how 
other countries dealt with the issue; recognition is given to regional variation within the 
country; and a communications and presentation strategy is prepared and implemented. 
 
The White Paper makes numerous references in a generalised sense to the international 
human rights instruments applicable to prisons and prisoners. In a number of instances it 
draws selectively on the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(UNSMR), citing particular rules as they may apply, for example, to labour of prisoners, a 
civilian staff corps and the rehabilitation of offenders. The general recognition of 
international human rights law applicable to prisoners does not translate, however, into giving 
international norms and standards a central position in the White Paper. Giving central 
recognition to the international norms and standards, as the Act does, would have prioritised 
meeting the minimum standards of humane detention in the strategies of the DCS. For 
example, the White Paper does not so much as mention the UN Convention against Torture 
(UNCAT), ratified by South Africa in 1998, even though it has important implications for the 
DCS, especially under Articles 10, 11 and 12.203 
 
                                                            
203 Article 10: (1) Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against 
torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, 
public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any 
individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment. (2) Each State Party shall include this 
prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such person. 
Article 11: Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and 
practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, 
detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture. 
Article 12: Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial 
investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any 
territory under its jurisdiction. 
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The White Paper makes a number of references to the Constitution as applicable to the prison 
system.204 However, the White Paper does not refer to the significant body of South African 
case law on prisoners’ rights.205 While it cannot be expected that a policy document should 
also be a legal text, it should also not fail to recognise the decisions of the courts which, in 
South Africa’s case, have had a substantive influence on the rights of prisoners. Prisoners’ 
rights jurisprudence has indeed been a notable influence on prison reform since 1994.  
 
There are several references in the White Paper to “international best practice” but it is 
unknown how these practices were identified and who or what identified them precisely as 
international best practices. Even within the sphere of rehabilitation, the Department’s core 
business, there is limited information and often conflicting opinions about what indeed is 
effective in rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.206 The shortcoming of the White 
Paper is that it refers to “international best practice” in a general sense and fails to motivate 
why particular policy options were selected.  
 
The White Paper does not present its own communication strategy, but it is generally known 
that the DCS took considerable effort to distribute and communicate it to its staff and 
stakeholders. This resulted in the development of a new terminology and set of concepts in 
the Department, the value of which should not be underestimated. However, the lofty ideals 
of the White Paper were not accompanied by an implementation plan, and at ground-level the 
initial enthusiasm was not sustained by delivery. Whether or not the DCS rank and file still 
                                                            
204 Human dignity (s 10); Equality (s 9); Rights underlying humane treatment of every detainee (s 35); The right 
to health care services and other associated rights (s 27); Freedom and security of the person (s 12); Children’s 
rights (s 28); The right to education (s 29); Freedom of religion (s 31); Intergovernmental relations (s 41); 
Values and principles governing Public Administration (s 195). 
205 See Chapter 2 (section 3.3), Chapter 5 (section 8), Chapter 6 (section3.3). 
206 An authoritative work cites the following as proven principles for effective programmes: risk classification 
should determine the nature and intensity of programmes; programmes should target criminogenic needs, such 
anti-social attitudes and drug dependency; programme integrity is maintained by adhering to the plan and using 
appropriately skilled staff; responsivity in programmes should be adhered to by matching teaching styles of 
facilitators with learning styles of beneficiaries; programmes emphasise treatment modality – interventions are 
skills-based, aimed at problem-solving, social interaction and includes a cognitive component to address 
attitudes, values and beliefs supporting offending behaviour; and interventions should include community-based 
programmes to render support to released offenders and their families (Dünkel, F. & Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001) 
Imprisonment Today and Tomorrow, London: Kluwer Law International, p. 822). 
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have faith in the White Paper is an open question, but among prisoners and the NGO sector 
the cynicism is palpable. 
 
Innovative, flexible and creative: Flexibility and innovation characterises the policy-making 
process. Critically examining established ways of dealing with problems is encouraged, as is 
developing creative solutions. The process is open to comments and suggestions of others, 
and risks are identified and actively managed. The following are examples: the process uses 
alternatives to the usual ways of working (brainstorming sessions, etc.); it defines success in 
terms of outcomes already identified; it consciously assesses and manages risk; steps are 
taken to create management structures which promote new ideas and effective team working; 
and it includes outside people in the policy team. 
 
From the contents of the White Paper it is not possible to assess if the policy-making process 
was “innovative, flexible and creative”, and it therefore needs to be assessed if the White 
Paper creates an appropriately enabling framework in which these virtues can flourish. The 
lack of consultation in the drafting of the White Paper, as noted above, does indicate a 
measure of inflexibility. 
 
The White Paper is at a sufficiently abstract level to enable innovation, flexibility and 
creativity at operational level. Moreover, Chapter 13, which deals with external partnerships, 
established a useful framework for collaboration between the DCS and civil society service 
providers. Civil society has been shown to be particularly creative in developing new 
programmes and approaches to rehabilitation and should thus be able insert their knowledge 
and skills into the Department.
207
 However, an appropriate forum for interacting with civil 
society organisations had not yet been established. It recently came to light that the DCS is 
planning to remunerate civil society organisations for services rendered.208  
 
Evidence-based: Decisions of, and advice to, policy-makers are based upon the best available 
evidence from a wide range of sources, and all key stakeholders are involved at an early stage 
and throughout the policy's development. All relevant evidence, including that from 
                                                            
207 Muntingh, L. (2009 a) A Societal Responsibility The role of civil society organisations in prisoner support, 
rehabilitation and reintegration, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies and Community Law Centre. 
208 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a) Annual Report 2009/10, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 69. 
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specialists, is available in an accessible and meaningful form to policy makers. Key points of 
an evidence-based approach to policy-making include: reviewing existing research; 
commissioning new research; consulting relevant experts and/or using internal and external 
consultants; and considering a range of properly costed and appraised options. 
 
Since the White Paper places rehabilitation at the core of the Department’s business, it is 
required that this focus in the White Paper should be based on the best available evidence and 
that the approach adopted reflect it accordingly. In the past 20 to 30 years there has been a 
considerable amount of research conducted on “what works” in offender rehabilitation, 
especially in the US and Canada. Notable contributions in this regard came from Sherman, 
Gendreau, Cullen, Bonta, Andrews, and Ross.209 It is not within the scope of this thesis to 
deal with extant literature, and only a number of salient findings will be highlighted.  
Cullen and Gendreau advocate for “evidence-based corrections” which, in practice, means 
the following: embracing professionalism that is respectful of data; training of practitioners 
based on research; the creation of correctional training academies; the implementation of 
programmes informed by empirically-based theory of effective interventions; the integration 
of evaluation as part of delivery; and the auditing and accreditation of agencies and 
programmes.
210
 
Sherman found that programmes which demonstrated a reduction in re-offending shared 
certain common principles. These principles were also confirmed in the work by Cullen and 
Gendreau.
211
 Programmes need to be carefully designed to target the specific characteristics 
and problems of offenders. These specific characteristics and problems are frequently 
referred to in the literature as dynamic characteristics and commonly addressed through 
cognitive behavioural programmes. The programmes also need to address factors which 
                                                            
209 See Sherman, L.W. et al (1997) Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising, National 
Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice, Washington; Gendreau, P., Goggin, C. and Cullen, F.T. (1999) 
The Effects of Prison Sentences on Recidivism, Public Works and Government Services, Canada; Cullen, F.T. 
and Gendreau, P. (2000) Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy Practice and Prospects in J Horney (ed) 
Criminal Justice 2000, Volume 3: Changes in Decision Making and Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, 
Washington: US Department of Justice; Cullen, F.T. (2005) The Twelve People who saved rehabilitation: How 
the Science of Criminology Made a Difference, Criminology, Vol. 43 No. 1. 
210 Cullen, F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000), p. 111. 
211 Cullen, F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000), pp. 145-148. 
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could influence the individual’s future criminal activities such as anti-social attitudes, drug 
use and anger management. This is frequently referred to in the literature as the criminogenic 
environment of the individual. The programmes need to be designed by professionals using 
techniques that are known to work, be delivered by skilled staff and adequate time must be 
invested in offenders undergoing these programmes. The most intensive programmes should 
be aimed at offenders who pose the highest risk of re-offending. Programmes should use 
cognitive and behavioural treatment methods which emphasise positive reinforcement and 
which are capable of being amended to meet the needs of specific individuals. 
Section 9.6 of the White Paper identifies the key service delivery areas, with the first being 
“Corrections”, and states that “the initial focus will be to target the actual offence for which 
the person has been convicted and sentenced” (para 9.6.2). This approach is not supported by 
the principles for effective programmes outlined above, which in fact make no mention of the 
current offence but rather the dynamic criminogenic factors driving criminal behaviour. The 
paucity in evidence-based policy-making is further demonstrated in paragraph 9.7.3 of the 
White Paper, which reads:  
Scientific and thorough research into the components of sentence planning for the 
various categories of offenders will have to shape the delivery of appropriate and 
effective corrections and development programmes in all aspects of the offender’s life. 
While rehabilitation is the desired outcome of the work of correctional services, of which 
correcting the offending behaviour is the key component, there is much debate about the 
components that are required to make up the route to rehabilitation. 
 
The work done by the above-noted scholars demonstrates that there is indeed increasing 
agreement on what works and the components that “make up the route to rehabilitation”. The 
lack of engagement in the 2004 White Paper with evidence-based interventions is perhaps its 
most serious flaw. 
 
A further brief but important point needs to be made in respect of evidence-based policy. The 
White Paper makes no mention of the costs of implementation or even the cost-drivers, yet 
emphasis is placed on the need for professionals to provide the necessary services.212 In short, it 
                                                            
212 See for example para 9.4.2: These professional services [needs-based interventions] must be rendered to 
offenders on the basis of either a court instruction or the need as determined by the Department. Care 
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remains unknown what it will cost to fully implement the services described in the White 
Paper. Seven years after the White Paper’s adoption, the DCS has not been able to align its 
budget to its strategic plans and thus the White Paper.213 
 
Inclusive: The policy-making process directly involves key stakeholders to take account of 
the impact on and/or meet the needs of all people directly or indirectly affected by the policy. 
An inclusive approach may include the following aspects: consulting those responsible for 
service delivery and implementation; consulting those at the receiving end or otherwise 
affected by the policy; carrying out impact assessments; and seeking feedback on the policy 
from recipients and frontline deliverers. 
 
The extent to which external stakeholders were brought into the policy-making process prior 
to the tabling of the draft in Parliament is unknown, although the Minister of Correctional 
noted that the concerns of stakeholders were taken into consideration.214 As stated above, the 
public hearings held by the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on the White Paper 
in early 2004 were the first time that civil society stakeholders had sight of the draft White 
Paper. At an earlier briefing, in November 2003, by the DCS on the Green Paper (which 
preceded the White Paper), the Portfolio Committee expressed concern that there had been 
insufficient consultation on the Green Paper.215 At the public hearings in February 2004, a 
number of civil society stakeholders expressed their dismay at the limited time they were 
afforded to study and comment on the lengthy White Paper.
216
 Furthermore, subsequent to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
intervention in the form of therapy, crisis intervention, and counselling must be responsive to the changing 
needs of an offender throughout the sentence period. These changing needs should be assessed through profiling 
and guided by the model for intervention. 
213 PMG report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Service, 19 October 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101019-researchers-briefing-stakeholder-input-department-correctional-servic 
214PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 25 November 2003, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20031124-white-and-green-paper-process-briefing-minister Accessed 4 January 
2012. 
215 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services, 25 November 2003, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20031124-white-and-green-paper-process-briefing-minister 
216Submission by CSPRI on the Draft White Paper and Submission by the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation. PMG report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Service, 3 February 2004, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2004/appendices/040203cspri.htm 
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the adoption of the White Paper there had been no formal and broad-based consultations on 
the content of and progress made in implementing the White Paper.  
 
Joined-up: The process takes a holistic view by looking beyond institutional boundaries to 
the government's strategic objectives and seeks to establish the ethical, moral and legal base 
for policy. There is consideration of the appropriate management and organisational 
structures needed to deliver cross-cutting objectives. The following points demonstrate a 
joined-up approach to policy-making: cross-cutting objectives are clearly defined at the 
outset; joint working arrangements with other departments are clearly defined and well 
understood; barriers to effective joined-up work are clearly identified with a strategy to 
overcome them; and implementation is considered part of the policy making process. 
 
The White Paper presents an adequate description of the legal basis and legislative mandate 
of the prison system, although a more overt focus on international human rights law would 
have added value. Reference is made to the now effectively abandoned National Crime 
Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (see Chapter 6 section 2.1) as regulating the relationship 
between the prison system and Department of Justice (para 1.2.1). Chapter 6, entitled 
“Integrated justice and social sector responsibilities for rehabilitation”, attempts to delineate 
the relationship between these two sectors but the description does not proceed beyond a 
high-level outline of a desirable state of affairs. From a structural-functional perspective, the 
White Paper is vague and the allocation of internal implementation functions is left to sub-
ordinate policies.  
 
The White Paper does not explicitly identify cross-cutting objectives. These need to be 
inferred, and include adherence to human rights standards, effective social integration, 
reducing prison overcrowding, and sentencing reform. It may perhaps be concluded that the 
White Paper’s focus on rehabilitation is so intense that it resulted in tunnel vision and a loss 
of sight of the other two objectives of the correctional system, namely implementing the 
sentences imposed by the courts and ensuring safe and humane custody. It is in particular the 
omission of an overt human rights-based approach that raises concern, an omission made 
increasingly conspicuous by extensive and often gross human rights violations after 2004, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. In many ways the goals of the White Paper are so abstract in nature 
that they seem transcendentally removed from such daily realities as lack of services, poor 
conditions of detention, human resource constraints, corruption and human rights violations. 
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Review progress: Existing and established policy is constantly reviewed to ensure it is indeed 
dealing with the problems it was designed to solve, taking account of associated effects 
elsewhere. Aspects of a reviewing approach to policy-making include: an ongoing review 
programme is in place with a range of meaningful performance measures; mechanisms to 
allow service deliverers and customers to provide feedback directly to policy-makers are set 
up; and redundant or failing policies are scrapped. 
 
The White Paper did not establish a review mechanism for itself, nor did it set at policy level 
the requirements for a performance monitoring system. However, the Department’s 
performance is overseen by Parliament (through the Portfolio Committee) and by civil 
society actors.217 In this regard five documents are important, namely the Departmental 
Annual Report, the budget vote, the strategic plan, the Annual Report of the Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services and the Auditor General’s report.  
 
The overall performance of the DCS since (and prior to) the adoption of the White Paper has 
not been satisfactory, as has been evidenced by successive qualified financial audits, critical 
reports by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services on the treatment of prisoners, 
low to moderate target setting in respect of which delivery was often not compliant, critique 
by civil society, and continued incidents (and allegations) of corruption and 
maladministration. The 2009/10 report by the Auditor General, in respect of the Department’s 
performance monitoring system, sketches a picture that makes reviewing of performance in 
respect of the White Paper virtually impossible:  
 
The accounting officer did not ensure that the department has and maintains an 
effective, efficient and transparent system and internal controls regarding performance 
management, which describe and represent how the institution’s processes of 
performance planning, monitoring, measurement, review and reporting will be 
conducted, organised and managed, as required in terms of section 38(1) (a) (i) and (b) 
of the PFMA” (Public Finance Management Act).
218
 
                                                            
217 ss 55 and 59 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
218 Report of the Auditor-General to Parliament on the financial statements of vote no. 18: Department of 
Correctional Services for the year ended 31 March 2010, In Department of Correctional Services (2010 a), p. 
131. 
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Moreover, the Auditor General noted that the strategic plan is incomplete (some targets lack 
indicators) and deviations from set targets are not adequately explained. It should be added 
that the successive strategic plans of the Department have changed every year, with the result 
that it is extremely difficult to assess performance over a multi-year period. The current 
situation is thus that the available performance information is of such questionable validity 
that it would be risky to base policy review on it.  
 
Evaluation: Systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of policy is built into the policy-
making process. Approaches to policy-making that demonstrate a commitment to evaluation 
include: a clearly defined purpose for the evaluation is set at outset; success criteria are 
defined; means of evaluation are built into the policy making process from the outset; and 
pilot projects are used to influence final outcomes. 
 
The White Paper (in paragraph 9.18) narrows the scope of evaluation to measuring success in 
respect of rehabilitation and, in so doing, sidelines the other goals of the White Paper. 
Importantly, compliance with the Correctional Services Act is not emphasised in the White 
Paper with particular reference to meeting the minimum standards of humane detention and 
implementing the sentences imposed by the courts. Moreover, and problematically, it 
identifies recidivism as the indicator of success.  
Measuring success in offender rehabilitation by means of a recidivism rate requires closer 
scrutiny. It is significant that effectiveness in rehabilitation and reintegration is commonly 
constructed in relation to its apparent failure, i.e. the recidivism rate. The recidivism rate is, 
however, trickier than a simple counting of crimes committed after the release of a sentenced 
prisoner or an intervention. Beck calls recidivism a “fruit salad concept” because of the 
different measurements that have been called recidivism rates, and poses three questions:219 
(1) What is counted as recidivism? For example, is it arrests, prosecutions, convictions, 
custodial and non-custodial sentences? Are all offences counted, including parole violations, 
consensual crimes and serious offences? (2) What is the time-frame of measurement? Is 
reoffending measured, for example, at one year for all offences, or are violent and sex 
                                                            
219 Beck, A.R. (2001) Recidivism: A Fruit Salad Concept in the Criminal Justice World, Available from 
http://www.justiceconcepts.com/recidivism.pdf, Accessed on 4 January 2012. 
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offences measured over longer periods?
220
 (3) What is the basis for making sense of the data? 
With recidivism data it is crucial to compare “apples with apples”. A general figure, stating 
that the recidivism rate, for instance, is 50%, does not say anything about managing certain 
categories of offenders and understanding re-offending patterns. Crucially, recidivism data on 
persons who participated in a particular intervention needs to be compared with a matched 
group that did not participate in the intervention. In short, reliable recidivism data requires 
sophisticated research and analysis. 
When using recidivism as an indicator of success, there must be clarity on the answers to 
these three questions as well as on the additional limitations of re-offence data. Particular 
changes in policing or prosecution priorities may produce elevated results for an offence 
category or a particular geographical area. A large police-swoop operation in an urban area 
can lead to the arrest of hundreds of suspects. Furthermore, the supervision of persons placed 
under community corrections is affected by a number of variables, for example, the staff-to-
parolee ratio. Legislative reform can have a further impact on results: by improving 
legislation, conviction rates may improve. Even if there is clarity on the three questions raised 
by Beck and other variables can be controlled, using recidivism as a measure for the success 
of rehabilitation and reintegration intervention is still simplistic – it is akin to “using retention 
as a measure of Adult Basic Education Programmes”.
221
 By the same token, successful 
reintegration and rehabilitation is not about remembering and regurgitating a set of external 
facts but continuously demonstrating skills and abilities in a variety of (risky) life-settings. 
In short, using recidivism as an indicator of success in rehabilitation and reintegration is 
fraught with difficulties and highly dependent on accurate recording and reporting. When 
information systems in the criminal justice system are not set up to and do not function in 
pursuit of this objective, the results will be questionable. Rehabilitation and reintegration is a 
multi-layered process with too complex an interaction of variables for it to be measured by 
                                                            
220 The research on criminal careers (such as that by Farrington) clearly indicates that persistent violent 
offenders do not offend as frequently as persistent property offenders. See Farrington, D. (2007), Origins of 
violent behaviour over the life span. In D. Flannery, A. Vazsonyi, & I. Waldman, The Cambrige Handbook of 
Violent Behaviour and Aggression, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Piquero, A., Farrington, D., & 
Blumstein, A. (2007), Key issues in criminal career research - new analysis of the Cambridge study in 
delinquent development. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 
221Vacca, J.S. (2004) Educated prisoners are less likely to return to prison, The Journal of Correctional 
Education, Vol. 55 No. 4, p 302. 
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one indicator that is, in essence, subject to a range of other intermediaries and at best can 
show us only part of the picture.  
 
Learns lessons: The process learns from experience of what works and what does not. A 
learning approach to policy development includes the following aspects: information on 
lessons learned and good practice is disseminated; there is an account available of what was 
done by policy-makers as a result of lessons learned; there is a clear distinction drawn 
between failure of the policy to impact on the problem it was intended to resolve and 
managerial/operational failures of implementation. 
 
In the preceding section it has been shown that the inadequate performance management 
systems of the DCS do not meet the requirement relating to the review of policies. In short, 
the current systems are not collecting the right information in a reliable manner that would 
yield valid answers. It was shown furthermore that the White Paper defined evaluation in a 
narrow manner, emphasising rehabilitation and identifying recidivism as the relevant 
indicator; the limitations of this have been noted. These two shortcomings place severe 
constraints on the extent to which lessons can be learnt from the implementation process. 
Moreover, a review of the post-2005 Departmental Annual Reports as well as the comments 
from the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, the Annual Reports of the Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services and the Auditor General, indicates that the problems 
facing the Department are strikingly consistent and recurrent. If lessons to be learnt have 
been identified, they have not been assimilated. 
 
3.1.3 Assessment 
 
The discussion has shown that the White Paper falls short in substantive ways of the 
requirements of modern policy-making. Seven years after its adoption, results in respect of 
the rehabilitation vision remain unknown and elusive. The Judicial Inspectorate for 
Correctional Services estimated that only 15% of sentenced prisoners are involved in some 
form of treatment programmes and labour.
222
 For the overwhelming majority of sentenced 
prisoners, the White Paper has not lived up to expectations. While it may be argued that re-
inventing the South African prison system is not a goal that can be reached in a seven years, 
                                                            
222 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010), p. 23. 
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it should also be asked if the White Paper provides the correct response (i.e. rehabilitation) to 
the challenges facing the prison system.  
 
The main challenges to the prison system are enumerated in the White Paper as: 
overcrowding; the state of prison infrastructure; institutional “prison culture”; corruption; 
training for the new paradigm; and “structuring [the department] for the new paradigm”. 
Conspicuously absent from this list are human rights violations and an explicit mention of 
meeting the minimum standards of humane detention. Presumably the latter can be read into 
challenges around infrastructure and overcrowding. These are significant challenges, yet the 
White Paper gives scant attention to human rights concerns and deals in far more detail with 
rehabilitation. Moreover, compliance with the Correctional Services Act is not a stated 
outcome of the White Paper, although several selected references to the Act are made. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the DCS finds itself continuously in litigation.223 
 
The White Paper says little about implementation, and while this is not a fundamental 
shortcoming, it should have articulated the pre-conditions or requirements for 
implementation. If rehabilitation is indeed the core business of the Department, the White 
Paper should have articulated, in more tangible terms, what is required at operational level 
with reference to staff skills, required staff categories, infrastructure, and so forth. After 
seven years it remains unknown to what extent the necessary pre-conditions for 
implementation have been met. In view of the above, it is argued that the White Paper needs 
to be re-visited and particular attention paid to compliance with the Correctional Services Act 
as well as to ensuring that knowledge informs the policy development process and that there 
is extensive consultation with stakeholders. 
 
3.2 Aligning the budget to the White Paper 
 
In the preceding section mention was made of the misalignment of the budget to the White 
Paper and this requires further analysis. The 2011/12 budget for the DCS is R16.6 billion 
                                                            
223 By 2010 there were claims against the DCS involving nearly R900 million (US$132 million) (Department of 
Correctional Services (2010 a). 
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(US$ 2.4 billion)
224
 which will result in a per-day-per-prisoner cost of R255 (US$ 37.00).
225
 
Compared to the other departments in the Justice and Security cluster the DCS has a sizeable 
budget, especially when considering the narrow scope of its mandate compared to that of the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development or the South African Police Services. 
The DCS budget is a third larger than the budget for the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and half the Defence budget.226 DCS staff are also remunerated 
well, with 63.6% of personnel costs spent on employees at Levels 6-8 with an average annual 
salary of R253 197 (US$ 37 234). Since the late 1990s the DCS budget has increased 
substantially, but spending patterns have remained fairly stable.  
Presumably the White Paper should have had a profound impact on the budget allocation and 
more specifically the allocations to different programmes within the budget. However, this 
did not happen, as shown in Table 2 below.227 There has indeed been very limited change in 
the proportional distribution of the budget across the seven programmes since 2004/5. The 
only notable change is in respect of the programme Corrections,228 and in this instance certain 
salary costs originally allocated to Security were transferred to Corrections. Moreover, the 
planned estimates of expenditure until 2013/4 also indicate no substantive shift in 
expenditure. This is especially true for the four programmes that are closely aligned to the 
objectives of White Paper and the new core business of the Department, namely Corrections, 
Care, Development and Social Reintegration. Historically, more than 63% of the total DCS 
budget is spent on compensating employees, leaving the balance for other direct operational 
expenses.  
                                                            
224 National Treasury (2011) Estimates of National Expenditure Vote 21 Correctional Services, Pretoria: 
National Treasury, p. 1. 
225 In calculating this, expenditure on infrastructure was excluded as this does not form part of daily operational 
expenditure on a prison population. 
226 National Treasury (2011), p. 1. 
227 The calculations are based on the figures presented in Table 21.2 of National Treasury (2011).  
228 The aim of the Corrections programme is to: Provide needs-based correctional sentence plans and 
interventions, based on an assessment of the security risk and criminal profile of individuals, targeting all 
elements associated with offending behaviour, and focusing on the offence for which a person is sentenced to 
correctional supervision, remanded in a correctional centre or paroled (Department of Correctional Services 
(2010 a), p. 67). 
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Table 2 
Programme Administration Security Corrections Care Development Social 
Reintegration 
Facilities 
2004/5 30.0 30.0 5.6 8.5 4.5 3.5 18.0 
2005/6 25.6 33.2 6.6 9.6 3.7 3.2 18.1 
2007/8 25.7 33.6 8.2 11.4 3.3 3.3 14.6 
2008/9 25.9 35.5 8.0 10.5 3.5 3.3 13.3 
2009/10 25.7 35.3 9.2 11.3 3.2 3.4 11.9 
2010/11 26.6 34.0 9.6 11.5 3.7 3.6 11.0 
2011/12 26.9 33.8 9.3 11.2 3.4 3.5 12.0 
2012/13 27.2 33.6 9.1 11.2 3.3 3.4 12.3 
2013/14 27.2 33.8 9.0 11.1 3.3 3.4 12.2 
 
 
The lack of alignment of the budget to the strategic objectives of the White Paper has also 
been a source of concern to the Portfolio Committee, which noted that the four programmes 
most closely associated with the aim of rehabilitation (see shaded columns in Table 2) receive 
the smallest share of the budget.229 
The question arising from the above is, What should the Department spend the budget on in 
order to align it with the White Paper? Rehabilitation and social reintegration programmes do 
not ordinarily involve large capital programmes or expensive equipment. Typically they 
entail socio-psychological interventions aimed at cognitive behavioural modification of 
offenders, usually in the form of semi-structured programmes. Added to this may be 
education and training programmes. While there are personnel costs involved, the 
interventions do not require significant expenditure above these in most instances. Even post-
release support services are not dependent on significant capital costs similar to that of prison 
construction or security services. However, securing the right staff with the correct skills and 
required levels of motivation is a significant challenge, and it is well known that the DCS is 
finding it difficult to retain scarce skills. It then appears as if it is indeed easier to spend the 
budget on large capital works, such as prison construction and technologically advanced 
security systems. 
                                                            
229 Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services’ budgetary review and recommendation report on the 
Department of Correctional Services’ performance in 2010/11, and the first half of the current financial year, 20 
October 2011, PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 20 October 
2011, http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111020-consideration-and-adoption-committees-budgetary-review-and-
recommenda Accessed 4 January 2012. 
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Aligning the budget to the White Paper may therefore not see substantial shifts in programme 
allocations, but it should see changes in performance of the prison system demonstrating 
results in respect of the programmes most closely associated with the aims of the White 
Paper. From a management perspective the budget is a powerful tool to change the 
performance and behaviour of subordinates, especially when attempting to introduce new 
policies. However, to affect such changed behaviour will require the devolution of decision-
making responsibilities as well as budgetary control. This should be supported by objective 
and agreed-upon performance indicators, service delivery targets and a monitoring system at 
the level of individual prisons.  
4. The set-backs and challenges 
 
In the preceding section it was argued that the DCS, after 2004, took a number of steps to 
address corruption and maladministration. This has reaped some modest results but many 
challenges remain. It would be unfair and ignoring the facts to claim that the Department is 
not dealing with corruption. Furthermore, it can be argued that addressing corruption and 
maladministration in a large organisation facing a multitude of risks and threats to good 
governance will take time and a concerted effort to achieve the end result of a clean, efficient 
and effective bureaucracy that is transparent and accountable. It can also be assumed that 
there will be set-backs, mistakes and failure: old habits die hard, and systemic weaknesses are 
not fixed overnight. 
Reflecting on the post-2004 period, however, there have been a number of noteworthy set-
backs. Some of these have frequently been of embarrassing proportions as they involved or 
implicated senior officials in corruption and thus attracted significant attention from the 
media and Parliament. Other set-backs demonstrated an unnerving inability by the 
Department to follow through on important projects. This section will provide an overview of 
these set-backs, mistakes and failures. It is not the intention to describe each of them in detail 
as this has been done already by other authors. The purpose is rather to illustrate how they 
have impacted on prison reform after 2004. These are: the role of prisons gangs in corruption; 
the discovery of high-level corruption in the Head Office involving tender manipulation; 
conflict between successive National Commissioners and Ministers; and the failure to 
renegotiate the public-private partnership prisons contracts.  
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4.1 The prison gangs 
 
The origin and history of South African prison gangs have been documented elsewhere and 
need not be repeated here,230 but a few background remarks are necessary to contextualise 
them in the current prison system and in the discussion on governance. The most well-known 
prison gangs are the so-called number gangs, these being the 26s, 27s and 28s. Two smaller 
gangs are also relatively common, namely the Big 5 (which colludes with officials) and the 
Airforce (which specialises in escapes). The lore of the number gangs is steeped in myth and 
mystery but it is generally agreed by scholars that they have their roots in the late nineteenth 
century in the Witwatersrand area (Gauteng province). The main objectives of the 28s centre 
on food, taking boy-wives and correcting the wrongs of the institution.231 The 26s focus on 
gathering wealth in the prison and smuggling contraband. The 27s are there to keep the peace 
and facilitate coordination and cooperation between the 26s and the 28s, but will also enforce 
discipline sanctioned by the gang laws of the three camps.232 In short, the number gangs are 
closely associated with, and frequently the architects of, coerced sex, violence and illegal 
activities in the prison system. The gangs are also structured in strictly hierarchical fashion 
and the authority of senior members must be obeyed. In many ways the hierarchy of the 
gangs mirror the hierarchy of the colonial and later administrations. Equally, gang law must 
be rigidly adhered to and punishments may be severe, if not fatal.  
The use of violence itself, unless in immediate self-defence, is rigorously controlled as is the 
taking of a wife (Afr. wyfie). Gang membership is for life and the gangs are prevalent in most 
prisons in South Africa, especially in the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces. In a perverse 
way the number gangs perform an important governance function by controlling the use of 
violence, maintaining order amongst prisoners and regulating trade in contraband. An 
                                                            
230 Haysom, N. (1981) Towards and understanding of prison gangs, Cape Town: Institute of Criminology, 
University of the Western Cape; Steinberg, J. (2004) Nongoloza’s children – Western Cape prison gangs during 
and after apartheid, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation; Lötter, J.M. and 
Schurink, W.J. (1986) Gevangenisbendes – ‘n ondersoek met special 
verwysingnanommerbendesonderKleurlinggevangenes, Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council; Lötter, 
J.M. (1989) Prison gangs in South Africa – a description, South African Journal of Sociology, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 
67-75; Van Onselen, C. (1984) The small matter of a horse, Johannesburg: Ravan Press; Steinberg, J. (2004) 
The Number, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.  
231 Jali Commission, p. 152. 
232 Jali Commission, pp. 152-153. 
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anarchic prison system would not serve the interests of the gangs and violence must thus be 
used sparingly and with clear objectives, for example, punishing an errant gang member or 
purposefully stabbing a warder.  
While the number gangs have existed in South Africa’s prisons for more than a century, the 
DCS has generally failed to deal with them in a manner that would diminish their influence 
over prisoners and officials. The Jali Commission was particularly concerned about DCS 
officials themselves belonging to number gangs, the lack of a coherent policy on gang 
management, and the contradictory departmental practices relating to gang members and non-
gang members (Afr. Franse).233 That gangs will probably always be part of the South African 
prison landscape is generally accepted, but the ostrich mentality of the Department in relation 
to the number gangs beggars belief. The gangs remain a powerful force within the prison 
system and directly undermine the Department’s duty to create a safe prison system free of 
contraband. The prison economy, inclusive of trade in contraband and assisted escapes, relies 
on corruption and the bribing of officials.234 When addressing corruption and governance, it 
is thus not an issue which the DCS can lightly ignore. 
When the DCS reported to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services in 2011 on its 
responses to the Jali Commission’s recommendations, the overall impression gained was that 
it regarded the gangs as less important than other matters.
235
 The Jali Commission made 11 
recommendations pertaining to the prison gangs, focusing on: the appropriate separation of 
different categories of prisoners; conducting research on prison gangs to inform a gang 
management strategy; the development of a gang management strategy; collecting 
intelligence on gang activities and cooperating with the National Intelligence Agency and 
police; cooperating with non-governmental organisations; amending the disciplinary code to 
make gang involvement by officials a dismissible offence; and training staff and managers to 
deal with gangs more effectively.236 
                                                            
233 Jali Commission, pp. 159-162; 172-175. 
234 Jali Commission, pp. 160 and 169. 
235 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e) Department of Correctional Services implementation of the 
recommendations of the Jali Commission of inquiry on systems and policies, Report presented to the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services, 7 September 2011.  
236 Jali Commission, pp.180-184. 
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The response by the Department was not convincing. By and large it referred to policies that 
were either in existence (e.g. separation of different categories) or which had been developed 
recently, but no evidence was presented on any results that have been achieved in reducing 
the influence of prison gangs. For example, in response to the recommendation that gang 
involvement by officials should be a dismissible offence, the Department replied as follows:  
The current Departmental Disciplinary Code for staff members provides effective 
leverage to deal with officials who promote gangs and who are involved in gang 
activities. Training of officials in Disciplinary Code Enforcement is done on a 
continuous basis to ensure effective enforcement of the code and to update officials on 
latest developments in the field of labour law.237 
In effect it regarded the gang membership of an official as an individualised labour relations 
matter, not grasping the serious ethical implications of such membership for the prison 
system. An official belonging to or colluding with a prison gang contradicts the core purpose 
of the prison system. The DCS evaded the Commission’s recommendation and as a 
consequence did not give the deserved priority to concerns about the involvement of officials 
in prison gangs. The most tangible result reported on was the development of a gang 
management strategy which was approved in April 2010 and circulated to all the regions in 
July 2010 for implementation. Whether any training or other support has been rendered to 
Heads of Prison to implement the strategy is unknown. On the strategy’s implementation, the 
Department concluded: “At this stage the effectiveness of the strategy is being evaluated by 
staff and managers at different correctional centres.”
238
 If no training and support are 
provided to implement the gang management strategy, it is unlikely that it will be effective. 
The strategy document itself is not available in the public domain and an assessment of its 
appropriateness is thus not possible. 
In overview, it is concluded that the DCS appears to be making light of probably its oldest 
and most enduring problem. It is perhaps because of this lack of prioritisation that the gangs 
have been such a lasting problem in the prison system. A more sinister interpretation would 
be that the management of the prison population has been deferred to the gang leaders.  
                                                            
237 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 15. 
238 Department of Correctional Services (2011 e), p. 12. 
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4.2 High value contracts 
 
In 2006 several allegations were made in the media about the awarding of high-value 
contracts by the DCS to a company called Bosasa,239 a company which since 2004 has 
benefited from prison tenders to the value of R3 billion (approximately US$ 360 million).240 
Shortly thereafter, the Auditor General and the PSC referred specific allegations regarding 
these contracts to the SIU for further investigation. A year later President Mbeki signed a 
proclamation instructing the SIU to investigate tender irregularities in the DCS.241 In 
November 2009 the SIU reported on its findings to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services. It should be noted that in its report to Parliament the SIU refrained from naming the 
individuals or company involved, but it was evident who the players were. The SIU 
investigated four contracts awarded to the Bosasa Group of Companies between 2004 and 
2006 and reported on these.242 The findings were damning and implicated the Chief Financial 
Officer (Patrick Gillingham) and the former National Commissioner, Linda Mti. The manner 
in which the four contracts were awarded showed strong similarities between them, and all 
evidenced deviations from the Treasury Supply Chain Management Policy. The SIU 
described as follows its findings in respect of the first contract: 
Instead of the end-user departments being involved in drafting the specifications of the 
product or service, the CFO (Chief Financial Officer), the Accounting Officer and the 
service provider company participated in the drafting of the specifications. In addition, 
                                                            
239 ‘Spoor van tender HK 2/2005 wys konkelry’ [Trail of tender HK2/2005 shows cheating - Own translation], 
Beeld, 16 November 2006, http://www.beeld.com/Suid-Afrika/Nuus/Spoor-van-tender-HK-22005-wys-
konkelry-20100617 Accessed 7 December 2011; ‘Skryf tender self en kry kontrak!’ [Write tender yourself and 
get the contract! - Own translation], Beeld, 17 November 2006, 
http://www.beeld.com/XArchive/Spesiaal/Ondersoeke/Skryf-tender-self-en-kry-kontrak-20100617 Accessed 7 
December 2011. 
240 ‘Prisons graft: Bosasa’s empire of influence’ Mail and Guardian, 20 November 2009, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2009-11-20-prisons-graft-bosasas-empire-of-influence Accessed 7 December 2011. 
241 ‘Prisons Boss bribed’ City Press, 20 March 2011, http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/Prison-boss-
bribed-20110320 Accessed 7 December 2011. 
242 These were a catering contract to the value of R717 million (US$ 85 million); an access control tender for 
R237 million (US 28 million); a fencing contract for R587 million (US$ 70.2 million); and a tender for 
televisions at R224 million (US$26.8 million). (‘Prisons graft: Bosasa’s empire of influence’ Mail and 
Guardian, 20 November 2009, http://mg.co.za/article/2009-11-20-prisons-graft-bosasas-empire-of-influence 
Accessed 7 December 2011.) 
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no financial planning, feasibility study or needs analysis was done. The security aspects 
concerned provided the company with a clear advantage above all the other bidders.243 
This same modus operandi was followed with the other three contracts, but additional steps 
were taken to manipulate the process in the preferred service provider’s favour. In the second 
contract the submission period was reduced from 30 to 21 days without reason, thus limiting 
the time available for competitors to prepare their bids. In the same contract the tender was 
awarded to an affiliate company of Bosasa which had been in existence for a mere seven days 
by the time bids had to be submitted, this despite government procurement policy requiring 
that a company should have been in existence for at least five years. In the third contract the 
budget was overspent by R150 million (US$ 18 million) and then increased with another 
R100 million (US$ 12 million). Moreover, payment of 90% of the contract price was made 
on the delivery of raw materials without the service provider committing to a final project 
completion date. In the fourth contract the same irregularities appeared, but the first invoice 
(R106 million - US$ 12.6 million) for payment was received three days after the contract was 
signed and duly paid. Ten days later another payment was made, exceeding the budget. The 
SIU then turned its investigation to the CFO and his family and found that he benefited to the 
tune of R2.1 million (US$ 251 000) through various payments from Bosasa.244 The SIU also 
found that the former National Commissioner benefited from payments by the same company 
to the value of R63 500 (US$ 8000).The SIU summarised its findings as follows: 
The general findings of the SIU in relation to these four tenders were that the proper 
procurement processes were not followed by DCS. This was aggravated by the 
payments made to the CFO and Accounting Officer at the time that tenders were being 
                                                            
243 Briefing by SIU to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services.PMG report on the meeting of the 
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 17 November 2009, http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091117-
special-investigations-unit-findings-their-investigation-department-c Accessed 24 November 2011. 
244 The CFO received a car and financial contributions to two other cars, his son and daughter received a car 
each, and his daughter's overseas trip was sponsored by the company. He also received six Blue Bulls rugby 
season tickets and the company financed the development of a house for him, worth more than R1 million. He 
had renovations done to the kitchen for R 180 000 (US$ 23 400) and received R80 000 (US$ 10 400) from the 
company towards a retirement home. In addition, the company paid three amounts totaling R48 000 (US$ 6200) 
into the credit card account of the CFO. (Briefing by SIU to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services.PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 17 November 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091117-special-investigations-unit-findings-their-investigation-department-c 
Accessed 24 November 2011.) 
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awarded to this company and its affiliates. It was also aggravated by the fact that there 
was such a close working relationship between the CFO, the accounting officer and the 
service provider company and its affiliates. The SIU was satisfied that the procurement 
process was undermined, in the sense that this company and its affiliates had an unfair 
advantage over its competitors in respect of these tenders. This prejudiced the DCS. 
The SIU was also satisfied that this close relationship undermined the procurement 
process itself and that DCS was significantly exposed to civil claims by the companies 
that lost out in the tender process. 
The SIU’s final report was handed to the Minister of Correctional Services and the National 
Prosecuting Authority in September 2009, but at the time of writing (December 2011) no 
criminal prosecutions were in progress. The CFO was suspended in September 2010 and 
ultimately resigned without facing disciplinary action from DCS.245 
The tender manipulation of the high-value contracts between 2004 and 2006 sent out the 
message that some of the most senior officials in the Department paid little attention to what 
was happening around them and followed their own agenda. The Jali Commission had at the 
time not yet finalised its investigations and the SIU was still busy with its investigations into 
other matters. Publicly the National Commissioner had committed himself to rooting out 
corruption,
246
 but from the SIU’s investigations it appears he was deeply involved in 
manipulating high-value contracts and colluding with his CFO. The whole saga remains 
deeply damaging to the public image of DCS and the level of trust that the rank and file place 
in the Department’s leadership.  
4.3 The Commissioners versus the Ministers 
 
Between 2007 and 2010 the respective Ministers and National Commissioners at the helm of 
the Department clashed, but for different reasons. In what can be seen only as political 
manoeuvring, Minister Balfour got rid of Commissioner Petersen who had challenged him. 
Petersen’s replacement, Sibeko, was initially investigated for corruption, subsequently 
acquitted but not reinstated.  
                                                            
245 ‘Suspended prisons official quits’ News24.com, 12 November 2010, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Suspended-prisons-official-quits-20101112 Accessed 7 December 
2011. 
246 Department of Correctional Services (2004 a), p. 7. 
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4.3.1 Petersen v Balfour 
 
In May 2007 Vernon Petersen was appointed as National Commissioner of Correctional 
Services after he joined the Department some time earlier as Chief Deputy Commissioner 
Corporate Services.247 He was previously employed by the Mpumalanga Provincial 
Government and was thus an outsider to the Department. His independence and commitment 
to clean up the DCS soon brought him into conflict with his Minister, Ngconde Balfour. 
Petersen blocked Balfour in extending a multi-million-rand catering tender to Bosasa while 
the company was being investigated by the SIU (see section 4.2 above). Petersen also 
reported Balfour to Parliament’s Ethics Committee for allegedly failing to declare a discount 
he received on the financing of a luxury vehicle. The financing was being provided by a 
company linked to the Bosasa Group of Companies.248 It was also Petersen who suspended 
the Chief Financial Officer (Patrick Gillingham) who was implicated in the SIU 
investigations of high-value contracts. In media reports Gillingham was described as a 
“confidant”249 and “right-hand man”250 of Balfour. Several public spats ensued and the 
Minister, in one incident, accused Petersen of a “drunken outburst” at an official event, 
although the claims were never substantiated. Reportedly, Petersen wrote a letter to Balfour 
in September 2008 warning that “something must break” if they could not “trust and work 
together in the department”.251 The breakdown in the relationship between Balfour and 
Petersen was also being discussed for some time at the highest level, involving then Public 
Service and Administration Minister, Geraldine Frazer-Moleketi, and then President Mbeki. 
The rupture happened two months later. 
Following the ousting of President Mbeki in September 2008, Kgalema Motlanthe was 
appointed as President. While Motlanthe was on an official visit abroad in October-
November 2008, the Deputy President (Baleka Mbete) was Acting President. It was during 
this period that Balfour and his counterpart in the Ministry of Sport and Recreation 
(Makhenkesi Stofile) approached Acting President Mbete and proposed that Petersen be 
                                                            
247 Department of Correctional Services (2005), p. 3. 
248 ‘DG of Sport Vernie Petersen dies’ Mail and Guardian, 28 February 2011,  
249 ‘Prisons graft: Bosasa’s empire of influence’ Mail and Guardian, 20 November 2009, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2009-11-20-prisons-graft-bosasas-empire-of-influence Accessed 7 December 2011.) 
250 ‘DG of Sport Vernie Petersen dies’ Mail and Guardian, 28 February 2011. 
251 ‘DG swap: Did Kgalema know?’ Mail and Guardian, 3 November 2008. 
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swopped with the Director General of Sport and Recreation, Xoliswa Sibeko. Mbete, in her 
capacity as Acting President, assented and signed off on the necessary paperwork. There is 
some speculation as to whether she consulted Motlanthe on the matter.252 In the aftermath, 
Stofile denied any involvement. It should be added that the relationship between Stofile and 
Sibeko was also strained and he had refused to appoint her permanently as Director General 
of Sport and Recreation after her 12-month probation period came to an end in August 2008. 
After less than two years in the position as National Commissioner, Petersen moved over to 
Sport and Recreation as Director General and Sibeko became the National Commissioner of 
Correctional Services, with a less than convincing track record in her previous position and 
no experience of managing prisons.  
According to a long-serving member of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 
(James Selfe, Democratic Alliance), the transfer of Petersen was directly related to the 
Bosasa catering tender. Petersen’s removal was a blow to prison reform. He had earned great 
respect from the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services and civil society organisations 
for his stance on corruption and willingness to deal with the tough issues facing the prison 
system, such as sexual violence and unnatural deaths in custody.253 The conflict between 
Balfour and Petersen must have created confusion, if not further division, in the Department’s 
senior management team, undermining efforts to implement policy and improve service 
delivery. On 27 February 2011 Petersen died of natural causes, aged 52.254 
 
4.3.2 Sibeko v Mapisa-Nqakula 
 
Following the recall by the ANC of Thabo Mbeki as President in September 2008, Minister 
Balfour did not resign immediately as Minister of Correctional Services but he was 
subsequently replaced by Nosiviwe Noluthando Mapisa-Nqakula on 11 May 2009.255 In mid-
July 2009 Minister Mapisa-Nqakula suspended National Commissioner Sibeko, the Acting 
CFO (Nandi Mareka) and the Gauteng Regional Commissioner, Adv Tozama Mqobi-Balfour, 
wife of former Minister Ngconde Balfour. The allegation was that Sibeko and Mqobi-Balfour 
                                                            
252 ‘DG swap: Did Kgalema know?’ Mail and Guardian, 3 November 2008. 
253 ‘Why was I shifted, Kgalema?’ Mail and Guardian, 26 October 2008, 
254 ‘DG of Sport Vernie Petersen dies’ Mail and Guardian, 28 February 2011, 
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were renting luxury accommodation in a prestigious area of Pretoria while there was official 
accommodation available for them.256 Other charges were also subsequently brought and in 
December 2009 Sibeko was cleared of all, but was then placed on special leave by the 
Minister.
257
 After much wrangling and Sibeko demanding to be reinstated since she was 
acquitted at the disciplinary hearing, she ultimately agreed to the termination of her contract 
in March 2010, accepting a payment of R700 000 (US$ 103 000).258 Mqobi-Balfour was 
further investigated for additional charges relating to fraud and misuse of public funds and 
further suspended in January 2010. In October of that year she was found guilty on six of the 
eight charges259 and dismissed in November 2010.260 
Both Sibeko and Mqobi-Balfour were suspended for long periods before their cases were 
finalised, even though the requirement is that a precautionary suspension should not exceed 
60 days.261 This was also the case with the former CFO, Gillingham. The reasons for the 
lengthy suspensions are not clear but the DCS had, according to the Public Service 
Commission, the highest number of precautionary suspensions for the period 2008 to 2010 of 
the Departments surveyed – 73 at a cost of R7 million.262 
It is uncertain what the real cause was of the breakdown in the relationship between Sibeko 
and Minister Mapisa-Nqakula, but the implication that the National Commissioner was 
suspected of corruption, even if later acquitted, added to the woes of the Department. Mqobi-
Balfour’s actions pointed to the lack of integrity of some officials at the most senior level of 
                                                            
256‘Prisons bosses suspended’ Mail and Guardian, 13 July 2009, http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Prisons-
bosses-suspended-20090713; 'Probe Balfour housing' Mail and Guardian, 14 July 2009, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Probe-Balfour-housing-20090714 Accessed 7 December 2011. 
257‘Prisons boss cleared’ Mail and Guardian, 15 December 2009, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Prisons-boss-cleared-20091214 Accessed 7 December 2012. 
258 ‘Sacked chief gets R700 000’ Mail and Guardian, 4 March 2010, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Sacked-chief-gets-R700-000-20100304 Accessed 7 December 
2012. 
259 ‘Gauteng prisons commissioner guilty’ News24.com, 12 October 2010, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Gauteng-prisons-commissioner-guilty-20101012 Accessed 7 
December 2012. 
260 ‘Prisons big shot fired over posh home scandal’ Pretoria News, 5 November 2010. 
261 Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) Resolution 1 of 2003 (Public Service Commission 
(2011) Report on management of precautionary suspension in the public service, Pretoria: Public Service 
Commission, p. 3.) 
262 Public Service Commission (2011), p. 12. 
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the Department. Moreover, as wife of then Minister Ngconde Balfour, it suggests that he 
knew what was happening or should have known. Again the episode attracted significant 
media attention and the ire of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services.263 It was an 
embarrassing scandal at a time when the SIU was continuing its investigations into the DCS 
and reporting on other matters. 
 
4.4 Failure to renegotiate PPP contracts 
 
In Chapter 3 (section 3.1.3) reference was made to the two privately operated prisons situated 
in Bloemfontein (Free State province) and Makhado (Limpopo province), respectively. 
Private sector involvement in the prison system remains a contentious but under-studied issue 
in South Africa.
264
 Both prisons accommodate roughly 3 000 sentenced prisoners and are 
often referred to as “state of the art prisons”.265 The specifications for their construction and 
operation266 were set extremely high. A fundamental difference between the DCS-operated 
                                                            
263 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 11 November 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091111-minister-progress-case-against-national-commissioner-developments-
vet Accessed 7 December 2011. 
264 Berg, J. (2001) Private prisons: the international debate and its relation to South Africa, Acta Criminologica 
Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 2-12; Muntingh, L. (2010) ‘Love Me, Love Me Not’ – Public Private Partnerships in the 
Department of Correctional Services, Paper delivered at seminar hosted by Institute for Security Studies, 28 
July 2010, Cape Town. 
265Technical review of the public-private partnership prisons contracts for the PPP prisons task team, Report 
presented to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 18 March 2003, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030317-public-private-partnership-prison-contracts-briefing Accessed 7 
December 2011. 
266 The following are examples of the level of detail provided in the specification: 
• Out of cell activities are based on a minimum 12 hours per day. 
• Cell sizes of 5.5m2 for single cells and 8.0m2 for double cells based on normal building requirements. 
• Minimum 5 layers of security protection. 
• Restrictions on persons to whom telephone calls may be made and recording / monitoring of all calls. 
• Complaints from prisoners to be responded to within 24 hours. 
• Cash-free environment. 
• Implement drug testing program with prevention and treatment. 
• All bedding material and furniture coverings (including in administration offices) to be of fire retardant 
material. 
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and the PPP prisons is that the latter may not, by contract, be occupied above their specified 
capacity.267 Furthermore, while prisoners in Public Private Partnership (PPP) prisons must be 
outside of their cells for a minimum of twelve hours per day, other prisoners are entitled only 
to a minimum of one hour per day. Similarly, the space norm in DCS prisons is 3.34 m
2 
per 
prisoner compared to the 8m2 in the PPP prisons for prisoners in double cells. The guaranteed 
profits of the contractors linked to the Consumer Price Index, as noted in Chapter 3, added to 
the cost. It was this high cost that ultimately prompted a review in 2002 of these two 
contracts and future PPP prisons.  
In November 2002 the Portfolio Committee was presented with a lengthy, detailed and highly 
technical review and analysis of the two PPP prison contracts.268 The same report was again 
presented to the Committee in March 2003. It was a financial analysis and recommended that 
a number of aspects of the PPP contracts could be renegotiated to improve “value for money” 
to the Department. The following were identified as key areas for renegotiation: reviewing 
standards and specifications; amending the fee payment structure; considering options for 
accommodating additional prisoners on a marginal cost per inmate basis; and negotiating debt 
funding to improve cash flows and net present value benefits, including considering inflation-
linked funding.269 From the available documentation it appears that a transaction advisor was 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
• Sick inmate to be seen by healthcare worker in 30 minutes. 
• Provide assistance for Legal Aid including reference library. (Technical review of the public-private 
partnership prisons contracts for the PPP prisons task team, Report presented to the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services 18 March 2003, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030317-
public-private-partnership-prison-contracts-briefing Accessed 7 December 2011.) 
267 Berg, J. (2001), pp. 5-8. 
268 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2007) ‘The state of South Africa’s prisons’. In S. Buhlungu, J. Daniel, R. Southall & J. 
Lutchman, State of the Nation – South Africa 2007, HSRC Press, Cape Town, p. 382; PMG report on the 
meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 12 November 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20021111-review-public-private-partnership-prison-contracts-mothers-babies-
women-imprisoned-Technical review of the public-private partnership prisons contracts for the PPP prisons 
task team, Report presented to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 18 March 2003, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030317-public-private-partnership-prison-contracts-briefing Accessed 7 
December 2011. 
269
 Technical review of the public-private partnership prisons contracts for the PPP prisons task team, Report 
presented to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 18 March 2003, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030317-public-private-partnership-prison-contracts-briefing Accessed 7 
December 2011, para A.3.2 
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subsequently appointed, and in August 2006 the Portfolio Committee received a presentation 
from the transaction advisor on the PPP prisons regarding the renegotiation of contracts.270 
Again the Committee received a highly technical financial analysis of the two PPP prison 
contracts, indicating that there was some scope, albeit limited, for renegotiation. The 
contractors were, quite understandably, not interested in reducing their fees and the 
transaction advisor thus focused on increasing the capacity of the two prisons. The 
assumption was that the unit cost per prisoner would then be distributed over a higher number 
of prisoners, thus creating more value for money. Potentially an additional 2 076 bed spaces 
could be created. 
The transaction advisor did not, however, investigate the profile of the prisoners detained at 
the two PPP prisons and how a change in the profile could add value to the prison system. 
For example, at Mangaung prison 75% of prisoners are serving sentences of longer than ten 
years and 41% are serving sentences of longer than 20 years.271 Prisoners at the two PPP 
prisons have, by all accounts, access to exceptional facilities, quality programmes, education, 
technical training, and so forth. In sharp contrast to the DCS-run prisons, as specified in the 
contracts, prisoners at the two PPP prisons are indeed kept constructively busy for 12 hours a 
day. The majority of them will, however, for the foreseeable future have little use for the 
skills acquired. The two PPP prisons could therefore be used far more effectively to provide 
access to quality programmes and services to prisoners with a release date in the near future, 
especially for younger and first-time prisoners.  
Using the two PPP prisons for juvenile offenders was proposed to the contractors by the 
Portfolio Committee in June 2008. The contractors indicated that they were open to the idea 
but that the DCS had not made such a proposal to them and it was contractually the 
Department’s decision which prisoners to transfer to the two PPP prisons from the DCS-
                                                            
270 PMG report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 10 August 2006, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060809-ppp-correctional-centres-contracts-briefing-negotiations Accessed 7 
December 2011. 
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operated prisons.
272
 The idea would nonetheless remain in the thinking of the Portfolio 
Committee and was included in its hand-over report at the end of its term in 2009.273 There is 
subsequently no evidence to indicate that the Department has taken this proposal on board.  
Fundamentally the DCS and its advisors interpreted the creation of additional value for 
money too narrowly by recommending the distribution of the existing costs over a higher 
number of (long-term) prisoners, which was not acceptable to the operators. If the profile of 
prisoners at the two PPP prisons were changed to target younger and first-time offenders with 
a release date in the near future, it could potentially make a significant contribution to 
attaining the rehabilitation objectives of the Department. The two private prisons are indeed 
“showcase” prisons but their impact on the entire prison system has been negligible, if not 
negative.274 As it stands now, this valuable resource is in practical terms being spent in a 
wasteful manner.  
 
4.5 Summary of issues 
 
In section 2 above, it was concluded that substantial efforts were made by the DCS after 2004 
to eradicate corruption and improve governance. Even if results were modest, it was evident 
that steps were being taken to undo the mess created in the previous decade and re-
institutionalise the prison system. There were, however, shortcomings in the approach 
followed. The most obvious is the Department’s reluctance to deal with the number gangs in 
a decisive manner, and it must be assumed that the gangs remain as influential as they were 
ten years ago. The gangs remain a prominent threat to the integrity of the prison system and 
its staff, yet they were excluded from the Department’s problem analysis. It was only in 2010, 
several years after the Jali Commission submitted its final report, that the Department 
embarked on the development of a gang management strategy. There appears to be an 
                                                            
272 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 3 June 2008, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080603-briefing-public-private-partnership-prisons-ppps-mangaung-and-
kutama- Accessed 7 December 2011. 
273 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2009) Overview report of the oversight activities of the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services (2004 - 2009) - Hand-Over Report, p. 7. 
274 Cavadino, M. and Dignan, J. (eds) (2006) Penal Systems – a comparative approach, London: Sage 
Publications, p. 321. 
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inexplicable lack of urgency to understand the number gangs and develop an appropriate 
response to them.  
In his analysis of Polish prison reform, Coyle lists a number of factors that contributed to a 
successful reform process. Apart from having a clear vision and knowledgeable leaders 
heading the prison system, he notes that during the period of the most radical reform “there 
were no embarrassing incidents, such as scandals, riots or escapes.”275 He argues that such 
embarrassing incidents would have been attributed to the reform process and would thus have 
undermined it. In the case of South Africa, the embarrassing incidents and scandals were of 
note and have proven to be extremely damaging to prison reform after 2004, fundamentally 
attacking the integrity of the leadership and the legitimacy of the prison system.   
The period after 2004 saw a series of smaller-scale and ensuing crises in the Department in 
the form of the findings of the SIU (the high-value contracts implicating the CFO and former 
National Commissioner Mti), the allegation that Minister Balfour received financial benefits 
from a Bosasa-linked company, the conflict between National Commissioner Sibeko and 
Minister Mapisa-Nqakula and the dismissal of Adv Mqobi-Balfour. Although not of the same 
scale as the general collapse of discipline and order described in Chapter 3, they contributed 
to the perception and reality that the DCS is a deeply troubled department.  
A first consequence of this is that in the eyes of the public and the ordinary DCS official, the 
Department’s leadership was perceived to be engaged in corruption whilst it was their 
explicit task as public officials to rid the Department of corruption. These events served only 
to deepen the legitimacy crisis of the prison system, yet this time the attention was not on the 
regions and individual prisons (as investigated by the Jali Commission) but directed at the 
Head Office. Flowing from this, the second consequence was that it placed under suspicion 
the sincerity and integrity of the DCS senior management’s commitment to address 
corruption. Inevitably questions must be raised about anti-corruption efforts by the Head 
Office when, as the SIU found, tenders were being manipulated in the Head Office and bribes 
paid to some of the most senior officials in the Department, among them none other than the 
CFO. Third, it must be assumed that the incidents described above did not pass unnoticed by 
the prison population. Even if only a few senior officials were implicated in corruption, there 
is a real risk that the prisoners will tar all officials with the same brush and conclude that all 
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officials are corrupt, assuming that this perception does not already exist. Such a perception 
would make a mockery of the Department’s efforts at rehabilitation, which requires a position 
of moral high ground. Fourth, the scandals reflected a culture of defying oversight. By 2004 
the DCS had access to several reports dealing with governance and corruption and making 
numerous recommendations, yet tenders were thereafter manipulated involving millions of 
rands.  
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has dealt with the Department’s response after 2004 to date in respect of 
corruption and maladministration, or how it attempted to establish norms and practices of 
good governance in the prison system. Following the appointment of the Jali Commission 
(2001) and thereafter the commencement of investigations by the SIU (2002), the DCS was 
under increasing pressure to address corruption. The results have been modest in many 
regards and significant set-backs were experienced. Admittedly, the DCS is a high-risk 
organisation with regard to fraud and corruption. It procures a large volume of goods and 
services; it has 240 prisons and more than 40 000 staff; and many staff lack the skill and 
experience for the positions they fill. Moreover, the Department has a long history of 
corruption and a general resistance to external advice and oversight. 
The chapter commenced with a description of the requirements for an effective anti-
corruption strategy and assessed the DCS anti-corruption strategy against these, but also 
considered how these have been integrated into the Department’s overall strategic plan. In 
this regard, it is concluded that the Department’s emphasis on the law enforcement pillar of 
the anti-corruption strategy has to an extent come at a cost to the other pillars.  
Improving governance in the DCS and addressing corruption has not come easily. A 
significant amount of political and administrative pressure was placed on the Department to 
initiate governance reforms. In short, it was reform by push and shove. The appointment of 
the Jali Commission, the investigations by the SIU, DPSA, PSC and initially the Directorate: 
Special Operations all combined to pressurise the Department to address corruption through 
investigations and effecting improvements in systemic weaknesses. Gradually gains were 
made as perpetrators of corruption were sanctioned, financial controls improved and the 
disciplinary code more effectively enforced. 
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The history of corruption and maladministration in the DCS should be seen against the 
general state of the public service by the late 1990s. Over time government incrementally 
appreciated the seriousness of the situation and the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 
was developed, which was followed by new anti-corruption legislation. Support from the 
DPSA and the PSC also assisted the DCS in formulating a more coherent and focused 
response to corruption and maladministration. It is unlikely that the DCS would have been 
able to have developed such a response at an earlier stage; there was simply not the political 
support from national government nor were the necessary supportive policies, legislation and 
resources in place.  
The DCS also developed internal capacity to investigate cases and enforce the disciplinary 
code and centralised this function in the Head Office, while the prevention function remained 
decentralised. There is limited evidence that this responsibility has indeed been taken up by 
the regions and management areas of the Department. Moreover, the DCS placed the 
emphasis, in general, on corruption resulting in losses to the state and thus paying less 
attention to corruption where prisoners are the victims. In addition, the DCS has for most of 
the period after 2004 ignored the influence of the prison gangs as a threat to good 
governance. More specifically, the DCS anti-corruption strategy overlooked prisoners as 
either enablers or victims of corruption.  
Whether the Head Office has (re-) gained control over the entire Department is not entirely 
confirmed. There is evidence of senior officials not submitting information to the Head 
Office and ignoring policies and legislation. Continuing corruption and rights violations 
create a sense instead that the Head Office has a fluctuating authority relationship with its 
subordinate structures. Consequently there has frequently been a notable chasm between what 
policy and law dictate and what occurs in practice. The emphasis on code enforcement must 
therefore be seen as a strategy employed by the Head Office to exert and establish its 
authority over the Department. This is, however, an inch-by-inch endeavour with the risk that 
disciplinary code enforcement may indeed alienate staff. 
It also needs to be asked whether the Department has been able to decrease its legitimacy 
deficit through its focus on corruption and maladministration. Assessed against the legal, 
philosophical and sociological requirements for legitimacy described in Chapter 2 (section 
2.3), it is a mixed bag of results. The 1998 Correctional Services Act, which is firmly based 
on the 1996 Constitution, addressed the first question of whether the power exercised by the 
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DCS is legally obtained. The laws regulating the prison system give expression to the values 
and prescripts of the Constitution, as the case should be. The new legislation, with effect from 
2004, also sets new standards of performance and, as has been shown in this Chapter and to 
be discussed in the following one, power is not always exercised within the bounds of the 
law.  
At a philosophical level the 2004 White Paper is an attempt to provide the justification for the 
prison system, stating that rehabilitation is the core business of the Department. This 
construct is, however, eroded by several contradictions at the sociological level. The set-
backs described (especially related to corruption) in this chapter as well as continuous human 
rights violations (discussed in Chapter 5) have continued to undermine the credibility of the 
aspirations of the 2004 White Paper. In respect of the legitimacy deficit it can thus be 
concluded that there is now a legal and policy framework in place, on the one hand, but on 
the other, successful implementation of this framework has been beleaguered by capacity 
constraints (an issue prevalent across the public service) as well as deliberate and criminal 
actions on the part of DCS officials. Notwithstanding these concerns, it has been 
demonstrated that concerted actions on multiple fronts, even when induced through pressure, 
can be effective in addressing corruption and maladministration. 
In respect of the White Paper it has also been shown that there were substantial problems 
with the manner in which it was developed. Moreover, the appropriateness of the White 
Paper to guide reform has been called into question. Aligning the budget to the White Paper 
has proven to be less than straightforward, with the result that it is not the goals of the White 
Paper which drive expenditure but rather the Department’s historical patterns of expenditure. 
These patterns, in other words, continue to dictate implementation (or the lack thereof). 
Developing new policies and procedures, setting up systems, creating internal structures and 
so forth are all part of re-institutionalisation. It is, as evidenced by events since 2004, an 
essential but tedious and time-consuming enterprise. Over time, information management and 
reporting thereon (e.g. Annual Reports) have become more sophisticated and probably akin to 
something normally seen in the private sector. These activities do not attract media attention, 
nor are their results immediately, or even soon, visible. On the other hand, scandals and 
embarrassing incidents have an immediate impact on reform efforts. They rapidly change 
positive, or confirm negative, perceptions of the Department and its management, placing at 
risk the broader reform effort. It is likely to be the case that public perceptions of the prison 
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system remain strongly coloured by the results of investigations, with the most sensational 
scandals having the strongest impact. 
In coming to grips with the new constitutional order, the Department has, after 2001, 
demonstrated a deeper understanding of its constitutional obligations with reference to good 
governance principles. Even if this was the result of external pressure, a number of advances 
have been made to regain control and address practices that violated good governance 
requirements articulated in the Constitution. 
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Chapter 5 Improving human rights 
standards 
1. Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, it was especially since 2004 that the Department, supported by 
other structures such as the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), made a concerted effort to 
improve governance and strategically re-align it. While it was argued in the preceding chapter 
that advances were made in respect of addressing corruption, it will be contended here that 
compliance with human rights standards did not receive the same attention. This chapter will 
explore the state of human rights reform in the prison system and provide an assessment of 
the current situation. From the extant literature it is evident that the situation is far from 
desirable, and human rights violations and related concerns have been reported on a broad 
range of issues. It is not possible to deal with all of these within the scope of this thesis. A 
number of thematic issues have been identified, as they are regarded as key to analysing the 
reform challenges facing the prison system. These are briefly outlined below. 
As contextual background to the discussion on human rights prison, it must be noted that, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3, overcrowding is a persistent phenomenon in the South African 
prison system. It will be shown that since 2005 there has been a notable decline in the size of 
the prison population, thus alleviating to some extent the immediate pressure on operations. 
Ideally this should have yielded positive results across a broad range of human rights areas, 
but the results are not conclusive.  
The personal safety of prisoners continues to be under threat from inter-prisoner violence, 
sexual assault by prisoners, and assaults by officials. Deaths in custody, due to both natural 
and unnatural causes, remain unacceptably high, raising concerns about the quality of health 
care in prisons as well as the quality of investigations into unnatural deaths and the efforts 
that are undertaken to prevent such deaths. The compromised personal safety of prisoners 
poses fundamental questions about the Department’s ability to ensure safe and humane 
custody, as required by the Constitution and the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998). 
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Furthermore, this chapter discusses the use of segregation, mechanical restraints and force 
with reference to the mandatory reports that must be submitted by Heads of Prisons to the 
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services when any such incidents occur. Nevertheless, 
compliance with this mandatory reporting is poor, which indicates a lack of knowledge and 
understanding among Heads of Prisons of the requirements of the Correctional Services Act. 
In the late 1990s super-maximum security prisons were much in vogue with the Department, 
and as a result two such facilities were established; however, their continued existence and 
utility-value needs to be questioned against constitutional standards. 
Much of the litigation against the Department brought by prisoners after 2004 centred on 
parole. The first civilian parole boards established after 2004 held much promise, but their 
poor management and training resulted in numerous problems, inconsistent decision-making, 
and litigation. This had a material impact on sentence administration. 
The chapter, in the last three sections, deals with three particular groups of prisoners who are 
highly vulnerable to rights violations, namely, women, children and unsentenced prisoners. In 
respect of all of these categories, some improvements on the legislative front are noted, but at 
implementation level there remains much room for improvement. The chapter commences 
with an overview of the legislative framework, making specific reference to human rights 
standards and the required conditions of detention. 
2. Overview of the legal framework 
 
While Chapter 2 has already dealt in general overview with the recognition of prisoners’ 
rights in a constitutional democracy, a number of more specific points need to be raised with 
regard to the legal framework governing conditions of detention. The Constitution sets clear 
standards in respect of all arrested and detained persons, standards which are derived from 
the right to dignity articulated in section 10.1 The emphasis here will be placed on the 
enumerated rights applicable to conditions of detention, as opposed to the rights pertaining to 
fair and just criminal procedure, or due process rights.
2
  
                                                            
1 Steytler, N. (1998) Constitutional Criminal Procedure – a commentary on the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Durban: Butterworths, p. 183. 
2 Section 12(1) protects against arbitrary detention, and section 12(1)(b) against detention without trial. Section 
35(1) sets out the basic rights of accused persons, such as the right to remain silent, be informed of the charges, 
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The first is the right to be free from torture and not to be treated or punished in a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading way.3 The second set of rights in respect of conditions of detention 
states that every detainee has the right to be detained under “conditions of detention that are 
consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, 
of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment”.4 Notably, 
these are minimum requirements, as evidenced by the use of the wording “at least”.5 The 
third set of rights focuses on contact with the outside world to prevent incommunicado 
detention by guaranteeing contact and communication between the detained person and his 
spouse or partner, next of kin, chosen religious counsellor, and chosen medical practitioner.6 
The Constitution also makes specific provision for detained children,
7
 requiring, first, that 
their detention should be avoided or otherwise be for the shortest possible period, and, 
second, that they be detained separately from adults under conditions “that take account of 
the child’s age”.8 
The Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998), in Chapter 3, operationalises the normative 
provisions of the Constitution by articulating especially detailed standards regulating 
conditions of detention and the treatment of prisoners. The legal prescripts are further 
supported by the Regulations to the Correctional Services Act and the Standing Orders 
(known as the B-Orders). It is not necessary to describe these here as it has been done 
elsewhere,9 but, in overview, progressive standards aligned to international human rights 
law10 cover the following areas: admission procedure; accommodation; nutrition; hygiene; 
clothing and bedding; exercise; health care; contact with community; religion, belief and 
opinion; deaths in prison; development and support services; access to legal advice; reading 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
not to be coerced to make a statement, to be brought before a court within 48 hours (or as soon as possible 
thereafter), and to be released from detention if permitted by the interests of justice.  
3 s 12(1)(d-e) Act 108 of 1966. 
4 s 35 (2)(e). 
5 Steytler, N. (1998) pp. 192-194. Also Schwikkard, P. J. (2005) Arrested, detained and accused persons. In 
Currie, I. and De Waal, J. (eds) The Bill of Rights Handbook (5th Ed) Cape Town: Juta, pp. 772-776. 
6s 35(2)(f). 
7 A child is a person under the age of 18 years. 
8s 28(1)(g). 
9 Muntingh, L. (2010) A guide to the rights and responsibilities of prisoners as described in the Correctional 
Services Act and regulations, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
10 For example, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the European Prison Rules.  
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material; children; mothers of young children; complaints and requests; disciplinary 
infringements; procedures and penalties; safe custody; searches; identification; security 
classification; segregation; mechanical restraints; use of force; non-lethal incapacitating 
devices; and the use of firearms. Further standards are set in respect of sentenced and 
unsentenced prisoners, standards which outline the general approach and the prisoners’ 
sentence status.  
 
Building on earlier decisions,11 the emerging jurisprudence on conditions of detention has 
dealt with the right to dignity,12 solitary confinement,13 access to medical care,14 access to 
electricity,15 transfers to C-Max prison,16 and the transfer of children sentenced to a reform 
school from prison to reform schools.17 There is also a substantial body of unreported cases.18 
The overall conclusion to be drawn is that the courts have been eager to adopt a progressive 
and expansive interpretation of prisoners’ rights, especially where their conditions of 
detention and the actions of the DCS have posed a threat to, or already violated, the right to 
dignity. Seen collectively, the Constitution, the Correctional Services Act (and its subordinate 
legislation) and case law provide clear, firm and well-motivated standards regulating 
prisoners’ rights and their conditions of detention. While overcrowding has remained a 
persistent problem, it has not been the subject of litigation in South African courts. However, 
in recent years there have been a number of decisions from the European Court of Human 
                                                            
11
 Whittaker and Morant v. Roos and Bateman 1912 AD 92.Goldberg and Others v Minister of Prisons and 
Others 1979 (1) SA 14 (A). Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 (3) SA 131 (A). 
12 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2003 (12) BCLR 1384 (C). 
13
 Minister of Justice v Hofmeyer 1993 (3) SA 131 (A). 
14 B v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (6) BCLR 789 (C), EN and Others v Government of the RSA and 
Others (2007) ((1) BCLR 84 (SAHC Durban 2006)S v Vanqa 2000 (2) SACR 371 (Tk). Van Biljon and Others 
v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 1997 (4) SA 441 (CPD).C v Minister of Correctional Services 
1996 (4) SA 292 (T). 
15
 Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services 1999 (3) BCLR 342(W). 
16
 Nortje en ander v Minister van Korrektiewe Dienste en ander 2001 (3) SA 472 (SCA). 
17S v Z and 23 similar cases 2004 (4) BCLR 410 (E). 
18 De Vos, P. (2004) Prisoners’ rights litigation in South Africa since 1994 – a critical evaluation. CSPRI 
Research Report No. 3, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
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Rights
19
 and it is anticipated that in due course these will cross-pollinate thinking on the issue 
in South Africa.  
3. Overcrowding 
 
3.1 Overcrowding in the 2004 White Paper 
 
As previously noted, prison overcrowding has been a long-standing problem, and since 1965 
(the earliest date for which information is available) there has been a shortfall between the 
demand for prison space and the available accommodation. The 2004 White Paper states that 
the “Department regards overcrowding as its most important challenge, as it has significant 
negative implications on the ability of the Department to deliver on its new Core Business”.20 
With the new “core business” being rehabilitation, the White Paper’s analysis is thus 
somewhat restricted in that it falls short of identifying overcrowding primarily as a human 
rights issue, and, more specifically, of identifying the right to be free from torture and other 
ill treatment. In a number of decisions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has 
indeed confirmed that overcrowding is a threat to the right to be free from torture and other ill 
treatment.21 More particularly, the ECHR has held that once the available space per prisoner 
falls below a certain level, such a situation will invariably raise questions about the absolute 
                                                            
19
 Bakhmutskiy v. Russia, ECHR Application no. 36932/02, Strasbourg, 25 June 2009; Kalashnikov v. Russia, 
ECHR Application no. 47095/99, Strasbourg, 15 July 2002; Orchowski v. Poland, ECHR Application no. 
17885/04, Strasbourg, 22 October 2009. 
20 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, Pretoria: 
Department of Correctional Services, p. 57 para 2.9.2. 
21Orchowski v. Poland, ECHR Application no. 17885/04, Strasbourg, 22 October 2009, Kalashnikov v. Russia, 
ECHR Application no. 47095/99, Strasbourg, 15 July 2002, Bakhmutskiy v. Russia, ECHR Application no. 
36932/02, Strasbourg, 25 June 2009. 
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prohibition of torture and other ill treatment.
22
 Other research has also emphasised the 
human-rights impact of overcrowded prisons.23 
Overcrowding should, however, be understood not only with reference to a space norm per 
prisoner. In addition to the provision of basic necessities (e.g. food, clothing, safety and 
shelter), conditions of detention should be assessed against other factors such as the adequacy 
of staff supervision, the availability of recreational opportunities, the amount of time spent 
outside of cells, and any other factor affecting the experience of imprisonment.
24
 
Nonetheless, the smaller the space available per prisoner, the more important the space norm 
becomes when assessing conditions of detention, overcrowding and the possible violation of 
the right to be free from torture and other ill treatment.25 
Albrecht, in a comprehensive review of the literature on prison overcrowding, concludes that 
overcrowded prisons have a negative impact on all conditions of imprisonment and intended 
consequences of imprisonment.26 This overall negative impact is manifested in a number of 
ways, as summarised hereafter. Restricted living space, associated loss of privacy and human 
dignity erodes the legitimacy of the prison regime. Overcrowding further reduces the general 
services that are rendered to comply with the standards set for access to medical treatment, 
sanitary infrastructure, educational, training or rehabilitative programmes. Substandard 
                                                            
22 “In consequence, all situations in which a detainee is deprived of the minimum of 3 m² of personal space 
inside his or her cell, will be regarded as creating a strong indication that Article 3 of the Convention has been 
violated.” Para 123, Orchowski v. Poland, ECHR Application no. 17885/04, Strasbourg, 22 October 2009. 
Article 3 states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
23 Giffard, C. and Muntingh, L. (2006) The effect of sentencing on the size of the South African prison 
population, Cape Town: Open Society Foundation (SA); Steinberg, J. (2005) Prison overcrowding and the 
Constitutional right to adequate accommodation in South Africa, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation; Chung, S.Y. (2000) Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth 
Amendment Violations, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 68 No. 6, pp. 2351-2400. 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss6/9 Accessed 25 November 2011; Liebling, A. and Maruna, S. (eds) 
(2005) The effects of imprisonment, Devon: Willan Publishing. 
24 Chung, S.Y. (2000). 
25 Albrecht, H. (2011) Prison Overcrowding - Finding Effective Solutions. In United Nations Asia and Far East 
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) Report of the Workshop. 
Strategies and Best Practices Against Overcrowding in Correctional Facilities. Twelfth United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Salvador, Brazil, 12-19 April 2010. Tokyo: 
UNAFEI, p. 69. 
26 Albrecht, H. (2011), p. 87. 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
medical services and a generally unhealthy environment places prisoners at an increased risk 
of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis (TB),27 hepatitis (B and C) and HIV, but also 
limits the extent to which transmission prevention policies can be implemented and thus 
places the general population at risk when infected prisoners are released. In general, pre-trial 
detention in overcrowded prisons poses severe health risks.28 Overcrowding and TB is a 
lethal combination, and recent South African research established that at overcrowding levels 
of 230% in communal cells (not uncommon in some prisons), coupled with poor TB case 
identification, results in TB transmission risks of 90% per annum.29 Elevated suicide rates 
have also been associated with overcrowded prisons, as well as higher levels of prison 
violence.
30
 Low staff-to-inmate ratios have implications for personal safety, the 
implementation of visits by families, and the control of contraband. Overcrowding is also 
associated with the overuse of imprisonment (as a sentence and pre-trial option). Young 
males with limited education from socio-economically disadvantaged areas are over-
represented in the prison population, thus reinforcing social inequality. The serving of a 
prison sentence in overcrowded conditions has also been associated with higher rates of 
recidivism and re-entry problems. Furthermore, overcrowding may affect fair trial rights, as 
observed by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which stated: “Where 
conditions of detention are so inadequate as to seriously weaken the pre-trial detainee and 
thereby impair equality, a fair trial is no longer ensured, even if procedural fair-trial 
guarantees are otherwise scrupulously observed.”31  
                                                            
27 In a recent judgment a former awaiting-trial prisoner successfully sued the Minister of Correctional Services 
after he was detained for four years at Pollsmoor Prison, a severely overcrowded prison, and contracted TB 
(Dudley Lee v Minister of Correctional Services, Western Cape High Court, Case No. 10416/04 Unreported 
decision). 
28 Schönteich, K. (2011) Pre-trial detention and health – unintended consequences, deadly results, New York: 
Open Society Foundations. 
29 Johnstone-Robertson, S. et al (2011) Tuberculosis in a South African prison – a transmission modelling 
analysis, South African Medical Journal, Vol. 101, No. 11, p. 809. 
30 The link between violence and overcrowding is not directly causal, and research has found that overcrowding 
creates the environment for other adverse consequences which in turn have a closer link with prison violence. It 
appears that overcrowding is also mediated by inmate turnover, the type of inmate management, and programme 
availability (French, S. and Gendreau, P. (2006). Reducing prison misconducts: what works! Criminal Justice 
and Behaviour, Vol. 33 No.2, p.188). 
31 E/CN.4/2005/6, para 69. 
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Prison overcrowding should thus be understood, first, as threatening to the right to be free 
from torture and other ill treatment; second, as contributing to the legitimacy deficit of the 
prison system; and, third, as foreshadowing consequences for the outside community. The 
2004 White Paper’s narrow analysis of overcrowding obscured the broader impact of prison 
overcrowding. The generalised assertion in the White Paper that overcrowding threatens the 
new core business of the Department fails to unpack the human experience of prison 
overcrowding. Moreover, since the DCS has limited control over the size of the prison 
population, blame for overcrowding is consequently displaced to other stakeholders in the 
criminal justice system, notably the police and the courts. 
3.2 The post-2004 prison population size 
 
At the time that the 2004 White Paper was adopted (May 2004), South Africa’s prisons were 
severely overcrowded. Of the 186 533 prisoners, 57% were detained in prisons that were 
175% or more full. In these prisons the available space per prisoner had been reduced to 
1.9m
2
 per prisoner or less,
32
 which is well below the official norm of 3.344m
2
.
33
 In the 
severely overcrowded prisons (175% or more occupied), 40% of prisoners were awaiting trial 
compared to 27% awaiting-trial prisoners in the total population. By February 2011 the 
situation had improved significantly on a national level. The proportion of prisoners detained 
in severely overcrowded facilities (175% or more full) had dropped to 34% from 57% in 
2004. Moreover, the total prison population declined from 186 533 to 162 162. Awaiting-trial 
prisoners declined marginally from 51 734 to 49 695, or by 3.9%. Nationally, the occupancy 
level had dropped from 162.5% in May 2004 to 137.3% in February 2011, while capacity 
increased with 3 367 new bed spaces.
34
 
The 2004 White Paper proposed a number of measures to reduce prison overcrowding. 
Noteworthy is that these all focused on awaiting-trial prisoners even through the 2004 White 
Paper identified the mandatory minimum sentences as a contributing factor to 
overcrowding.35 These measures were: the planned reduction of the detention cycle time of 
                                                            
32 General calculations such as these obscure the practical situation at ground level. In these prisons it may 
indeed be the case that, as a result of the separation of certain categories of prisoners, the space norm is better 
than 1.9m2 in some cells, but in other cells it may be less.  
33 Standing Orders of the Department of Correctional Services (B-Orders) Order 2 Ch 2 para 2.1. 
34 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. 
35 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
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awaiting-trial detainees; involvement in the Saturday courts project, then operational at 92 
courts countrywide; the establishment of a Departmental Task Team to liaise with a task team 
working on overcrowding within the Security cluster at implementation level; the utilization 
of sections 62(f)
36
 and 63A
37
 of the Criminal Procedure Act by Heads of Prison in court 
applications to facilitate the release of prisoners; and the use of section 81 of the Correctional 
Services Act38 to allow the release, under specific conditions, of awaiting-trial prisoners who 
have been granted bail but could not afford to pay due to the prisoner’s personal social 
circumstances.39 
The results of these proposed measures were less than encouraging. The number of awaiting 
trial prisoners in custody has remained fairly stable since May 2004, and there is no reason to 
conclude that the detention cycle time has decreased40 (see section 12.3 below) or that section 
62(f) has been used more extensively. While section 63A held promise, it appears that it has 
                                                            
36 Section 62(f) allows a court to place a person awaiting trial under correctional supervision as part of his her 
bail conditions. 
37 Section 63A enables a Head of Prison who is of the view that the size of the prison population has taken on 
such proportions that it poses a threat to human dignity, physical health or safety of the prisoners, to apply to a 
court in respect of certain prisoners to have their bail conditions amended or released on warning in lieu of bail. 
The following prisoners could be considered: the person is charged with an offence for which the police could 
have granted bail; the offence is listed under Schedule 7 to the Criminal Procedure Act and there are no other 
charges; and the person has been granted bail but cannot afford to pay it.  
38 81. Special measures for reduction of prison population 
(1) If the Minister is satisfied that the prison population in general or at a particular prison is reaching such 
proportions that the safety, human dignity and physical care of the prisoners are being affected materially the 
matter must be referred to the National Council. 
(2) The National Council may recommend the advancement of the approved date for placement of any 
prisoner or group of prisoners under community corrections and the Minister may act accordingly. 
(3) Community corrections granted in terms of subsection (2) is subject to such conditions as may be 
imposed by the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board under whose jurisdiction the prisoners may fall 
or the Commissioner in terms of section 75 (7). 
(4) In the case of unsentenced prisoners the Minister may release any such prisoner or group of such 
prisoners subject to such conditions as may be determined by the Minister with the concurrence of the 
Minister of Justice. 
39 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) p. 58, para 2.9.3. 
40 At the end of May 2004 there were 21 754 awaiting trial prisoners in custody for longer than three months and 
by February 2011 this figure stood at 23 733. The slight increase is in all likelihood due to the seasonal increase 
after the courts had been in recess over the December–January period. 
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not been successful in facilitating the release of awaiting-trial prisoners due to the apparent 
complicated administrative procedure involved.41 A more likely explanation is that Heads of 
Prison fear litigation should they submit to a court that the conditions in their prison threaten 
the human dignity, safety and health of prisoners. The Saturday courts dealt with significant 
numbers of cases until 2004/5 when the project was discontinued.42 In short, the measures 
proposed in the 2004 White Paper to deal with overcrowding fell flat, save for the section 81 
provision which is discussed below. 
At the beginning of the 2005/6 financial year, the prison population stood at a massive 187 
394 or 163% occupancy. Using section 81 of the Correctional Services Act, the Minister 
sought advice from the National Council on Correctional Services and then approached 
Cabinet with a proposal. Some changes were made by Cabinet and then submitted to the 
President for approval.43 The President ultimately approved a maximum of six months special 
remission of sentence to all prisoners, probationers, parolees and day parolees irrespective of 
the crime committed. A further maximum of 14 months special remission of sentence was 
granted to all prisoners, probationers, parolees and day parolees serving sentences for crimes 
other than aggressive, sexual, fire-arm and drug related crimes.44 The 2005 special remissions 
programme saw the release of nearly 32 000 sentenced prisoners in the latter half of that 
year.
45
 The prison population dropped from more than 187 000 to 157 000 by 31 December 
2005.46 Similar mass releases have been implemented in the past and have been shown 
                                                            
41 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2009) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
2008/9, Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 10. 
42 For example, in 2002/3 the Saturday Courts handled nearly 30 000 cases but by 2004/5 this had declined to 
11751 and the project then officially stopped (National Prosecuting Authority (2006) Annual Report of the 
National Prosecuting Authority 2005/6, Pretoria: National Prosecuting Authority, p. 19.)  
43 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 23 August 2005, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20050822-department-report-special-remissions-briefing Accessed 25 
November 2011. 
44 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 23 August 2005, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20050822-department-report-special-remissions-briefing Accessed 25 
November 2011. 
45 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2006) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
2005/6, Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 4. Department of Correctional Services (2006) Annual 
Report 2005/6, Pretoria: Department of Correctional Services p. 14.  
46Office of the Inspecting Judge (2006), p. 4. 
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domestically and internationally to have a short-lived impact on reducing overcrowding.
47
 
However, contrary to previous experiences with mass releases, the total prison population did 
not bounce back to previous levels, but increased only marginally by 3% from December 
2005 till February 2011. This requires closer analysis. 
The simple reason for the stabilisation of the prison population is that fewer prisoners, 
sentenced and unsentenced, were being admitted to prison, as shown in Figure 4 below. From 
2004/5 to 2010/11, sentenced admissions declined by 51% and unsentenced admissions by 
18%. At least two factors seem to have contributed to this. First, notwithstanding concerns 
about reported crime statistics, there had been a notable decline in the number of violent 
crimes reported.48 Second, apart from spikes in 2008/9 and 2009/10, the total number of 
prosecutions in all three tiers of the criminal justice system has been in decline. For example, 
from 2004/5 to 2010/11 the number of cases finalised49 by the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) declined by 13%, or just more than 50 000 cases.50 Figure 1 clearly shows a 
correlation between the number of cases finalised by the NPA and the number of sentenced 
admissions to DCS.  
                                                            
47 Dissel, A. and Ellis, S. (2002) Reform and stasis: Transformation in South African prisons, Johannesburg: 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Albrecht, H. (2011),  p. 106. 
48 Reported crimes for the following categories, as collected by SAPS, were used to create the index: murder, 
attempted murder, aggravated robbery, and all sexual and assault with intention to cause grievous bodily harm 
(SAPS crime statistics http://www.issafrica.org/crimehub/pgcontent.php?UID=1000062 Accessed 28 November 
2011).  
49 These are cases with a verdict and exclude diverted cases. 
50 National Prosecuting Authority Annual Reports 2004/5 to 2010/11. 
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Figure 1 
. 
 
The overall picture is thus that the prison population has stabilised and overcrowding been 
alleviated. But this was unexpected and unplanned: it was not the result of any particular 
intervention on the part of the government. The combined effect of a reduction in reported 
(violent) crimes and a reduction in the number of sentenced and unsentenced people admitted 
to prison has ensured that the prison population did not quickly return to previous levels, as 
has historically been the case with amnesties and remissions. There is, however, good reason 
to believe that efficiency and efficacy problems in the criminal justice system also account 
for the decline in sentenced admissions. It remains the case that only a small proportion of 
violent crimes are successfully prosecuted. For example, it is estimated that a suspect is tried 
in court in only one-third of all contact crimes51 and then there is a further attrition at that 
stage too. 
It can thus be accepted that even if overcrowding had not been resolved entirely after 2005 
and that many prisons remain occupied above capacity, the negative effects of overcrowding 
on the prison system should have declined. The level of overcrowding had been reduced 
substantially and had thus created an environment more conducive for implementing the 
policies emanating from the 2004 White Paper. Crime levels remain unacceptably high, and 
                                                            
51 SA Police Services (2011) Annual Report 2010/11, Pretoria: SA Police Services p. 9. 
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if efficiency and effectiveness in the criminal justice system were to improve markedly, 
specifically crime solving and prosecution services, there may indeed be an increase in the 
number of people being admitted to prison again. For the foreseeable future it remains the 
case that the overwhelming majority
52
 of prisoners will continue to be detained in conditions 
in which they have less personal space available to them than legally permitted by the 
Department’s Standing Orders (i.e. 3.344m2). More specifically, once the space norm is 
reduced to less than 3m
2
 per prisoner it must serve as a strong indication of a possible 
violation of the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
4. Deaths in custody 
 
The Correctional Services Act, in section 15, sets out the requirements for dealing with 
prisoner deaths. All deaths in custody must be reported to the Office of the Inspecting Judge 
by the Heads of Prisons; this information forms part of a collection of mandatory reports to 
be made to the Inspecting Judge, who may then conduct, or instruct the National 
Commissioner to conduct, an investigation into the death. The obligation to inform the next 
of kin of the deceased prisoner rests with the Head of Prison. In the event that a medical 
practitioner cannot certify that the death was due to natural causes, the Head of Prison must 
report such a death in terms of section 2 of the Inquests Act (58 of 1959). It has been the 
practice of DCS to report, in its Annual Reports, on deaths due to both natural and unnatural 
causes, with the latter referring to murders, accidents and suicides. The following subsections 
will deal with both natural and unnatural deaths. In respect of deaths due to natural causes, 
particular attention is paid to HIV and AIDS, the occurrence of deaths over time, and medical 
parole. It will be argued that little action had been taken to prevent natural deaths and that 
when prisoners become terminally ill, the provisions for medical parole remain severely 
underutilized. 
 
4.1 Deaths due to natural causes 
 
                                                            
52 On a national level, 86% of prisoners are detained in prisons that are occupied more than 100% (Statistics 
made available by the Judicial Inspectorate of Correctional Services). 
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4.1.1 Overall trends and HIV and AIDS 
 
Figure 2 below shows the number of reported deaths due to natural causes from 1996/7 to 
2010/11. It is evident that the number of deaths increased rapidly from a low base of 211 in 
1996/7 and reached a peak in 2004/5 of 1 689 deaths; thereon it declined steadily, and by 
2010/11 had reached a ten-year low. Although the HIV-status of deceased prisoners is not 
disclosed in the available reports, it is commonly accepted that the rapid increase of deaths 
due to natural causes was the result of HIV and AIDS.53 A sample of death certificates 
studied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services found that the main causes of 
death indicated on the certificates were TB, respiratory failure, pneumonia and right 
ventricular dysplasia (RVD). TB and pneumonia are strongly associated with AIDS deaths in 
prisons.54 
 
HIV prevalence appears to be slightly higher amongst prisoners than the general South 
African population, a pattern consistent with findings in other parts of the world.55 A 2006 
DCS-commissioned HIV/AIDS and syphilis prevalence survey amongst sentenced prisoners 
found that 19.8% were HIV-positive, slightly above the national infection rate of 16.25%.56 
Furthermore, of the prisoners who tested HIV-positive, nearly 60% were below the age of 35 
years and the highest infection rate (46.6%) was in the 26-35 year age-category. The results 
of the 2006 survey indicated that the HIV infection rate in the prison population is much 
closer to the infection rate in the general population, and earlier estimates by Goyer and Gow 
that as many as 60% of prisoners may be HIV-positive57 were shown to be unfounded. This 
lower-than-expected prevalence rate may suggest that the primary mode of infection is 
through unsafe sex prior to entering prison rather than sexual contact within prison.
58
 
                                                            
53 Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009) HIV/Aids and the prison system, in Rohleder, P. Et al (eds) HIV/Aids in 
South Africa 25 years on London: Springer, pp. 305-321. 
54 Egamberdi, N. (2010) HIV and Prisons in sub-Saharan Africa: opportunities for action, Vienna: UNODC, p. 
2. 
55 Egamberdi, N. (2010), p. 1. 
56 Department of Correctional Services. (2008 b) Unlinked, anonymous HIV and syphilis surveillance study 
among staff employed by, and offenders in the custody of, the Department of Correctional Services in South 
Africa. Pretoria: Lim’Uvune Consulting. 
57 Goyer, K.C. and Gow, J. (2001).Confronting HIV/AIDS in South African prisons. Politikon, 28(2), 195-206. 
58 UNODC (2006) HIV/AIDS Prevention, Care, Treatment and Support in Prison Settings – A Framework for 
an Effective National Response, Vienna: UNODC/WHO/UNAIDS. 
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Figure 2 
 
The substantial decline in the number of deaths after 2004/5 has not been studied 
independently and a possible explanation is presented here. First, the special remission of 
sentence programme in 2005 (discussed above in section 3.2) saw the release of nearly 32 
000 sentenced prisoners. This consequently removed them from the possibility of dying in 
prison regardless of their state of health or HIV-status. Second, the reduction in the prison 
population undoubtedly eased the overcrowding situation, and the level of occupation after 
the 2005 remission has by and large been maintained (as was discussed above in section 3.2). 
In short, less crowded prisons make for healthier prisoners and a reduced risk of especially 
pneumatic infections such as TB. Third, after the EN and Others decision in the KwaZulu-
Natal High Court (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, section 2.2.3), the DCS took a 
number of steps to address HIV and AIDS amongst prisoners. It established accredited ARV 
sites, and by 2009/10 there were 21 such sites in the DCS.59 The number of prisoners on 
ARV increased rapidly from 2 323 in 2006/7 to 7 640 in 2009/10, although this figure 
dropped to 4 427 the following year.60 Since 2006/7 large numbers of prisoners (in excess of 
40 000 per year) also received information on voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) and a 
                                                            
59 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a) Annual Report 2009/10, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 75. 
60 DCS Annual Reports for the relevant years. 
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substantial share of them (approximately 10 000 per annum) were tested.
61
 Even though 
stigma remains associated with the disease and its treatment62 and the Department admits that 
it underestimated the ARV uptake,63 the overall impression gained is that notable advances 
have been made in reducing prisoner deaths due to AIDS after 2006. Regrettably, the DCS 
only commenced with these steps once it was taken to court and compelled to implement the 
relevant policies making ARV available to qualifying prisoners. 
4.1.2 Distribution of deaths over time 
 
Prisoner deaths due to natural causes are not spread evenly across the duration of 
imprisonment. The Judicial Inspectorate has undertaken two analyses of trends in 2006/7 and 
2010/11, respectively, and the results are presented in Figure 3 below. The 2006/7 sample 
found that 70% of deaths occurred cumulatively after four years in custody. The 2010/11 
sample found that this level was reached after only two years in custody.  
 
Figure 3 
 
                                                            
61 For example, in 2010/11 more than 53 000 prisoners received VCT and 10 226 were tested (Department of 
Correctional Services (2011 a) Annual Report 2010/11, Pretoria: Department of Correctional Services, p. 56). 
62 Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009). 
63 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a) p. 56. 
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While the total number of deaths had declined significantly, it appears that the time lapse to 
death has also shortened significantly. Regardless of an exact explanation for this trend, it 
appears that people are admitted to prisons with a compromised health status (not only arising 
from HIV infection but also as a consequence of asthma, tuberculosis, diabetes and other 
illnesses) and that, due to inadequate health care services in the prisons, superficial health 
status examinations and unhealthy detention conditions, the state of health of many prisoners 
deteriorates rapidly, leading to their death after a relatively short period in custody. Basic 
health care facilities are also absent from a number prisons, as was found by the Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services in an infrastructure audit conducted in 2007/8.64 A 
further indication of the quality of health care is the alarming volume of complaints lodged 
by prisoners with the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services regarding health care – 
these amounted to nearly 40 000 in 2010/11.65 The reduction in the number of natural deaths 
should therefore not be interpreted as a sign that the prison health care system is in a good 
state. There is reason to conclude that a sizeable portion of deaths due to natural causes are 
indeed preventable through improved health care services, improved access to health care and 
proper health status examinations, as required by the Correctional Services Act.  
 
4.1.3 Medical parole 
 
Prior to being amended in 2011 by Act 5 of 2011, the Correctional Services Act (11 of 1998) 
made provision for the release on medical parole of a terminally ill sentenced prisoner who is 
in the final phase of an illness or condition so that he would be able to die a dignified and 
                                                            
64 The following prisons, from a sample of 93 inspected, were found to be without any health care infrastructure 
or health-care personnel: Brits; Rustenburg Medium B; Bergville; Estcourt; Kranskop; Empangeni; Ingavuma; 
Melmoth; Mtunzini; Nkandla; Mafikeng; Brandfort; Bethulie; Lindley; Victoria West; Zastron; and Drakenstein 
Medium A (Office of the Inspecting Judge (2008) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate 2007/8, Cape 
Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 19.). Sifunda, S., Reddy, P. et al (2006) Access point analysis on the 
state of health care services in South African prisons: A qualitative exploration of correctional health care 
workers’ and inmates’ perspectives in Kwazulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, Social Science & Medicine,Vol.63 pp. 
2301–2309. 
65 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2011) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate 2010/11, Cape Town: Office 
of the Inspecting Judge, p. 33. 
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consolatory death.
66
 However, medical parole became embroiled in controversy for two 
reasons, both of which call the decision-making procedure into doubt. First, although the 
number of prisoners dying of natural causes soared, as shown above in Figure 2, the number 
of prisoners released on medical parole remained, with one exception in 2007, less than 100 
per year.67 The vast discrepancy between the number of deaths due to natural causes and the 
number of medical parole releases raised questions about its application. In 2008/9 the 
Judicial Inspectorate established that, based on a sample of deaths due to natural causes, 86% 
of deceased prisoners were receiving medical treatment at the time of death and that the 
seriousness of their medical condition was thus known to the DCS. However, only 14% of 
them were considered for medical parole, and all passed away before the process was 
finalised.68 Civil society organisations, the Judicial Inspectorate and the Portfolio Committee 
on Correctional Services were deeply concerned about the apparent underutilisation of 
medical parole.69 Despite questioning from external stakeholders, the Department had not 
been able to provide a satisfactory explanation for the discrepancy between natural deaths 
and medical parole releases. Nonetheless, the overall impression was that the DCS was slow 
to initiate the application process for medical parole. The reluctance of the DCS to initiate the 
process of medical parole, coupled with the parole boards’ own interpretation of how to apply 
the law, contributed to the discrepancy.  
This was well illustrated in the Stanfield decision.70 The applicant was denied medical parole 
even though diagnosed with a terminal lung cancer for which no further treatment was 
                                                            
66 s 79 “Any person serving any sentence in a prison and who, based on the written evidence of the medical 
practitioner treating that person, is diagnosed as being in the final phase of any terminal disease or condition 
may be considered for placement under correctional supervision or on parole, by the Commissioner, 
Correctional Supervision and Parole Board or the court, as the case may be, to die a consolatory and dignified 
death.”  
67 CSPRI submission to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services regarding deaths in prison and 
medical parole, PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services of 5 August 
2008, http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080805-briefing-south-african-human-rights-commissioncivil-society-
prison-re Accessed 10 January 2012. Office of the Inspecting Judge (2009) p. 26. 
68Office of the Inspecting Judge (2009) pp. 24-25. 
69 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 12 August 2008, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080812-medical-parole-minister-and-department-correctional-
services%E2%80%99-report Accessed 31 December 2011. 
70
Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services and Others [2003] ZAWCHC 46; [2003] 4 All SA 282 (C) (12 
September. 
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available and having, according to the treating physicians, limited life expectancy. He turned 
to the Cape High Court after the parole board refused to release him on medical parole. 
According to the parole board, he was not visibly sick, was able to take care of himself, and, 
above all, continued to smoke. The Court placed the emphasis on the right to dignity and was 
most displeased with the parole board’s handling of the case: 
The third respondent’s failure to respect the applicant’s inherent right to human dignity 
came to the fore, firstly, in his assessment of the applicant’s physical condition for 
purposes of section 69 of the [1959] Act. By restricting his understanding of such 
condition to the applicant’s external or outward appearance, which is clearly only 
temporary and will undoubtedly undergo a radical change in the near future, the third 
respondent chose to ignore, or downplay, the fact that he is suffering from an 
inoperable and incurable disease that will inevitably cause his death within a few 
months. To insist that he remain incarcerated until he has become visibly debilitated 
and bedridden can by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as humane treatment in 
accordance with his inherent dignity. On the contrary, the overriding impression gained 
from the third respondent’s attitude in this regard is that the applicant must lose his 
dignity before it is recognised and respected.71 
 
In 2009 the second controversy emerged. Mr. Schabir Shaik, the former financial advisor to 
then Deputy President Jacob Zuma, was convicted of fraud and corruption in June 2005 and 
sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, but was 
unsuccessful and started serving his term of imprisonment in November 2006.72 However, 
shortly thereafter he reportedly developed health problems and was transferred to a private 
medical facility.
73
 Here he remained until 3 March 2009, when he was released on medical 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2003) 
71Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services and Others [2003] ZAWCHC 46; [2003] 4 All SA 282 (C) (12 
September 2003), para 124. 
72 ‘Cell doors clang shut for Shaik’ IOL, 9 November 2006, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/cell-doors-
clang-shut-for-shaik-1.302477 Accessed 12 January 2012. 
73 ‘Shaik still being treated at hospital’ IOL, 15 December 2006, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/shaik-
still-being-treated-at-hospital-1.307658 Accessed 12 January 2012. 
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parole.
74
 In effect he served two years and four months of his 15-year prison term, and most 
of that in a private medical facility.75 His release provoked an uproar from the public and the 
media; given his close connections with the ANC leadership, political interference was 
suspected. His behaviour while supposedly terminally ill (e.g. playing golf, being seen at his 
favourite restaurant, and allegedly assaulting a journalist) added fuel to the flames of 
speculation that the decision to release him had been subject to political manipulation. 
Regardless of numerous calls for a review of the decision, investigations by the media, and 
Shaik’s own misbehaviour, his medical parole was not revoked, although he was briefly 
detained in 2011.76 The Shaik saga placed the entire medical parole system under suspicion. 
As the events unfolded, a firm impression was created in the public mind that medical parole 
is a remote possibility for ordinary prisoners who are terminally ill but an open avenue for a 
politically connected élite seeking to avoid imprisonment. 
In 2011 the provisions in the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 dealing with medical 
parole were amended to broaden its scope and also set out the relevant procedure.77 The 
changes were in all likelihood prompted by the Shaik case. The originally narrow scope for 
medical parole (i.e. the prisoner being in the final phase of any terminal illness or condition)78 
was extended to include a sentenced prisoner “suffering from a terminal disease or condition 
or if such offender is rendered physically incapacitated as a result of injury, disease or illness 
so as to severely limit daily activity or inmate self-care”.79 Sentenced prisoners therefore need 
not be in the “final phase” of a terminal illness or condition, but merely suffering from a 
                                                            
74 ‘Shaik walks free’ IOL, 3 March 2009, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/shaik-walks-free-1.436176 
Accessed 12 January 2012. 
75 Although the Correctional Services Act (s 12(3)) provides that a prisoner can consult with and be treated by 
his private medical practitioner at his own cost, the Act does not provide for or prohibit that he be transferred to 
a private medical facility. The Standing Orders (Order 3, Chapter 3) also does not provide for a situation where 
a prisoner offers to pay for his residence at a private medical facility. Provision is, however, made for a situation 
in which there is no space available at a public hospital and where a transfer to a private facility can be arranged; 
in this case, the transfer will be at state expense. 
76 ‘Shaik to be released on Wednesday’ IOL, 16 March 2011, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-
natal/shaik-to-be-released-on-wednesday-1.1042708. 
77 The amended provisions were not yet in operation at the time of writing (December 2011).  
78 Mujuzi, J. (2009) Releasing Terminally Ill Prisoners on Medical Parole in South Africa. South African 
Journal of Bioethics and Law, Vol. 2 No. 2.; Muntingh, L. (2006) Medical parole: prisoners’ means to access 
anti-retroviral treatment, AIDS Law Quarterly, Vol. 10, pp. 8-10. 
79 s 79 (1)(a). 
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terminal illness or condition. The scope is further broadened by including sentenced prisoners 
who can no longer take care of themselves due to illness, disease or injury; however, there is 
no requirement that the condition must be terminal. This provision, for example, would deal 
with sentenced prisoners who had become physically disabled during imprisonment. The 
amendment also sets out a procedure for addressing unsentenced prisoners who had become 
terminally ill or incapacitated, one requiring the Head of Prison to make an application to the 
relevant court to amend the bail conditions of the prisoner.
80
 
While the amendment broadened the scope of medical parole, it also introduced a new 
criterion which could possibly restrict it again, namely, the risk of reoffending upon release.81 
The risk should be assessed against a number of factors, these being, “amongst others”:82 
whether the presiding officer was aware of the medical condition for which medical parole is 
being sought; any remarks by the presiding officer; the type of offence(s) and the balance of 
the sentence remaining; the previous criminal record83 and any of the factors applicable to 
any sentenced prisoner being considered for parole.84 A further requirement of the amended 
section 79 is that there should be appropriate arrangements for supervision, care and 
treatment of the medical parolee in the community.85 Section 79(2) places the onus firmly on 
the prisoner (himself, his doctor or family member) to initiate the application process for 
medical parole according to specified procedural requirements. Prior to the amendment there 
was no direction in this regard.86 
                                                            
80 s 49F Act 5 of 2011. 
81 s 79(1)(b). 
82 The amended section 79 prefaces the list of factors to be considered with the words “amongst others”, and 
hence it does not limit the factors to be considered by those listed in the amended section 79.  
83 s 79(5). 
84 These are: the offence or offences for which the prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment together with the 
judgment on the merits and any remarks made by the sentencing court in question at the time of the imposition 
of sentence if made available to the Department; the previous criminal record of such prisoner; the conduct, 
disciplinary record, adaptation, training, aptitude, industry, physical and mental state of such prisoner; and the 
likelihood of a relapse into crime, the risk posed to the community and the manner in which this risk can be 
reduced. If the prisoner had been declared a habitual criminal, there should be a reasonable probability that the 
prisoner will in future abstain from crime and lead a useful and industrious life, or the prisoner is no longer 
capable of engaging in crime, or for any other reason, it is desirable to place the prisoner on parole (s 42(2)(d)). 
85 s 79(1)(c). 
86 Muntingh, L. and Ballard, C. (2011 a) Correctional Matters Amendment Bill (41 of 2010), CSPRI Newsletter, 
No. 38, June. 
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It appears, then, that the amended section 79 makes it even more difficult for a prisoner to be 
released on medical parole, since it combines the health status of the offender, the risk of re-
offending and penal concerns.87 This framework is at odds with the Stanfield decision,88 
which found that the central issue when considering medical parole is the right to dignity of 
the prisoner which is non-derogable; it also found that any limitation must comply with the 
requirements in the limitations clause of the Constitution.89 The Stanfield court found that 
other concerns are subservient to the right to dignity, such as the length of sentence remaining 
or the seriousness of the offence. The amended section 79 was, at the time of writing 
(December 2011), not yet operational, but for the reasons set out above its constitutionality is 
open to challenge since it clearly goes against the Stanfield decision.  
 
4.2 Deaths due to unnatural causes 
 
Deaths due to unnatural causes refer to murders, accidents and suicides. Until the publication 
of the 2009/10 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, very 
little was known about the profile of these deaths (e.g. proportional distribution between 
suicides, accidents and murders) because only an aggregate figure was reported by the DCS 
in its Annual Reports. The Judicial Inspectorate’s Annual Reports for 2009/10 and 2010/11 
provided more detailed information on 103 of these deaths.
90
 The causes of death are 
summarised in Table 1 below. Just over 60% of unnatural deaths were due to suicide, with 
the overwhelming majority of these caused hanging. Homicides constitute a third, and this is 
equally distributed between three subcategories, namely, homicide by a prisoner, by an 
official, and by prisoners and officials.91 
Table 1 
Cause of death Percentage 
All suicide 60.2 
                                                            
87 Muntingh, L. and Ballard, C. (2011 a). 
88 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services and Others () [2003] ZAWCHC 46; [2003] 4 All SA 282 (C) (12 
September 2003). 
89 s 36. 
90 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate 2009/10, Cape Town: Office 
of the Inspecting Judge, pp. 59-76. Office of the Inspecting Judge (2011) pp. 57-75. 
91 The latter category usually refers to instances in which officials intervened in fights between inmates but 
acted with excessive force and, in so doing, inflicted fatal injuries.  
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Accidents 3.9 
Homicide by inmate 11.7 
Homicide by inmates and officials 9.7 
Homicide official only  8.7 
Other 1.9 
Unknown 3.9 
 
Suicides and other forms of self-harm have been studied extensively elsewhere
92
 but remain 
severely understudied in South Africa, with the result that only the most rudimentary data are 
available. Of the 62 suicide cases, it was known in 55% of the cases that the prisoner posed a 
suicide risk, which indicates that officials either failed to take suicide threats and personal 
circumstances seriously, or were not able or willing to respond appropriately to the situation. 
Of the prisoners who committed suicide by hanging, half did so after eight or less months in 
custody, indicating that this is a critical period for self-harm.  
 
At policy level, there is little to indicate that suicide prevention is a priority for the 
Department, save for a brief mention in the 2010/11 Annual Report noting the need to review 
“current strategies”.93 The current strategies presumably refer to the Standing Orders, which 
deal with suicide prevention in an elementary manner
94
 but nonetheless provide the basis for 
an effective response.95 Since more than half of all successful suicides were known to pose a 
suicide risk, it seems more likely that the requirements in the Standing Orders were either not 
complied with at all or complied with only in part. 
 
The capacity of the DCS to deal with prisoners’ mental health, especially those exhibiting 
serious behavioural problems, is severely constrained by the lack of psychologists. At the end 
of the 2010/11 financial year, more than half of the funded posts (113 in total) were vacant; in 
other words, there was effectively one psychologist for every 2 900 prisoners.96 That being 
said, the responsibility to prevent suicides and other forms of self-harm rests with all 
                                                            
92 Liebling, A. and Maruna, S. (eds) (2005). 
93 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a) p. 48. 
94 For comparative purposes see: World Health Organisation (2000) Preventing suicide - a resource for prison 
officers, Geneva: Mental and Behavioural Disorders, Department of Mental Health, World Health Organization. 
95 Department of Correctional Services, B-Order 2: Chapter 6 – Section duties, Section 19 - Combating Suicide 
among ‘Prisoners’. 
96 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a) p. 202. 
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custodial staff, as acknowledged in the Standing Orders, and is not the sole preserve of the 
few psychologists employed by the Department. 
 
In respect of the homicide cases involving officials, there had not been a single criminal 
prosecution at the time that the Judicial Inspectorate published the two relevant Annual 
Reports.97 Even though the descriptions provided in the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional 
Services annual reports are brief, a number of traits are clear.
98
 The deaths implicating 
officials were the result of aggravated assaults inflicted either as punishment or in retaliation 
for an assault on an official. It also appears that these assaults were committed by groups of 
officials on single prisoners. In several of the cases it was noted by the Judicial Inspectorate 
that the assaults continued after the prisoner was subdued and/or the situation stabilised, thus 
exceeding the use of minimum force requirements in the Correctional Services Act.99 The 
most common weapon used by officials was a baton, but prisoners were also subjected to 
kicks, teargas and electroshock equipment.100 In a number of cases the deceased was denied 
prompt medical attention even though the Correctional Services Act is clear that any prisoner 
who is subjected to the use of force must immediately undergo a medical examination.101 It is 
also apparent that when disciplinary action was taken against officials, the proceedings took 
                                                            
97 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010), Office of the Inspecting Judge (2011). 
98 Submission by CSPRI to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, PMG Report on the meeting of 
the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 30 November 2011. 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111130-stakeholder-hearings-prevalence-torture-correctional-centres Accessed 
21 December 2011. 
99 s 32 of the Correctional Services Act. 
100 The appropriateness of having and using electroshock equipment in prisons is increasingly under question. 
(Omega Research Foundation and the Institute for Security studies (2011) Submission on the Prevalence of 
Torture in Correctional Centres, Jointly Submitted to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, PMG 
Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 30 November 2011. 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111130-stakeholder-hearings-prevalence-torture-correctional-centres Accessed 
21 December 2011.) 
101 s 32(5) of the Correctional Services Act. 
 
 
 
 
287 
 
extremely long to be finalised, that the charges were inappropriate,
102
 and that the sanctions 
imposed were light.103 
The overall trends described above with reference to suicides and homicides give little reason 
for optimism as the current situation foments a culture of indifference and impunity. The 
Department has also not provided an adequate explanation for the lack of suicide prevention 
initiatives or the failure to investigate deaths properly. Notwithstanding domestic104 and 
international legal obligations
105
 to investigate deaths in custody, homicides implicating 
officials reveal a pattern in which investigations are slow, disciplinary charges minor, 
sanctions imposed light, and criminal prosecutions unlikely.  
5. Assaults and torture 
 
South Africa does not have legislation criminalising torture, as required by Article 4 of the 
UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT), and this remains a notable failure of compliance 
with the Convention. Assaults on, and torture of, prisoners are disturbingly common in South 
Africa’s prisons, yet the DCS has failed to deal with them appropriately. DCS Annual 
Reports, as well as the Annual Reports of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, 
have dutifully noted the number of assaults reported by prisoners, be these perpetrated by 
officials or fellow prisoners. For example, in 2009/10 a total of 2 189 complaints were lodged 
by prisoners with the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, alleging assault by an 
                                                            
102 Even though little information is provided on the charges against implicated DCS officials, it appears that 
these are lesser charges such as misconduct, disregarding security rules, negligence, falsifying registers and 
altering the scene of a crime.  
103 The following sanctions were imposed in respect of the cases reported in 2009/10: one month suspended 
without pay – 8 officials; final written warning – 4 officials; written warning – 2 officials; demotion – 1official; 
and dismissal – 1 official.  
104 Inquest Act 58 of 1959. 
105 UNCAT Article 12: “Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and 
impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed 
in any territory under its jurisdiction.” UNCAT Article 13: “Each State Party shall ensure that any individual 
who alleges he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to 
and to have his case promptly and impartially examined its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure 
that the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his 
complaint or any evidence given.” 
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official on a prisoner.
106
 For the same period the DCS reported that 317 assaults per 10 000 
prisoners (or in excess of 5 000 assaults) were recorded, although this figure is not 
disaggregated and therefore includes inter-prisoner violence.107 Despite the high number of 
reported assaults, few officials were subject to disciplinary procedures in connection with 
assaults.108 However, prisoners and former prisoners increasingly direct themselves to the 
courts for relief, and by end of the 2010/11 financial year the Department’s financial 
statements reflected contingent liabilities amounting to a colossal R976 million (US$ 143.5 
million) as a result of claims alleging “Bodily Injury/Assault”.109 Moreover, the number of 
claims against the Department increased by 43% from 2009/10 to 2010/11, a third of these 
claims being for assault.
110
 
 
Allegations of torture have also attracted the attention of the UN Committee against Torture 
(CAT). In response to South Africa’s initial report required under UN Convention against 
Torture (UNCAT),111 it expressed concern in 2006 about the high number of deaths in 
detention as well as the growing number of allegations of torture and ill treatment.
112
 The 
Committee was concerned, too, about the lack of investigation of the alleged ill-treatment of 
detainees and with the apparent impunity of law enforcement personnel. CAT also requested 
additional information from the South African government to be submitted within 12 months; 
this information did not materialise, and nor did the next periodic report, which was due on 
31 December 2009.113 
 
In 2006, when CAT was assessing South Africa’s initial report, it was informed of an 
incident at St Albans prison (Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape) in July 2005, during which 
                                                            
106 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2011) p. 37. 
107 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a) p. 47. 
108 In 2010/11 a total of 208 officials faced disciplinary action under the category ‘Assault, attempt or threatens 
to assault, another employee or person while on duty’. (Department of Correctional Services (2011 a) p. 222). 
109 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a) p. 193. 
110 Department of Correctional Services (2011 c) Annual Litigation trends analysis report – 1 April 2010 until 
31 March 2011. Report presented to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on 18 October 2011.  
111 CAT/C/52/Add.3; HRI/CORE/1/Add. 92 
112 CAT/C/ZAF/CO/1 para 20. 
113 Report status by country: South Africa 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/NewhvVAllSPRByCountry?OpenView&Start=1&Count=250&Expand=162.
1#162.1 Accessed 3 December 2011.  
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officials staged a mass assault on prisoners, reportedly in retaliation for the fatal stabbing of a 
warder.114 In deliberations with CAT, the South African government evaded the allegations 
and stated that, as the matter was subject to a civil claim, it was sub judice.115 The mass 
assault was particularly brutal.
116
 In its aftermath, the prisoners were denied access to medical 
treatment as well as legal representation. The latter was remedied only after a successful High 
Court application.117  
 
One prisoner, a Mr. McCullum, assisted by legal counsel, made numerous attempts to have 
the mass assault investigated and to seek relief. These efforts amounted to nothing, and he 
subsequently directed an individual complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC). 
                                                            
114 Muntingh, L. and Fernandez, L. (2006) Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI) submission to the UN 
Committee Against Torture in response to ‘Republic Of South Africa – First Country Report on the 
implementation of the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment’, Bellville: Community Law Centre, para 57. 
115 CAT/C/SR.739 para 57. 
116 The following is an extract from the decision by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) in the 
McCullum matter and describes the events at St Albans prison: On 17 July 2005, the author [McCallum], 
together with the other inmates of his cell, were ordered to leave their cell while being insulted by Warder P. 
When the author inquired about the reason, the warder hit him with a baton on his upper left arm and left side 
of his head. A second warder, M., intervened and forcibly removed the author’s shirt. In the corridor, Warder 
M. kicked the author from behind causing him to fall on the ground. The warder then requested that the author 
remove his pants and forced him on the ground, which caused a dislocation of his jaw and his front teeth. In the 
corridor, there were about 40 to 50 warders in uniform. The author recognized five of them. They beat inmates 
indiscriminately and demanded that they strip naked and lie on the wet floor of the corridor. Warder P. 
requested that the inmates lie in a line with their faces in the inner part of the anus of the inmate lying in front of 
them. Around 60 to 70 inmates were lying naked on the floor of the wet corridor building a chain of human 
bodies. Inmates who looked up were beaten with batons and kicked. Around 20 female warders were present 
and walked over the inmates, kicking them into their genitals and making mocking remarks about their private 
parts. Thereafter, the inmates were sprayed with water, beaten by the warders with batons, shock boards, 
broomsticks, pool cues and pickaxe handles. They were also ordered to remove their knives from their anus. As 
a result of the shock and fear, inmates urinated and defecated on themselves and on those linked to them in the 
human chain. At some point, Warder P. approached the author and while insulting him, he inserted a baton into 
the author’s anus. When the author tried to crawl away, the warder stepped on his back forcing him to lie down 
on the floor. The author still experiences flashbacks of what he felt like rape. Meanwhile, some of the warders 
went into the cells and took some of the inmate’s belongings. Thereafter, the inmates were ordered to return to 
their cells. This however created chaos, as the floor was wet with water, urine, faeces and blood and some 
inmates fell over each other. (CCPR/C/100/D/1818/2008) 
117‘Court victory for St Alban’s prisoners’. The Herald, 24 April 2006. 
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On 2 November 2010 the HRC released its decision, finding that his right to be free from 
torture, as protected by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), had been violated.118 Even though the decision attracted some media attention, the 
DCS did not respond at the time. However, nearly a year later, when the matter was brought 
to the attention of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services by the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), the DCS did respond.119 It placed an advertorial in the 
major newspapers claiming that the Department had not been given the opportunity to 
respond, and that if they had been, the outcome may have been different. This was, of course, 
untrue, as the HRC had on five occasions invited the South African government to 
respond.
120
 Nonetheless, government gave the undertaking that the investigation will be 
reopened.121 The Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services subsequently took up the 
broader issue of torture and held public hearings on the prevalence of torture in November 
2011, a step indicating some growing awareness of the absolute prohibition of torture.122 
 
The McCullum decision is significant for a number of reasons, since it developed into a small 
crisis and pointed to numerous failures in the safeguards for protecting prisoners. First, it 
demonstrated the shambolic nature of the government’s internal systems for communicating 
and coordinating with treaty monitoring bodies. If the failure to cooperate with the HRC were 
a deliberate one, it reeks of malfeasance.123 Second, the Department’s actions since South 
                                                            
118 ICCPR Art 7. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation. 
119 Telephonic interview with Ms J. Cohen, SA Human Rights Commission, Parliamentary Programme, 3 
December 2011. 
120 CCPR/C/100/D/1818/2008 para 4. 
121 Response by South African Government to the findings of the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 
the matter of McCullum, 29 September 2011. Statement by Department of Correctional Services, issued by 
Government Communication Service 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=21945&tid=44442 Accessed 21 October 
2011. 
122 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 30 November 
2011,http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111130-stakeholder-hearings-prevalence-torture-correctional-centres 
Accessed 28 December 2011. 
123 At the time of writing, the DCS was embroiled in a class action of 231 prisoners and former prisoners who 
were the victims of the St Albans mass assault. The DCS was evidently frustrating all efforts at redress and the 
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Africa ratified UNCAT in 1998 reflect an attitude of indifference to the broader issue of 
torture. Notwithstanding the White Paper’s repeated references to prisoners’ constitutional 
rights (one of which is the right to be free from torture), little evidence exists that the DCS 
has taken any tangible steps to prevent and reduce assaults by officials on prisoners. Third, at 
policy level there is still no policy on the prevention and eradication of torture in the DCS, 
and the concept of torture has not yet entered the Department’s terminology. Fourth, instead 
of holding perpetrators of torture accountable and ensuring their criminal prosecution (even if 
on assault and attempted murder charges), the DCS leadership has rather opted to shield them 
from prosecution and create obstacles for victims seeking redress. With reference to the 
McCullum case, the DCS senior management was already aware of the incident by 2006, 
disclosing as much to CAT, but failed to address the issues at hand. Fifth, when the 
McCullum case was reported to various institutions (e.g. SAPS and the Judicial Inspectorate 
for Correctional Services), there was a general failure to respond and investigate. It is 
unknown whether this was due to a lack of willingness or lack of capacity to investigate the 
allegation. Nonetheless, the McCullum case demonstrated the institutional and systemic 
failure to deal with allegations of torture in a manner that is compliant with Articles 12 and 
13 of UNCAT. 
 
The absence of legislation criminalising torture, combined with the Department’s poor 
response to allegations of torture and ill treatment, have left prisoners vulnerable to violations 
in this regard. Notwithstanding the absolute prohibition of torture and the high number of 
alleged assaults reported annually to the Department and the Judicial Inspectorate, there is 
little evidence to indicate that the Department has taken any meaningful and tangible steps to 
abide by its obligation to promote and protect the constitutional right of prisoners to be free 
from torture and other ill treatment.  
6. The mandatory reports to the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional 
Services 
 
The drafters of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) were alive to the fact that the 
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services would have limited capacity and not be able to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
claimants ultimately had to obtain a court order to compel the Department to release the necessary evidence 
pertaining to the assault as is required by the discovery procedure (The Herald, 23 November 2011). 
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monitor all activities relating to the treatment of prisoners. Furthermore, in respect of serious 
incidents and high risk areas, it would be important to have the Department’s version of 
events on record should there be further investigations. Consequently, a structured statutory 
monitoring mechanism in respect of certain operations was established, and the Correctional 
Services Act requires the DCS (i.e. Head of Prison) to report to the Office of the Inspecting 
Judge on a specified number of issues. The submission of these reports is mandatory and 
deals with aspects of prison operations generally considered as high risk areas for rights 
violations. Accordingly, a Head of Prison must report the following to the Inspecting Judge: 
all deaths of prisoners;124 the segregation and extended segregation of prisoners;125 the use of 
mechanical restraints;
126
 and all instances where force was used.
127
 The Correctional Services 
Amendment Act (25 of 2008) effected two changes to the mandatory reports requirements. 
First, the amendment removed the penalty “solitary confinement” from the Act, which was 
prior to the amendment requiring a mandatory report from the Head of Prison to the 
Inspecting Judge. Prior to the amendment, the penalty of solitary confinement was subject to 
a mandatory review by the Inspecting Judge, who had to confirm or set aside the decision 
after reviewing the record of proceedings. Implementation may only have commenced after 
confirmation by the Inspecting Judge. The second change introduced the requirement that 
when force was used, a report must also be submitted to the Inspecting Judge by the Head of 
Prison.  
Compliance with the legislative provisions has not been at the desired level, even in respect 
of deaths in custody.
128
 It furthermore remains questionable whether the mandatory reports 
are effective in preventing rights violations and abuses. In the remainder of this section, 
segregation, mechanical restraints and the use of force are discussed. 
 
6.1 Solitary confinement and segregation 
 
                                                            
124 s 15(2). 
125 s 30(6). 
126 s 31(3)(d). 
127 s 32(6). 
128 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) pp. 29-33. 
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Even though the disciplinary punishment of solitary confinement has been removed from the 
legislation by the 2008 amendment, it is necessary to describe it as there is reason to conclude 
that it still occurs under the guise of segregation. Originally the distinction between solitary 
confinement and segregation was clear: solitary confinement was a punishment following a 
disciplinary procedure, while segregation was a mechanism used for a range of other 
purposes. Segregation is therefore permissible under the following conditions: if a prisoner 
requests to be placed in segregation;
129
 to give effect to the penalty of the restriction of 
amenities; if prescribed by a medical practitioner; when a prisoner is a threat to himself or 
others; if recaptured after escape and there is reason to believe that he will attempt to escape 
again; and at the request of the police in the interests of justice.
130
 
While the difference between effective solitary confinement and segregation appears now to 
be one only in name, an important distinction has nevertheless crept in under the noble 
mantle of correcting offending behaviour. Prior to the amendment, the Act was clear that the 
limit was 30 days and there was no possibility of an extension.131 Following the amendment, 
the Act states that in the event of serious and repeated transgressions, a prisoner may be 
placed in segregation “in order to undergo specific programmes aimed at correcting his 
behaviour”, with a loss of gratuity up to two months and a restriction of amenities for up to 
42 days.
132
 What exactly constitutes a programme is not clear, nor are minimum requirements 
laid down in the Act. Moreover, segregation should be used only “as far as it may be 
necessary” with the aim of giving effect to the restriction of amenities133 and should not be 
ordered as a form of punishment or disciplinary measure.
134
 In short, detaining a prisoner in a 
single cell for punishment is permitted when done with the purpose of restricting his access to 
amenities, and if necessary this could be done for 42 days. While the practice goes by a 
different name, it is evident that it can be used in exactly the same manner as solitary 
                                                            
129 See also s 7(2)(e) Act 111 of 1998. 
130 s 30(1). 
131 s 24(5)(d) prior to the amendment by Act 25 of 2008. 
132 s 24(5)(d) read with 24(5)(b and c) 
133 Amenities refer to exercise, contact with the community, reading material, recreation and incentive schemes 
(Definitions, Correctional Services Act). 
134 s 30(9). 
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confinement. This vagueness has created the space for super-maximum security prisons and 
their hard and austere regimes, as elaborated in section 7 below.135 
Prior to the amendment, the Inspecting Judge had either to confirm or set aside the penalty of 
solitary confinement, but this mechanism has been weakened. Prisoners subjected to 
segregation may refer the matter to the Inspecting Judge, who must make a decision thereon 
within 72 hours.136 Instead of a mandatory review, there is now a voluntary review 
mechanism which relies on the prisoner having knowledge of this review mechanism, being 
able to lodge such an application (e.g. by having access to writing materials or telephone), 
and being permitted to do so. As it turned out later, less than 1% of reported segregation 
cases were referred to the Inspecting Judge for review.137 It must therefore be assumed that 
segregated prisoners are not informed of their right to refer their case to the Inspecting Judge 
or that they are prevented from doing so. 
When solitary confinement was still a punishment option and required mandatory reporting, 
the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services referred to it as “a case of chronic under-
reporting”. In 2007/8 the Inspecting Judge received 159 solitary confinement review 
applications but 1 528 reports of prisoners undergoing segregation for displaying violence or 
being threatened with violence.138 The implication was that many prisoners were being held 
in solitary confinement but with few of them accorded the due process of a disciplinary 
hearing as prescribed by the Act.139 After the 2008 amendment, under-reporting in respect of 
segregation continued even though the situation improved.140 Figure 3 below provides a 
profile of the 6 022 segregation cases for 2008/9.
141
 The most frequent reason (33.7%) for 
segregating a prisoner was because he threatened or displayed violence, or was threatened 
with violence. Segregation for the purpose of giving effect to a penalty of restriction of 
amenities constituted 17.5% of the cases.  
                                                            
135 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming) Super-maximum prisons in South Africa. In Ross, J. (ed) 
Globalization of Supermax Prisons. Chapel Hill: Rutgers University Press. 
136 s 30(7). 
137 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) p. 27. 
138 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2008) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual report 2007/8, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, pp. 28-29. 
139 s 24. Office of the Inspecting Judge (2009) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual report 
2007/8, Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 28. 
140 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) p. 27. 
141 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2009) p. 29. 
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Figure 4 
 
The amendment to the legislation rid the prison system of the stigma associated with the 
concept “solitary confinement”, a practice questioned (if not condemned) internationally.142 
Nonetheless, the status of solitary confinement is recognised in international human rights 
law and has been the focus international instruments and commentaries by treaty monitoring 
bodies. This status is important for controlling its use. For example, Principle 7 of the UN 
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners states that “efforts addressed to the abolition 
of solitary confinement as a punishment, or to the restriction of its use, should be undertaken 
and encouraged”, while the Human Rights Committee stressed that “prolonged solitary 
confinement of the detained or imprisoned person may amount to acts prohibited by Art. 7 
(prohibition of torture)”.
143
 Regional instruments have also prescribed that “solitary 
confinement shall be imposed as a punishment only in exceptional cases and for a specified 
                                                            
142 General Comment 20 on the ICCPR para. 6. The Istanbul statement on the use and effects of solitary 
confinement defines solitary confinement as the physical isolation of individuals who are confined to their cells 
for twenty-two to twenty-four hours a day. In many jurisdictions prisoners are allowed out of their cells for one 
hour of solitary exercise. Meaningful contact with other people is typically reduced to a minimum. The 
reduction in stimuli is not only quantitative but also qualitative. The available stimuli and the occasional social 
contacts are seldom freely chosen, are generally monotonous, and are often not empathetic. [Adopted on 9 
December 2007 at the International Psychological Trauma Symposium, Istanbul.] A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 para 55. 
143General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning the prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment or punishment (Art. 7): 10/03/1992. CCPR General Comment No. 20 para. 6. See also the Istanbul 
Statement: ‘As a general principle solitary confinement should only be used in very exceptional cases, for as 
short a time as possible and only as a last resort.’ 
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period of time, which shall be as short as possible.”
144
 However, following the 2008 
amendment to the Correctional Services Act, detention in a single cell for punishment 
purposes continues but with a weaker oversight regime than was the case with solitary 
confinement,  where all instances were subject to mandatory review by the Inspecting Judge. 
Solitary confinement possessed a particular legal status which has now been lost, given that 
confinement in a single cell for punishment or disciplinary reasons is grouped together with a 
host of other reasons for segregation. It was because solitary confinement posed such risks to 
the individual’s well-being that it was tightly controlled and safeguards built into the 1998 
Correctional Services Act. However, segregation, accompanied by programmes to correct 
offending behaviour, appears to be terminologically less ominous and protective measures 
have been diluted.  
6.2 Use of mechanical restraints 
 
The use of mechanical restraints is provided for in the Correctional Services Act in section 
31, which was amended by Act 25 of 2008. Mechanical restraints may be used to protect the 
safety of a prisoner or other person, to prevent damage to property, or if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the prisoner may escape.145 Mechanical restraints may also be used when 
requested by a court.146 A prisoner may, however, not appear in court in mechanical restraints 
unless so ordered by the court.147 In addition to these general provisions, the Act provides for 
the use of mechanical restraints when a prisoner is in segregation. In such instances, the use 
of mechanical restraints must be authorised by the Head of Prison and reported to the 
National Commissioner and the Inspecting Judge.148 On the authority of the Head of Prison, 
                                                            
144 Art. 60.5, European Prison Rules (revised 2006). See also Prisons in Cameroon - Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Report to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon on the visit of the Special Rapporteur on 
Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa, From 2 to 15 September 2002, ACHPR/37/OS/11/437; 
Communication 54/91, 13th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(1999-2000)(Annex V) para 115. African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Communications: 64/92: 
Krishna Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda) / Malawi; 68/92: Amnesty International (on behalf of Orton and 
Vera Chirwa) / Malawi; 78/92: Amnesty International / Malawi. 
145 s 31(1). 
146 s 31(1). 
147 s 31(2). 
148 s 31(3) (b-d). 
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the mechanical restraints may be used for a period of seven days on a prisoner in segregation. 
The use of mechanical restraints under such circumstances may be extended by the National 
Commissioner for a maximum period of 30 days.149 However, such extension is subject to 
consideration of a report by a psychologist or medical practitioner. A prisoner under 
mechanical restraints in segregation may appeal the decision to the Inspecting Judge, who 
must make a decision within 72 hours.150 The use of mechanical restraints is not permitted as 
a form of punishment, and mechanical restraints in addition to handcuffs and leg irons may 
be used only when the prisoners is outside of the cell.151 The Regulations to the Correctional 
Services Act specify the permitted mechanical restraints in addition to handcuffs and leg 
irons, namely, belly chains, plastic cable ties, electronically activated high-security stun belts 
and patient restraints.152 
6.2.1 Long-term use of mechanical restraints 
 
The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners restrict the use of 
mechanical restraints to specific situations, such as the transportation of prisoners, and then 
for no longer than what is strictly necessary.
153
 The European Prison Rules prohibit the use of 
chains and irons, and also restrict the use of physical restraints to a narrow set of situations.154 
The specific use of mechanical restraints for relatively short periods of time, especially when 
                                                            
149 s 31(3)(c). 
150 s 31(5). 
151 s 31(6-7). 
152 Regulations to the Correctional Services Act, Regulation 18(1), Government Gazette, Vol. 469, No. 26626, 
30 July 2004. 
153 UNSMR Rule 33. 
154 68.1 The use of chains and irons shall be prohibited. 
68.2 Handcuffs, restraint jackets and other body restraints shall not be used except: 
a. if necessary, as a precaution against escape during a transfer, provided that they shall be removed when the 
prisoner appears before a judicial or administrative authority unless that authority decides otherwise; or 
b. by order of the director, if other methods of control fail, in order to protect a prisoner from self-injury, injury 
to others or to prevent serious damage to property, provided that in such instances the director shall immediately 
inform the medical practitioner and report to the higher prison authority. 
68.3 Instruments of restraint shall not be applied for any longer time than is strictly necessary. 
68.4 The manner of use of instruments of restraint shall be specified in national law. (European Prison Rules, 
Council of Europe, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies). 
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prisoners are outside of the secure environment of the prison building is understandable and 
reasonable. Neither the UNSMR nor the European Prison Rules raise objections in this 
regard. However, the long term use of mechanical restraints inside a prison, and moreover, 
when the prisoner is held in a segregation cell, is a different matter.
155
 
 
The long-term use of mechanical restraints has not been tested in South African courts but 
has been the subject of a 1999 decision from the Namibian Supreme Court in Namunjepo and 
Others v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison and Another.
156 In Namunjepo four of the 
five appellants were recaptured after escaping from custody and the fifth had attempted to 
escape. They were subsequently placed in leg irons and had been in that situation for between 
five and six months. The Court found this practice to be unconstitutional and in violation of 
the right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 
Making reference to the slave trade and denigrating prisoners as “hobbled animals”, the Court 
noted: 
Whatever the circumstances the practice to use chains and leg-irons on human beings 
is a humiliating experience which reduces the person placed in irons to the level of a 
hobbled animal whose mobility is limited so that it cannot stray. It is furthermore still 
a strong reminder of days gone by when people of this continent were carted away in 
bondage to be sold like chattels. To be continuously in chains or leg-irons and not to 
be able to properly clean oneself and the clothes one is wearing sets one apart from 
other fellow beings and is in itself a humiliating and undignified experience.157 
The Correctional Services Act provides for mechanical restraints during segregation to be 
used initially for a period of seven days on the authority of the Head of Prison, with the 
possibility of extension by the National Commissioner for a further 30 days, thus totalling 37 
days. Even though the Act states that the National Commissioner must approve the extension 
                                                            
155 In April 2006 a female prisoner at Pollsmoor Female Prison set her cell on fire and subsequently died. She 
was kept in mechanical restrains and in segregation, and had been chained to the grille gate of the cell for two 
days after behaving disruptively (PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services of 6 June 2006, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060608-investigations-zonderwater-and-pollsmoor-
incidents-department-report Accessed 3 February 2012). 
156 SA 3/98 [1999] NASC 3; 2000 (6) BCLR 671 (NmS). 
157
 Namunjepo and Others v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison and Another SA 3/98 [1999] NASC 3; 
2000 (6) BCLR 671 (NmS), p. 23. 
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to a maximum of 30 days, this competency has been delegated to Area Commissioners,
158
 
one rank higher than the Head of Prison and his immediate supervisor. The extension of the 
use of mechanical restraints is thus handled by mid-level managers working in the same 
management environment, thereby limiting the chances for review by more senior officials 
who are at a greater distance from the daily milieu of a particular prison. The situation creates 
significant risks for abuse of this provision, over and above the fact that the extended use of 
mechanical restraints has been outlawed in Europe and neighbouring Namibia.  
6.2.2 The use of electroshock equipment 
 
The electric stun belt is a physical restraint which has been severely criticised elsewhere and 
in South Africa. Fitted on the wearer like a belt, a stun belt is a device that can be activated 
remotely to inflict a substantial electric shock and instantly incapacitate the prisoner. Most 
models deliver a shock of up to 50 000 volts and can be repeatedly activated.
159
 One survivor 
described the electric shock as so severe that he thought he was going to die, and the long-
term physical side-effects include urination, defecation, heartbeat irregularities and 
seizures.160 The device also causes mental suffering, in that the wearer is all too aware that it 
can be activated at any moment.  In 2009 the DCS purchased 900 such stun belts at a cost of 
R2.7 million (US$ 400 000).161 
 
                                                            
158 Regulations to the Correctional Services Act, Government Gazette Vol. 469, No. 26626, 30 July 2004, p. 90. 
159
 Submission on the Prevalence of Torture in Correctional Centres. Jointly Submitted to the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services by the Institute for Security Studies and the Omega Research Foundation, 
PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 30 November 2011, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111130-stakeholder-hearings-prevalence-torture-correctional-centres Accessed 
21 December 2011. 
160
 Submission on the Prevalence of Torture in Correctional Centres. Jointly Submitted to the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services by the Institute for Security Studies and the Omega Research Foundation, 
PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 30 November 2011, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111130-stakeholder-hearings-prevalence-torture-correctional-centres Accessed 
21 December 2011. 
161 ‘Prisoners in for a shock’ IOL, 9 February 2009, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/prisoners-in-for-a-
shock-1.433834 Accessed 18 December 2011.  
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Internationally, the use of stun belts has been criticised by human rights groups,
162
 and US 
jurisprudence has left it only a narrow scope, namely for use when the prisoner is appearing 
in court (i.e. outside the secure environment of the prison building).163 In 1997 the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel Rodley, had already expressed deep concerns about the 
use of stun belts and other electroshock equipment.164 The CAT, in its concluding 
observations on the US’s first report, recommended banning the use of stun belts as a method 
of restraining prisoners as “their use almost invariably leads to breaches of article 16
165
 of the 
Convention”.166 Other electroshock equipment, such as riot shields, is also used by the DCS, 
and the Jali Commission was appalled by its use at Pretoria C-Max to inflict ritualised torture 
on new admissions to the prison.
167
 Against the backdrop of these findings, the purchase of 
stun belts by the Department in 2009 appears to have been ill-advised. The continued use of 
electroshock equipment in prisons poses significant risk for prisoners’ right to be free from 
torture and other ill treatment, and this purchase of additional equipment was a retrogressive 
step, flagrantly disregarding guidance both from the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the 
growing body of research on the topic.  
 
6.2.3 Compliance with mandatory reporting on the use of mechanical restraints 
 
The Judicial Inspectorate has consistently noted that the use of mechanical restraints is 
severely under-reported, with only 57 such cases reported in the 2009/10 financial year.168 In 
the following year, 67 cases were reported and only seven prisoners appealed the decision.
169
 
The Inspecting Judge saw this as indicative of “the general disregard by many heads of 
                                                            
162 Citing a report compiled by Amnesty International ‘The stun belt: Torture at the push of a button’, World 
Socialist website, 19 June 1999, http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jun1999/stun-j19.shtml Accessed 18 
December 2011. 
163 People v. Mar, 02 S.O.S. 4412. 
164 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1997/38, E/CN.4/1998/38 para 193. 
165 Article 16 prohibits other ill treatment that does not amount to torture. 
166 UN Committee against Torture (2000) Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: 
United States of America. 15/05/2000. A/55/44,paras.175-180. (Concluding Observations/Comments) Para 180 
167 Jali Commission, Vol. II Chapter 25.  
168 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) p. 33. 
169 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2011) p. 28. 
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centres of their statutory responsibility in this regard.”
170
 Consequently the Inspectorate was 
unable to provide any meaningful report about the use of mechanical restraints by the 
Department, but did express concern about media reports of sick inmates, some terminally ill, 
who were reportedly handcuffed to their beds because they allegedly posed a security risk.
171
 
Although the Correctional Services Act is clear that when mechanical restraints are used on a 
prisoner it must be reported to the Inspecting Judge, by and large Heads of Prison fail to meet 
this statutory obligation. Given the low number of appeals against the use of mechanical 
restraints referred to the Inspecting Judge, it is more than likely that prisoners in mechanical 
restraints in segregation are not aware of the fact that they can appeal to the Inspecting Judge. 
It may also be the case that they are not informed of this right. 
The legislative provisions and practices in respect of mechanical restraints thus appear to be 
out of step with the growing consensus that it should have both a narrow scope of application 
and be restricted to the shortest possible periods of use. Using mechanical restraints when 
prisoners are already in segregation cells seems strikingly at odds with jurisprudence and 
other guidelines on the issue. Moreover, the decision to extend the use of mechanical 
restraints for up to 30 days is subject to weak internal and external oversight. Heads of Prison 
generally fail to inform prisoners of their right to appeal to the Inspecting Judge and also fail 
to report such cases to the Inspecting Judge. If subjected to scrutiny by the Constitutional 
Court, the extended use of mechanical restraints while in segregation will, it is argued, very 
likely not pass muster. 
The level of compliance with mandatory reports has shown that Heads of Prison can easily 
ignore the requirements. This raises concerns about using such a mechanism to monitor areas 
of operations prone to rights violations. On the one hand, the mechanism relies on the 
honesty and integrity of Heads of Prisons to report certain incidents in the face of the known 
risk that such actions may alienate their staff; on the other, there is no mechanism of 
enforcement available to the Judicial Inspectorate if it is later established that a Head of 
Prison failed to comply with a mandatory reporting requirement. As such, the mandatory 
reporting mechanism remains inherently weak. 
6.3 Use of force 
 
                                                            
170 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) p. 33. 
171 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) p. 33. 
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The Correctional Services Act states that an official may not use force against an inmate, 
unless it is necessary for self-defence; the defence of another person; preventing an inmate 
from escaping; and the protection of property.172 Furthermore, only the minimum amount of 
force may be used to achieve the objective, namely self-defence, the defence of another 
person, preventing escape, or the protection of property. Force may only be used with the 
permission of the Head of the Prison, unless it is an emergency and the official believes that 
he or she would obtain it should he or she waited for permission.
173
 After force was used, the 
prisoner(s) concerned must undergo a medical examination and receive the appropriate 
treatment as prescribed by the correctional medical practitioner.174 When force was used, this 
must be reported to the Head of Prison as soon as possible
175
 and the Office of the Inspecting 
Judge.176 The mandatory reporting on the use of force to the Inspecting Judge was added 
following the 2008 amendment of the Correctional Services Act.177 
Compliance with the requirement to report the use of force to the Inspecting Judge is sadly 
lacking. In 2009/10 the Inspecting Judge reported that only nine such cases were reported 
despite the fact that the unlawful use of force is common in South African prisons.178 During 
the same period the Inspectorate recorded 2 189 complaints from prisoners alleging that they 
were assaulted by officials.179 In the following year (2010/11), 2 276 complaints alleging 
assault by officials on prisoners were recorded, but only ten reports on the use of force were 
submitted by Heads of Prison to the Inspectorate.180 
The overall impression gained is that Heads of Prison are either entirely ignorant of the 
statutory duty to report the use of force to the Judicial Inspectorate, or deliberately flouting 
this duty. The former is probably more likely. In addition, the Department’s Annual Reports 
do not present any information, making the mandatory reports the only avenue for obtaining a 
more accurate description of how and when force is used. Whether or not force is used 
                                                            
172 s 32(1)(c). 
173 s 32(2). 
174 s 32(5). 
175 s 32(2). 
176 s 32(6). 
177 s 25(d) of Act 25 of 2008. 
178 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) p. 33. 
179 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) p. 37. 
180 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2011) pp. 28 and 32. 
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lawfully or unlawfully, the Department appears to be particularly secretive about it. This is an 
intolerable situation, and it requires urgent action to ensure transparency and accountability 
through effective investigations and the institution of criminal prosecutions where necessary. 
Failure to do so would only further entrench the culture of impunity.  
 
6.4 Overview of issues 
 
The preceding discussion highlighted a number of concerns relating to the treatment of 
prisoners and made specific reference to segregation, the use of mechanical restraints and the 
use of force. While these practices are provided for and controlled by law and international 
instruments, the concerns centre on the right to be free from torture and other ill treatment as 
well as the fact that compliance is generally poor with the legislative requirement that Heads 
of Prisons report such incidents. Moreover, legislative amendments have created weaknesses 
with respect to the use of segregation, and the legislative provisions for the extended use of 
mechanical restraints appear to be at odds with the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment. This situation leaves prisoners vulnerable to the 
injudicious, if not unlawful, use of segregation, mechanical restraints and force. Furthermore, 
the lack of transparency regarding the use of segregation, mechanical restraints and force 
makes it difficult to monitor the situation and address problem areas. 
The requirement of mandatory reports was presumably included in the Correctional Services 
Act to monitor state actions associated with torture and other ill treatment and prohibited by 
the Constitution. Requiring mandatory reports on the use of force, use of mechanical 
restraints and segregation is reasonable, and reflects a desire on the part of the legislature to 
monitor human rights standards in the prison system. Notwithstanding these intentions, it has 
also become apparent that the mandatory reporting requirements are not being complied with 
and, furthermore, that there is no effective enforcement mechanism upon which the Judicial 
Inspectorate can call.  
7. Super-maximum facilities 
 
As noted in Chapter 3 (section 4.1.2), South Africa has two super-maximum security prisons, 
C-Max in Pretoria (Gauteng), with a capacity of 281 prisoners, and Ebongweni in Kokstad 
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(KwaZulu-Natal), with capacity for 1 440. Both house only male sentenced prisoners. C-Max 
became operational in 1997 and Ebongweni, in 2002. Both prisons were created to house 
South Africa’s most dangerous and disruptive prisoners, and initial estimates were that space 
for 7 000 such prisoners would be needed.
181
 Despite these estimates, the prisons remain 
under-utilised.182 They were originally intended exclusively for sentenced prisoners, but in 
practice they have deviated from this intention. Particularly so at Ebongweni, there has been 
an increase in the number of unsentenced prisoners, with more than 80 unsentenced prisoners 
having been detained there since 2007. Kokstad’s remote location also makes it difficult for 
unsentenced prisoners to access their legal representatives.183 
 
The super-maximum security facilities were intended to be rigidly run prisons adhering to the 
highest standards of security, order, discipline and control; at the same time they would also 
comply with human rights requirements as shaped specifically by the 1993 Supreme Court of 
Appeal decision in Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr.
184
 The Hofmeyr decision dealt extensively 
with prisoners’ rights and paid particular attention to solitary confinement.185 The plaintiff 
contested his conditions of confinement when he was detained for five months under the then 
apartheid state of emergency regulations. He averred that, with two brief exceptions, he had 
                                                            
181 The Jali Commission outlined the typical profile of a super-maximum inmate as a sentenced prisoner serving 
a long term of imprisonment and one who has committed crimes inside prison or attempted escape.  
“The criteria for admission of inmates to C-Max Prison are contained in a Departmental document, 
referenced 1/3/13 dated 5 November 1998. In terms of this document the following criteria are used by the 
Department for the transfer of prisoners to C-Max Prison: 
• Prisoners sentenced to longer than twenty (20) years within the last three (3) months. 
• Prisoners who have been found guilty of escaping/attempted to escape or aided an escape. 
• Prisoners who have been declared dangerous persons by the Court. 
• Prisoners who have assaulted/murdered a DCS official, a SAPS [South African Police Services] official or 
fellow inmate. 
• Prisoners who are troublesome and who do not show any improvement in their behaviour even after they 
have been demoted to C Group. 
• Prisoners who are actively involved in prison gangsterism. 
• Prisoners who have been convicted for hijackings and who have murdered/assaulted their victims, are 
members of notorious crime syndicates, or are serial killers/rapists.” (Jali Commission pp. 354-355) 
182 As at the end of February 2011 Ebongweni was 37% full and C-Max 45% (figures supplied by Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services). 
183 ‘Awaiting-Trial Men Tell of Rights Abuses in Far-Away Prison’. The Star, 1 August 2010.  
184 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming). 
185 1993 (3) SA 131 (A). 
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been unlawfully separated from all other prisoners in circumstances amounting to solitary 
confinement. Furthermore, he had been subjected to unlawful treatment in a number of other 
ways, including insufficient exercise, no access to books, magazines, newspapers, and food 
from outside the prison, insufficient access to write and receive letters, and insufficient access 
to radio or television broadcasts. Hofmeyr successfully sued the Minister of Justice in the 
Cape High Court, and the decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal on appeal. 
The judgment cites in approving terms the findings of the lower court:  
 
[T]he segregated manner in which plaintiff was detained for the bulk of his period of 
detention, the fact that he was not allowed some form of indoor exercise, that he was 
not allowed access to books and magazines from outside the prison and that he was 
not allowed some form of access to radio broadcasts constitute wrongful and unlawful 
conduct as alleged by plaintiff. 186 
 
The SCA clearly stated that “[t]he plain and fundamental rule is that every individual’s 
person is inviolable. … The detention to which the plaintiff was subjected constituted an 
infraction of his basic rights and, in particular, of his right to bodily integrity.”187 
 
The regime developers of C-Max were thus acutely aware of the Hofmeyr decision and its 
implications for solitary confinement, access to the media, and prisoners’ association with 
each other, as was confirmed by its designer.
188
 Moreover, the Interim Constitution afforded 
detailed rights to prisoners and this was later expanded upon by the 1996 Constitution, even 
though the 1998 Correctional Services Act was not yet operational.189 The design and regime 
of both C-Max and Ebongweni had to be guided by the Interim Constitution and the Hofmeyr 
decision.  
 
                                                            
186 1993 (3) SA 131 (A) p. 60. 
187 1993 (3) SA 131 (A) p. 64. 
188 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming) Interview with Mr. F. Venter on 9 July 2010, 
Johannesburg. 
189 The Interim Constitution, in section 25(1)(b), made it clear that: “Every person who is detained, including 
every sentenced prisoner, shall have the right . . . to be detained under conditions consonant with human dignity, 
which shall include at least the provision of adequate nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at state 
expense.” The 1996 Constitution added “access to exercise” as an additional right (section 35(2)(e)). 
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As the first to become operational, it was predominantly C-Max that attracted the attention of 
human rights groups and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). In C-Max, 
security measures included prisoner isolation, cordoned-off exercise yards, plastic cutlery, 
specially developed hand- and leg-irons, video surveillance, warders armed with stun guns, 
electrified riot shields, bullet and stab-proof vests, and the denial of permission for prisoners 
to shave or smoke.190According to the SAHRC Chairperson at the time, “We concede there 
are dangerous offenders and high-risk prisoners, and that you need a system to deal with 
them. But we think C-Max goes beyond what you require. It's difficult to imagine how the 
almost solitary-confinement conditions of C-Max encourage rehabilitation."191 The Jali 
Commission in turn expressed a similar view about both C-Max and Ebongweni.
192
 
 
While the DCS proclaims that rehabilitation is its core business, the messages about how the 
super-maximum facilities were to meet this goal were mixed. It was the then Minister of 
Correctional Services (Balfour), who in 2007 told the Security and Constitutional Affairs 
Select Committee that “not all offenders could be rehabilitated or corrected . . . [the DCS is] 
not dealing with angels”; C-Max and Ebongweni were, he said, “the destination of the 
completely incorrigible”.193 The Minister’s understanding of the super-maximum facilities 
was evidently different from their design aims. The regimes for both facilities were structured 
according to a multi-stage programme, ranging from a more to a less restrictive regime based 
on the behaviour of the prisoner. The intention was that a problematic prisoner would 
progress through the programme and, if successful, be returned to the general prison 
population. The intention was not that a prisoner would serve his entire sentence at one of 
these facilities. 
 
                                                            
190 SAIRR (1998) Annual Survey 1997/98. Johannesburg: South African Institute for Race Relations, p. 71; ‘C-
Max prison hatched in secret’. Mail and Guardian, 14 November 1997,http://mg.co.za/printformat/single/1997-
11-14-cmax-prison-hatched-in-secret Accessed 17 January 2012. 
191 ‘Rights groups slam new prison units’ IOL, 2 June 2000, http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/rights-groups-
slam-new-prison-units-1.39352?ot=inmsa.ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot Accessed 3 December 2011. 
192 Jali Commission, p. 367. 
193 PMG Report on the meeting of the Security and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee on 7 November 
2007, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20071106-sexual-offences-bill-deliberations-correction-services-ab-
briefing Accessed 5 December 2011. 
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The Jali Commission held a different view, arguing that the purpose of the DCS is to 
rehabilitate prisoners and that if rehabilitation is not possible at super-maximum facilities, 
then there is no justification for their existence. Based on its analysis, the Jali Commission 
concluded that these prisons were “merely institutions of solitary confinement”.
194
 It 
remained unconvinced by official explanations for detaining prisoners at C-Max, and 
observed instead that C-Max Prison is “being used as a form of punishment for those who 
attack officials . . . [rather than to] correct general bad behaviour within our prisons”.
195
 
 
Notwithstanding the efforts of the designers of C-Max to strike a balance between super-
maximum security requirements and constitutional prescripts, problems soon emerged around 
the treatment of prisoners and related matters. While policy dictated that C-Max inmates 
could have contact with each other only as a privilege earned through good behaviour, in 
actuality prisoners and staff were frequently in violent altercations with each other. Between 
September 1997 and February 2005, 64 official-on-prisoner assaults, 26 prisoner-on-official 
assaults, and 63 prisoner-on-prisoner assaults were reported.
196
 C-Max was thus not as well 
controlled as policy would have it.  
 
When the Jali Commission investigated C-Max, it found that the treatment of prisoners fell 
far short of what the Constitution and the legislation required, and drew attention to the 
systematic assault of prisoners upon admission: 
 
The treatment of prisoners at Pretoria C-Max Prison upon admission is a clear 
indication that the members of the Department have no respect for prisoners’ human 
rights. Evidence has established that prisoners are assaulted for no apparent reason 
upon admission. This treatment is normally referred to as an initiation process. 
Prisoners at Pretoria C-Max have already been sentenced by courts of law and there is 
no need for further punishment on admission. This is a further indication that members 
of the Department do not subscribe to the ethos of human rights for prisoners.197 
 
                                                            
194 Jali Commission, p.351. 
195 Jali Commission, p. 381. 
196 Jali Commission, p. 359. 
197 Jali Commission, Vol. II, Chapter 25, pp. 95-96. 
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What is perhaps more worrying is that the unravelling of the supposedly strict adherence to 
both security and human rights standards began as early as 1998, and hence not long after C-
Max had become operational; according to the Jali Commission, the trend continued into 
2003.
198
 
Despite all the security hardware (e.g. close circuit television) for making C-Max “escape-
proof”, its vulnerability to human failure was best illustrated by the escape of one Annanias 
Mathe. He was a notorious criminal ultimately convicted of 64 charges of rape, indecent 
assault, attempted murder, aggravated robbery and housebreaking,199 but managed to escape 
from C-Max prior to conviction (he was later recaptured). At first the DCS claimed he had 
escaped “Houdini-like” by using Vaseline petroleum jelly to slide through a narrow window 
measuring 20 cm by 20 cm. Subsequent investigations revealed that his escape was in fact the 
result both of his own ingenuity, bribing prison staff and of negligent oversight by 
officials.200 An earlier attempted escape from C-Max, on 7 November 2004 – made possible 
by firearms smuggled in by officials – resulted in the death of two officials.201 If the latter 
incident already suggested that the super-maximum prison had a soft underbelly, Mathe’s 
escape amply confirmed this weakness in the integrity of its staff. 
 
Ebongweni super-maximum prison has not been immune from internal problems either. The 
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services reported as follows on the August 2009 death 
of a 59-year-old prisoner:  
 
Deceased brutally assaulted by officials with batons, electric shields and booted feet 
and then failed to provide adequate and timeous medical attention. Independent 
                                                            
198 Jali Commission, Vol. II, Chapter 25, p. 82. 
199 ‘Mathe guilty on 64 charges’. News24.com, 3 June 2006, http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Mathe-
guilty-on-64-charges-20090603 Accessed 5 December 2011. 
200 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming). 
201 The murder in July 2010 of a C-Max official, after he testified in court about a 2004 attempted escape with 
fatalities, underscores the threat that corruption holds to the security of super-maximum prisons. (‘C-Max Prison 
Official Shot Dead’. East Coast Radio, 22 July 2010, http://www.ecr.co.za/kagiso/content/en/east-coast-
radio/east-coast-radio-news?oid=836529&sn=Detail&pid=5882&C-max-prison-official-shot-dead Accessed 3 
December 2011.) 
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pathologist found death consistent with smothering, i.e. obstruction of mouth and 
nose.202 
Evidence has also been found at Ebongweni of a female warder engaging in sexual relations 
with a prisoner for payment.
203
 
 
The two super-maximum prisons continue to exist but they are threatened on a number of 
fronts. First, their regimes depend heavily on what amounts to solitary confinement and 
minimal human contact; from a constitutional perspective this remains suspect and open to 
attack, a view expressed by both the SAHRC and the Jali Commission. Second, the integrity 
failures of staff at these prisons have resulted not only in security breaches but in gross rights 
violations, corruption, the death of officials, and inter-prisoner violence. If the super-
maximum prisons are intended to be the ultimate penal institutions in South Africa, these 
failures only deepen their legitimacy deficit. Third, both prisons remain underutilised and 
have not demonstrated that they contribute to safer prisons or fewer escapes. Ultimately the 
conditions of detention at the two prisons must be measured against the right to dignity, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the substantial limitation of this right for a few prisoners for 
the alleged benefit of the greater majority of prisoners. 
8. Sexual violence
204
 
 
In Chapter 3 sexual violence in prisons was briefly described and is explored here in more 
detail. Other authors have undertaken extensive work on the subject which need not be 
                                                            
202 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010), pp. 69-70. 
203 ‘Warder had sex with inmate for R1 000.’ IOL, 30 July 2010, (US$ 135), 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=nw20100730145253490C610957 Accessed 4 
December 2011. 
204 This section is largely based on Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. (2011 a) Sexual violence in prisons – Part 1: 
The duty to provide safe custody and the nature of prison sex, SA Journal for Criminal Justice,Vol. 24 No. 1; 
and Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. (2011 b) Sexual violence in prisons – Part 2: The duty to provide safe 
custody and the nature of prison sex, SA Journal for Criminal Justice,Vol. 24 No. 2. 
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repeated.
205
 The focus will rather be on sexual violence as a human rights issue, and this 
contribution assesses the extent to which the DCS has responded to an age-old problem.  
The extent and prevalence of sexual violence in prisons is uncertain, but there have been 
attempts to quantify it.
206
 Sexual victimisation in prisons is notoriously under-reported and 
often deliberately hidden, but research from the United States indicates that between 7% and 
12% of male inmates are raped an average of nine times during their term of imprisonment.207 
The risk of sexual victimisation is not equally distributed across the prison population, and the 
evidence indicates that sexual victimisation is profile-driven - inmates displaying certain 
characteristics are more vulnerable to aggression, making them more likely to be “turned” 
into the feminine role.208 Prisoners who are least able to defend themselves, lack credibility 
with prison staff or are disliked by other prisoners and staff, as well as those who are easily 
ostracised, are most at risk of victimisation.209 Other factors that increase the risk of sexual 
victimisation are lack of knowledge of the prison and gang system, youthfulness, economic 
circumstances, weaker physical attributes, reluctance to engage in violence, conviction for a 
crime lacking the element of violence, and aesthetically pleasing looks, are all factors which 
contribute to a prisoner’s risk-profile and possible assignment to the female gender.210 
 
In general terms it has been noted that the marginalisation of prisoners’ rights and the political 
                                                            
205 Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002) Daai Ding: Sex, sexual violence and coercion in men’s prisons, 
Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation; Steinberg, J. (2004) Nongoloza’s Children: 
Western Cape Prison Gangs During and After Apartheid, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation; Mashabela, P. (2003) Victims of Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in Prisons, Paper 
Submitted for XIth International Symposium on Victimology, 13-18 July 2003, South Africa; Jali Commission, 
Chapter 8; Gear, S. (2007) Fear, violence & sexual violence in a Gauteng juvenile correctional centre for males, 
CSVR Criminal Justice Programme Briefing Report No. 2, Johannesburg, CSVR; Man, C.D. and Cronan, J.P. 
(2001/2) Forecasting sexual abuse in prison: The prison subculture of masculinity as a backdrop for ‘deliberate 
indifference’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 92, 157. 
206 Gear, S. (2007). 
207 Robertson, J.E. (2003) Rape among incarcerated men: Sex, coercion and STDs, Aids Patient Care &STDs,Vol. 
17 No. 8, p. 423. 
208 Man, C.D. and Cronan, J.P. (2001/2), p. 157; Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002), pp.14-32. 
209 Dumond, R.W. (2006) The impact of prisoner sexual violence: Challenges of implementing public law 108-79 
The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Journal of Legislation, Vol. 32, p. 150.  
210 Man, C.D. and Cronan, J.P. (2001/2), p. 157-174; Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002), pp.14-32. 
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marginalisation of male rape, place prisoners in an especially vulnerable situation.
211
 This 
stands in sharp contrast to the non-derogable protections afforded by the Constitution,212 
namely to be free from all forms of violence,213 and the right to be free from torture and ill 
treatment.
214
 
8.1 The nature of sex in prisons 
 
According to Muntingh and Satardien, the nature of sex in prisons is shaped by three issues.215 
The first is the loss of power by prisoners due to their confinement, which places them at risk 
of victimisation by fellow prisoners as well as by officials, whether through action or 
omission. The overwhelming majority of South African prisoners are detained in frequently 
overcrowded communal cells.216 Generally prisoners spend very little time outside their 
cells,
217
 and once locked up for the night, the prison operates on a skeleton-staff complement 
to provide supervision. Should officials need to respond to an emergency, unlocking a cell is a 
time-consuming process regulated by security concerns.218 While prisoners may be locked up 
for the greater part of the day, the overwhelming impression is that they are unsupervised, or 
minimally supervised.219 Inside the cells, confinement is regulated by the unofficial regime 
imposed by prison gangs, especially in prisons where gangs are entrenched. Non-gang 
members lack status and protection, making them vulnerable to many forms of exploitation.220 
 
Second, the duty to ensure safe custody and the protection of prisoners falls squarely upon the 
                                                            
211 Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. (2011 a), p. 5. 
212 Section 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 deals with states of emergency and 
includes a table of non-derogable rights. The protection afforded by the Constitution in respect of certain 
fundamental rights may thus not be derogated from even during a state of emergency.  
213 Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
214 Section 12(1)(d) and 12(1)(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
215 Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. (2011 a). 
216 By February 2011, 53% of the South African prisoners were accommodated in prisons that were 150% or more 
full (statistics supplied by Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services). 
217 Prisoners are normally unlocked at 07h30 and locked up again by 15h00 or earlier. However, this does not mean 
that they are necessarily outside of their cells during that period; it is more likely that the minimum of one hour 
outside exercise per day, as required by law, is in fact the norm.  
218 See the procedure set out in the Department of Correctional Services: B-Order 2 Chapter 12 (2004). 
219 Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. (2011 a), p. 12. 
220 Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002), pp. 5 and 16.  
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DCS,
221
 as noted in Chapter 2 (section 3.2.3). This duty is recognised in international law, 
which links the right to human dignity to the right to be free from torture and other ill 
treatment,222 and is further built upon in regional human rights treaties; in addition, there are 
specific principles and rules on deprivation of liberty.
223
 South African courts have also ruled 
unambiguously that prisoners are entitled to all personal rights and personal dignity not 
temporarily taken away by law through imprisonment.224 The right to dignity therefore gives 
rise to the right to freedom and security of a prisoner as well as the right not to be tortured in 
any way or treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner. The DCS has a clearly legislated 
                                                            
221 Sections 12 and 35(2) of the Constitution 108 of 1996; sections 2(b) and 4(2)(a) of Correctional Services Act 
111 of 1998. 
222 Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): ‘1. All persons deprived of 
their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 2. (a) 
Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons and shall be 
subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons; (b) Accused juvenile persons 
shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication. 3. The penitentiary system 
shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social 
rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their 
age and legal status.’ Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm. Accessed on 3 February 2011. 
See also Article 5(2) American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), available at 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html, accessed on 3 February 2011, and Article 5 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/official_documents/treaties_%20conventions_%20protocols/banjul%20charter.pdf, accessed on 3 
February 2011. See also Articles 12 and 13 of the Third Geneva Convention, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68, 
accessed on 3 February 2011, as well as Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/375-590006, accessed on 3 February 2011.  
223 See Principle 1 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r173.htm, accessed on 15 March 2011: : 
‘All persons under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner and with respect 
for the inherent dignity of the human person.’ and Rule 60 (1) of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners (UNSMR), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/treatmentprisoners.htm, accessed on 3 February 2011: ‘The regime of the 
institution should seek to minimize any differences between prison life and life at liberty which tend to lessen 
the responsibility of the prisoners or the respect due to their dignity as human beings.’  
224 See Whittaker and MorantvRoos and Bateman 1912 AD 92 at para 123, Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr1993 (3) 
SA 131 (A) at para 20, Goldberg v Minister of Prisons 1979 (1) SA 14 at para 39 C-E, S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 
632 (CC) at para 76-77, S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 142, Stanfield v the Minister of 
Correctional Services 2004 (4) SA 43 (C) at para 89.  
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duty to provide safe custody to prisoners in its care and to conform to the requirements of 
international law and constitutional demands.225 It must therefore act proactively to prevent 
the transgression of human dignity through torture or ill treatment.226 Any failure to provide 
custody consistent with conditions that ensure human dignity,
227
 whether through action or 
inaction,228 is a breach of that duty and constitutes a violation of prisoners’ rights.  
 
 Third, sex in prisons appears to exist on a continuum of consent and coercion, with consent 
often manufactured under the threat of coercion.229 First-time prisoners are often tricked and 
manipulated into providing sex in exchange for cigarettes, protection or other commodities.230 
Lacking in “street-smartness”, they accept a gift or protection only to discover that this must 
be “paid for” later. Fearing violence, an individual may give consent, but this is not out of free 
will but rather the will to survive. It appears, moreover, that sexual violence and coercion 
range from opportunistic events of victimisation to long-term “prison marriages” between 
men.231 Untangling consent and coercion, not only in relation to a particular incident but in 
the broader context of sex in prisons, raises complex questions in respect of law enforcement, 
the protection of victims and the prosecution of offenders.  
 
8.2 The Sexual Offences Act and its implications for the Department 
 
In 2007
232
 the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 
2007 (hereafter the SOA) came into operation. The SOA has consolidated all sexual offences 
under one statute, and although not originally drafted with adult men and male prisoners in 
mind, it does substantially affect the DCS, the prison system and prisoners. New offences 
                                                            
225 Preamble to the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
226 Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2, CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev. 4 para [2]-[3] http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/402/62/PDF/G0840262.pdf?OpenElement, Accessed on 31 December 2011.  
227Section 2 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
228 The state has a positive duty to protect citizens from preventable harm and is liable for wrongful omissions that 
result in harm. Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). The police have a positive duty 
to protect individuals in custody from assault. Moses v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 (3) SA 106 (C). 
229 Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. (2011 a), p. 13. 
230 Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002), pp. 19 - 21.  
231 Gear, S. and Ngubeni, K. (2002), p. 40. 
232 The date of commencement was 16 December 2007. 
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have been defined which can be applied equally to prison settings in order to help 
marginalised prisoners and protect them from sexual offences.233 Some of the broader 
categories of sexual offences, such as those where an offender compels another to commit a 
sexual offence or those which cause a person to witness a sexual offence, are particularly 
relevant to prisoners, who live in violent and communal conditions of confinement. The SOA 
can be used to combat sexual violence and abuse in prison settings as it creates a wide reach, 
covering key players in the prison system such as officials and gang leaders. The SOA 
provides a platform for the recognition of sexual violence and enables prosecutions in a prison 
setting. Male victims are given recognition in law; more appropriate redress is provided for; 
suffering and trauma are acknowledged; and increased awareness should result in improved 
protection.  
 
Muntingh and Satardien recommend that specific emphasis be placed on the efficacy of 
channels for lodging complaints, on expediting complaints, and obtaining satisfactory levels 
for the collection of evidence relevant to the assault in question.
234
 Moreover, attention 
should be paid to eradicating staff interference in investigations and the coercion and 
intimidation of victims and witnesses when matters are investigated; the focus should be on 
appropriately protecting victims and witnesses who report corruption and sexual violence.
235
 
Responses to prisoner rape must under no circumstances be indifferent, and successful 
responses require the consideration of more effective alternatives, given that current solutions 
often deter victims from coming forward. It would also be important for prisoners to have 
access to reporting facilities outside DCS mechanisms and be able to report rape or other 
sexual offences directly to the police. Interference by DCS officials in frustrating police 
investigations must be minimised in order to eradicate an environment where victims feel 
helpless in reporting a crime or where they legitimately fear that reporting the offence will 
only aggravate their situation.236 
 
                                                            
233 For a detailed commentary, see Smythe, D., Pithy, B. (eds) and Artz, L. (2011) Sexual Offences Commentary 
Act 32 of 2007, Cape Town: Juta. 
234 Mashabela, P. (2003), p. 12; Muntingh, L. and Satardien, Z. (2011 a). 
235 Jali Commission Report, p. 425. 
236 Describing the factors that contribute to, or frustrate, successful investigations and prosecutions, the Jali 
Commission Report cited intimidation of witnesses in DCS custody and attributed the low rate of successful 
prosecutions to the withdrawal of charges and prisoners not being brought to trial by the DCS (pp. 423-429). 
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Furthermore, newly-admitted prisoners, first-time prisoners, weaker, younger and more 
vulnerable offenders, including homosexual prisoners, should be screened and initially 
isolated from more experienced prisoners. This would enable personnel to inform these 
categories of prisoners about prison culture as well activities, behaviours, practices or 
situations they should avoid or be aware of in the prison environment.237 Perpetrators of 
sexual violence should receive appropriate discipline, including rehabilitation programmes 
that address both the direct and indirect factors leading to their sexually violatory conduct.
238
 
Importantly, officials – including their political heads – who fail prisoners at various stages of 
the criminal justice process should be held accountable for their involvement in the 
commission of sexual offences.
239
 
8.3 Overview of issues 
 
Even though the Jali Commission covered sexual violence extensively in its final report,240 the 
official position of the DCS has been one of general denial and, at best, uncomfortable 
acceptance. It was only in 2008 that the DCS publicly acknowledged that sexual violence in 
prisons, including male rape, was a problem.241 In 2010 it was reported that the DCS is in the 
process of developing a policy framework on the prevention of sexual violence in prisons and 
                                                            
237 The Jali Commission, p. 449. 
238 The Jali Commission, p. 451. 
239 The Centre for Child Law, which was at the forefront of launching a civil claim on behalf of a child who was 
raped at the hospital section of Durban Westville prison, said the Constitution required children to be detained 
separately from adults. ‘This matter gives the impression of an uncaring system. The officials who dealt with 
this child at various stages of the criminal justice process failed him at every turn. It is time that officials were 
held accountable, as well as their political heads,’ said Centre for Child Law co-ordinator Ann Skelton in an 
article dated 18 May 2008. Available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/boy-15-sold-for-jail-rape-
1.400901.Accessed on 28 December 2011. 
240 Jali Commission, p.393.  
241 ‘How do we stop rape in prisons?’ IOL, July 1 2008, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/how-do-we-
stop-rape-in-prisons-1.406478 Accessed 18 December 2011. The DCS Offender Rape Seminar took place on 30 
June 2008, and in his opening remarks, the then DCS National Commissioner Vernie Peterson said the 
Department is developing a policy on sexual violence. In 2008 Pollsmoor Prison invited the US-based NGO 
Stop Prisoner Rape to conduct a week-long seminar with staff from 7-11 July 2008. The author was present at 
this workshop.  
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that certain procedures have been put in place.
242
 The policy framework has reportedly been 
finalised, but since it is not available in the public domain, it is not possible to assess it. It is 
unclear what steps have been taken to address sexual violence and whether the policy framework 
has been introduced and supported with training. Notwithstanding these recent developments, the 
Department has since 2004 failed in general to deal effectively with sexual violence in prisons. 
The limited progress that has been made appears to have come about thanks to pressure from 
civil society organisations such as the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 
Sonke Gender Justice and Just Detention International. The inadequate response to sexual 
violence in prisons must be regarded as one of the most important reform failures after 2004.  
9. Parole 
 
South Africa’s parole system has its roots in a long-standing practice of hiring out convict 
labour for public works projects as well as use by private contractors, a practice inherited 
from the British. Over time it became more formalised through new legislation (e.g. Act 8 of 
1959) and the adoption of recommendations made by various commissions of inquiry (e.g. 
the Viljoen Commission, 1976).
243
 
Post-1994 the administration of parole has been marred by confusion and controversy, with 
prisoners ever more directing themselves to the courts for relief.244 If anything, the legitimacy 
                                                            
242 PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services of 14 April 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100414-feedback-department-matters-related-their-accountability-
management-n. Accessed 8 February 2011.  
243 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992) South African Prison Law and Practice. Durban: Butterworth Publishers, pp. 20-43. 
244 S v Matolo en 'n Ander 1998 (1) SACR 206 (O); Mazibuko v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 
2007 (2) SACR 303 (T); S v Madizela 1992 (1) SACR 124 (N); Van Gund v Minister of Correctional Services 
and Others 2011 (1) SACR 16 (GNP); Groenewald v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2011 (1) 
SACR 231 (GNP); Motsemme v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2006 (2) SACR 277 (W); Mans v 
Minister van KorrektieweDienste en Andere 2009 (1) SACR 321 (W); Lombaard v Minister of Correctional 
Services and Others and Two Similar Cases 2009 (1) SACR 157 (T); Combrink and Another v Minister of 
Correctional Services and Another 2001 (3) SA 338 (D) 2001 (3); S v Nkosi and Others 2003 (1) SACR 
91(SCA); Saunders v Minister of Correctional Services and Others (unreported) TPD case no. 14015/2000; 
Mohammed v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2003 (6) SA 169 (SE); Ngenya and Others v 
Minister of Correctional Services and Others (unreported) WLD Case no. 29540\2003. S v Segole(1999) JOL 
5349 (W) Winckler and Others v Minister of Correctional Services 2001 (1) SACR 532 (C); S v Botha 2006(2) 
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crisis in the prison system has extended to the parole system. It is not the intention here to 
deal with the detailed technical and legal provisions of parole, as this has been done 
elsewhere and is in itself a field of specialised study.245 The aim is rather to assess the main 
thematic issues that have emerged and how these have shaped, or failed to shape prison 
system reform.  
Parole is central to the life and experiences of sentenced prisoners, creating an incentive for 
good behaviour while imprisoned but also serving as an important management tool in the 
hands of their custodians. To be released on parole is not a right that prisoners hold but rather 
a privilege.246 However, sentenced prisoners have the right to be considered for parole at a 
specified point in time.247 Importantly, the possibility of release on parole must always be 
there, even for those sentenced to life imprisonment and terms of imprisonment that exceed 
normal life expectancy.248 Furthermore, sentenced prisoners have a legitimate claim to have 
certainty in sentencing, and that the decision to release a sentenced prisoner on parole should 
be procedurally and substantively fair. In the following section, legal certainty is explored in 
detail, with the focus being placed on the confusion created by a 1998 policy directive, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
SACR 110 (SCA); S v Williams; S v Papier2006 (2) SACR 101(C); S v Pakane and Others 2008(1) SACR 518 
(SCA); Lombaard v Minister of Correctional Services and Others and two similar cases 2009(1) SACR 157(T); 
Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2004 (4) SA 43 (C); S v Mhlakaza& another 1997 (1) 
SACR 515 (SCA); S v Sidyno 2001 (2) SACR 613 (T). 
245 Bruyns, H.J. and Cilliers, C.H. (2009) A review of imprisonment and deterrence programmes as a strategy to 
reduce prison populations, Acta Criminologica Vol.22 No. 1.; Cilliers, C.H. (2006) New horizons for parole 
applications in South Africa”, Acta Criminologica, Vol.19 No. 3.; Lidovho, G.J. (2003) A critical look at the 
past and current release policy of the Department of Correctional Services, SA Journal of Criminal Justice, 
Vol.16; Louw, F.C.M. and Luyt, W.F.M. (2009) Parole and parole decisions in South Africa, Acta 
Criminologica Vol.22, No. 2.; Moses, L.J.J. (2003) Parole: Is it a right or a privilege? SA Journal for Human 
Rights, Vol.19; Mujuzi, J.D. (2009) Releasing terminally ill prisoners on medical parole in South Africa, SA 
Journal for Bio-ethics and Law Vol. 2 No. 2; Mujuzi, J.D. (2011) Unpacking the law and practice relating to 
parole in South Africa, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, Vol. 14 No. 5. 
246
 Combrink and Another v Minister of Correctional Services and Another 2001 (3) SA 338 (D) 2001 (3). 
247 ss 42 and 73 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
248 In S v Nkosi and Others (2003(1) SACR 91(SCA)) the four appellants received terms of imprisonment of 
120, 65, 65 and 45 years, respectively, for murder and attempted murder. The Court concluded that if the 
sentence were to be served in full, there would be no possibility of release on either serving one half of the 
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specification of a non-parole periods by the courts, and the now-repealed incarceration 
framework. 
9.1 Legal certainty 
 
In October 2004 the remaining provisions of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) 
came into force and effectively introduced a second parole regime operating in parallel with 
the already existing one. In order to remain compliant with constitutional requirements 
pertaining to just administrative action,249 it is made abundantly clear in the transitional 
provisions of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) that the two systems will operate in 
parallel.250 Those prisoners sentenced prior to 1 October 2004 would be governed by the 
1959 Correctional Services Act, and those thereafter, by the 1998 legislation. This was 
because the 1998 legislation imposed a harsher parole regime. The central issue is the so-
called non-parole period, namely the period that a sentenced prisoner must serve before he 
can be considered for parole and thus release. Prior to 2004 and with effect from March 1992, 
the rule of thumb was that prisoners serving a determinate sentence had to serve at least one-
third of their sentences before they could be considered for parole. The law required that one 
half must be served but that this could be reduced to one-third by earning credits for good 
behaviour. This applied to the overwhelming majority of prisoners. However, a number of 
factors could see this period being increased, specifically the offence of escaping from 
custody.
251
 The 1998 Act required, in general, that a prisoner serving a determinate sentence 
must serve at least one half before he can be considered for parole. 
9.1.1 The lasting confusion created by the 1998 Guidelines 
 
In an effort to bring greater clarity and hence consistency to parole decisions, the DCS issued 
new parole guidelines on 23 April 1998.252 The guidelines were intended to increase the non-
parole period, especially for prisoners convicted of violent offences, and were at least 
                                                            
249 s 33 of Act 108 of 1996. 
250s 136(1). 
251 Prisoners who had escaped or attempted to escape or assisted with an escape, and are recaptured, would have 
added to their non-parole period the number of days they spent out of custody; the sentence imposed for the 
escape to be served in full if less than two years; an additional six months for every escape; and three-quarters of 
the sentences imposed for offences committed while being a fugitive (Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 362). 
252 Jali Commission, p. 484. 
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partially motivated by public concerns about crime.
253
 The guidelines listed “negative” and 
“positive” factors to be taken into account. Amongst the negative factors, it was required that 
prisoners convicted of serious violent crimes had to serve three-quarters of the sentence 
before being considered for parole, and prisoners who had escaped, four-fifths.
254
 The policy 
made a material alteration to the one-third requirement and did so retrospectively. This policy 
would cause lasting confusion and ultimately result in extensive litigation against the 
Department.  
The 1998 Act, coming into force in October 2004, changed the general requirement for 
prisoners serving a determinate sentence to one-half of the sentence to be served instead of 
one-third. Again there were exceptions,255 such as prisoners sentenced under the minimum 
sentences legislation (Act 105 of 1997) who had to serve four-fifths of the term before being 
considered for parole.256 
The restrospectivity of the 1998 guidelines was addressed in 2001 in Combrink v Minister of 
Correctional Services.
257 The Court found that prisoners sentenced prior to 1998 had a 
legitimate expectation that the parole provisions applicable at the time of sentencing would 
apply to them. The 1998 guidelines altered this retrospectively to the detriment of the 
applicants who would, in terms of the policy guidelines, have had to serve three-quarters and 
four-fifths, respectively, instead of “one half less credits” before they could be considered for 
parole. In short, the application of the guidelines violated the Constitutional guarantee of 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.258 
Notwithstanding the Combrink decision as well as others, the 1998 guidelines appear to have 
had a lasting effect on the decision-making of parole boards. In Botha v Minister of 
Correctional Services, the Department presented evidence that, following a number of 
                                                            
253 Interview with Prof J. Sloth-Nielsen, former member of the National Council on Correctional Services, Cape 
Town, 9 January 2012. 
254 Jali Commission, p. 484-485. 
255 For a detailed description of these exceptions, see Muntingh, L. (2010).  
256 s 73(6)(b)(v) Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. This provision was repealed in 2011.  
257 2001(3) SA 338(D). 
258 s 33 Act 108 of 1996. Also Mohammed v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2003 (6) SA 169 
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decisions between 1999 and 2003,
259
 the parole boards were supposed to disregard the 1998 
guidelines.260 Evidence of the lasting confusion would still be found in 2011.261 If this was 
communicated to the parole boards, it was either done so poorly or the parole boards chose to 
ignore it.  
It was not long before prisoners who felt themselves “done in” by the lengthening of the non-
parole period turned to the courts for relief. Numerous decisions were handed down to clarify 
the legal situation regarding parole; even so, this remains an evolving field of 
jurisprudence.262 The decisions also showed that the parole system was in disarray and that 
parole boards often refused to grant parole for reasons that had no basis in law. 
The prevailing confusion in parole board decision-making was best illustrated in the 2006 
case of Motsemme v Minister of Correctional Services.263 Not only did the parole board apply 
the law incorrectly, it also ignored several court orders to re-assess the case properly and 
apply the law correctly.264 Motsemme was sentenced in 1996 to 17 years imprisonment. He 
was initially told that he would need to serve one-third, but in 2002 was informed that due to 
the 1998 guidelines (which were no longer applicable following the Combrink decision) he 
would have to serve three-quarters: that is, 12 years and nine months as opposed to five-and-
a-half years. The applicant used his time in prison well and acquired a post-graduate degree 
in law; he also demonstrated himself to be a model prisoner, being motivated and an 
exemplary candidate for parole. In 2004 he instituted legal proceedings, and several court 
                                                            
259
 Combrink and Another v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2001 (3) SA 338 (D); Saunders v 
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260 S v Botha 2006 (2) SACR 110 (SCA) para 9. Also Lombaard v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 
and Two Similar Cases 2009 (1) SACR 157 (T). 
261 Groenewald v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2011 (1) SACR 231 (GNP). 
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264 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 b) Parole Pandemonium, CSPRI Newsletter, No. 14, p. 1. 
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appearances with different judges ensued. Evidence before the Court indicated that the parole 
board was of the opinion he had not yet served a long enough term in prison and that the 
offences he committed (robbery and unlawful possession of arms and ammunition) were 
serious. The parole board failed to acknowledge that the 1998 guidelines were unlawful, as 
per the Combrink decision handed down some three years earlier, and that Motsemme had 
indeed been rehabilitated. Moreover, this had been confirmed in documents placed before the 
parole board.
265
Motsemme’s release was, after the fifth appearance, ordered by the court.  
It is open to speculation how many other prisoners at the time were affected in the same way 
yet found themselves without the good fortune of having Motsemme’s skills and resolve. But 
whatever the scope and scale of its impact, the situation most certainly created a material 
failure in the administration of sentences – a matter which, as specified in the Correctional 
Services Act, is the first objective of the prison system.266 
9.1.2 A non-parole period specified by the courts 
 
Section 73(6)(a) of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) stipulates that: 
 
a prisoner serving a determinate sentence may not be placed on parole until such a 
prisoner has served either the stipulated non-parole period, or if no non-parole period 
was stipulated, half of the sentence, but parole must be considered whenever a prisoner 
has served 25 years of a sentence or cumulative sentences. 
 
However, this provision came into force only on 1 October 2004, and at the same time that a 
corresponding provision in the Criminal Procedure Act came into force stating that: 
                                                            
265 Sloth-Nielsen summarises it as follows: ‘After detailing his LLB and LLM studies, teaching of other inmates, 
positive attitude and exemplary behaviour in prison, his high level of motivation, his effective efforts to resolve 
the underlying motivation for the original offences, the completion of a variety of courses and receipt of a prize 
for rehabilitation, and establishment of a hand skills project for other inmates out of his own pocket, the report 
says he shows “maturity and selflessness and with this and other positive factors in his favour, the CMC 
believes he is an ideal candidate for placement on parole. He has become a very responsible and respectful 
individual who may no longer pose any further danger to society … he has obtained maximum benefit from his 
imprisonment and his paroling will no doubt lead to further rehabilitation. Nothing we believe would negatively 
impact upon his suitability of (sic) parole.”’ (Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 b), p. 1). 
266 s 2(a). 
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276B(1)(a) If a court sentences a person convicted of an offence to imprisonment for a 
period of two years or longer, the court may as part of the sentence, fix a period during 
which the person shall not be placed on parole 
(b) Such a period shall be referred to as the non-parole period and may not exceed two 
thirds of the term of imprisonment imposed or 25 years, whichever is the shorter. 267 
Read together, the provisions create a mechanism whereby courts can stipulate, or rather 
order, that the DCS not consider a prisoner for parole until the specified non-parole period 
has lapsed. This applies only to sentencing after 1 October 2004. Prior to section 276B being 
in force there was no mechanism in place by which courts could order a non-parole period.268 
Importantly, should courts wish to specify a non-parole period, they should do so with 
reference to section 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act and not section 73(6)(a) of the 
Correctional Services Act.269 The changes to the parole provisions should also be seen against 
a general desire on the part of government to establish a regime prescribing stiffer sentences 
for serious crimes.  
The situation with regard to a court specifying a non-parole period is a confusing one, since 
the chronology of evolving jurisprudence does not follow a neat time-line. Prisoners were 
sentenced prior to the amendment of laws, and the commencement of amendments was 
delayed. In S v Botha the Supreme Court of Appeal had to assess the validity of the trial 
court’s recommendation that the applicant had to serve two-thirds of the sentence before 
being considered for parole. The appellant was sentenced before October 2004 (with s 276B 
of the Criminal Procedure Act not in force) and the appeal judgment delivered in 2006. In 
Botha the Supreme Court of Appeal regarded subordinate courts specifying a non-parole 
period as an undesirable incursion into the affairs of the executive, another branch of 
government.
270
 Furthermore, where a court specified a non-parole period, this should be 
regarded as “just a recommendation” to the DCS and not an instruction.271 The Botha court 
wanted to see a strict separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive.272 An 
                                                            
267 It should be noted that s 276B was inserted by Act 87 of 1997 but its coming into force was delayed until the 
full Correctional Services Act came into force in October 2004. 
268
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earlier decision also followed this approach when the trial court recommended that the 
prisoner serve at least 30 years before he is considered for parole. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal concluded that it merely indicated the trial judge’s view of the period that 
ought to expire before parole is considered and not intended to bind the executive.
273
 A 
similar conclusion was reached in S v Sidyno.274 
Even if courts are, after October 2004, legally mandated to order a non-parole period and thus 
bind the executive, questions still arise as to its desirability. In Stander v S the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in a 2011 judgment concluded that this should only be done in exceptional 
circumstances.275 Citing several judgments, the Court was acutely aware of the separation of 
powers doctrine and the importance of avoiding tension between the judiciary and the 
executive. In general it regarded the DCS to be in a far better position and better equipped to 
deal with the question of release. The philosophical points underlying the earlier judgments 
were not discarded when statutory provision was made for courts specifying a non-parole 
period to be served. To make such an order, a court must therefore consider specific evidence 
with regard to, for example, the seriousness of the offence, the prospects for rehabilitation 
and the risk that the offender pose to the community. This incursion into the domain of the 
executive, as per Botha, should thus be made with great circumspection. 
While any court can make a recommendation, as compared to an order with reference to 
section 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act, with respect to a non-parole period, parole 
boards should regard it as such: a non-binding recommendation expressed by the court at 
some point in time (which could have been several years earlier). From the many cases that 
prisoners took to court about the non-parole period, the overwhelming impression is that the 
parole boards interpreted these recommendations too narrowly and were willingly bound by 
them. 
9.1.3 The incarceration framework 
 
                                                            
273
 S v Maseko 1998 (1) SACR 451(T) cited in Mujuzi, J.D. (2011), p. 216. 
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Relying somewhat tenuously on a number of court decisions,
276
 the DCS came to the 
conclusion in 2007 that the courts had “no control” over the decision to release a prisoner on 
parole and that this was entirely the prerogative of the executive.277 The DCS did, however, 
not refer to the findings of the South Law Reform Commission report on sentencing and its 
recommendation with regard to parole.278Again with the aim of establishing consistency in 
parole decisions, it introduced, through the Correctional Services Amendment Act (25 of 
2008), the “incarceration framework”. The framework would be developed by the National 
Commissioner in consultation with the National Council on Correctional Services (an 
advisory body to the Minister) and “ratified”279 by the Minister of Correctional Services. 
Regulations to give effect to the incarceration framework would be developed and submitted 
to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services for approval. The Correctional Services 
Amendment Act (25 of 2008) required that the incarceration framework: 
 (a) must prescribe sufficient periods in custody to indicate the seriousness of the 
offences; 
(b) must apply to all sentenced offenders generally;  
(c) must provide for consistent application of its provisions; 
(d) may provide for different periods in relation to the same offence, depending on the 
measure of good behaviour or co-operation of a sentenced offender during 
incarceration; and 
(e) may provide for any ancillary or incidental administrative matter necessary for the 
proper implementation or administration of the incarceration framework.
280
 
 
When the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services in its deliberations on the draft 
Correctional Services Amendment Act (25 of 2008) [Bill 32 of 2007] invited public 
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 S v Botha 2006 (2) SACR 110 (SCA) and S v Nkosiand Others2003 (1) SACR 91 (SCA). 
277 Motivation for the amendment of the Correctional Services Act, 111 of 1998 (Correctional Services 
Amendment Bill, 2007), PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 24 
August 2007, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20070823-correctional-services-amendment-bill-briefing 
Accessed 28 December 2011. 
278 South African Law Commission (2000) Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework), Discussion Paper 91, 
Project 82, Pretoria: SALRC. 
279 The notion of domestic subordinate law being “ratified” by a Minister is without precedent in South Africa 
and its meaning is thus unclear.  
280 s 73A (2). 
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comment, the incarceration framework came in for sharp criticism from civil society groups. 
The first major point of concern was that the incarceration framework would introduce a third 
parole regime into the already confusing situation where different non-parole periods were 
already applicable to prisoners sentenced before and after October 2004.
281
 Second, leaving 
the determination of non-parole periods entirely at the discretion of the executive who would 
determine this in subordinate legislation (i.e. regulations), which may indeed change from to 
time, was unfair to prisoners who needed certainty with regard to the non-parole period they 
were to serve.282 Third, leaving the specification of the non-parole period entirely in the 
hands of the executive may indeed conflict with the intentions of the sentencing court. A 
court may impose a particular term of imprisonment with the knowledge that consideration 
for release on parole will happen at a known and specified point in time in the future (e.g. at 
half the term).283 The incarceration framework would have removed this certainty. 
 
When the Correctional Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008 came into force on 1 October 
2009, the sections dealing with the incarceration framework
284
 were omitted.
285
 In November 
2010 the Correctional Matters Amendment Bill [Bill 41 of 2010] was tabled in Parliament 
and proposed the repeal of the sections in the Correctional Services Amendment Act (25 of 
2008) establishing the incarceration framework. Three reasons were given for this about-face: 
the introduction of a third parole system would “be highly undesirable and unworkable”; 
there were concerns about the legality of the framework; and it was said that “no version of 
                                                            
281 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2007) Submission to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 
relating to parole and the proposed amendments concerning parole in the Correctional Services Amendment 
Bill, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape. PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services of 4 September 2007, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20070903-correctional-services-
amendment-bill-public-hearings Accessed 28 December 2011. 
282 Muntingh, L. (2007 c) Submission by the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative to the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services on the Correctional Services Amendment Bill [B 32 of 2007]. PMG report on the meeting 
of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 4 September 2007, 
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an incarceration framework could practically achieve the desired outcomes stipulated”.
286
 
The reasons offered were indeed the very same objections raised by civil society in 2007.  
 
Although it was later repealed, the incarceration framework was ill-conceived from the start 
and should not have been passed into law. It appears that its enactment driven by the then 
Minister of Correctional Services, Ncgonde Balfour; after his departure in 2009, it was 
possible to remove it from the legislation. The actions of the DCS were again indicative of an 
organisation that remained unresponsive to the advice given by outsiders. Notwithstanding its 
repeal, the incarceration framework was an awkward incident and alienated several civil 
society stakeholders. At a time when legislative simplicity was required to clean up the 
confusion around parole and prevent further litigation by disgruntled prisoners, the intention 
was there to devise a system under executive control that would only have aggravated the 
situation. The failed incarceration framework is also indicative of the less tangible tension 
between the Department and its charges. If the framework could have been made to work, it 
would have given unfettered discretion to the executive to grant and withhold parole.  
 
9.2 Structure and functioning of the parole boards 
 
9.2.1 Overview 
 
There are 48 Correctional Supervision and Parole Boards (parole boards) in South Africa, 
structured according to the respective management areas, and these were created by the 
Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) when it came into force in October 2004.287 The 
parole boards make decisions in respect of the conditional release of sentenced prisoners on 
parole288 and on correctional supervision for sentenced prisoners serving sentences of two 
years or longer.
289
 Prior to the 2008 amendment to the Correctional Services Act, parole 
                                                            
 286PMG report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 10 November 2010,  
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101110-department-correctional-services-matters-related-enhanced-parole-syst 
Accessed 28 December 2011. 
287 s 74-75. 
288 This includes ordinary parole, day parole and medical parole. 
289 s 75. 
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boards dealt with all sentenced prisoners serving a sentence of twelve months or longer.
290
 
The decision to release sentenced prisoners serving determinate sentences of less than 24 
months (the so called non-board cases) is made by the National Commissioner, who has 
delegated this authority to Heads of Prisons.
291
 
The implications of this are not insignificant. More than 72% of sentenced prisoners released 
in South Africa, according to 2005 figures, have served sentences of less than 24 months and 
61% served sentences of less than twelve months.
292
 The 2008 amendment saw the parole 
boards’ effective control over releases diminish to a little more than a quarter of all releases. 
Conversely, the overwhelming majority of decisions to release sentenced prisoners serving 
determinate sentences remain firmly under the control of the executive in the absence of 
civilian input. In respect of the release on parole of the “non-board” cases, little has changed 
from what the situation was prior to 2004. As a result of this structural arrangement, there is a 
paucity of information about the decision-making processes governing “non-board” cases. 
Since this category serves shorter sentences it is also unlikely they would engage in litigation, 
which would have brought some measure of transparency. 
In respect of prisoners serving life imprisonment, the parole board makes a recommendation 
to the Minister of Correctional who in turn makes the final decision.293 The Act also provides 
for a Correctional Supervision and Review Board with the authority to review parole board 
decisions that have been referred to it by the Minster of Correctional Services, the National 
Commissioner or the Inspecting Judge.294 Each parole board consist of a chairperson, deputy 
chairperson, two representatives from the community and one official appointed by the 
National Commissioner of Correctional Services. Save for the appointed official, all other 
members are not officials of the DCS and are appointed for a period of five years.295 
                                                            
290 s 75 as amended by s 52 of Act 25 of 2008. 
291 Regulations to the Correctional Services Act, Government Gazette, No. 26626, p. 97. 
292 Muntingh, L. (2007 c). 
293 s 75(1)(c). 
294 s 76. 
295 There are conflicting reports with regard to the term of the contract, with some reports indicating a five-year 
term and others, annual contracts.  
 
 
 
 
328 
 
Essentially the parole boards make their decisions independently from, but based upon, 
information submitted to them by the prison-based Case Management Committee (CMC).296 
The establishment of civilian parole boards was intended to bring about a greater sense of 
public participation in the prison system and, perhaps more importantly, to make the 
community partly responsible for who is released from prison. Fears about public safety and 
the possibility that dangerous offenders are released without recognising the interests of the 
public are what partly motivated the establishment of the civilian parole boards. Prior to that 
(between 1993 and 2004), parole boards did exist but comprised of only DCS officials; the 
responsibility and accountability for releases thus rested firmly with the DCS. 
9.2.2 Problems with the parole boards 
 
In the preceding section it was evident that there were substantial problems with the decision-
making of parole boards, resulting in several instances where prisoners sought relief from the 
courts. The problems with the parole boards did not escape Parliament’s attention, and in 
September 2009 the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services invited a number of parole 
board representatives and the DCS to brief it on their achievements and challenges.297 A 
myriad of problems emerged.  
The first was that the DCS was not properly managing the parole boards. This manifested 
itself primarily in positions on the parole boards being vacant, especially those of 
chairpersons, with vice chairpersons having to fulfil that function without being remunerated 
accordingly.
298
 In the case of some parole boards, the position of chairperson had never been 
                                                            
296 The Case Management Committee (CMC) is an internal DCS Committee whose task it is to prepare a 
comprehensive report, as required by s 42(2)(d) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, on each sentenced 
prisoner. The report is referred to as a profile and is submitted to the parole board with a recommendation from 
the CMC as to the suitability of the prisoner to be released on parole or correctional supervision. 
297 PMG Report on the meeting of the portfolio Committee on Correctional services of 8 September 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20090908-briefing-selected-parole-board-chairpersons-challenges-functioning-pa 
Accessed 21 December 2011. 
298 The recruitment of chairpersons would remain a problem, and in 2010 the existing chairpersons’ five-year 
contracts were extended for a further two months to allow for the delayed recruitment of new chairpersons 
(‘Parole board tenure extended’ News24.com, 26 July 2010, http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Parole-
board-tenure-extended-20100726 Accessed 23 December 2011). By the end of the 2010/11 financial year, new 
parole boards had been appointed (Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), p. 21.) 
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filled. Whereas chairpersons were appointed on five-year contracts, there was no clarity in 
respect of vice chairpersons, and community representatives were appointed on monthly 
contracts. Furthermore, it appeared that at least some parole board chairpersons were kept in 
the dark as to their remuneration. Naturally this affected the morale of the parole board 
members. Administrative, logistical and security support were also raised as concerns. From 
the information presented to the Portfolio Committee it appears that the parole boards 
received little, if any, assistance from the DCS when prisoners engaged in litigation, and it 
was left to the parole boards and the state attorney to prepare and file the necessary court 
papers. Initially this resulted in significant backlogs,299 but these had been addressed by and 
large by 2010/11.
300
 
Second, a number of parole board chairpersons doubted the independence of the parole 
boards as there was, allegedly, undue influence in the decision-making of the parole boards. 
Reference was made to, for example, a sudden interest from the Head Office in high profile 
cases and DCS officials insisting on accompanying the parole board members to a hospital 
when assessing medical parole cases. This was equally demoralising as it affected the boards’ 
independence and legitimacy as well as the esteem in which the community held them.  
Third, the reports on individual prisoners submitted to the parole boards by the CMC 
frequently lacked vital information, such as the history of previous criminal convictions, 
remarks by the trial court or the sentence plan. This problem was exacerbated by the shortage 
of professional staff in DCS (e.g. social workers) to prepare the relevant documentation and 
render the necessary rehabilitation programmes. In the absence of critical information the 
parole boards found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. A prisoner has a legitimate 
expectation to be assessed by the parole board and it is no fault of the prisoner that the 
information is not available; however, the parole board can hardly proceed and make a 
decision if key information is not included in the report from the CMC.301 This added to the 
backlog of cases. 
Fourth, consistency in decision-making was more a concern of the DCS than of the parole 
boards when addressing the Portfolio Committee in 2009. The core issue appears to be a lack 
                                                            
299 ‘Prison parole boards dysfunctional: Bloem’. SABC News, 12 May 2007, 
http://196.35.74.234/south_africa/crime1justice/0,2172,148933,00.html Accessed 23 December 2011. 
300 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), pp. 70-71. 
301 Groenewald v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2011 (1) SACR 231 (GNP). 
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of skills and knowledge by both the parole board members and CMC members of the relevant 
legislation and related matters. The legislation governing parole is not simple, and each case 
requires careful analysis to ensure that the correct decision is reached in a manner that 
complies with the requirements of just administrative action. It appears that parole board 
members had received very little initial training, and no evidence was presented to the 
Portfolio Committee in September 2009 that refresher training courses were undertaken. The 
inconsistency in decision-making, as described in the preceding sub-section, is therefore not 
altogether surprising. 
In addition to the four problems areas described above, it was also noted that the Department 
of Justice and the SA Police Services seldom, if ever, participated in parole board meetings as 
is provided for in law, and this has been confirmed in other research.302 Medical parole cases 
were also identified as a problem area and concerns raised about the opinions received from 
medical practitioners; the concerns related to prisoners who are debilitated but not terminally 
ill and to the lack of post-release support systems for prisoners being considered for medical 
parole. 
9.3 Summary of issues 
 
The first civilian parole boards (2005 to 2010) ran into numerous difficulties. Many of their 
travails can be ascribed to the deficient manner in which the Department managed the parole 
boards in terms of their training, conditions of service and general support. In several 
instances prisoners contested parole board decisions in the courts, and this affirmed, when 
successful, that the parole boards were poorly trained and not infrequently receiving 
inadequate advice and support from the Department. A number of high-profile cases fuelled 
public doubt in the parole system.303 It also became increasingly clear that the parole boards 
                                                            
302 Louw, F.C.M. and Luyt, W.F.M. (2009), p. 13. 
303 The following are two examples in this regard. In 2005 Mark Scott-Crossley was sentenced to life 
imprisonment by the Phalaborwa Circuit Court for assaulting and then throwing a former employee into a lion 
enclosure. He appealed, and on 28 September 2007 the Supreme Court of Appeals in Bloemfontein set aside 
Scott-Crossley's murder conviction. The sentence of life imprisonment was substituted with five years' 
imprisonment on the lesser offence of being an accessory after the fact. It was established that the victim was 
already dead when Scott-Crossley intervened. He was released on parole in September 2010. The case was 
charged with racial overtones, and for many South Africans his release meant that white and rich people can 
escape punishment. (‘Man who threw worker to the lions walks free’. Mail and Guardian, 30 September 2010, 
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were not properly trained in the Constitutional requirements of just administrative action, and 
it can be surmised that there must have been prisoners who served longer periods of their 
sentences in prison than were strictly required. In a number of the court decisions it was not 
always clear why the Department opposed the applications; good legal advice should have 
pointed out the weaknesses in the Department’s case. 
The history of the parole boards after 1994 well illustrates the nexus between governance and 
human rights. Failure to comply with strict adherence to constitutional and legal prescripts by 
parole boards, a belligerent attitude in litigation, and inadequately trained parole board 
members led to decisions that had a direct impact on the right of sentenced prisoners to be 
considered for parole at the appropriate, legally prescribed time and, unless relevant evidence 
is presented, then released on parole. Unlawful decisions by parole boards resulted in 
prisoners being deprived of their liberty for longer than what was strictly necessary. 
 
10. Children 
 
A 1997 survey of children in South Africa’s prisons found that the 1 361 sentenced children 
and 1 175 awaiting-trial children (2536 in total) were in general poorly cared for.304 The weak 
legislative framework regulating children in conflict with the law at the time, the absence of a 
legal framework regulating children in prison  (the 1998 Correctional Services Act was still 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
http://mg.co.za/article/2010-09-30-man-who-threw-worker-to-the-lions-walks-free Accessed 28 December 
2011). Tony Yengeni, a former ANC Chief Whip in the National Assembly, was convicted of defrauding 
Parliament by not declaring a discount he received on a luxury vehicle. He was sentenced to four years’ 
imprisonment under a specific provision requiring him to serve at least one-sixth of the sentence in prison. He 
was released in January 2007 under correctional supervision after five months. Shortly thereafter he was seen 
consuming alcohol whilst under community corrections, and in November 2007 was arrested for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. It transpired that a police officer interfered with the evidence relating to the drunk-
driving case, and although he was prosecuted, the charges against Yengeni were dropped. With good reason, the 
Yengeni matter created suspicion about political interference in the implementation of sentences 
(‘Commissioner gave order on Yengeni, says cop’. Mail and Guardian, 18 June 2009, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2009-06-18-commissioner-gave-order-on-yengeni-says-cop Accessed 28 December 
2011). 
304 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (1997) Children in Prison in South Africa – a situational analysis, Bellville: Community 
Law Centre. 
 
 
 
 
332 
 
being drafted at the time), and the sheer volume of children in prisons created problems in 
nearly every aspect of operations relating to children. Whilst good or at least acceptable 
practices were identified, the overwhelming impression was that children were detained 
under conditions that were in line neither with international norms
305
 nor the Constitution.
306
 
Overcrowding, poor record-keeping, failure to segregate children from adults, violence in 
prison, poor conditions of detention and so forth were some of the problems noted in the 
1997 survey. There was little doubt that children were detained under conditions which the 
Constitution did not permit. 
The remainder of this section deals with legislative developments pertaining to the 
imprisonment of children and also provides updated information on conditions of detention 
and services to imprisoned children. It will be argued that while legislative reforms have been 
progressive, implementation lagged behind. 
10.1 Legislative developments 
 
In 2004 the remaining chapters of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) came into 
force and set new standards with regard to children in prisons. A number of provisions deal 
specifically with children to give recognition to the special protections under the 
Constitution.307 The Act firstly defines a child as a person under the age of 18 years, whereas 
the 1959 Act defined a juvenile as a person under the age of 21 years. It further requires that 
children be detained separately from adults and in accommodation which is “appropriate to 
their age”. The latter is, however, not defined. Standards are also set in respect of their diet308 
through the regulations, requiring that children should receive a more nutritious diet with 
increased protein.
309
 Section 12 of the Act addresses health care of all prisoners and requires, 
with reference to children, that consent for surgery must be obtained from the child’s 
                                                            
305 For example the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989 Entry into force 2 September 1990, 
in accordance with article 49) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their 
Liberty (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/113 of 14 December 1990). 
306 ss 12, 28(1)(g) and 35. 
307 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2004) What does the new Correctional Services Act say about children in prison, Article 
40, Vol. 6 No. 3. 
308 s 8(2). 
309 Regulations to the Correctional Services Act, Gazette 26626, 30 July 2004, Regulation 4(1)(c). 
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guardian, or if it is not possible, that consent can be given by the attending physician. Section 
13 of the Act requires the National Commissioner, upon the admission of a child to prison, to 
inform the relevant authorities who have a statutory responsibility for the education and 
welfare of children. Furthermore, the National Commissioner must also inform the parent or 
guardian of the child’s imprisonment and/or transfer and the child may not refuse that this be 
done.310 
Section 19 of the Act deals in particular with children’s access to education as well as social-
work services, religious care, recreational programmes and psychological services. 
Importantly, all children of compulsory school-going age311 must have access to education 
and if not of compulsory school going age school, access to education should as far as 
practicable be provided. Illiterate children, even when not of compulsory school-going age, 
may also be compelled to attend programmes aimed at literacy.312 In addition, a duty is 
placed on the National Commissioner to ensure, as far as is possible, that children remain in 
contact with their families.313 In respect of children performing labour in prison, such labour 
should be limited to activities aimed at obtaining and improving skills for their 
development.314 Dull repetitive tasks, such as cleaning duties, would not meet this 
requirement.315 The amended section 43(4) provides that the National Commissioner may, in 
consultation with the relevant provincial authorities (Welfare or Education), transfer a child 
to a child and youth care facility as contemplated in section 191(2)(f) of the Child Justice Act 
(75 of 2008). Section 69 deals with children placed under community corrections, and it may 
be required that a child attend certain programmes whilst under community corrections. 
The Child Justice Act (75 of 2008), which came into operation on 1 April 2010, further 
strengthened the legal framework regulating the imprisonment of children. It firstly raised the 
age of criminal capacity from seven to ten years, thus removing children under the age of ten 
                                                            
310 s 13. 
311 Schooling is compulsory for all South Africans from the age of seven (grade 1) to the age of 15, or the 
completion of grade 9 (s 3(1) South African Schools Act 84 of 1996). 
312 s 41(2). 
313 s 19(3). 
314 s 40(3)(b). 
315 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2004), p. 4. 
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years from the ambit of criminal sanctioning and the possibility of imprisonment.
316
 
Furthermore, children aged between ten and fourteen years are presumed to lack criminal 
capacity unless the state can prove otherwise. The Child Justice Act also excludes a prison as 
a place of pre-trial detention for children under the age of 14 years,
317
 and if the child is under 
the age of 16 years, the Director Public Prosecutions must issue a certificate verifying that 
there is a prima facie case involving an offence listed under Schedule 3318 to the Child Justice 
Act.
319
 The Child Justice Act lists a number of additional factors to be taken into account
320
 
and stipulates further that the placement of an awaiting trial child detained in a prison be 
reviewed every 14 days.321 In respect of sentencing, the Child Justice Act limits the use of 
imprisonment as a sentencing option to children older than 14 years and adds additional 
                                                            
316 7. (1) A child who commits an offence while under the age of 10 years does not have criminal capacity and 
cannot be prosecuted for that offence, but must be dealt with in terms of section 9. 
(2) A child who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years and who commits an offence is presumed to 
lack criminal capacity, unless the State proves that he or she has criminal capacity in accordance with section 
11. 
(3) The common law pertaining to the criminal capacity of children under the age of 14 years is hereby amended 
to the extent set out in this section. 
317 s 30(1)(b) Act 75 of 2008. 
318 Schedule 3 contains the most serious offences such as treason, sedition, murder, extortion, kidnapping, 
robbery and rape.  
319 s 30(2) Act 75 of 2008. 
320 s 30(3) (a) the best interests of the child; 
(b) the child’s state of health; 
(c) previous convictions, previous diversions or charges pending against the child; 
(d) the risk that the child may be a danger to himself, herself or to any other person or child in a child and 
youth care centre; 
(e) any danger that the child may pose to the safety of members of the public; 
(f) whether the child can be placed in a child and youth care centre, which complies with the appropriate 
level of security; 
(g) the risk of the child absconding from a child and youth care centre; 
(h) the probable period of detention until the conclusion of the matter; 
(i) any impediment to the preparation of the child’s defence or any delay in obtaining legal representation 
which may be brought about by the detention of the child; 
(j) the seriousness of the offence in question; or 
(k) any other relevant factor. 
321 s 30(4). 
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protective measures to restrict its use to ensure that it is used as a measure of last resort and 
only for the shortest possible period.322 
Collectively the Correctional Services Act and the Child Justice Act brought about vast 
improvements to the legal framework regulating the use of imprisonment for children and, if 
imprisoned, the conditions of their detention. Jurisprudential developments have also ensured 
that children are excluded from the provisions of the much-maligned mandatory minimum 
sentences legislation,
323
 that non-custodial sentencing option are considered even when a 
serious offence had been committed,324 criminal capacity,325 and pre-sentence reports.326 
 
10.2 The situation in 2011327 
 
A 2011 survey of children in South African prisons collected qualitative and quantitative data 
from 41 prisons. Despite the guidance provided by the Correctional Services Act, the Child 
Justice Act, the 2004 White Paper on Corrections, DCS policies and case law, the central 
finding of the survey was that implementation in respect of the services and activities 
available to children is varied and inconsistent. This referred in particular to information 
provided at admission, orientation of new admissions, conditions of detention, the 
segregation of children from adults, access to education, access to recreational activities and 
preparation for release.  
Instances were identified at certain DCS facilities where practices were compliant with the 
legislation, indicating that the required standards can be met in the current environment and 
                                                            
322 s 77. 
323
 Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others [2008] JOL 22687 
(T); S v Vilakazi (576/07) [2008] ZASCA 87; [2008] 4 All SA 396 (SCA) ; 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) (3 
September 2008) S v Z and 23 Similar Cases 2004 (1) SACR 400 (E); S v B 2006 (1) SACR 311 (SCA). 
324
 Director of Public Prosecutions, Kwazulu-Natal v P 2006 (1) SA 446 (SCA); 2006 (1) SACR 243 (SCA). 
325
 S v Ngobese and Others 2002 (1) SACR 562 (W). 
326 S v Van Rooyen 2002 (1) SACR 608 (C). 
327 This section is based on Muntingh, L. and Ballard, C. (2011 b) Report on Children in prison in South Africa, 
Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
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context. The Brandvlei Youth Correctional Centre (Western Cape) stood out in particular, 
echoing similar findings made in the 1997 survey.328 
It was also found that since 2003 the total daily number of children imprisoned in South 
Africa across all categories declined drastically from 4500 to 846 in February 2011.
329
 It was 
also established that children charged with and convicted of non-violent offences are now far 
less likely to be imprisoned. Despite these developments, it was also the case that sentence 
tariffs for children have increased slightly, a trend reflected in the total prison population.
330
 
The survey established that children remain awaiting trial in DCS facilities for an average of 
70 days, a considerable length of time for a child. While policies and law stipulate that 
children should have access to a range of services (educational, social work, therapeutic, 
developmental and recreational), this was found not to be the case at all prisons surveyed. 
Awaiting-trial children of compulsory school-going age are, in particular, excluded from 
education. Generally, conditions of detention for unsentenced children were below the 
required standards in several facilities surveyed due to limited infrastructure, overcrowding 
and staff shortages. However, staff shortages may be the result of the poorly managed shift 
system discussed in Chapter 4 (section 2.2.4). 
Some centres surveyed were able to engage children actively throughout the day, but the 
overwhelming impression is that children are sitting idle in their cells for most of the time. 
Even when children are outside their cells, structured recreational, educational and 
developmental services are limited. It is especially unsentenced children who are feeling the 
brunt of the idle monotony of daily prison life, with little to engage them in constructive and 
meaningful activities. Although unsentenced children are innocent until proven guilty, and 
                                                            
328 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (1997) p. 15. 
329 The decline in the number of children detained and sentenced to imprisonment has not been studied 
independently, but it is in all likelihood the result of a combination of at least three factors. First, over a number 
of years the Department of Social Development had created additional Child and Youth Care Centre capacity 
where children could be detained awaiting trial and therefore not be in a prison. Second, there has been a general 
and substantial decline in the number of offenders sentenced to imprisonment (see section 2.2 Fig. 1 above), and 
this is also reflected in the number of children sentenced to imprisonment. Third, it can be argued that given the 
extensive advocacy and training done by civil society organisations with judicial officers since 1990 on child 
justice, their attitude towards, and knowledge of, children’s rights and the appropriateness of imprisoning 
children had improved. 
330 Giffard, C. and Muntingh, L. (2006). 
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thus technically not eligible for rehabilitation services, this should not exclude them from 
general educational, developmental and recreational activities. There is also a common 
perception that awaiting-trial child prisoners have a high turnover and can thus not be 
engaged in sustained educational services. However, it was found, as alluded to above, that 
on average unsentenced children remain in prison for a period of 70 days. This is a 
sufficiently long period to engage unsentenced children in meaningful activities. 
Generally, sentenced children find themselves in a better situation than their unsentenced 
counterparts. However, a number of problems areas were noted in respect of conditions of 
detention, the range and accessibility of services and programmes, and access to education 
for all children, especially those of compulsory school-going age. In 2008 the Correctional 
Services Act was amended and subsequently required that only offenders serving a sentence 
of longer than 24 months need to have a sentence plan.331 This applies regardless of age. Prior 
to the amendment, the cut-off point was 12 months. Without a sentence plan it is difficult to 
see how sentenced prisoners, including children, would access educational, training and 
rehabilitation services. The amendment was extremely unfortunate as it now excludes a larger 
proportion of sentenced prisoners, and thus children, from access to services emanating from 
the sentence plan. The implication of the amendment is that that a child has to commit a more 
serious offence and thus receive a longer sentence in order to gain benefits from the services 
rendered by DCS. The exclusion is arbitrary and not based on any well-motivated reasons; in 
all likelihood it would not be justifiable under the limitations clause of the Constitution.332 
Child safety inside prisons is a further reason for concern. In interviews the 2011 survey 
established that violence (including sexual violence) and intimidation were fairly common. It 
was found that that the overwhelming majority of DCS officials working with children 
(sentenced and unsentenced) had not received training to work with children with specific 
reference to anti-bullying strategies, suicide prevention or conflict management.  
Even though section 19(3) of the Correctional Services Act requires the National 
Commissioner to take all practicable steps to ensure that children remain in contact with their 
families, little evidence was found that the Department takes any specific measures to 
promote contact between children and their families. Children are required to purchase phone 
cards from their own funds, and it is only at a few prisons that they are supplied with 
                                                            
331 s 38(2). 
332 s 36 Act 108 of 1996. 
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stationery to write letters to their families. Children who do not have the necessary funds and 
resources are effectively cut off from their families. It was found that 40% of children had not 
had any visitors in the three months preceding the data collection undertaken for the survey. 
Even though children generally have access to the DCS internal complaints mechanism, their 
knowledge of the Judicial Inspectorate’s Independent Visitors was limited and few 
understood what their functions are.  
Section 6 (3-4) of the Correctional Services Act requires the DCS to provide prisoners with 
information upon admission about their rights and responsibilities. This relates not only to the 
regime of the prison but also to due process rights such as access to legal representation. 
Practices were found to vary widely between different prisons, and most children stated that 
their main source of information was other children. Children’s access to rehabilitative and 
therapeutic programmes is also inconsistent, with some prisons providing excellent services 
(e.g. Brandvlei prison) and others having virtually nothing in place to assist children. 
10.3 Overview of issues 
 
While the number of children in prison has declined drastically, efforts to render better 
services that are aligned to the Correctional Services Act appear to be limited. The reduction 
in numbers should have enabled the rendering of improved services, but in many regards the 
situation remains similar to that described in the 1997 survey report. A number of individual 
centres such as Brandvlei and Cradock exhibited greater levels of compliance with the 
Correctional Services Act, but the majority are characterised by inconsistent practices where 
policy and law is implemented to a greater or lesser degree. Where conditions of detention 
and services are of an acceptable nature, it appears that this is the result of individual 
leadership and commitment by the staff at a particular prison, rather than of a system-wide 
endeavour to treat children in accordance with legal and constitutional prescripts. 
As is the case in respect of other thematic areas, the impression gained is that constitutional 
and legislative requirements have not driven reform in the prison system. This is particularly 
true in the case of children. Strict adherence to the requirements of the Correctional Services 
Act as it pertains to children is not enforced, nor does it seem to be a priority. For imprisoned 
children, the Constitution has afforded little value. 
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11. Women 
 
Very little is known about female prisoners, be they adults and children, in South Africa, and 
the research undertaken has been descriptive in an effort to place women’s issues on the 
prison discourse agenda.333 The crimes women commit, especially murder, have received 
some attention in the literature,334 as have the reasons for women’s involvement in crime.335 
Recent research has also investigated policy recommendations in respect of women’s 
imprisonment.336 In addition, imprisoned mothers have been the subject of research,337 and 
mothers imprisoned with their infants have received notable attention from the Ministry of 
Correctional Services in recent years.
338
 Two notable studies have also been undertaken on 
female prisoners’ experiences in prison as well as on their exposure to violence prior to and 
during imprisonment.339 Writings by female prisoners with a literary slant have been 
                                                            
333 Gibbons, J. (1998) Women prisoners and South Africa, The Prison Journal, Vol. 78 No. 3. 
334 Pretorius, H.G. and Botha, S. (2006) The cycle of violence and abuse in women who kill an intimate partner - 
a biographic profile, South African Journal of Psychology, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 242-252; Kramer, S. (undated) 
Discourse and power in the self-perceptions of incarcerated South African female sexual offenders, University 
of South Africa Institute for Social and Health Sciences, http://www.mrc.ac.za/crime/atsa_kramer.pdf Accessed 
27 December 2011; Maritz, S. (2003) Women who kill: a psycho-legal literature review, Mini-dissertation in 
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master in Psychology, University of Johannesburg.  
335 Artz, L., Hoffman-Wanderer, Y. and Moult, K. (2011) Women, crime and incarceration – exploring 
pathways of women in conflict with the law, Cape Town: Gender, Health and Justice Research Unit. 
336 Gender, Health and Justice Research Unit (2011) Policy brief – women in prison – health and mental health, 
Cape Town, Gender, Health and Justice Research Unit. 
337 Luyt, W.F.M. (2008) Imprisoned mothers in South African prisons with children outside the institution, 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, p. 304. 
338 Address by the Hon. NN Mapisa-Nqakula – MP, Minister of Correctional Services On the Occasion of the 
National Women’s Consultative Conference: Launch of National Council on Gender Based Violence and the 
South African Chapter on UN ‘Unite to End Violence’ Campaign, Birchwood Hotel, Boksburg Gauteng / 1-3 
August 2011. ‘Better facilities to make jail stay easier for babies’. The Sowetan, 1 July 2010, 
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/2010/07/01/better-facilities-to-make-jail-stay-easier-for-babies 
Accessed 27 December 2011. 
339 Haffejee, S., Vetten, L. and Greyling, M. (2006 a) Violence and abuse in the lives of women and girls 
incarcerated at three Gauteng women’s prisons, Johannesburg: CSVR Gender Programme, Research Brief, No. 
3, Haffejee, S., Vetten, L. and Greyling, M. (2006 b) Minority Report – the imprisonment of women and girls in 
Gauteng, Johannesburg: CSVR Gender Programme, Research Brief, No. 4. 
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published from time to time.
340
 In short, empirical research on women in prison in South 
Africa, especially from a rights perspective, is scarce indeed. 
The Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 makes only brief mention of female prisoners 
with reference to the separation of males from females at all times
341
 and female prisoners 
admitted with their infants.342 The Department’s Standing Orders do not provide much more, 
although there is a substantive section on women’s reproductive health, stipulating the 
medical and support services that they should receive.
343
 Compliance with this has, however, 
not been assessed. The 2004 White Paper is equally light in respect of female prisoners, 
noting that female prisoners are often far removed from their families due to the small 
number of designated female prisons.344 The White Paper further advocates for meaningful 
training opportunities for female prisoners and the greater use of non-custodial sentencing 
options. The emphasis in the White Paper is, however, placed on mothers imprisoned with 
their infants as the key issue in respect of female prisoners. 
In this section it will be argued that the rights, concerns and real challenges faced by female 
prisoners have been neglected by and large and that the care of infants imprisoned with their 
mothers has dominated the Department’s approach to female prisoners. As much as one may 
lament the fact that infants are on occasion imprisoned with their mothers and that a prison is 
not the ideal environment for child-rearing, it should also be acknowledged that there are 
very few such infants in the prison system – 145 at the end of February 2011 for the 3 762 
female prisoners.345 
                                                            
340 Schreiner, B. (ed) (1992) A snake with ice water: prison writings by South African women, Johannesburg: 
Congress of South African Writers; Landau, J. (2004) Journey to myself – writings by women from prison in 
South Africa, Cape Town: Footprints. 
341 s 7(2)(b) 
342 s 20 
343 B Order 3, Chapter 3, Section 9.0. Other provisions deal with the wearing of a thali (necklace worn by 
married Hindu women); the transfer of pregnant females to hospitals at other prisons; the separation of female 
prisoners; security measures around the keys to female sections; a register for body-cavity searches; the use of 
teargas in female sections, especially where there are pregnant female prisoners; the prohibition of the use of 
stun belts on pregnant female prisoners; the provision of toiletries; the clothing to be issued; and females under 
community corrections to be monitored by female officials.  
 344Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) para 11.4. 
345 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. 
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11.1 Profile 
 
It is not necessary to describe the profile of female prisoners in detail as this has been done 
elsewhere,346 but a few notable issues need to be raised as background. By October 2007 
there were eight prisons designated for women only and 86 where men and women could be 
detained separately in different sections.
347
 The majority of female prisoners are held in 
overcrowded prisons, and at the end of February 2011 occupation levels for six of the eight 
designated female prisons were as follows: Pollsmoor 204%; Pretoria 196%; Johannesburg 
183%; Worcester 173%; Thohoyandou 150%; and Durban 143%.
348
 Overcrowding has 
similar effects here as it has in male prisons (see section 3 above), but in this case, given the 
low and stable number of female prisoners, it is even more perplexing that the construction of 
female prisons to alleviate overcrowding has never featured in the Department’s plans. 
Since 1994 the proportion of women in the prison system has remained fairly stable, and by 
the end of March 2011 they constituted 2.3% of the total population.349 This falls at the lower 
end of the range for African countries
350
 and substantially below the rate in developed 
countries.351 As at end February 2011, 29% of female prisoners were awaiting trial compared 
to 30% of males. However, compared to their male counterparts, awaiting-trial female 
prisoners are less able to afford bail when this is granted. According to a 2004 survey by the 
Judicial Inspectorate, a third of female prisoners were granted bail but could not afford it, 
compared to 7% of male prisoners. Women’s inferior socio-economic status in society is thus 
also felt in prison, and results in avoidable imprisonment.352 With respect to race and gender, 
                                                            
 346Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons (2004) Women in South African Prisons. A publication prepared by the 
Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons in Support of the 16 Days of Activism Campaign Unite Against Women and 
Child Abuse. Cape Town: Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons; Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a) Women and Prisons in 
South Africa, CSPRI Newsletter, No. 9, February 2005, p. 1.  
347 Luyt, W.F.M. (2008), p. 304. 
348 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. 
349 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. See also Luyt, W.F.M. (2008), p. 
305. 
350 Vetten, L. (2008) The imprisonment of women in Africa, In Sarkin, J. (ed) Human Rights in African Prisons, 
Cape Town: HSRC Press, p. 136. 
351 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a), p. 1. 
352 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a), p. 2. 
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coloured females, as is the case with coloured males, are over-represented in the prison 
population, a situation that is apparent in Table 2 below.353 
Table 2 
Category Asian Black Coloured White 
Prison Population Female 1.9 68.6 21.1 8.5 
National population Female354 2.5 79.5 9.0 9.0 
Prison Population Male 0.5 80.5 17.5 1.5 
National population Male355 2.6 79.4 8.9 9.1 
 
Female prisoners tend to be slightly older than males, with 71% above the age of 25 years 
compared to 66% of males.356 Sentenced female prisoners serve slightly shorter sentences 
compared to males, with 55% serving sentences of less than five years compared to 31% of 
males.357 The crime profile for sentenced and unsentenced women in prison shows that 45% 
are imprisoned for economic offences and 38% for aggressive crimes.358 Noteworthy in 
respect of the offence profile is that, according to a 2004 survey, nearly a third of imprisoned 
(sentenced and unsentenced) women are there for murder and attempted murder.359 This is 
substantially higher than for males.  
 
11.2 Female prisoners’ exposure to violence and abuse 
 
A 2006 survey of female prisoners at three South African prisons found that female prisoners 
had been exposed to violence and sexual violence prior to imprisonment at alarmingly high 
rates,360 as has been found elsewhere.361 Notable in this regard was that 21% experienced 
                                                            
353 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. 
354 Statistics South Africa (2011) Mid-year population estimates 2011, Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 
Statistical Release P 0302, p. 3. 
355 Statistics South Africa (2011), p. 3. 
356 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, as at end February 2011. 
357 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, as at end February 2011. 
358 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, as at end February 2011. 
 359Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a), p. 2. 
360 Haffejee, S., Vetten, L. and Greyling, M. (2006 a). 
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some form of sexual assault, and 15% were raped, before the age of 15 years. Furthermore, 
10% were raped after turning 15 years of age, and a further 11% were victims of an attempted 
rape. Intimate partner abuse was also prevalent, with 63% reporting physical abuse and 33% 
sexual abuse in their last relationship. Of all the women surveyed, 70% reported emotional 
abuse in their last relationship. The extent of injuries sustained as a result of abuse was 
generally severe. Twenty-six percent of those who reported physical abuse suffered 
dislocations and bone fractures, with a further 15% reporting stabbings and gunshot wounds. 
Over the course of their lifetime: 62% experienced some form of economic abuse; 81% 
experienced emotional abuse; 77% experienced physical violence; and 43% experienced 
some form of sexual abuse.
362
 The survey also found that the type of abuse suffered (sexual 
violence versus other forms of abuse such as economic and emotional) was correlated with 
the crime committed (murder versus other crimes). Abuse inside prison was also reported at 
the three prisons surveyed, with 47% of respondents reporting emotional abuse and 34% 
physical abuse in the preceding twelve months. Only 3% reported sexual violence in the 
preceding twelve months. Of importance too is that 16% had attempted suicide and 23% 
reported suicide ideation. Self-harm was reported by 11% of respondents.  
Against this background, two issues are raised: first, the recognition in case law of women in 
abusive relationships who kill their abusive partners, and second, the implications of the 
profile of female prisoners presented above for the DCS and services to female prisoners.  
A significant proportion of sentenced South African female prisoners murdered an intimate 
and abusive partner and did so after suffering years of abuse without receiving the required 
assistance to end the cycle of abuse.363 A number of factors contribute to the eventual murder, 
such as symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a state of hyper-vigilance, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
361 Scherer, Z.A.P. and Scherer, E.A. (2011) Knowledge and violence experience of female prisoners in their 
past life, European Psychiatry, March 2011 Supplement 1, Vol. 26, p1683-1683; Yik Koon Teh (2006) Female 
Prisoners in Malaysia, Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, Vol. 43 Issue 1, pp. 45-64; Pollock, J.M., Mullings, J. 
L. and Crouch, B. M. (2006) Violent Women: Findings from the Texas Women Inmates Study, Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence, Vol. 21 Issue 4, pp. 485-502; Artz, L., Hoffman-Wanderer, Y. and Moult, K. (2011). 
362 Haffejee, S., Vetten, L. and Greyling, M. (2006 a), p. 3. 
363 Pretorius, H.G. and Botha, S. (2006) The cycle of violence and abuse in women who kill an intimate partner - 
a biographic profile, South African Journal of Psychology, Vol. 3 No. 2, p. 242. 
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coercive control by the abusive partner, including needs deprivation, high levels of conflict 
and substance abuse.364 
 
It was these factors that came to the fore in the Supreme Court of Appeal decision of S v 
Ferreira and others.365 Anita Ferreira found herself trapped in a seven-year relationship with 
an abusive man from which she could not escape despite several attempts to do so. She hired 
and paid two young men to kill him, and as this was a premeditated murder, the trial court 
was obliged to impose life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that 
the history of severe abuse amounted to “substantial and compelling reasons” permitting a 
deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. The Court overturned 
the life sentence of Ferreira but not of her accomplices, and replaced it with six years’ 
imprisonment suspending the remainder which she had not already served. There may indeed 
be several more female prisoners who could benefit from the Ferreira decision, and Sloth-
Nielsen reported that an identification of possible beneficiaries was under way in 2004.366 It 
is, however, unknown if it delivered any results. Despite this, South African Courts will 
subsequently have to recognise that the “pattern of the mind of the abused partner is 
eventually so overborne by maltreatment that no realistic avenue of escape suggests itself 
other than homicide”.
367
 
 
In respect of services (e.g. rehabilitation) to sentenced female prisoners, the profile of female 
prisoners compels the Department to render services that recognise the high prevalence of 
sexual victimisation, family violence and intimate partner violence in this group of prisoners. 
Nevertheless, there is nothing in official documents such as the DCS’s Annual Reports and 
Strategic Plans to indicate that these characteristics have been taken into account in the 
development of rehabilitation services specifically geared to female sentenced prisoners. 
Instead the impression gained is that the mindset around rehabilitation services is permeated 
by the non-gendered approach characteristic of the Correctional Services Act and the 2004 
                                                            
364 Pretorius, H.G. and Botha, S. (2006), p. 244. 
365
 S v Ferreira and others 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA). 
366 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a), p. 3. 
367 S v Ferreira and others 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA) para 10. Also S v Engelbrecht 2005 (2) SACR 42 W; 
Williams, J. (2008) Violence in intimate relationships: ‘’Til death do us part’, Cape Town: Women’s Legal 
Centre. 
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White Paper. This is the predominant approach, and it presents a significant hurdle to the 
successful rehabilitation and reintegration of sentenced female prisoners. 
The Department would thus be well-advised to take note of recent developments that saw the 
adoption of the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-
custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules).368 A more overt focus on 
female prisoners would require devoting particular attention to their mental health care (Rule 
12-13), social reintegration needs (Rule 29), and staff training to give recognition to women’s 
special needs (Rule 29). The prevalence of victimisation amongst female prisoners calls for 
additional steps to be taken in recognition of their vulnerability to violence in society.  
11.3 Female prisoners as mothers 
 
11.3.1 Imprisoned mothers with children outside 
 
The overwhelming majority of female prisoners (83%) in South Africa are mothers, and 45% 
of them were the breadwinners of the household prior to their imprisonment.
369
 Of 
imprisoned mothers, 33% had one child, 25% had two children and 42% had three and more 
children. 370 It has also been found that the children of female prisoners are young, with 68% 
under the age of 12 years.
371
 While infants imprisoned with their mothers may readily attract 
media and political attention, the larger and more direct impact of imprisoning women is felt 
in the households they leave behind. The 2004 survey undertaken by the Judicial Inspectorate 
found that 74% of these children were placed with family or friends and only 17% were 
placed in foster care, children’s homes or adopted.372 Regular contact with their families is 
the preserve of the minority of female prisoners, with 55%373 reporting that they have no 
contact.374 Luyt reported that, based on a national survey, just less than a third of female 
prisoners confirmed some form of contact with all their children, while 65% of female 
prisoners had lost contact with all or at least some of their children. The same author found 
                                                            
368 A/C.3/65/L.5 Adopted by the UN General Assembly 6 October 2010. 
369 Haffejee, S., Vetten, L. and Greyling, M. (2006 b), p. 3; Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a), p. 3. 
370 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a), p. 2. 
371 Luyt, W.F.M. (2008), p. 315. 
372 A slightly higher figure, of 22% is reported by Haffejee, S., Vetten, L. and Greyling, M. (2006), p. 3. 
373 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a), p. 2; Haffejee, S., Vetten, L. and Greyling, M. (2006 b), p. 3. 
374 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2005 a), p. 2. 
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that 95% of female prisoners had not received any visits from their children. The Gauteng 
survey found that one in three female prisoners have had not seen their children since they 
were imprisoned. 375 
Although different surveys may have reported slightly different results in respect of family 
contact, the overall conclusion is that the greater majority of female prisoners will lose 
contact with their children when imprisoned and that very few receive visits from their 
children. While some women in Luyt’s study reported that they prefer not to have their 
children visit them at prison, other reasons included intimidation of children by officials and 
older children choosing not to visit their mothers in prison out of shame.376 Overcrowding 
and the disastrous shift system377 also limit the duration of visits. In addition, concerns have 
been raised about the suitability of visiting facilities for the children of female prisoners.378 
The situation regarding female prisoners as mothers raises a number of concerns, especially 
ones relating to the impact their imprisonment has on the children who remain behind and 
separated from their primary caregivers. This has been associated with problem behaviour in 
children during adolescence and later life.379 The imprisonment of a household member, 
including a parent, has been found to increase the risk of children in that household for later-
in-life imprisonment by five times.380 The impact of imprisonment of a primary caregiver on 
her children was the substance of the 2007 Constitutional Court decision M v S. In this case 
the Constitutional Court attached particular significance to the interests of M’s three children 
as she was the primary caregiver and, if she were imprisoned, it would have had severely 
detrimental consequences for them.
381
 In her particular circumstances neither the father of the 
children nor any other family member was in a position to take care of her children if she was 
imprisoned for four years (the sentenced imposed by the trial court). The best interests of the 
                                                            
375 Haffejee, S., Vetten, L. and Greyling, M. (2006 b), p. 3. 
376 Luyt, W.F.M. (2008), p. 319. 
377 See Chapter 4 section 2.2.4. 
378Luyt, W.F.M. (2008) p. 318. 
379 Agnew, R. (2007) Strain theory and violent behaviour. In D. Flannery, A. Vazsonyi, and Waldman, I. The 
Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behaviour and Aggression (pp. 519-529). Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press. 
380 Social Exclusion Unit (2002) Reducing Re-offending by Ex-prisoners: Report by the Social Exclusion Unit, 
London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (UK). 
381
 M v S (Centre for Child Law: Amicus Curiae) 2007 (12) BCLR 1312 (CC); 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) 2008 
(3) SA 232 (CC). 
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children
382
 became the central and thus constitutional issue. The Constitutional Court 
overturned the term of four years’ direct imprisonment imposed by the Cape High Court and 
replaced it with three years’ correctional supervision to enable M to continue to take care of 
her children and avoid the detrimental impact her imprisonment would have had on them. 
The findings presented above tend to indicate that the DCS has not delivered on the 
objectives in the 2004 White Paper relating to the central role that families play in social 
reintegration and rehabilitation.
383
 There is, indeed, little evidence to suggest the Department 
regards the lack of contact between imprisoned mothers and their children as a problem.  
11.3.2 Infants imprisoned with their mothers 
 
The admission of infants to prison with their mothers was possible under the 1959 
Correctional Services Act,384 and according to DCS policy these infants could remain with 
their mothers until the age of two years.385 When the relevant section of the 1998 legislation 
was enacted (31 July 2004),386 it was stipulated that such infants could remain with their 
mothers until they reached the age of five years. The 2008 amendment of the Correctional 
Services Act reduced this period to two years, as was the case prior to 1998.387 The 
Department motivated this, first, by stating that the age limit was initially set at five years due 
to a lack of resources to place children elsewhere, and second, based on advice from the 
Department of Education stating that two years of age is sufficient for the critical bonding 
                                                            
382 s 28(2) Act 108 of 1996. 
383 3.3.3 In this regard, the Department of Correctional Services recognises the family as the basic unit of 
society. The family is also the primary level at which correction should take place. The community, including 
schools, churches and organisations is the secondary level at which corrections should take place. The state is 
regarded as being the overall facilitator and driver of corrections, with the Department of Correctional Services 
rendering the final level of corrections. Our successes in crime-prevention and rehabilitation are intimately 
connected to how effectively we are able to address the anomalies in South African families that put people at 
risk with the law at the primary level – that is at family level.(Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) para 
3.3.3.) 
384 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 229. 
385 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services of 24 August 2007, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20070823-correctional-services-amendment-bill-briefing Accessed 28 
December 2011. 
386 s 20 Act 111 of 1998. 
387 s 14 Act 25 of 2008. 
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period between mother and child.
388
 The amended legislation also requires that upon 
admission of such an infant the Department must “immediately” take the necessary steps, in 
conjunction with the Department of Social Development, to effect the proper placement of 
the child taking into consideration the best interests of the child.
389
 Furthermore, the 
Department remains responsible for the health care and nutrition of the infant, and where 
practicable, there should be a designated mother-and-child unit to accommodate mothers with 
their children.
390
 As far as could be established, two such units have been established at 
Pollsmoor and Durban Westville prisons and a third is planned for Zonderwater prison.391 
However, the international norm in respect of the age to which children may remain with 
their imprisoned mothers is not so firm as was presented by the DCS to the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services. Even within the European Union there is notable 
variation.392 In respect of closed prisons, the age limit ranges from nine months (e.g. 
Netherlands and England and Wales) to three years (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
Where open prisons are available, the age limit is higher, and in the case of Germany this is 
set at six years.  
In August 2011 draft regulations pertaining to, amongst others, the placement of infants 
imprisoned with their mothers were placed before the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services. At the time of writing, these were not yet finalised. It is nonetheless notable that the 
amendment of the Correctional Services Act in 2008 did not use the opportunity to cross-
refer to the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (as amended by Act 41 of 2007), which describes in 
                                                            
388 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services of 24 August 2007, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20070823-correctional-services-amendment-bill-briefing Accessed 28 
December 2011. 
389 s 20(1) and (1A). 
390S  20 (2-3). 
391 ‘Minister launches a 'model' Mother and Child Unit’. SA Government Information Press Release, 18 Aug 
2011, ,http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=20944&tid=40274 Accessed 28 
December 2011. Speech by the Hon. N.N. Mapisa-Nqakula – MP, Minister for Correctional Services, on the 
Occasion of the Unveiling of the Durban Westville Mother and Child Unit, Durban Westville Female 
Correctional Centre, 26 August 2011, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=21292&tid=41655 Accessed 28 December 
2011. 
392 EU Age limits for children living with imprisoned mothers, http://www.eurochips.org/facts-and-figures/eu-
prison-age-limit/ Accessed 28 December 2011. 
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detail the procedure for placement of children in alternative care as well as for adoption. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Department appears to have taken tangible steps to 
ensure the proper care of the small number of infants imprisoned with their mothers through 
amending the relevant legislation and incrementally establishing mother-and-child units.  
12. Unsentenced prisoners 
 
Unsentenced prisoners (those awaiting the finalisation of their trials) find themselves in a 
particularly difficult situation. On the one hand, they are presumed innocent until proven 
guilty,393 and on the other, they have been deprived of their liberty (effectively a punishment) 
in the interests of justice.
394
 To address this tension, the Constitution guarantees the right to 
conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, and notes specifically the right 
to exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading 
material and medical treatment.
395
 Furthermore, all prisoners, including unsentenced 
prisoners, are afforded the right to legal counsel396 and to be visited by their spouse or 
partner, next of kin, religious counsellor and chosen medical practitioner.397 The minimum 
standards for detention under humane conditions set out in Chapter 3 of the Correctional 
Services Act apply equally to sentenced and unsentenced prisoners. In short, unsentenced 
prisoners are afforded the same basic rights as sentenced prisoners, notwithstanding that they 
are excluded from rehabilitation services (corrections) since they are presumed innocent. 
The 2011 amendment to the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998)398 expanded 
substantially on the legislative framework governing unsentenced prisoners. In addition to 
existing provisions dealing with receiving food and drinks, clothing and visitors, Act 5 of 
2011 added standards in respect of pregnant unsentenced prisoners,399 disabled unsentenced 
                                                            
393 s 35(3)(h) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
394 s 35(1)(f) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
395 s 35(2)(e) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
396 The provision of legal counsel at state is expense is only provided ‘if substantial injustice would otherwise 
result’ (s 35(2)(c) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996). 
397 s 35(2)(f) and s 35(3)(f) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
398 Correctional Matters Amendment Act 5 of 2011. 
399 s 49A. 
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prisoners,
400
 aged unsentenced prisoners,
401
 mentally ill unsentenced prisoners,
402
 and the 
referral of terminally ill or severely incapacitated unsentenced prisoners to court,403 the 
release of unsentenced prisoners into the custody of the police,404 and a maximum period 
(two years) for which an unsentenced prisoner may be detained.
405
 An important change is 
that in respect of clothing, unsentenced prisoners will, once the amendment comes into 
operation, be issued with a prisoner uniform which is distinct from those worn by sentenced 
prisoners. At present unsentenced prisoners are permitted to wear civilian clothes. At the time 
of writing (December 2011), the amendment act had not yet come into force, but it improves 
in a number of ways the legal framework regulating unsentenced prisoners. A peculiarity of 
the amendment is that in some regards it sets clearer and firmer standards for unsentenced 
prisoners than for sentenced prisoners with reference to pregnant prisoners, disabled 
prisoners, aged prisoners, and mentally ill prisoners. 
The amendment to the legislation governing unsentenced prisoners follows a Cabinet 
decision in 2009 that the DCS should establish dedicated capacity to manage unsentenced 
prisoners.406 The Department had, until the Cabinet decision, regarded unsentenced prisoners 
as technically falling outside of its responsibilities: unsentenced prisoners have not been 
convicted and sentenced, and the Department’s core business is the rehabilitation of 
offenders. The 2004 White Paper notes that the Department continues “to be saddled” with 
the responsibility of unsentenced prisoners.407 Ideally the Department wanted either the 
police or the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development to be responsible for 
unsentenced prisoners. The 2009 Cabinet decision brought finality to the issue even though it 
was highly unlikely that either the police or the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development would ever have taken over this function. 
                                                            
400 s 49 B. 
401 s 49 C. 
402 s 49 D. 
403 s 49 E. 
404 s 49 F. 
405 s 49 G. 
406 Department of Correctional Services (2010 a) Annual Report 2009/10, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 16. 
407 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) para 2.2.2. 
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Subsequent to the Cabinet decision the Department commenced planning to establish a 
dedicated remand detention unit and remand detention facilities; it also began the drafting of 
a White Paper on Remand Detention.408 At the time of writing, information about the 
progress of these activities was unavailable, and it is thus not possible to make an assessment. 
However, during deliberations on the draft legislation, questions were raised about the cost 
implications of establishing a dedicated remand unit in the Department and the establishment 
of dedicated remand detention prisons.
409
 The Department did not offer an adequate response 
to these questions,410 and this may cause delays in implementation. 
In many respects, unsentenced prisoners have found themselves marginalised in the ideology 
of the Department. They were not part of the Department’s new core business – rehabilitation 
– and their presence in DCS prisons was patently resented by senior management. Whereas 
the DCS understood its mandate in respect of sentenced prisoners as having a clear bearing 
on rehabilitation, this was not the case with unsentenced prisoners, even though the 1998 
Correctional Services Act explicitly stated that they were the Department’s responsibility. 
Three main themes have emerged in relation to unsentenced prisoners: their conditions of 
detention, unnecessary detention and the duration of detention. It will be argued that, 
measured against the Constitution, their conditions of detention are frequently worse than 
those sentenced prisoners, primarily as a result of overcrowding. A further argument is that 
the detention of a sizeable proportion of the unsentenced prison population is indeed 
avoidable; by implication, their presence in prison aggravates overcrowding. It will also be 
shown that a notable proportion of unsentenced prisoners remain in custody for long periods 
                                                            
408 Department of Correctional Services (2011 b) Strategic Plan 2011/-2014/5, pp. 11 and 13. 
409 Submission by CSPRI on the Correctional Matters Amendment Bill [B41 of 2010], Submission by the 
Institute for Security Studies on the Correctional Matters Amendment Bill [B41 of 2010] PMG Report on the 
meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 25 January 2011, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110125-correctional-matters-amendment-bill-research-analysis-provisions-cont 
Accessed 29 December 2011. 
410 The information provided by the Department only covered the costs incurred at Head Office level for Year 1 
and an estimate of the costs to provide clothing to unsentenced prisoners. The information provided did not 
address the establishment of dedicated remand detention facilities. (Department of Correctional Services (2011 
g) Summary of submissions received and Departmental responses thereto: Correctional Matters Amendment 
Bill, 41 of 2010, PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 27 January 
2011, http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110127-correctional-matters-amendment-bill-department-correctional-
services- Accessed 29 December 2011). 
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prior to their cases being finalised and that the existing legal framework does not provide 
adequate protection of the rights to liberty and to have one’s trial commence and conclude 
without undue delay. Combined with one another, these three thematic issues raise serious 
concerns about the right to dignity and the right to be free from arbitrary detention. 
 
12.1 Conditions of detention 
 
Conditions of detention are closely linked to overcrowding, as discussed previously in section 
3. Table 3 below presents the figures on the unsentenced prisoner population as at the end of 
February 2011 for the 15 prisons holding the highest numbers of this category of prisoner. 
Nearly 70% of unsentenced prisoners are held in these prisons; with the exception of 
Pollsmoor Medium A, all the listed prisons holding unsentenced prisoners were overcrowded, 
with several of them occupied above 175%. 
Table 3 
Prison Capacity Unsentenced Sentenced In custody: 
total 
% 
Occupation 
Johannesburg Med. A  2630 6118 150 6268 238.3% 
Pollsmoor Max.  1872 4162 104 4266 227.9% 
Pretoria Local  2171 4140 104 4244 195.5% 
Durban Med. A  2399 3873 137 4010 167.2% 
St. Albans Med. A  1446 2681 45 2726 188.5% 
Boksburg 2012 2188 1973 4161 206.8% 
Modderbee 2993 2156 2845 5001 167.1% 
Krugersdorp  1757 1445 1774 3219 183.2% 
Pietermaritzburg  2499 1326 1597 2923 116.9% 
Umtata Med.  580 1272 61 1333 229.8% 
Grootvlei Max.  890 1260 609 1869 210.0% 
Goodwood 2115 1216 1158 2374 112.3% 
Nelspruit  816 864 421 1285 157.5% 
Pollsmoor Med. A  1111 824 249 1073 96.6% 
Vereeniging  786 752 379 1131 143.9% 
 
As articulated in the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998), the general requirement in 
respect of unsentenced prisoners creates the impression of a freer and more open regime:  
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Remand detainees
411
 may be subjected only to those restrictions necessary for the 
maintenance of security and good order in the remand detention facility and must, 
where practicable, be allowed all the amenities to which they could have access outside 
the remand detention facility.
412
 
The reality, however, is substantially different. Unsentenced prisoners do not have access to 
rehabilitation and education programmes, and seldom have access to recreational services.413 
The Judicial Inspectorate reported on instances where prisoners were not issued with eating 
utensils and had to resort to eating out of plastic containers with their hands or, using expired 
phone cards, with self-made spoons.414 Given the severity of overcrowding and the 
prevalence of staff shortages (see Chapter 4 section 2.2.4 with reference to the Seven Day 
Establishment), it is doubtful if the minimum of one hour of outside exercise per day415 is 
consistently complied with. Indeed, pre-trial detention is primarily a life of idleness, 
monotony and boredom. Compared to sentenced prisoners, unsentenced prisoners are 
frequently worse off, an observation that did not escape the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention during its mission to South Africa in 2005: 
The Working Group is primarily concerned about the conditions of detention affecting 
these persons, either when placed in police cells or in regular prison facilities. Not only 
are the conditions much worse than those affecting sentenced detainees, but the lack of 
adequate facilities is so blatant that they do not meet minimum standards enshrined in 
the United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form 
of Detention or Imprisonment.
416
 
 
Similar observations were made as far back as 1997 by the South African Human Rights 
Commission
417
 and, in 2004, by the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of 
                                                            
411 Act 5 of 2011 introduced the new terms ‘remand detainee’ and ‘remand detention’. 
 412s 46(1). 
413 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2006) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2005/6, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 14. 
414 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2008) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2007/8, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 9. 
415 s 11 of Act 111 of 1998. 
416 E/CN.4/2006/7/Add.3 para 66. 
417 South African Human Rights Commission (1998) Report of The National Prisons Project of the South 
African Human Rights Commission, Johannesburg: SAHRC, p. 32. 
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Detention in Africa after her mission to South Africa.
418
 The Judicial Inspectorate for 
Correctional Services has also consistently raised concerns about overcrowding in pre-trial 
detention facilities and the impact it has on hygiene, infrastructure and the general well-being 
of these prisoners. In it’s 2005/6 Annual Report the Inspectorate noted that, because 
unsentenced prisoners were not issued with uniforms and made to wear their private clothes, 
it is often the case that they have only one set of clothes: should they want to wash these 
clothes, they have to strip naked and wait for them to dry.
419
 Even though (as described 
above) the DCS cited the issuing of uniforms from a security perspective,420 it should 
nevertheless address this undignified practice. 
The Department’s strategy in respect of unsentenced prisoners is unclear at present. However, 
the most important development was the confirmation, in the form of a Cabinet decision, that 
the DCS is indeed the agency responsible for unsentenced prisoners. It means the DCS must 
ensure that such prisoners are detained under conditions consonant with human dignity. The 
changes to the legislation, the planned White Paper on Remand Detention and the creation of 
a distinct unit in the Head Office to manage pre-trial detention are all grounds for optimism 
that there will be an improvement in the conditions under which unsentenced prisoners are 
detained. That being said, reducing the number of unsentenced prisoners – and, more 
specifically, reducing the period in which they are kept in custody – remains the central 
challenge. This is discussed in the following section. 
12.2 Avoidable detention 
 
Some 30% of South Africa’s prison population are unsentenced prisoners, and while this may 
not be high compared to some African states (e.g. Mali = 89%) it is also higher than the 
figures for several other African states.421 It will be argued that the detention in prison of a 
                                                            
418 Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa (2004) Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa Mission to the Republic of South Africa 14 – 30 
June 2004, Banjul: African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. 
419 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2006), p. 20. 
420 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services of 10 November 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101110-department-correctional-services-matters-related-enhanced-parole-syst 
Accessed 29 November 2011. 
421 Ghana 28.6%; Cote d'Ivoire 28.5%; Sao Tome & Principe 28.5%; Swaziland 27.5%; Seychelles 27.2%; 
Mozambique 26.9%; Rwanda 26.9%; Tunisia 22.7%; Malawi 18.5%; Lesotho 18.0%; Botswana 17.0%; 
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substantial proportion of the unsentenced prison population is in fact avoidable. Avoidable 
detention is primarily the result of unnecessary arrests being made by the police, courts 
granting unaffordable bail, and persons suspected of mental illness being detained in prisons 
awaiting trial. These are problems arising mainly from poor coordination between different 
role players in the criminal justice system and the consequent fragmentation in functions and 
performance. Three issues, then, are dealt with below: unnecessary arrests, unaffordable bail, 
and the detention of persons to undergo psychiatric evaluations. 
 
12.2.1 Unnecessary arrests 
 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the police make unnecessary arrests, but the 
Judicial Inspectorate made such an attempt in its 2004/5 Annual Report. It estimated that in 
excess of 18 000 people per month were unnecessarily arrested by the police and 
consequently ended up in prison awaiting trial.422 Even though the exact quantum may be 
hard to pin down, it is well known that the police have monthly arrest targets and it is hence 
likely that these targets contribute to unnecessary arrests.
423
 A closer analysis of police arrests 
statistics shows that 53% of the 1 452 600 arrests made by the police in 2010/11 were not for 
priority crimes, or crimes less serious than shoplifting;424 it can be assumed that at least some 
of those suspects will have been detained in prison. These observations are given further 
credence by findings from three magisterial courts, to the effect that one out of two accused 
persons remanded to custody are never tried – instead, their cases are either withdrawn or 
struck from the roll.425 Even if only a relatively small proportion of the unnecessary arrests 
made by the police end up awaiting trial for a relatively short period of time, it will 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Ethiopia 14.0%; Algeria 12.4%; Sudan c.10%; Egypt 9.9%; Namibia 7.9% (World Prison Brief, International 
Centre for Prison Studies, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=africa&category=wb_pretrial Accessed 29 
December 2011). 
422 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2005) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2004/5, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 21. 
423 Women’s Legal Centre (Undated) Submissions on South Africa to the Commission on status of Women, para 
188.  
424 SAPS (2011) Annual Report 2010/11, Pretoria: SAPS, p. 66. 
425 Karth, V (2008) ‘Between a rock and a hard place’ - Bail decisions in three South African courts, Cape 
Town: Open Society Foundation (South Africa), p. 32. 
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nonetheless make a significant contribution to the unsentenced prisoner population. Whether 
or not the DCS has attempted to intervene on policy and coordination level in this regard is 
unknown. Be the case as it may, the sheer number of arrests raises serious concerns that many 
of them would amount to arbitrary detention, which is a violation of section 12(1)(a) of the 
Constitution. 
 
12.2.2 Unaffordable bail 
 
The majority of South Africa’s prisoners, sentenced and unsentenced, are from poor and 
disadvantaged backgrounds. What may seem a modest and affordable amount to a magistrate 
granting bail, may in truth not be the case. The accused may even agree to the affordability of 
the proposed bail amount, hoping that friends and family will contribute. Unaffordable bail is 
not an isolated incident, and a 2005 survey by the Judicial Inspectorate found that 27% of the 
unsentenced prison population were granted bail of less than R1 000 (US$ 150) but remained 
in custody because they could not afford to pay it.426 Two years later, in 2007, the situation 
improved marginally and the proportion dropped to 22.3%.
427
 The implication, nonetheless, 
is that one in five unsentenced prisoners is unnecessarily in custody because of his or her 
socio-economic status. 
Part of the problem appears to lie in poor coordination and communication between Heads of 
Prisons and the courts. If bail is granted, a court may assume that the accused will pay. 
However, if he does not, there is no formal mechanism by which the court will be notified of 
this and will only become aware of it at the accused person’s next appearance in court. In this 
regard the Judicial Inspectorate recommended close and active monitoring to ensure that 
courts are informed with the least delay that the accused is unable to pay the amount set and 
that reconsideration may be required.428 
12.2.3 Detention of persons suspected of mental illness, mental defect or lacking criminal 
responsibility 
 
                                                            
426 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2005), pp. 19 and 21. 
427 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2007) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2006/7, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 31. 
428 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2007), p. 35. 
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The Criminal Procedure Act makes provision for the committal of a person suspected of 
mental illness, mental defect or lacking criminal responsibility to a psychiatric institution 
where a panel of designated persons will conduct an assessment and make a recommendation 
to the court.
429
 However, bed space in the designated psychiatric hospitals is limited. For 
example, Valkenburg Psychiatric Hospital in Cape Town has space for 15 patients referred by 
the courts for observation. The result is that if bail is not granted, these individuals remain in 
the custody of the DCS until bed space becomes available. In 2010 it was reported that an 
accused person referred for observation to Valkenburg had still not been admitted to the 
hospital despite two months having passed; he was, moreover, number 55 on the waiting 
list.
430
 Waiting lists of similar length were also reported at Sterkfontein Psychiatric Hospital 
in Krugersdorp431 and Weskoppies Psychiatric Hospital in Pretoria.432 The waiting time for 
admission to a psychiatric hospital can be months and possibly more than a year. In one case 
it was reported that an accused person was referred to Sterkfontein Psychiatric Hospital for 
observation shortly after being arrested.433 At that stage he was number 114 on the waiting 
list and seven months later he had moved up to number 35. In the meantime he was detained 
at a prison where he was frequently assaulted by other prisoners.  
Although prisoners in this category constitute a small proportion of the total unsentenced 
prisoner population, their prolonged detention in prison whilst awaiting bed space in a 
psychiatric hospital is an attack both upon their right to dignity and right to have their trials 
commence and be concluded without unreasonable delay.434 Moreover, because there is at 
least a suspicion of mental illness or defect, their presence in a prison may pose a risk to 
themselves and to others. 
                                                            
429 s 78-79 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
430 ‘Geen bed by ValkenburgvirEksteen. Die Burger, 17 May 2010, http://www.dieburger.com/Suid-
Afrika/Nuus/Geen-bed-in-Valkenberg-vir-Eksteen-20100517 Accessed 29 December 2011 [No bed at 
Valkenburg for Eksteen – own translation]. 
431 ‘Alleged wife and daughter killer could walk free’ Looklocal.co.za 
http://www.looklocal.co.za/looklocal/content/en/kempton-park/kempton-park-news-
crime?oid=4497689&sn=Detail&pid=490121&Alleged-wife-and-daughter-killer-could-walk-free Accessed 29 
December 2011. 
432 ‘Ghosts in C-Max?’IOL, 10 April 2008, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/ghosts-in-c-max-1.395985 
Accessed 29 December 2011. 
433‘The plight of prisoners with mental illnesses’ Wits Justice Project, Radio production, 21 August 2011, 
http://www.journalism.co.za/he-plight-of-prisoners-with-mental-illnesses.html Accessed 29 December 2011. 
434 s 35(3)(d) Act 108 of 1996. 
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The Correctional Matters Amendment Act (5 of 2011) attempted to provide some relief in 
this regard in that it mandates the National Commissioner to detain a person suspected of 
having a mental illness in a single cell and also to provide, as far as possible, the necessary 
mental health care services.
435
 Strictly speaking, the Correctional Matters Amendment Act (5 
of 2011) did not bestow any more powers on the National Commissioner in respect of 
prisoners suspected of being mentally ill. Segregation was already possible if “such detention 
is prescribed by the medical officer on medical grounds”.
436
 The capacity of the Department 
to render mental health care services to these prisoners whilst they are awaiting admission to 
a psychiatric hospital is limited, and at the end of the 2010/11 financial year only 55 
psychologists were employed in the Department.
437
 
The solution to the problem lies in the sphere of the Department of Health, which is 
responsible for psychiatric hospitals. The limited available bed space is far exceeded by the 
demand, leading to an entirely undesirable situation in which persons awaiting psychiatric 
observation remain for months in the custody of the DCS with virtually no access to support 
services. 
 
12.3 Duration of custody 
 
Even though the Constitution guarantees the right for an accused person’s trial to commence 
and be concluded within a reasonable time, there is no limit on how long a person may 
remain in custody awaiting trial. While the accused may at any time apply for bail, subject to 
the submission of additional evidence if already refused, the majority (65%) of detained 
accused persons stay in custody until their cases are finalised.438 The Criminal Procedure Act 
also provides for an inquiry into unreasonable delays in a trial, but the initiation of such an 
inquiry is at the discretion of the court and is not mandatory after a specified period of time 
has lapsed.439 It has been argued elsewhere that this open-ended approach, lacking custody 
                                                            
435 s 49D Act 5 of 2011. 
436 s 30(1)(c) Act 111 of 1998. 
437 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), p. 202. 
438 Karth, V. (2008) p. 28. Ballard, C. (2011) Research report on remand detention in South Africa: an overview 
of the current law and proposals for reform, Bellville: Community Law Centre, p. 21. 
439 s 342A Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
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time-limits and a mandatory review mechanism concerning delays, is out of step with 
developments in other countries and regional jurisprudence.440 It is not necessary to repeat 
this reasoning here. Fundamentally, the absence of these safeguards results in the Criminal 
Procedure Act providing inadequate protection of the accused persons’ right to liberty.  
A substantial proportion of unsentenced prisoners remain in prison for a considerable period 
of time while they wait for the finalisation of their trials. As at the end of February 2011, 47% 
of the unsentenced prison population had been in custody for longer than three months. 
Comparing data from 2003/4 with data from 2010/11, it appears that the situation is 
deteriorating slightly and that there has been an increase in the number of unsentenced 
prisoners remaining in custody for longer than 12 months; this is presented in Figure 4 
below.441 In 2003/4 some 42% of unsentenced prisoners had been in custody for three to six 
months, but by 2010/11 this proportion had dropped to 38%. On the other hand, the 
proportion of unsentenced prisoners who had been in custody for longer than two years had 
increased from 6% to 8.5%. This shift is seen across all the categories presented in Figure 4.  
Figure 5 
 
 
                                                            
440 Ballard, C. (2011). 
441 Statistics supplied by the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
3 - 6 
Months
>6 - 9 
Months
>9 - 12 
Months
>12 - 15 
Months
>15 - 18 
Months
>18 - 24 
Months
> 24 
Months
2003/4
2010/11
 
 
 
 
360 
 
The Correctional Matters Amendment Act (5 of 2011) (not in operation at the time of 
writing), stipulates in section 49G that the period of incarceration of a remand detainee 
cannot exceed two years “from the initial date of admission without such matter having been 
brought to the attention of the court”. The Head of Prison will also be required to report to the 
National Prosecuting Authority at six-monthly intervals on cases involving remand detainees 
who have been held for successive six-month periods. In the event that detention continues, 
the Head of Prison must bring such cases before the court on an annual basis. The proposed 
mechanism, even if it is a step in the right direction, remains weak and will serve only as a 
monitoring mechanism.442 Furthermore, the amendment sets out the procedure to bring an 
accused before a court, but it does not explain what the court must do. The court may indeed 
end up postponing a case for a further six months without interrogating the reasons for the 
delay, as provided for in section 342A of the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977). 
 
In order to be effective, limiting the duration of pre-trial detention should be regulated in the 
Criminal Procedure Act and not in the Correctional Services Act. The decision to remand a 
person to prison awaiting trial is made by the courts, which are governed by the Criminal 
Procedure Act. It is through this legislation, then, that time limits and a mandatory review 
mechanism should be created. 
 
The current provisions are open to a constitutional challenge and it is unlikely that the two-
year limit provided for in the Correctional Matters Amendment Act (5 of 2011) would be 
sufficient to avert such a challenge. Moreover, the two-year limit seems of itself to be too 
long to reflect the constitutional requirement that trials should commence and conclude with 
undue delay. Even though the large awaiting trial prison population, their conditions of 
detention and the duration of their custody are longstanding and well-known problems, 
efforts to address them have not succeeded in bringing about a situation reflecting the 
Constitutional requirement. 
13. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented an overview of the state of prison reform with reference to prisoners’ 
rights in the period after 2004. It dealt with the pervasive and persistent problem of prison 
                                                            
442 Muntingh, L. and Ballard, C. (2011 a). 
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overcrowding, and demonstrated that, especially since the 2005 remission, there has been a 
notable improvement in the national occupancy levels; nevertheless, many prisons remain 
critically overcrowded and detain prisoners under conditions that are an affront to human 
dignity. The combination of overcrowding and reported staff shortages continues to be 
substantial obstacle to improved service delivery and satisfactory conditions of detention. It is 
unsentenced prisoners in particular who bear the brunt of this situation, and they are 
frequently worse off than sentenced prisoners.  
Even though there has been a marked drop in the mortality rate of prisoners, this should not 
be taken to mean that prison health care is at an acceptable level. Information was presented 
that those who die of natural causes do so in a shorter period of time after admission than was 
the case five years earlier. Poor conditions of detention combined with TB, overcrowding and 
less than optimal health-care services place the lives of prisoners at great risk, potentially 
violating their right to life and their right to primary health care.  
The Department cannot guarantee the personal safety and bodily integrity of prisoners, and it 
was shown that inter-prisoner violence, sexual violence, assaults on prisoners by officials and 
torture remain frighteningly common in the prison system. Even if it is accepted that violence 
will always be part of any prison system, the level at which it has been shown to occur in 
South African prisons is unacceptable and cannot be regarded as “normal”. This situation is 
aggravated by the lack of proper investigations for holding perpetrators, especially officials, 
accountable.  
The super-maximum prisons, originally conceived to house only the most problematic of 
prisoners, have not been shown to reduce escapes or make other prisons any safer. 
Furthermore, their regimes of isolation and deprivation remain at odds with the right to 
dignity and the right not be punished in a cruel, inhuman and degrading manner.  
The Department’s level of compliance with statutory prescripts, such as mandatory reports to 
the Judicial Inspectorate and the legislation governing parole, has been shown to be less than 
desirable. The situation was especially poorly managed in respect of the first civilian parole 
boards, resulting in incorrect decisions and prisoners possibly serving longer sentences than 
were strictly necessary.  
It was also shown that even if the number of children in prison decreased dramatically, this 
did not result in a consistent and general improvement in service delivery and conditions of 
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detention. It is rather a case of inconsistency prevailing, with some centres rendering 
excellent services and others denying children the basic right to education and flouting 
national legislation. Unsentenced children find themselves in a particularly vulnerable 
situation. As small a group as they may be, it was shown that female prisoners present a 
distinctive profile that the Department should not ignore in rendering services to them. 
However, little effort is being made to assist female prisoners to remain in contact with their 
families, notwithstanding the fact that DCS policy dictates that the family is central to 
rehabilitation.  
Lastly, unsentenced prisoners are a marginalised group and subject to poor conditions of 
detention characterised by overcrowding. It was also shown that in many instances their 
detention could have been avoided but that poor coordination and communication between 
criminal justice system departments created impediments to their release. 
In overview, then, it appears that while the Constitution and the Correctional Services Act set 
out in detail the rights of prisoners and particular groupings such as children, compliance 
with these standards remained weak. A number of observations in this regard are warranted. 
First, it is safe to say that prisoners’ rights, as legal and ideological constructs, had not 
attained the necessary prominence in the Department’s strategy development and 
consequently failed to permeate the execution of policy. At a rhetorical level, references are 
frequently made to prisoners’ rights, but there is little indication that there exists, or that 
systematic efforts were made to create, a pervasive awareness of prisoners’ rights among the 
staff of the Department. Such an awareness would have prompted dynamic, proactive 
engagement with risk areas; in actuality, however, the situation was all too frequently one in 
which the DCS merely reacted as and when problems broke out. 
Second, in Chapter 4 it was shown that the Department made significant efforts to address 
governance issues, such as engaging external stakeholders, developing internal capacity, 
fixing administration weaknesses and enforcing the disciplinary code. With reference to 
prisoners’ rights, though, similar initiatives were not observed. Governance and human rights 
are two sides of the same coin, but both require an explicit focus if they are to result in 
effective and fundamental reform. The implications of this are twofold. It indicated that 
violations of prisoners’ rights were not regarded with the same reverence by the 
Department’s leadership as allegations and findings of corruption and mismanagement. 
Furthermore, it indicated that when rights violations were reported, they were at best seen as 
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individual incidents as opposed to systemic problems. Rights violations were consequently 
not regarded as systemic failures requiring systemic solutions. While the Department 
acknowledged that in respect of governance it was in a crisis and thus required a focused and 
strategic response, the same conclusion was not reached about the level of compliance with 
prisoners’ rights standards.  
Third, and following from the preceding, the Department at times actively resisted efforts to 
improve the situation in respect of prisoners’ rights. This was well illustrated by its 
willingness to engage in fruitless litigation on parole decisions, by the EN and Others case 
regarding prisoners’ access to ARV, and in its actions in frustrating the class action by a 
group of prisoners from St Albans prison following the mass assault there in 2005. 
Fourth, the 2004 White Paper described the Department’s new core business as rehabilitation, 
and significant efforts were made internally to communicate and promote this message to 
DCS staff. The focus on rehabilitation was, however, nothing new, and even the apartheid 
government of the 1970s advocated for a stronger focus on rehabilitation.443 The White Paper 
assumed great prominence in the reports, communications and policies of the Department 
after 2004. This cannot be faulted, as the White Paper is the overarching policy framework. 
However, with the focus on the White Paper and the centrality accorded to it as the point of 
reference, the Correctional Services Act and meticulous compliance with its prescripts 
consequently shifted to the background. It appears that little preparation was undertaken to 
implement the Correctional Services Act when it came into force in mid- 2004,444 and 
training on the Act seems to be of a superficial and job-specific nature.
445
 Moreover, as Sloth-
Nielsen pointed out in 2007 – a commentary which, so far as could be established, remains 
valid at the time of writing – the Department has not summarised the Act, simplified it into a 
user-friendly format, or used promotional material to communicate it to its 42 000 
employees.446 The lack of knowledge and understanding of the Correctional Services Act 
amongst the staff corps is evidenced by increased litigation against the Department, failure to 
                                                            
443 Super, G. (2011) Like some rough beast slouching towards Bethlehem to be born – a historical perspective 
on the institution of the prison in South Africa 1976-2004, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 51, p. 218. 
444 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2007) ‘The state of South Africa’s prisons’. In S. Buhlungu, J., Daniel, R., Southall & J. 
Lutchman State of the Nation – South Africa 2007, HSRC Press, Cape Town, p. 390. 
445 Personal observation based on interactions with officials and training provided to DCS officials in the course 
of a six-year research project to monitor compliance with the Correctional Services Act. 
446 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2007), p. 391. 
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comply with statutory reporting obligations, and denying prisoners rights that are clearly 
articulated in the Correctional Services Act. The lack of compliance with basic requirements 
in the Correctional Services Act therefore raises doubts about the ability of the Department to 
comply with the 2008 and 2011 amendments to the Act, which place even further demands 
on it. The Correctional Services Act sets the requirements for the operationalisation of the 
Constitutional rights of prisoners; the lack of focus by DCS in this regard therefore explains 
to a large extent the very limited impact the Constitution has had on human rights reform in 
the prison system. 
Fifth, the great prominence that was given to the 2004 White Paper led to the emergence of 
contradiction, one in which the goal – not the reality – of “rehabilitation of offenders” was 
accorded greater priority than meeting the minimum standards of humane detention. For 
example, while prisons remained overcrowded and numerous assaults were reported, public 
pronouncements by the Department, along with its official documentation, addressed these in 
a limited manner. Notwithstanding the bloated rhetoric about rehabilitation,447 realising the 
aims of rehabilitation in an environment where basic rights, especially the right to dignity, are 
compromised is, of course, extremely difficult. Meeting the minimum standards of humane 
detention is, it is contended, a prerequisite for the rendering of effective interventions with 
offenders. 
Sixth, the Department remained less than responsive to concerns raised by domestic and 
international stakeholders to human rights violations. In essence the Department did not 
identify strategic areas of concern regarding rights violations. It did not, based on the 
available information, engage external stakeholders, seek expert advice or train staff on 
human rights law, and so forth, to address rights concerns and violations clearly identified by 
the Judicial Inspectorate, the Committee against Torture, the Special Rapporteur on Prisons, 
the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Human Rights Committee, the SA 
Human Rights Commission and civil society groupings. This lack of responsiveness is 
nowhere better illustrated than in the McCullum case, discussed above in section 4. 
                                                            
447 The following is an extract from the Department’s official newsletter: ‘In his keynote address, the Minister 
said that the department is reaching a milestone in its social partnerships towards sustaining an effective 
correctional system and breaking the cycle of crime. “We are forging ahead with quantifiable service delivery 
targets of promoting corrections as a societal responsibility, running successful rehabilitation programmes and 
facilitating offenders’ social reintegration through partnerships with community police forums and civic 
society,” he said.’ (SA Corrections Today, April/May 2008, p. 5.) 
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Lastly, if it is accepted that the policy and legislative framework in respect of prisoners’ 
rights is sufficient and that, flowing from it, the duties imposed on the Department are 
adequately described, the implementation consistent with these requirements was in a 
material way grossly deficient. This raises concerns about the ability of the Department’s 
senior management to communicate new standards of service delivery to staff at operational 
level. Moreover, it raises concerns about senior management’s ability or willingness to 
address non-compliance issues. The extent to which the Head Office has regained control 
over the Department remains questionable, since compliance with the mandatory reports to 
the Judicial Inspectorate and the decision-making of parole boards call into doubt the 
functionality of the Department’s command hierarchy. 
In overview, progress in respect of delivering on prisoners’ rights has been slow since 2004, 
notwithstanding more than adequate legislation and a growing body of jurisprudence on 
prisoners’ rights. The guidance provided by statutory and case law on prisoners’ rights is 
indeed detailed and progressive. The notable achievements attained in advancing prisoners’ 
rights were by and large the result of external pressure from civil society and the courts.  
It is submitted that the general lack of achievement in giving manifest expression to rights 
enumerated in the Constitution can by and large be attributed to the Department’s lack of 
emphasis on compliance with the Correctional Services Act. The lack of focus on prisoners’ 
rights seems to indicate that the Department was beguiled by populist notions of punishment 
in view of the high violent crime rate. The expectation that post-1994 South Africa’s prison 
system would come to embody, as far as is possible, the values of a constitutional democracy 
has consequently not been met. This chapter has shown that in all the thematic areas assessed, 
there remain serious deficiencies, often of such a serious nature (e.g. deaths in custody) that 
one is left with the impression that very little has actually changed. Neither the rights 
requirements nor the rehabilitation objectives have been met.  
In Chapter 4 it was argued that external pressure combined with constitutional obligations 
resulted in governance improvements in DCS. With reference to human rights standards, it is, 
however, concluded that Departmental policy and practice were not infused with a similar 
realisation of constitutional obligations. Even when human rights deficiencies and violations 
were patently evident, similar external pressure (from government and civil society) did not 
emerge, or where such pressure existed, the Department was able to evade and deflect it. In a 
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general sense it can thus be concluded that constitutionalism had not provided the requisite 
impetus for human rights reforms in the prison system after 1994. 
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Chapter 6 The broader political context 
and the role of external influences on 
prison reform  
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter reviews the influence of events and developments external to the DCS on prison 
reform after 1994. The prison system does not exist in a vacuum and, despite its insular 
tendencies, is affected by external forces and role-players. Moreover, the Constitution creates 
a framework based on cooperative governance1 and, with reference to Parliament, places a 
duty on it to facilitate public participation.2 An analysis of prison reform and 
constitutionalism therefore has to assess the influence of stakeholders external to DCS. 
The preceding chapters (3-5) showed that the DCS has been less than responsive to external 
influences, especially with regard to human rights concerns. However, this is not to say it has 
been entirely immune to such influences, or that there had not been a significant amount of 
activity to advance prison reform since 1994. Policies, or rather the lack thereof, of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) created a particular environment for the DCS, and 
many of the problems that continue to beset it have their roots in the period 1994 to 1999. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the failure to deal effectively and constructively with the legitimacy 
crisis resulting from the new democratic order led to the second crisis in the prison system, 
namely the collapse of order and discipline, leading to the appointment of the Jali 
Commission and the launch of investigations by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU).3 The 
influence of four important stakeholders on prison reform after 1994 is explored in this 
chapter, these being civil society (including the media), organised labour, the legislature, and 
the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services.  
                                                            
1 Chapter 3 Act 108 of 1996. 
2 Section 59 Act 108 of 1996.  
3 The SIU investigations would focus on medical aid fraud, procurement and vehicle fleet management 
(Muntingh, L. (2006) Corruption in the prisons context, CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law 
Centre).  
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Historically, three periods are discernible in this review. The first is the period from 1994 to 
the end of 1996 when there were still real attempts by civil society and the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services to reform the prison system, albeit attempts that faced 
resistance from the DCS and the then Minister of Correctional Services. From 1997 to 2003 
the DCS became increasingly closed to outsiders, the Portfolio Committee failed to hold the 
Department accountable, and, by 1999, the state had in fact lost control of the Department. 
Instead of addressing the legitimacy crisis stemming from the new constitutional order, 
powerful and corrupt groupings arose in the DCS which operated with impunity and in the 
absence of external control or interventions. This was described in Chapter 3. The third 
period is from roughly 2004 onwards, when a new Portfolio Committee was appointed, the 
Jali Commission and SIU investigations were under way, and civil society had again re-
entered the discourse on prison reform. It was also in 2004 that the DCS adopted a new White 
Paper on Corrections in South Africa and the entire Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) 
came into force. Whereas Chapters 3-5 described and discussed developments focusing 
primarily on the DCS, this chapter assesses the period under review by focusing on the 
influences and actors external to the DCS. From a constitutional perspective the aim is 
therefore to assess and analyse the extent to which accountability and transparency have been 
established in the relationship between the DCS and designated oversight structures as well 
as in relation to civil society.  
The chapter commences with the role of the national government in steering the reform 
process; thereafter it deals with the influence of civil society, the role of the legislature, the 
impact of organised labour (POPCRU in particular) and the Judicial Inspectorate for 
Correctional Services. The aim here is to provide an overview of trends as these relate to the 
influence of external stakeholders; much of the underpinning factual information was 
presented in Chapters 3-5. It will be argued that for a brief period after 1994 civil society had 
a notable presence in the prison-reform discourse but by 1996 this had disappeared. In the 
subsequent years until 2004, the DCS paid little attention to external stakeholders, including 
its designated oversight structures. The lack of transparency and accountability correlate with 
the collapse of disciple and order in the Department immediately after 1996. However, post-
2004 the situation changed and both transparency and accountability showed improvements 
in view of the re-emergence of civil society and a more assertive Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services. After the passage of nearly a decade, the constitutional principles of 
accountability and transparency found new expression in the prison-reform discourse. 
 
 
 
 
371 
 
2. The national government 
 
In large-scale societal transformation processes, the national government has a key role to 
play in containing the change-process in the public service through the identification of 
overarching objectives. In order to facilitate large-scale public service reform, of the kind that 
South Africa required in 1994, it is important that there should be first and foremost an 
overarching programme for state reform which aims in particular at institution-building and 
the promoting good governance and the rule of law. This programme should set an 
appropriately time-bound framework for high-level decision-making to bring certainty to 
senior managers in the public service; in addition, it should articulate particular targets for 
reform and set the necessary standards. An overt and conscious focus on institution-building 
to meet international human rights standards is crucial.  
 
An example of such an overarching programme is the so-called Fayyad Plan, the programme 
of the 13th Government of the Palestinian Authority.4 The Fayyad Plan is relevant to this 
thesis because it has guided decision-making in prison reform and significant results have 
been achieved to date.5 Importantly, a clear vision and plan for reform at a high level should 
secure political will and consolidate support. The Fayyad Plan makes repeated references to 
building institutions of state and strengthening capacity where it is lacking: 
 
Success in achieving national goals requires that high priority be given to developing 
the public institutions in the PNA (Palestinian National Authority). . . The Government 
has identified its main institution-building priorities in five core areas: the legal 
framework; organizational structures and processes; the use of technology in 
government; management of national financial resources; and management of human 
resources in the civil and security sectors. 
 
With the overall focus of establishing an independent Palestinian state, there is full 
recognition that this will not be possible in the absence of effective institutions of state (to 
                                                            
4 Palestinian National Authority (2009) Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State - Program of 
the Thirteenth Government. (The Fayyad Plan.) 
5 The author was part of a two-person team tasked to evaluate in July to August 2010 a prison reform project in 
the Palestinian Authority which was funded and facilitated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. 
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maintain security and enable economic growth) and that such institutions must be well 
governed, able to meet the needs of Palestinians and comply with international human rights 
norms.  
In view of the constitutional demand for democratic and institutional reform in 1994 in South 
Africa, it was the task of the national government to provide stewardship and clearly identify 
targets for reform aligned to the Constitution. In the discussion below the emphasis is, firstly, 
placed on the approach to public service reform in the period 1994 to 2000. Three major 
areas of policy development are dealt with: crime, poverty and affirmative action. It is argued 
that the failures of prison reform after 1994 (especially under the Government of National 
Unity - GNU) were strongly shaped by policy-development difficulties in the period 1994 to 
2000. Second, an assessment is made of how the rights enshrined in the Constitution, 
applicable to suspects and prisoners, shaped or failed to shape government policy. Third, 
from 1994 to 2004 the Correctional Services Portfolio was under ministers from a minority 
party (the Inkatha Freedom Party – IFP) in a Parliament and Cabinet dominated by the ANC. 
This had a profound influence on the performance of the DCS. It was especially under 
Minister Mzimela that aspirations for widespread prison reform were dealt crippling blows.  
2.1. Public service reform 
 
In 1994 the ANC-led GNU faced enormous challenges: the economy was under strain, crime 
was rampant, socio-economic development needs were enormous, and political consensus 
was tenuous. Moreover, it had to address these challenges with a bloated and ineffective 
public service6 that was not representative of the population but dominated by an old guard 
occupying senior positions. How the GNU responded to the demands for reform in the public 
service, and in particular to demands for affirmative action, shaped in material ways the 
events that unfolded in the DCS under the new constitutional order. Importantly, the GNU 
did not have a “clean slate” – it inherited the institutions of state and their processes from its 
predecessor and was bound, to some extent, by its policies and what the reality dictated.7 
Nonetheless, it needed to create the framework for public sector reform that would guide 
government departments, such as the DCS, to de-institutionalise and re-institutionalise with a 
                                                            
6 Gumede, W. M. (2009) Delivering the democratic developmental state in South Africa. In McLennan, A. and 
Munslow, B. (eds) The politics of service delivery, Johannesburg: Wits P&DM Governance Series, p.55. 
7 Picard, L.A. (2005) The state of the state – institutional transformation, capacity and political change in South 
Africa. Johannesburg: P&DM Wits University Press, p. 121. 
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sense of urgency (see Chapter 2 section 2.2.2). This, however, did not happen as institution-
building was not a priority for policy-makers in the ANC-led GNU and the public sector soon 
faced a capacity-crisis that made it increasingly unable to deliver the services it needed to.8 
National government was not oblivious to the situation in the public service, and in 1996 
President Mandela established the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Transformation and 
Reform of the Public Service which became known as the Presidential Review Commission 
into the Public Services (PRC). Its final report, published in 1998, described the DCS 
(together with Education, Justice and Safety and Security) as being in a crisis situation:  
The crisis in these departments has been widely covered and stems from a variety of 
sources. The departments are inadequately coordinated, erratically restructured and 
apparently dysfunctional at some levels. Greater management capacity in all of them is 
required at senior level. Escapes from prisons have been chronically regular and there 
has been a notable failure to provide credible assurances that mechanisms are in place 
to avoid these in the future. Provincial heads were instructed to achieve a 50% drop in 
escapes by the end of 1997. However, no strategy is in place to achieve this.9 
The PRC recommended that in the case of these departments serious and urgent consideration 
must be given to a major re-engineering and rationalisation at senior level and that the 
President and relevant ministers reassess the suitability or otherwise of some of the top 
echelons of their public managers.10 As part of the re-engineering, the PRC recommended the 
de-establishment of the Ministries of Correctional Services and Justice (and their associated 
departments) and the creation of a new ministry and department, namely the Ministry of 
Justice and Rehabilitation.11 This would have taken the situation back to something similar to 
what prevailed before October 1990 when the De Klerk government created the Ministry of 
Correctional Services. The proposal, however, was not accepted and the two departments 
remained as they were. The restructuring of the two departments may indeed have provided 
the necessary impetus to see wide-ranging reforms in the criminal justice system and prison 
                                                            
8 McLennan, A. (2009) Introduction. In McLennan, A. and Munslow, B. (eds) The politics of service delivery, 
Johannesburg: Wits P&DM Governance Series, p. 11. Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 118. 
9 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) Developing a culture of good governance report 
of the presidential review commission on the reform and transformation of the public service in South Africa. 
Pretoria: Government of the Republic of South Africa, para 2.5.2. 
10 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) para 2.5.2. 
11 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) para 2.5.8.2. 
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system in particular. Instead the opposite happened and the crisis deepened, as described in 
Chapter 3. The situation in the DCS became more disorganised and distant from state control, 
and by 2000 it was conceded that the state had lost control over the DCS. The separation 
from the Ministry of Justice appears in hindsight not to have been an innocuous event. 
Without the oversight exercised by the Minister of Justice, generally regarded as a senior and 
influential portfolio in Cabinet, the DCS, headed by a minority party minister, drifted away 
from state control.  
2.1.1. Policy development 
 
Three national policy areas dominated the period after 1994 and emanated from South 
Africa’s three major societal problems, poverty, crime and racial inequality. In respect of 
crime, the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) would initiate a process of policy 
development, while the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the RDP 
White Paper (1994) were aimed at addressing poverty. Transformation of the public service 
to render services to all South Africans and be representative of the South African population 
was ultimately done in a rushed and unsupported manner through affirmative action. 
2.1.1.1. Crime  
 
The NCPS was a response to President Mandela’s 1995 State of the Nation Address in which 
he announced that instructions had been issued to the relevant ministers to take all necessary 
measures to bring crime under control.12 Published in 1996, there were great expectations 
from the NCPS, and government departments and civil society would rally around it. 
However, the NCPS made little mention of the prison system save for references to 
community-based sentencing, crime intelligence, general education, support for other 
departments, and diversion of young offenders.13 The NCPS did not assign to the prison 
system a fundamentally different task and left it in its “comfort zone”. The NCPS articulated 
a dual approach where more effective law enforcement would be balanced with addressing 
the social causes of crime. It would unavoidably require a long-term approach, but long-term 
view would result in diminished political support for the NCPS. 
                                                            
12 Rauch, J. (2001) The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy, Johannesburg: CSVR, p. 1. 
13 Government of South Africa (1996) National Crime Prevention Strategy – a summary. 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/1996/crime1.htm  
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The high violent crime rate and public demands for action prompted government to opt for 
more visible short-term strategies focusing on priority crimes as described in the National 
Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) released in 2000, a policy document produced in-house 
by the South African Police Service (SAPS).14 By the late 1990s the initial political support 
for the balanced approach of the NCPS (combining law enforcement and social crime 
prevention) had fizzled out despite the PRC having regarded its integrated approach in a 
favourable light.15 The NCCS did not deal with Correctional Services, but large police 
operations flowing from the NCCS impacted negatively on the prison system and high 
numbers of arrests aggravated prison overcrowding.16 From 1998 to 2004 government’s 
response to crime would largely be shaped by the White Paper on Safety and Security,17 a 
policy document for the police which thus made only occasional reference to the DCS.18 
Apart from requiring additional space to accommodate the rising numbers of prisoners, 19 the 
NCPS and the other national policy documents aimed at addressing crime (i.e. NCCS) did not 
in any material way place different demands on the prison system. In the crime policy 
discourse after 1994, it appears that the prison system was increasingly marginalised and the 
discourse dominated by the SAPS. 
2.1.1..2 Poverty 
 
The RDP, released by the tripartite alliance20 before the 1994 elections, set extremely 
ambitious targets for socio-economic reform.21 It was indeed too ambitious, and by 1996 the 
                                                            
14 Du Plessis, A. and Louw, A. (2005) Crime and crime prevention in South Africa: 10 years after, Canadian 
Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, April 2005, pp. 430-431. 
15 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) para 2.5.8.10. 
16 Burger, J. (2006) Crime combating in perspective: a strategic approach to policing and the prevention of 
crime in South Africa, Acta Criminologica 19 (2) 2006, pp. 105-118. 
17 Newham, G. (2005) A decade of crime prevention in South Africa: from a national strategy to a local 
challenge, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, p.4. 
18 Department of Safety and Security (1998) White Paper on Safety and Security: ‘In Service of Safety’ 1999 – 
2004. Pretoria: Department of Safety and Security 
19 Rauch, J. (2001), p. 13. 
20 The alliance consists of the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
21 Terreblanche, S. J. (1999) The Ideological Journey of South Africa: From The RDP to the GEAR Macro-
economic Plan. Paper presented at workshop on ‘Globalisation, Poverty, Women and the Church in South 
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ministry of the RDP was abolished and the office of the RDP was transferred to the Office of 
the Deputy President.22 The RDP did, however, include a section on the prison system 
articulating a number of specific outcomes relating to: the establishment of a representative 
staff corps; de-militarisation; recognising prisoners’ rights; rendering rehabilitation services; 
law reform in respect of child offenders; improved conditions of detention for mothers with 
infants; the abolition of solitary confinement and spare diet and dietary punishments; 
substantial prison law reform; and improved transparency and oversight over the prison 
system.23 Flowing from the RDP, the RDP White Paper (released in 1994) did indeed 
describe more clearly what was expected of the prison system and the following eight policy 
objectives were formulated, each accompanied by a programme, targets, requirements for 
institutional reform, legislative reform requirements and financial arrangements: 
• to protect the community by ensuring the safe custody and risk management of those 
persons entrusted to its care; 
• to incarcerate and treat prisoners in a humane manner and to create a climate which is 
conducive to rehabilitation; 
• to provide the necessary infrastructure for the rehabilitation of offenders; 
• to provide separate facilities and specifically designed programmes for juveniles 
sentenced to imprisonment; 
• to provide an adequate infrastructure for alternative or community-based sentences; 
• to ensure a professional personnel corps broadly representative of the community;  
• to be open and accessible to the public, responsive to public criticism and 
continuously seeking improvement; and, 
• to establish and maintain positive and constructive partnerships locally, nationally and 
internationally.24 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Africa’. 16 February 1999, Cape Town, hosted by Religion in Public Life and the Ecumenical Foundation for 
South Africa. http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/ricsa/confer/me99/procs/pro_terr.htm p. 81, accessed 20 October 2011. 
22 Terreblanche, S. J. (1999), p. 81. 
23 African National Congress (1993) The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) - A Policy 
Framework, 
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm 
Accessed 20 October 2011, Para 8.5. 
24 Ministry in the Office of the President (1994) White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, Government 
Gazette No. 16085, Notice No. 1954 of 1994, pp. 57-60. 
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The policy objectives set out in the RDP White Paper would have been a solid framework for 
prison reform in South Africa if these were followed through. However, the status of the RDP 
White Paper waned and its oversight structure demoted in rank. Consequently, by 1996 it 
would have been relatively easy for the DCS to ignore it. Moreover, the rapidly increasing 
prison population and rampant corruption in the Department placed it well beyond the 
influence of a national policy document.25 Overcrowding and corruption overshadowed the 
strategic renewal of the Department, if not directly undermining the capacity and willingness 
to reform. While the RDP White Paper could have steered the prison system onto a new 
trajectory, the GNU was not able to drive and sustain its objectives. The RDP White Paper 
should thus be regarded as a missed opportunity in proving the springboard to operationalise 
the requirements set in the Constitution. 
2.1.1.3 Affirmative action 
 
Under the GNU, improving the delivery of public services seemed to have focused on 
affirmative action while maintaining existing services,26 and this frequently resulted in under-
qualified and inexperienced officials being appointed to senior positions.27 During the years 
of the GNU, the debate on affirmative action also pulled in different directions and there was 
indeed no single strategy to implement affirmative action.28 Importantly, affirmative action 
increasingly meant Africanisation as opposed to non-racialism. 29 After a year under the GNU 
there was already widespread dissatisfaction with the implementation of affirmative action 
amongst both black elites and the predominantly white senior civil service.30 Different 
interpretations of and proposals to implement affirmative action had a paralysing effect on 
the GNU and its efforts to reform the public sector. What was lacking was a “legal 
framework to regulate and control the bureaucracy and to mete out punishment for 
                                                            
25 Both the 1994 and 1995 Annual Reports of the Department of Correctional Services give prominence to the 
RDP in the National Commissioner’s introduction to the reports, but in the 1996 Annual Report no such 
mention is made.  
26 Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 131. 
27 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) para 2.1.3; Ngoma, W. (2009) The potholes of 
service delivery – reflections on the Eastern Cape Department of Education. In McLennan, A. and Munslow, B. 
(eds) The politics of service delivery, Johannesburg: Wits P&DM Governance Series, p.210. 
28 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) para 2.5.1. Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 155. 
29 Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 128. 
30 Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 139. 
 
 
 
 
378 
 
corruption”.31 A clear roadmap was needed to guide institution-building in order to meet the 
needs and demands of the public.  
The controversial nature of affirmative action resulted in many senior civil servants leaving 
and finding employment in the private sector, frequently to return as consultants to the 
departments they had served in.32 Capacity problems also resulted in mismanagement and 
corruption, and increasingly private sector involvement became an acceptable solution in 
order to minimise losses.33 Whilst capacity problems were increasingly evident, 
government’s White Paper on Affirmative Action (1998) contained no specific component on 
training and human resource development but cross-refers to the White Paper on Public 
Service Training and Education (1997) and the White Paper: Human Resource Management 
in the Public Service (1997).34 Human resource development in the context of affirmative 
action would become, and continue to be, a serious problem in the public service, as borne 
out by a 2010 Public Service Commission report:  
There are no specific leadership and management development interventions for 
employees from designated groups in national and provincial departments. Similarly, 
there is no support mechanism specifically designed for employees from designated 
groups in middle and senior management.35 
By 1999 corruption in the public service had become an extremely worrying problem to the 
political leadership, and in his State of the Nation address of that year President Mbeki 
undertook to deal with corruption in the criminal justice system, the protection of 
whistleblowers, and improvements to the integrity of public servants.36 Problems of capacity, 
internal conflicts, lack of control and inability to enforce discipline resulted in what Picard 
summarised as “a lethal combination of patronage and corruption, and a narrow focus on 
                                                            
31 Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 148. 
32 McLennan, A. (2009) Introduction. In McLennan, A. and Munslow, B. (eds) The politics of service delivery, 
Johannesburg: Wits P&DM Governance Series, p.10; Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 148. 
33 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) para 2.1.3. Picard, L.A. (2005), pp. 245-291. 
34 Department of Public Service and Administration (1998) White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public 
Service. Government Gazette, 23 April 1998 No. 18800, p. 21. 
35 Public Service Commission (2010) An audit of affirmative action in the public service. Pretoria: Public 
Service Commission, p. xi. 
36 Address of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the Opening of Parliament: 
National Assembly, Cape Town, 25 June 1999. 
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salaries, privileges and what the South African press called the gravy train, which would 
threaten long-term institutional effectiveness of the South African government and society”.37 
It would, however, take several years for government to start implementing a coherent 
approach to deal with corruption in the public service. Only in 2002 did Cabinet make a 
decision requiring all government departments to establish a Minimum Anti-Corruption 
Capacity (MACC), as noted in Chapter 4.38 Similarly, the inadequate Corrupt Activities Act 
(94 of 1992) was replaced by the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (12 of 
2004) only in 2004, five years after President Mbeki’s undertaking to deal with corruption in 
the public service.  
 
The lack of direction from the national government in implementing affirmative action in the 
public service and the sluggish response to corruption and maladministration created the 
space for corrupt forces to establish themselves in the DCS. It was in particular organised 
labour (as discussed in Chapter 3 and section 4 below) that exploited this space, destabilising 
the Department and effectively halting prison reform for nearly a decade. 
 
2.1.1.4 Summary of issues 
 
Post-1994 the role of the national government in containing and guiding reform in the public 
service is important for the assessment of prison reform, as three issues would have a material 
impact on the DCS. The first was the particular interpretation of affirmative action to address 
racial and gender imbalances in the public service. As early as 1995 there was support for a 
rapid process to be implemented, and affirmative action was interpreted to mean 
Africanisation. Second, and as a consequence of this, little attention was paid to institution-
building (or re-institutionalisation) and capacity development in the public service with 
specific reference to the human resource development of new and emerging incumbents. The 
lack of containment and guidance from the national government created the space for corrupt 
groupings within the DCS staff corps to highjack the recruitment process and placement of 
                                                            
37 Picard, L.A. (2005), p. 230. 
38 Department of Correctional Services (2011 d) Annual trend analysis on corruption, fraud, theft and 
maladministration. Briefing to the portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 18 October 2011, p. 4. 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111018-discussion-department-correctional-services-activities-its-legal-serv 
Accessed 25 October 2011. 
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staff, as was found by the Jali Commission and described in Chapter 3. As a result, 
competency in job function became secondary to ensuring that the “right people” were 
appointed. Third, corruption had become a pervasive problem by 1999 and the corruption 
later uncovered in the DCS should be seen against this background – corruption was indeed 
not a DCS-only problem, but the failures of the GNU made it easier for corruption to flourish 
in the prison system. Efforts across the public service to address corruption in a 
comprehensive manner would only materialise from 2002, shortly after the Jali Commission 
was established. 
The broader issues affecting public service reform after 1994 were also felt in DCS, and the 
national government’s slow response in addressing governance concerns, despite clear 
constitutional obligations, would consequently impede prison reform. As an external 
influence, the role of the national government was especially weak for the first six years of 
democratic rule and the results were seen in both a deterioration of governance and human 
rights standards.  
2.2 Human rights 
 
The Constitution places a duty on the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in 
the Bill of Rights.39 This implies that the state should place a high priority on human rights in 
all its actions and not only in its rhetoric. The state’s human rights obligations should thus be 
a driving force in policy development, legislative reform and service delivery. After 1994 the 
legislature and executive were extremely busy and hundreds of pieces of legislation were 
passed and policies developed to dismantle the legacy inherited from apartheid40 and 
establish a legal framework reflecting the Constitution. Moreover, the Bill of Rights “exposed 
all existing legal provisions, whether statutory or derived from the common law, to 
reappraisal in the light of the new constitutional norms heralded by that transition”.41 This 
process has not been completed and legislative advances continue to be made in pursuit of 
this objective, such as the Child Justice Act (75 of 2008) and Children’s Act (38 of 2005). 
While service delivery may be constrained by available financial resources (for example, 
                                                            
39 s 7(2). 
40 SA Human Rights Commission (2004) Reflections on Democracy and Human Rights: A Decade of the South 
African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), Johannesburg: SA Human Rights Commission, p. 192. 
41 S v Dlamini, S v Dladla and Others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat [1999] ZACC 8; 1999 (4) SA 623; 1999 (7) 
BCLR 771 (3 June 1999), para 2. 
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when addressing widespread socio-economic inequalities), there should at least be visible 
political will to give effect to the rights in the Bill of Rights. As is the case with institutional 
reform, the requirement is that national government should provide the framework and broad 
direction for reform. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide an assessment of how the Bill of Rights 
informed and influenced national government policies in general after 1994, and attention 
will be placed rather on how the rights pertaining to suspects and offenders were framed by 
government as this had a direct impact on developments in the prison system. It is argued 
below that government, due to the high violent crime rate, became increasingly intolerant of 
prisoners’ rights and attempted (and was partly successful) to reframe or dilute these rights, 
or distance itself from prisoners’ rights enshrined in the Constitution. In effect, the rights 
afforded to suspects and sentenced prisoners became a contested terrain.  
2.2.1 Policy and rhetoric  
 
By 1994 violent crime had spoiled the fruits of the new democratic order and continued to do 
so42 – the public was fearful and demanded action from government. It was in fact President 
Mandela who framed the problem in a particular manner, portraying a war-like situation of 
criminals versus law-abiding citizens.43 The ensuing government response was focused on 
improved law enforcement embodied in the NCPS of 1996, although the NCPS still balanced 
this with social crime prevention as noted in section 2.1.1.1 above. However, the focus on 
law enforcement became overt after a review of the NCPS in 1998.44 Political rhetoric, 
espousing a tough-on-crime approach, found popular support and in his 1999 State of the 
                                                            
42 Sarkin, J. (2000) Fighting crime while promoting human rights in the police, the courts and the prisons in 
South Africa, Law Democracy and Development, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp.151-153. 
43 ‘The situation cannot be tolerated in which our country continues to be engulfed by the crime wave which 
includes murder, crimes against women and children, drug trafficking, armed robbery, fraud and theft. We must 
take the war to the criminals and no longer allow the situation in which we are mere sitting ducks of those in our 
society who, for whatever reason, are bent to engage in criminal and anti-social activities. Instructions have 
therefore already gone out to the Minister of Safety and Security, the National Commissioner of the Police 
Service and the security organs as a whole to take all necessary measures to bring down the levels of crime.’ 
(Opening of Parliament address by President N. R. Mandela, 17 Feb 1995, Cape Town). Also Cavadino, M. and 
Dignan, J. (eds) (2006) Penal Systems – a comparative approach, London: Sage Publications, p. 95. 
44 Rauch, J. (2001) The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy. Johannesburg: CSVR, p. 10. 
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/urbansafety/1996nationalcrime.pdf Accessed 11 October 2011. 
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Nation Address President Mbeki was convinced that more effective law enforcement would 
reap dividends.45 At an earlier opportunity Mbeki (then Deputy President) likened criminals 
to "barbarians in our midst".46 The new Ministers of Justice and Safety and Security in the 
first Mbeki Cabinet were explicit in how they saw the required response: 
As our country embarks on the second democratic term, we have to reflect on the 
shortcomings of the previous term and resolve to improve significantly on performance. 
While over the last five years the Department [of Justice] was able to lay a solid 
legislative and indeed infra-structural foundation for a strong and responsive justice 
system, many problems continue to plague our justice system and at times evoking 
public sentiments that the new democratic order is more sympathetic to human rights 
concerns of criminals and less sensitive to the plight of victims of crime and the general 
sense of insecurity that continues to besiege our country. (Minister of Justice, Penuel 
Maduna, June 1999)47 
The criminals have obviously declared war against the South African public. … We are 
ready, more than ever before, not just to send a message to the criminals out there about 
our intentions, but more importantly to make them feel that ‘die tyd vir speletjies is nou 
verby’.48 We are now poised to rise with power and vigour proportional to the enormity 
and vastness of the aim to be achieved. (Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete 
June 1999)49 
Minister Maduna was evidently frustrated with the rights to which offenders and suspects 
were entitled. In 1999 Steve Tshwete, Minister of Safety and Security, reportedly suggested 
that police officers deal with criminals “in the same way a bulldog deals with a bull”.50 Calls 
for the return of the death penalty were also frequent despite it having been declared 
unconstitutional in 1994. Throughout the 1990s and later, political rhetoric framed crime and 
                                                            
45 Address of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki At the Opening of Parliament: 
National Assembly, Cape Town, 25 June 1999. 
46 Speech by ANC President, Thabo Mbeki, at the Fourth National Congress of the South African Democratic 
Teachers Union, Durban, 6 September 1998. 
47 Cited in Rauch, J. (2001), p. 10.  
48 ‘The time for fun and games is over’ (own translation). 
49 Cited in Rauch, J. (2001), p. 10.  
50 ANC Daily News Briefing 8 January 2006 citing article by W. Roelf. http://www.e-
tools.co.za/newsbrief/2006/news0108.txt Accessed 11 October 2011. 
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human rights in a particular manner, attempting to drive a wedge between the Constitution 
(applicable to the just and innocent) and offenders (who should have limited protection under 
the Constitution).  
2.2.2 Harsher punishment and tighter bail laws 
 
Shortly after the April 1994 elections the Constitutional Court dealt with the constitutionality 
of the death penalty and of corporal punishment.51 Both types of punishment were declared 
unconstitutional and this may have given some cause for optimism around a more liberal 
sentencing framework. This was not to be the case. The political rhetoric and “tough on 
crime” approach espoused by government found public support and were soon expressed in 
harsher sentences and tighter bail laws. Indeed, a sense of “moral panic” had set in as a result 
of the high crime rate and perceptions that offenders were walking away scot-free.52 Even the 
courts expressed disgust at the high levels of crime and supported longer sentences: 
Our country at present suffers an unprecedented, uncontrolled and unacceptable wave 
of violence, murder, homicide, robbery and rape. A blatant and flagrant want of respect 
for the life and property of fellow human beings has become prevalent. The vocabulary 
of our courts to describe the barbaric and repulsive conduct of such unscrupulous 
criminals is being exhausted. The community craves the assistance of the courts: its 
members threaten, inter alia, to take the law into their own hands. The courts impose 
severe sentences, but the momentum of violence continues unabated. A court must be 
thoroughly aware of its responsibility to the community, and by acting steadfastly, 
impartially and fearlessly, announce to the world in unambiguous terms its utter 
repugnance and contempt of such conduct.53 
 
Initially, and as a temporary and annually renewable measure, Parliament passed the 
minimum sentences legislation in 1997.54 This legislation set down certain mandatory 
minimum terms of imprisonment to be imposed for certain, primarily violent, crimes.55 
                                                            
51 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) and S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632. 
52 Cavadino, M. and Dignan, J. (eds) (2006), p. 94. 
53
 S v Matolo en 'n Ander 1998 (1) SACR 206 (O). 
54 Act 105 of 1997. 
55 For example, the imposition of life imprisonment was mandatory for the crime of rape when: the victim is 
raped more than once by the accused or others; by more than one person as part of common purpose or 
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However, courts could deviate from the prescribed minimum sentence if there were 
“substantial and compelling reasons” to do so. To add further sting to the minimum sentences 
legislation, it had two provisions to ensure that the time served in prison is as long as 
possible, although both these stipulations have subsequently been amended. First, offenders 
sentenced under the minimum sentences legislation had to serve four-fifths of the sentence 
before they could be considered for release on parole compared to the one-third or one-half 
rule of thumb depending on the applicable parole regime.56 Second, the sentence starts on the 
day of sentencing, thus deliberately excluding discount for any time spent awaiting trial in 
prison.57 Shortly after passing the minimum sentences legislation, the sentence jurisdiction of 
the Magistrates’ Courts was increased.58 In the case of district courts the jurisdiction was 
raised from one year to three years’ imprisonment and in the case of regional courts, from ten 
to 15 years. A further development, by means of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998), 
was that prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment had to serve 25 years and not 20 years, as 
the case was previously, before they could be considered for parole.59 Due to the delay in 
bringing the full Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) into operation, the increase in the 
term of life imprisonment only became operational in October 2004, but it nonetheless 
reflected the sentiments of the legislature and the executive as they were in 1998.  
Amendments to the bail legislation in 1995 and 1997 saw a tightening of the bail laws which 
undoubtedly also contributed to prison overcrowding.60 As was discussed in Chapter 5 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
conspiracy; the accused has been convicted of more than one rape offence and not yet sentenced; the accused 
knows he is HIV-positive; or when the victim is under 16 years of age, a vulnerable disabled woman, is a 
mentally ill woman, or involved the infliction of grievous bodily harm. 
56 This requirement has subsequently been removed by section 12 of the Correctional Matters Amendment Act 5 
of 2011, but was not yet in operation at the time of writing (December 2011). 
57 This requirement has subsequently been removed by section 1 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment 
Act, 38 of 2007. 
58 Magistrates Amendment Act No. 66 of 1998. 
59 s 73(6)(iv) of the Correctional Services Act. As at the end of February 2011 there were 10 349 prisoners 
serving life imprisonment, compared to the 443 in 1995 (Giffard, C. and Muntingh, L. (2006) The impact of 
sentencing on the size of the prison population, Cape Town: Open Society Foundation (SA). DCS website 
http://www.dcs.gov.za/WebStatistics/ Accessed 3 November 2011). 
60 Steyn, E. (2000) Pre-trial detention – its impact on crime and human rights, Law Democracy and 
Development, Vol. 4 No. 2, p. 213; Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004) Swimming against the tide. In Dixon, B. and Van 
der Spuy, E. Justice gained – crime and crime control in South Africa’s transition, Devon: Willan Publishing, p. 
242-243. 
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(section 12) awaiting-trial prisoners would spend, and continue to do so, long periods in 
detention due to unaffordable bail, unnecessary arrests and inefficiencies in the criminal 
justice process. In the absence of a mandatory review mechanism and enforceable time-limits 
on pre-trial detention the situation will persist.61  
The 1998 parole guidelines discussed in Chapter 5 (section 9.1.1) were furthermore reflective 
of the punitive attitude demonstrated by government.62 Even though they were later declared 
unconstitutional,63 they were nonetheless an attempt to regulate the release of (violent) 
offenders through a policy instrument instead of regulating it through legislation. This 
consequently created much confusion, resulting in a flood of High Court applications from 
prisoners believing they were being treated unfairly, as discussed in Chapter 5 (section 
9.1.1).64  
Punishment and deterrence remained the central themes in government’s response, and 
between 1995 and 1998 a number of legislative and policy measures were adopted reflecting 
this. It was borne out of a perception that offenders were getting away with light sentences 
and that government should be seen to be “tough on crime”. There was and is, however, no 
scientific evidence that such an approach would indeed be effective in bringing crime under 
control. These changes were purposefully directed at imposing harsher punishments by 
limiting access to bail, increasing sentence jurisdiction, lengthening prison terms, limiting 
courts’ discretion at sentencing and increasing non-parole periods. The impact of these 
measures, individually or combined, on the already overcrowded prisons was of little concern 
to the legislature and the executive.65 The combined effect of these measures contributed to 
worsening the overcrowding in the prisons, having a material impact on conditions of 
detention and thus the right to dignity but it simply did not matter: prisoners were not a group 
worthy of sympathy and public concern. 
                                                            
61 Ballard, C. (2011) Research report on remand detention in South Africa – an overview of the current law and 
proposals for reform. CSPRI Research Report, Bellville: Community Law Centre. Steyn, E. (2000), p. 215. 
62 Muntingh, L. (2007 d) Punishment in South Africa, Paper delivered at seminar hosted by the Wits Institute for 
Social and Economic Research (WISER), 29-30 August 2007, Johannesburg. 
63 Mujuzi, J.D. (2011) Unpacking the law and practice relating to parole in South Africa, Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal, Vol. 14 No. 5, p. 220. 
64 Jali Commission, pp. 505-507. 
65 Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004), p. 239. 
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2.2.3 The right to vote 
 
A further indication of how the executive’s attitude towards prisoners became more vengeful 
was the intended exclusion of prisoners from the 1999 general elections, given that the 
Electoral Commission had not put in place measures to register prisoners for the upcoming 
elections.66 The matter was ultimately settled in the Constitutional Court in favour of 
prisoners and they were permitted to participate in the 1999 general elections.67 Late in 2003 
Parliament passed the Electoral Law Amendment Act (34 of 2003), and this time the 
intention was clear: certain prisoners (those serving a prison sentence without the option of a 
fine) should be excluded by law from voting. Again the matter went to the Constitutional 
Court and again the Court ruled in favour of prisoners and declared unconstitutional the 
impugned provisions of the legislation.68 Importantly, part of the state’s defence was that the 
government would be seen to be “soft on crime” if prisoners were allowed to vote but the 
Constitutional Court rejected this argument. Government’s intention was nonetheless clear: 
the symbolic and thus political value of harsher punishments outweighed constitutional 
concerns. 
2.2.4 Prison law delayed 
 
In 1996 the DCS commenced with drafting new legislation to replace the already extensively 
amended Correctional Services Act of 1959 (see Chapter 3 section 3.1.5). Parliament adopted 
the new Correctional Services Act in 1998, but it would take six years before the chapters 
detailing the minimum conditions of detention and other relevant rights applicable to 
prisoners would come into operation.69 While some parts of the Act were brought into force 
earlier (e.g. the chapters dealing with the Judicial Inspectorate), the effect was that there was 
legal uncertainty, with both the 1996 Constitution and the 1959 prison laws being applicable. 
                                                            
66 Muntingh, L. and Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2009) The Ballot as a Bulwark: Prisoners’ Right to Vote in South Africa. 
In Ewald, A.C. and Rottinghaus, B. (eds) Criminal disenfranchisement in an international perspective, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 232. 
67 August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others, [1999] ZACC 3; 1999 (3) SA 1; 1999 (4) BCLR 
363. 
68 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO and Others, [2004] ZACC 10; 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC); 2004 (5) BCLR 445 
(CC). 
69 Reference is made specifically to Chapter 3 (Custody of all prisoners under conditions of human dignity), 
Chapter 4 (Sentenced prisoners) and Chapter 5 (Unsentenced prisoners) which came into effect on 31 July 2004. 
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The reasons for the delay are less than firm and not entirely convincing, as noted by Sloth-
Nielsen. First, that regulations for the 1998 Act had to be drafted; second that a “work study” 
was required to redefine staff levels and shifts so as to be able to serve three meals at 
reasonable intervals each day; and third that the legislation had to accommodate changes in 
the composition of Correctional Supervision and Parole Boards (CSPB) since some 
government departments had decided that they could no longer be represented on these 
structures due to cost and time implications.70 The delay in bringing the Correctional Services 
Act into force did, however, not make a material difference as substantial areas of non-
compliance with it remain to date, as described in Chapters 4 and 5.71 The apparent 
reluctance to bring the full Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) into operation is 
nonetheless regarded as indicative of government’s unwillingness to bring legal certainty to 
prisoners’ rights under the new democratic and constitutional order. 
2.2.5 Summary of issues  
 
Seeking a balance between being tough on crime and strong on human rights72 proved to be a 
difficult task for the post-1994 governments. However, emphasising the former at the cost of 
the latter was not only easier but came at a cost to an already marginalised group with little 
political influence and low moral standing in the eyes of the public. In response to the high 
violent crime rate and under pressure from public opinion and the media, government’s 
attitude towards criminal suspects and prisoners became increasingly conservative and 
                                                            
70 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003) Overview of Policy Developments in South African Correctional Services. CSPRI 
Research report No. 1, Bellville: Community Law Centre, p. 32. Prior to an amendment in 2001 (s 28 
Correctional Services Amendment Act 32 of 2001), the Correctional Services Act required that a CSPB would 
consist of a chairperson and vice-chairperson, two DCS officials, an official from the South African Police 
(SAPS) nominated by the Commissioner of Police, an official and an alternate from the Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development (DoJCD) nominated by the Director General of the DoJCD (both with a legal 
background), and two members from the community. In total a CSPB would have had nine members. The 2001 
amendment reduced the number to five by requiring only one DCS official and doing away with required 
representation from the DoJCD and SAPS, although allowing for co-optation of one official from each 
department.   
71 Report of the Auditor-General to Parliament on the financial statements of vote no. 18: Department of 
Correctional Services for the year ended 31 March 2010. In Department of Correctional Services (2010) Annual 
Report 2009/10, Pretoria: Department of Correctional Services, p. 132. 
72 Calland, R. and Masuku, T. (2000) Tough on crime and strong on human rights – the challenge for us all, Law 
Democracy and Development, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 121-135. 
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punitive, if not vindictive. By emphasising punishment, “tough on crime” rhetoric, and 
delaying the coming into operation of the Correctional Services Act, the national government 
appealed to populist notions of crime and justice, but twice this position landed it in the 
Constitutional Court. The effect was that it had not only failed to establish a firm policy and 
legal framework for prisoners’ rights, but actively sought to dilute and limit them. As a result 
it was easier for the DCS senior management and other stakeholders (such as Parliament) to 
tolerate rights violations in the prison system, even when these were well known and 
frequently reported in the media. The acceptance of prison overcrowding by government is a 
good example in this regard and it is doubtful if government would of its own accord have 
taken any measures were it not for pressure from the Office of the Inspecting Judge (see 
discussion below at section 6.1 on the Judicial Inspectorate) and civil society groupings after 
2003 (see section 3 below).  
2.3 An IFP portfolio 1994 – 2004 
 
The inclusion of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in the Cabinet of the GNU was the result of 
a negotiated settlement reflected in the Interim Constitution that would give each political 
party with more than 5% of the votes in the 1994 election representation in Cabinet.73 From 
1994 to the end of the first Mbeki Cabinet in 2004, the Correctional Services portfolio had an 
IFP minister at the helm, first Sipo Mzimela (May 1994 to July 1998) and then Ben Skosana 
(1998 to 2004). Correctional Services was one of three portfolios held by IFP ministers, the 
others being Mangosotho Buthelezi (Home Affairs) and Ben Ngubane (Arts and Culture).74 
During both terms, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services had ANC 
Chairpersons, which would have added to tensions but also created a sense of vulnerability 
on the part of the IFP Minister of Correctional Services in the ANC-dominated Cabinet and 
Parliament. Moreover, during the first years of democratic rule the senior bureaucrats in the 
DCS were still from the “old guard” and resistant to change, as described above in Chapter 3 
(section 3.1). For the first two years of Mzimela’s reign the DCS National Commissioner was 
General H. Bruyn, a career prison officer who had been in that position since 1 January 
                                                            
73 s 88(2) Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
74 ‘President Mandela chooses an all-party cabinet’ African Business, June 1994, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5327/is_n189/ai_n28645345/ Accessed 13 October 2011.  
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1994.75 In 1996 he was replaced by Commissioner Khulekani Sithole, the first black National 
Commissioner, who left under a cloud of financial mismanagement at the end of 1998, 76 as 
discussed in Chapter 3 (section 4.2).  
The IFP was also a political party with waning support, and after securing 43 seats in the 400 
seat Parliament in the 1994 elections this dropped to 34 seats in the 1999 elections.77 With 
dwindling political support for the IFP and with its traditional Zulu support-base, the new 
Minister of Correctional Services was probably not the most popular choice amongst DCS 
officials. Mzimela had, at the time, returned from the USA where he had been in exile for 
more than 30 years and worked as a prison chaplain. Mzimela was reportedly impressed with 
American super-maximum security prisons78 and favoured private sector involvement in the 
prison system,79 as noted in Chapter 3 (section 4.1.2 and 4.1.3)  
It is difficult to assess how the IFP Ministers of Correctional Services fared in the ANC 
dominated Cabinet, but three issues have emerged in respect of Mzimela.80 The first centred 
on a large-scale prison construction programme, the second on the security threat that former 
death row prisoners posed after the death penalty was declared unconstitutional in 1994, and 
the third was his political activities outside of the correctional service portfolio. On the first 
two issues Mzimela was at odds with the ANC ministers Jeff Radebe (then Minister of Public 
Works) and the late Dullah Omar (Minister of Justice). In respect of the prison construction 
                                                            
75 Department of Correctional Services (1994 a) Annual Report 1993, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 1. 
76 Taco Kuiper Award 2006, Forum for Investigative Reporters, 
http://www.fairreporters.org/?showcontent_home&global%5B_id%5D=914 Accessed 20 October 2011.  
77 Election Resources on the Internet: General Elections in the Republic of South Africa by Manuel Álvarez-
Rivera http://electionresources.org/za/ Accessed 13 October 2011. In the 2004 election the IFP secured 28 seats 
and in 2009, 18 seats.  
78 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming) Super-maximum prisons in South Africa. In Ross J (ed) 
Globalization of Supermax Prison, Chapel Hill: Rutgers University Press. 
79 Goyer, K.C. (2001) Prison privatisation in South Africa - issues, challenges and opportunities. Monograph 
64, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 38-39. Giffard, C. (1997) Out of Step? The transformation 
process in the South African Department of Correctional Services, Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the degree of Master of Science in Criminal Justice Studies, Scarman Centre for the Study of Public Order, 
University of Leicester, p. 32. 
80 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming). 
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programme, 81 Mzimela was of the belief that the DCS was capable of managing its own 
prison construction projects and that it was not necessary for the Department of Public Works 
to manage this, but twice his proposals were scuppered by Radebe.82 In respect of the former 
death row prisoners, Mzimela reportedly believed that Dullah Omar did not appreciate the 
urgent security problems these prisoners posed for DCS and that it needed to build a super-
maximum security prison where they would be held. In the end, Cabinet supported this 
decision as a departmental rather than a senior governmental decision, without attaching 
much political weight to it. This ultimately led to the construction of the over-priced and 
under-utilised Ebongweni Super-Maximum Security prison in Kokstad (KwaZulu-Natal),83 as 
discussed in Chapter 5 (section 7). The third issue that ultimately led to his removal from 
office in July 1998 was his political activities outside of the Correctional Services portfolio. 
Over a period of time he reportedly persisted with provocative statements about a merger 
between the IFP and the ANC. This attracted the ire of his own party, and in June 1998 the 
IFP National Council passed a motion of no confidence in Mzimela as minister. IFP President 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi informed President Mandela that the IFP no longer wanted Mzimela 
as a minister and he was relieved of his duties in July 1998, although with some delay.84 
Mzimela appears to have made numerous enemies along the way and was a controversial 
political character. The insults he directed at then President Mandela in a book he published 
did not help his cause either.85 At a time when South Africa needed mediators and 
reconciliatory leaders, Mzimela’s role was divisive. He would also alienate civil society 
groupings, as described below in section 3.1 below. 
It was also during Mzimela’s tenure that a number of important events took place, but the 
overall impression gained is that he was conspicuously absent. With violence and unrest 
wracking the prison system in the aftermath of the 1994 election (as discussed in Chapter 3 
                                                            
81 According to the then advisor to Mzimela plans were afoot to replace the entire prison infrastructure with 160 
prisons and this would have been funded with RDP funds as well as the sale of the grounds that Pollsmoor 
prison is situated on. (Interview with Mr. Golz Wessman, 16 July 2010.) 
82 In the media Mzimela described the prisons built by the Department of Public Works as ‘totally useless 
warehouses fit only for cattle’ and went on to describe its officials as ‘stupid’. (Weekend Argus 10-11 June 
1995, cited in Giffard, C. (1997), p. 49) 
83 Buntman, F. and Muntingh, L. (2012 forthcoming). 
84 ‘Mzimela uit Kabinet geskop’ Die Burger, 31 July 1998. [Mzimela kicked out of cabinet – own translation.] 
85 Gevisser, M. (1996) Portraits of power: profiles in a changing South Africa. Johannesburg: Mail and 
Guardian, p. 55.  
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section 3.3.2), Mzimela appears absent from all efforts to bring the situation under control, 
save for announcing the six-month amnesty to be granted to sentenced prisoners on 10 June 
1994.86 The six-month amnesty itself was regarded as an insult by many prisoners and 
resulted in further unrest and violence in the prisons. It also must have alienated the Minister 
from the prison population, since a more substantive amnesty would have curried favour with 
them. Whether Mzimela supported the 1994 White Paper is uncertain, but when it was 
criticised by civil society organisations he refused to engage with these groupings on the 
Transformation Forum on Correctional Services (discussed below in section 3.1).87 The 
inability of Mzimela to exercise control became abundantly clear when the National 
Commissioner, Khulekani Sithole, was implicated in corruption and effectively forced to 
resign in 1999 after the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) recommended 
that he was not fit to hold office.88 At the end of Mzimela’s term in 1998 there were serious 
problems within the DCS.89 Corruption and maladministration were rife, and this was 
confirmed by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) in 1999 when its 
Director General (Phumi Sikhosana) told Parliament: “The state had completely lost control 
over the Department of Correctional Services; the Department is not under the state’s 
control.”90 
In many ways the problems that continue to beleaguer the DCS emerged under the GNU with 
Mzimela at the helm. Shortly after Ben Skosana took over as Minister of Correctional 
Services, matters in the DCS took a turn for the worse with the assassination of a 
whistleblower.91 This was a watershed event, and Skosana requested then President Mbeki to 
                                                            
86 Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into unrest in prisons (1995) Unrest in Prisons (Kriegler 
Commission), p. 75. 
87 Giffard, C. (1997). 
88 Parliamentary Monitoring Group Minutes of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 
10 November 1999, http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/19991109-closure-sitole-matter-overseas-trip Accessed 13 
January 2012. Interview with Gavin Woods, Focus, Issue 21, http://www.hsf.org.za/resource-
centre/focus/issues-21-30/issue-21-first-quarter-2001/interview-with-gavin-woods Accessed 13 January 2012. 
89 Presidential Review Commission of the Public Service (1998) para 2.5.2 
90 ‘Staat het alle beheer oor DKD verloor, sê DG’ Die Burger, 15 April 2000. [State lost all control over 
Department - Own translation.] PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services, 14 April 2000 http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20000413-audit-department-correctional-
services Accessed 13 January 2012. 
91 ‘Ms Thuthukile Bhengu was in charge of Human Resource Management in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial 
Office of the Department of Correctional Services. She was murdered when she was shot through a window in 
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appoint a Judicial Commission of Inquiry, with the result that the Jali Commission was 
established.92 Skosana did the sensible thing and acknowledged there was a problem in the 
DCS beyond his and his senior management’s control. More precisely, they had lost control 
of the Department93 and needed to regain it. The fact that Correctional Services was given to 
the IFP is evidently not the reason why the state had lost control over the Department, but 
Mzimela’s position in the political landscape, his own views and style, and tensions between 
the ANC and IFP did not help the prison system. Moreover, he failed to provide the necessary 
leadership at a time when it was desperately needed. 
3. The role of civil society and the media 
 
Civil society organisations are an integral part of the South African human rights landscape.94 
Their role in prison reform after 1994 has involved varying levels of activity, but in general it 
has been less than warmly welcomed by the Department and Ministry of Correctional 
Services. This lack of enthusiasm for external stakeholder involvement did not escape the 
attention of the Jali Commission, which found the overall attitude of Departmental officials to 
be self-defeating inasmuch as they believed outsiders were not in a position to tell them how 
to run their prisons:95 
This is a sad state of affairs because it is this very attitude that discourages any input 
from people who might be experts in other areas, which would be of assistance to the 
Department. The Department cannot operate in isolation. It is not an island but an 
integral part of the South African society. The manner in which it conducts its affairs 
has a bearing on the lives of all South Africans, who expect the Department to consult 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
her residence on the prison grounds on 26 June 2001. In June 2002, two senior correctional officers, Mr. 
Mlungisi Dlamini and Mr. Lucky Mpungose, were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for Ms 
Bhengu’s murder. The court heard that the assassination was planned after Ms Bhengu refused to consider the 
employment of Mr. Mpungose’s fiancée allegedly as a result of a fraudulent job application.’ (Jali Commission 
p. 27.) 
92 Jali Commission, p. 5. 
93 Jali Commission, p. 116. 
94 Mubangizi, J.C. (2004) The role of non-governmental organisations in the protection of human rights in South 
Africa, Journal of South African Law, Vol. 2, pp. 324-342. 
95 The Jali Commission Report, pp. 944 -945. 
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and interact with experts and relevant stakeholders to ensure that correctional facilities 
in our country are competently run so that they compare with the best in the world.96 
It will be argued that the relationship between civil society and the DCS reached its lowest 
point during the first ten years of democratic rule. From 2003 onwards there was an 
improvement in civil society engagement, although it was not always welcomed by the DCS. 
In this regard, the Constitutional requirement for public involvement in the work of 
Parliament proved to be a critical ingredient for more purposeful prison reform. 
 
3.1 The Transformation Forum on Correctional Services  
 
Community involvement and inclusivity became, after 1994, key requirements for 
government on all tiers. The DCS realised this and even the Annual Reports at the time make 
reference to “community involvement”.97 In the early 1990s an alliance of civil society 
organisations,98 the Penal Reform Lobby Group (PRLG), was formed with the aim to 
promote prison reform, placing particular emphasis on human rights concerns. The PRLG 
would rally against the 1994 White Paper and regarded it as so inadequate that it drafted an 
Alternative White Paper.99 This, unfortunately, had little impact and there is no real 
indication that the DCS or the Ministry took the Alternative White Paper seriously, given that 
the 1994 White Paper remained intact until it was finally discredited ten years later in the 
2004 White Paper.100 
The PRLG did present the DCS with the opportunity to engage with a group of high-calibre 
civil society organisations (lawyers, academics and service delivery agencies) but it did not 
do so. It was thanks only to external pressure that then Deputy President Mbeki convened a 
meeting of stakeholders, including the DCS, Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 
                                                            
96 The Jali Commission Report, p. 945. 
97 Giffard, C. (1997), p. 33. 
98 The following organisations were part of the PRLG: Lawyers for Human Rights, NICRO, SAPOHR, 
POPCRU as well as research groups (Giffard, C. (1997), p. 33).  
99 Penal Reform Lobby Group (1995) An Alternative White Paper on Correctional Services, Pretoria: Penal 
Reform Lobby Group. 
100 Department of Correctional Services (2004) White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, Pretoria: 
Department of Correctional Services, p. 33-36 
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Minister and PRLG, that some progress was made. As proposed by Mbeki, an inter-sectoral 
conference on prison reform was held101 and there it was agreed that a transformation task 
group will be established “to develop a plan for transformation”.102 Mbeki’s proposal was not 
entirely new, having been proposed a year earlier by the Kriegler Commission (see Chapter 3 
section 3.3.2).103 Shortly thereafter the task group was established and by mid-1995 became 
known as the Transformation Forum on Correctional Services (TFCS), with broad 
representation from the Ministry, Department, Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 
trade unions, the National Advisory Council on Correctional Services, and non-governmental 
organisations. The TFCS was chaired by Carl Niehaus (ANC), who was also chairperson of 
the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services at the time.104 The TFCS was, however, 
short-lived and by September 1996 its funding ended and it dissolved. Throughout the 
Forum’s short existence it was clear that Minister Mzimela was not interested in participating 
in the Forum, and in March 1996 he withdrew, only to be ordered back by President 
Mandela.105 However, this did not resolve the intense conflict between Niehaus and 
Mzimela.106 The Department’s cooperation was not much better than the Minister’s and it 
played its cards close to its chest, as Giffard observed: 
                                                            
101 Conference on Civil Society Involvement in Correctional Services, Johannesburg, 16 -18 March 1995. 
102 Giffard, C. (1997), p. 33. 
103 Kriegler Commission, pp. 102-103. 
104 Giffard, C. (1997), p. 33. 
105 Giffard, C. (1997), p. 34. 
106 The following report from the Mail and Guardian of 22 March 1996 gives some insight into the relationship 
between these two individuals: Minister's 'one-upmanship': ‘African National Congress MP Carl Niehaus has 
charged Correctional Services Minister Dr Sipo Mzimela with displaying “one-upmanship” rather than the 
leadership necessary to effect change in South Africa’s prisons. In a letter to Mzimela this week, Niehaus said 
the “deepening crisis” in the Department of Correctional Services needed ‘strong, transparent and consultative 
leadership”. Yet recent events had left him with “the distinct impression [of] one-upmanship”. Niehaus cited 
Mzimela’s announcement earlier this year that the department would be demilitarised, which came four days 
before the Transformation Forum on Correctional Services presented him with a document on the selfsame 
issue. After Mzimela terminated the department’s participation in the forum, claiming it cost too much and was 
unproductive, the forum, which is funded by the Danish government, released a sheaf of documents on work it 
had done. These included proposals for an independent prisons inspectorate - prompting “a hasty press 
statement by your office that a “prisons inspector” will soon be appointed. One is left with the distinct 
impression that instead of leadership one is confronted by one-upmanship.” While it was encouraging that 
proposals developed by the forum were being implemented, the way it is done raised “serious concerns”, 
Niehaus wrote. He appealed to Mzimela to “find time” to meet a delegation from the forum. “Consultation is not 
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While on the one hand the Department wanted the legitimacy that the representative 
Forum gave it, particularly with reference to its dubious past, on the other its 
centralised leadership was not accustomed to referring ideas to, or negotiating with, 
‘outsiders’. As a result, the Department to a large extent kept the key decisions to itself, 
while it attempted to control the issues that were presented to the Forum.107 
Nonetheless, the Forum did make some lasting impact on the prison reform process, most 
notably proposals on an independent prisons inspectorate and a lay visitor’s scheme.108 Both 
of these became part of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) as the Office of the 
Inspecting Judge and the Independent Visitors. With Carl Niehaus as chairperson of both the 
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services and the TFCS, there was indeed closer 
interaction between civil society groupings and Parliament,109 and although this would wane 
after Niehaus’s departure in 1997, there would be a revival from 2003 onwards (see section 
3.2 below).  
Another factor that undermined the TFCS was the inclusion of organised labour, more 
particularly the union POPCRU, which equated transformation of the prison system with 
affirmative action in staff appointments, as discussed in Chapter 3.110 When established in 
1989 POPCRU’s roots lay in a civil rights agenda, reflecting resistance by police and prison 
officers to implement unjust policies such as the ill-treatment of black prisoners and strip-
searching of prisoners.111 It was on this basis that it sought allegiances with, and was 
accepted into, the network of organisations focusing on prisoners’ rights. However, over time 
its focus shifted away from prisoners as a stakeholder group. For example, the Preamble to 
POCRU’s Constitution (as at October 2011) makes no mention of prisoners and refers only to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
a luxury in the new South Africa, it is a prerequisite for any effective ministry. The ministers who perform best 
are those who developed good relationships with parliamentary committees and civil society. We are not 
interested in challenging you – we want to work with you,” he said. Copies of the letter were sent to Mandela, 
the Commissioner of Correctional Services, members of Niehaus’s portfolio committee and the forum.’ Mail 
and Guardian 22 March 1996, http://mg.co.za/article/1996-03-22-ministers-one-upmanship Accessed 3 
November 2011.  
107 Giffard, C. (1997), p. 34. 
108 Giffard, C. (1997), p. 34. 
109 Dissel, A. (2003) A review of civilian oversight over Correctional Services in the last decade, CSPRI 
Research report No. 4, Bellville: Community Law Centre, p. 21. 
110 Giffard, C. (1997), p. 35. 
111 Mtshelwane, Z. (1993) Recognize POPCRU, SA Labour Bulletin, Vol. 17 No. 6, p. 70. 
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employees of SAPS, DCS and traffic departments. Importantly, prisoners could not join 
POPCRU as they were not employees. By the mid-1990s POPCRU was a recognised trade 
union looking after its members’ interests, and in due course it also developed significant 
private sector interests through the POPCRU Group of Companies.112 Ultimately POPCRU 
would be a highly destructive force in the Department, as found by the Jali Commission and 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
The demise of the TFCS and the departure in 1997 of Carl Niehaus, a proponent of civil 
society involvement in prison reform, ushered in a period that saw very limited civil society 
engagement on prison-related matters and lasted until 2003. Although there were a number of 
court cases that focused on prisoners’ rights during that period,113 the DCS and the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services became increasingly inaccessible to civil society.114  
3.2 Civil society after 2003 
 
In 2003, supported by the Open Society Foundation (South Africa) (OSF-SA), the 
Community Law Centre (University of the Western Cape) and NICRO115 established a joint 
project aimed at prison reform, the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI).116 The 
project would focus its activities on research and advocacy to promote transparency, 
accountability and civil society involvement in the prison system. CSPRI was a direct 
response to the marginalisation of civil society from the policy debates in the preceding years 
and the dearth of reliable research on prisons and prison reform. Its first research output was 
                                                            
112 By 2007 the POPCRU Group of Companies had assets worth more than R200 million (US$ 29.4 million). 
(‘Union Investment- a pile of assets’ Financial Mail, 28 September 2007, 
http://secure.financialmail.co.za/07/0928/cover/coverstoryf.htm Accessed 2 November 2011.  
113 August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC); President of the Republic 
of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC); Minister of Correctional Services v Kwakwa and Another 
2002 (4) SA 455; Nortje en ‘n ander v Minister van Korrektiewe Dienste en Andere Minister of Correctional 
Services v Kwakwa and Another 2002 (4) SA 455; Winckler v Minister of Correctional Services. 2001 (2) SA 
747 (CPD); Roman v Williams NO 1998 (1) SA 270 (CPD); Van Biljon and Others v Minister of Correctional 
Services and Others 1997 (4) SA 441 (CPD); C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 (4) SA 292 (T); and 
Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 1999 (3) BCLR 342 (W). 
114 Dissel, A. (2003), p. 2; Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003), p. 6. 
115 At the time the author was Deputy Executive Director of NICRO and the Community Law Centre was 
represented by Prof. J. Sloth-Nielsen, and were the founding members of CSPRI. 
116 In mid-2005 NICRO withdrew from the agreement.  
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a critical review of policy development in the DCS for the period 1994 to 2001. It criticised 
the Department severely for its lack of focus and flip-flopping between different foci without 
making much progress on any stated objectives,117 as discussed in Chapter 3 (section 4.1). 
The CSPRI policy review of the DCS was presented to the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services on 9 September 2003 and received a lukewarm response.118 However, 
after the 2004 elections Mr. Dennis Bloem (ANC) was elected as chairperson of the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services.119 Under Bloem the Portfolio Committee would 
welcome civil society organisations to air their views of the prison system and he thus created 
an important space for policy debates. The Portfolio Committee had in effect stepped in to fill 
the gap left by the demise of the TFCS in 1996. For example, in the remainder of 2004 the 
Portfolio Committee received 18 submissions from civil society organisations, the majority of 
them on the 2004 White Paper. Even though the impact of the submissions was negligible (as 
noted in Chapter 4 (section 3)), civil society organisations had nonetheless found a platform 
to air their views, namely Parliament. This was a radical break from the past. The available 
records indicate that between 1998 and 2001 there were indeed no submissions or other 
formal interactions between civil society organisations and the Portfolio Committee.120 There 
is little doubt that after 2004 the oversight capacity of the Portfolio Committee was 
significantly strengthened by civil society in-puts and research undertaken by civil society 
organisations. For example, between 2007 and 2009 the Portfolio Committee would receive 
31 formal written submissions from a range of civil society organisations.121 These included 
expert briefings and submissions on draft legislation, the budget vote and Annual Reports of 
the DCS.122  
Over the next eight years CSPRI and other civil society organisations (e.g. Institute for 
Security Studies and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation) would produce 
several research papers focusing on prison reform. It was an express aim of CSPRI to fill the 
                                                            
117 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2003), pp. 39-41. 
118 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on 9 September 2003, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030908-civil-society-prison-reform-initiative-briefing Accessed 20 October 
2011.  
119 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on 25 June 2004, 
www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20040624-chairperson-election-1  
120 See PMG reports on Committee meetings for 1998 to 2001. 
121 Muntingh, L. (2011 d). 
122 Muntingh, L. (2011 d). 
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knowledge-gap that had developed after the PRLG123 and TFCS came to an end. Research 
undertaken and inserted into the discourse on prison reform dealt with sentencing,124 
oversight,125 prisoners’ rights litigation, 126 governance and corruption,127 children in 
prison,128 offender reintegration,129 torture and ill treatment,130 prison law,131 remand 
                                                            
123 By 2000 the PRLG had lost its momentum (telephonic interview with Ms Amanda Dissel, former manager of 
the Criminal Justice Programme at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 20 October 2011). 
124 Ann Skelton (2004) Alternative Sentencing Review. CSPRI Research Paper No. 6, Bellville: Community Law 
Centre; Giffard, C. and Muntingh, L. (2006); Mujuzi, J.D. (2008) The Changing Face of Life Imprisonment in 
South Africa. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law Centre.  
125 Jagwanth, S. (2004) A Review of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons of South Africa. CSPRI Research Paper 
No. 7, Bellville: Community Law Centre; Dissel, A. (2003); Gallinetti, J. (2004) Report of the Evaluation of the 
Independent Prison Visitors (IPV) System. CSPRI Research Paper No. 5, Bellville: Community Law Centre; 
Hettinga, B., Mandlate, A. and Muntingh, L. (2011) Survey of Detention Oversight Mechanisms Provided for in 
the Laws of SADC Countries. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
126 De Vos, P. (2003) Prisoners' Rights Litigation in South Africa Since 1994, a Critical Evaluation, CSPRI 
Research Paper No. 3, Bellville: Community Law Centre; De Vos, P. (2004) South African Prisoner's Right to 
Vote: Addendum to ‘Prisoners' Rights Litigation in South Africa since 1994: a Critical Evaluation. CSPRI 
Research Paper No. 3A, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
127 Van der Berg, A. (2007) Jali Commission Report - Summary and Comment. CSPRI Research Paper, 
Bellville: Community Law Centre; Muntingh, L. (2006) Investigating prison corruption. CSPRI Research 
Paper, Bellville: Community Law Centre; Muntingh, L. (2006); Tapscott, C. (2005) A study of best practice in 
prison governance. CSPRI Research Paper No. 9, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
128 Odongo, G. and Gallinetti, J. (2005) The Treatment of Children in South African Prisons - A Report on the 
Applicable Domestic and International Minimum Standards. CSPRI Research Paper No. 11, Bellville: 
Community Law Centre.  
129 Muntingh, L. (2005) Offender rehabilitation and reintegration: taking the White Paper on Corrections 
forward. CSPRI Research Paper No. 10, Bellville: Community Law Centre; Muntingh, L. (2009) A Societal 
Responsibility: The role of civil society organisations in prisoner support, rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Pretoria: CSPRI and Institute for Security Studies; Muntingh, L. (2009) Prisoner Re-Entry in Cape Town – An 
Exploratory Study. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law Centre; Muntingh, L. (2011) The law 
and the business of criminal record expungement in South Africa. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community 
Law Centre; Muntingh, L. (2010) Ex-prisoners' Views on Imprisonment and Re-Entry. CSPRI Research Paper, 
Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
130 Muntingh, L. (2008) Preventing and Combating Torture in South Africa: A framework for action under CAT 
and OPCAT. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law Centre; Fernandez, L. (2003) Optional 
Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhumane Treatment. CSPRI Research Paper 
No. 2, Bellville: Community Law Centre; Muntingh, L. (2009) Reducing Prison Violence: Implications from the 
literature for South Africa. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law Centre; Muntingh, L. (2009) 
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detention132 and HIV and AIDS.133 After 2004 there would be an increasing convergence of 
issues raised by civil society organisations with the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Service and the issues that the Committee in turn raised with the DCS during departmental 
briefings.134 Private sector involvement in the prison system, deaths in custody, the Jali 
Commission’s recommendations, the quality of Annual Reports, and the alignment of the 
budget to the strategic plan are examples of the issues that were raised with the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Service by civil society organisations. The submissions and in-
puts received from civil society would provide the Portfolio Committee with different 
perspectives on issues in the prison system and thus reduce its reliance on the DCS to provide 
it with information. In its handover report in 2009 the outgoing Committee acknowledged the 
role of civil society organisations in assisting it.135  
After 2004 it can be concluded that, compared to preceding years, there had developed a 
special relationship between a number of civil society organisations and the Portfolio 
Committee. The latter would continue to invite submissions on a consistent basis relating to 
law reform, DCS Annual Reports, budget votes and particular focal areas (e.g. medical 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Guide to UN Convention Against Torture in South Africa. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law 
Centre. 
131 Muntingh, L. (2007 b) Prisons in South Africa's Constitutional Democracy. CSPRI and CSVR Research 
Paper, Johannesburg: CSVR; Muntingh, L. (2011) Prisons in a Democratic South Africa - a Guide to the Rights 
of Prisoners as Described in the Correctional Services Act and Regulations. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: 
Community Law Centre. 
132 Ballard, C. (2011). 
133 Tapscott, C. (2008) An Assessment of the Impact of HIV/AIDS on Correctional System governance with 
Special Emphasis on Correctional Services Staff. CSPRI Research Paper, Bellville: Community Law Centre. 
134 Muntingh, L. (2007) Has prison oversight come of age in South Africa? Reflections on the Judicial 
Inspectorate of Prisons and the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services. CSPRI Newsletter, No. 24, 
December 2007. http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/civil-society-prison-reform-
initiative/newsletters/newsletter/newsletter%2024.pdf/  Accessed 21 October 2011. 
135 ‘The Committee was fortunate to during its tenure build working relationships with a number of non-
governmental organisations with interest in matters related to correctional services, including the Civil Society 
Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI), the National Institute for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders 
(NICRO) and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR).’ [Parliament of the RSA (2009) 
Overview report of the oversight activities of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services (2004 - 2009), p. 
2. PMG report of the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Service, 17 February 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20090217-correctional-services-committee-reports-and-minutes-adoption 
Accessed 20 October 2011. 
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parole). It was in particular the engagements on the DCS Annual Reports and the budget 
votes that afforded civil society organisations with a platform to raise a broad range of issues 
with the Committee and not be restricted to, for example, a particular legislative 
amendment.136 Moreover, the range of in-puts received enabled the Portfolio Committee to be 
more effective in holding the DCS accountable. This is discussed further in section 5 below. 
3.3 Civil society and litigation on prisoners’ rights 
 
Civil society’s actions were also not limited to engagements with Parliament and two notable 
court decisions were the result of litigation initiated by civil society organisations on behalf 
of prisoners. The first involved prisoners’ right to vote and, using the name of NICRO to 
litigate, CSPRI launched an application in 2003 in the Cape High Court to challenge the 
exclusion of sentenced prisoners without the option of a fine from the voters’ roll.137 When 
the case reached the Constitutional Court, the state argued that the exclusion of this category 
of prisoners was justifiable because it had to limit the number of people for whom special 
votes needed to be arranged due to financial and logistical reasons. In essence, “the 
justification was that the resources available for special votes should rather be used for law 
abiding citizens (par 45)”.138 A further point raised was that allowing this category of 
prisoner to vote would send out the message that the government is soft on crime (par 45),139 
evidently a concern of government, as noted in section 2.2.3 above. The Constitutional Court 
dismissed the cost argument, stating that a factual basis for such a claim had not been 
established and that steps had to be taken in any event to register prisoners not affected by the 
exclusion (unsentenced prisoners and prisoners serving a sentence with the option of a fine). 
In response to the “soft on crime” claim, the Court found: 
A fear that the public may misunderstand the government’s true attitude to crime and 
criminals provides no basis for depriving prisoners of fundamental rights that they 
retain despite their incarceration.
 
It could hardly be suggested that the government is 
entitled to disenfranchise prisoners in order to enhance its image; nor could it 
reasonably be argued that the government is entitled to deprive convicted prisoners of 
                                                            
136 Muntingh, L. (2011 d). 
137 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO and Others, (CCT 03/04) [2004] ZACC 10; 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC); 2004 
(5) BCLR 445 (CC) (3 March 2004). Muntingh, L. and Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2009), pp. 221-243. 
138 Muntingh, L. and Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2009), p. 236. 
139 Muntingh, L. and Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2009), p. 236. 
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valuable rights that they retain in order to correct a public misconception as to its true 
attitude to crime and criminals.140  
In March 2004, shortly before the 2004 general elections the Constitutional Court declared 
the relevant sections of the Electoral Law Amendment Act unconstitutional.141  
In 2006 a group of 15 prisoners, at Durban Westville prison, supported by the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC) and the Aids Law Project (ALP), took the Government of South 
Africa to court to gain free and unrestricted access to anti-retroviral therapy (ART) for 
prisoners suffering from AIDS.142 The prisoner-applicants (15 in total) were HIV-positive 
and had developed AIDS symptoms. In the preceding months several attempts were made by 
ALP and TAC to avoid litigation but failure by the DCS to comply with the implementation 
plan it proposed left no alternative. Ultimately the Court ordered that any restrictions that are 
preventing the applicants and other similarly situated persons from accessing ART at an 
accredited public health facility, as guided by the National Department of Health’s 
Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment for 
South Africa, be removed. Furthermore, it was ordered that the DCS provides the applicants 
and similarly situated persons with access to ART at an accredited public health facility as set 
out in the Department of Health’s Operational Plan.143 The Court was also critical of how the 
DCS had dealt with the problem and described it as inflexible, causing unexplained delays 
especially when time was of the essence. The DCS appealed, but the appeal was dismissed 
and the Court of Appeal confirmed the order made earlier. The Appeal Court was equally 
scathing of the DCS and found it in contempt of court as it had failed to implement the 
interim order made by Judge Pillay in the High Court.144  
 
                                                            
140 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO and Others, (CCT 03/04) [2004] ZACC 10; 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC); 2004 
(5) BCLR 445 (CC) (3 March 2004), Para 56 
141 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO and Others, (CCT 03/04) [2004] ZACC 10; 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC); 2004 
(5) BCLR 445 (CC) (3 March 2004). 
142 EN and Others v Government of RSA and Others 2007 ((1) BCLR 84 (SAHC Durban 2006) 
143 EN and Others v Government of RSA and Others 2007 ((1) BCLR 84 (SAHC Durban 2006) para 35.1-35.2 
144 EN and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Westville), Section 27 website, 
Posted on 12 April 2006, http://www.section27.org.za/2006/04/12/en-and-others-v-government-of-the-republic-
of-south-africa-and-others-westville-2/ Accessed 21 October 2011. 
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Subsequent to the EN and Others decision, the DCS has established 21 accredited ART 
sites,145 as discussed in Chapter 5 (section 4.1.1), and the impact of civil society’s 
intervention should not be underestimated. Historically, the Department’s response to the 
HIV pandemic after 1994 should be contextualised in government’s general response to HIV 
and the internal challenges faced by the DCS. Under President Mbeki, government’s response 
to HIV and AIDS was one of denialism, inaction and confusion at national government level, 
making a proactive, goal-directed and evidence-based approach to HIV and AIDS 
impossible.146 Government’s lack of an appropriate response to HIV and AIDS created a 
particular environment in which the DCS was operating, one in which HIV and AIDS were 
not priorities. This was a lethal combination: “Seen in tandem, the national government’s 
confused response to HIV and Aids and the DCS’s own internal woes, placed prisoners at 
tremendous risk of rights violations in general and, more specifically, of HIV and Aids.”147  
 
The right to vote and the right to adequate health care were issues fundamental to the right to 
dignity and consequently personhood. In both instances civil society organisations were left 
with no alternative but litigation. In the NICRO case Parliament had already passed the 
impugned legislation and in the EN and Others case, the DCS was failing to deliver on its 
own undertakings. Civil society organisations have indeed used litigation sparingly after 1994 
to advance prisoners’ rights and have preferred to affect reform through research-based 
advocacy. It should be added that the DCS has in general not responded well to litigation and 
where this was pursued, the Department frequently ignored court orders.148 By using 
Parliament and the courts, civil society organisations relied on Constitutional provisions to 
affect very specific advances in prison reform and the recognition of prisoners’ rights. 
3.4 The media 
 
Since 1994 the influence of the media on the prison system has been significant. Apart from 
general reporting on events relating to prisons and prisoners, a few areas stand out: 
                                                            
145 Department of Correctional Services (2010), p. 75. 
146 Nattrass, N. (2007) Mortal Combat – AIDS denialism and the struggle for antiretrovirals in South Africa. 
Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
147 Muntingh, L. and Tapscott, C. (2009) HIV/Aids and the prison system. In Rohleder, P. et al (eds) HIV/Aids 
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overcrowding, the Jali Commission, the so-called Grootvlei-video, and tender manipulation. 
These are important because they advanced transparency in the prison system, without which 
there can be no accountability. 
3.4.1 Overcrowding 
 
Even though prison overcrowding has been a long-standing problem, it would receive 
renewed media attention from 2000 onward during the tenure of Judge Hannes Fagan as 
Inspecting Judge for Correctional Services.149 Fagan would also find support from another 
judge, Judge Bertelsman of the North Gauteng High Court, who initiated the “National 
Initiative to Address Overcrowding in Correctional Facilities”.150 In September 2005 the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, funded by the Dutch government, 
together with a working committee consisting of other National Ministries, NICRO, Justice 
College, and several government and civil society role-players, hosted a national conference 
on prison overcrowding in Pretoria. The aim of the conference was to define and stimulate a 
national initiative to reduce both criminal behaviour and the overcrowding of prisons by 
pooling resources, avoiding duplication of services, networking and creating a national 
register of available services, resources and initiatives.151 In November 2006 a follow-up 
conference was held in East London to review progress.152 The two conferences involved 
numerous stakeholders from within and outside government. Improved access to prisons 
would also enable the reproduction of photographs153 and video material about overcrowded 
                                                            
149 See Fagan, H. (2005) Our Bursting Prisons. Paper delivered at the Criminal Justice Conference 7-8 February 
2005, Pretoria; ‘Dramatic Drop in Prison Numbers, Less Overcrowding: Fagan’ AllAfrica.com, 16 September 
2003, http://allafrica.com/stories/200309170018.html Accessed 21 October 2011; PMG Report on the Meeting 
of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 16 September 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030915-progress-report-regard-overcrowding-and-current-situation-prisons 
Accessed 21 October 2011; Fagan, H. (2002) Prison Overcrowding - One of our biggest challenges to 
transformation, Track Two, Vol.11 No.2; Fagan, H. (2004) Curb the vengeance - Laws on minimum sentencing 
and parole spell worsening prison conditions. SA Crime Quarterly, No. 10.  
150 Correspondence with Judge Bertelsman, February 2012, on file with author. 
151 Conference on strategies to address prison overcrowding in South Africa, 14-16 September 2005, Pretoria 
Country Club, Pretoria http://www.issafrica.org/pgcontent.php?UID=3875 Accessed 27 October 2011. 
152 Correspondence with Judge Bertelsman, February 2012, on file with author. 
153 A series of photographs about life at Pollsmoor prison by Cape Town photographer Mikhael Sobotsky 
attracted wide media attention, giving the public a rare glimpse to life inside. The photographs are accessible at 
http://www.subotzkystudio.com/die-vier-hoeke/ Accessed 15 October 2011. 
 
 
 
 
404 
 
prisons in South Africa.154 Over a period of ten years a substantial amount of information was 
placed in the public domain by the media about prison overcrowding, to the extent that it can 
safely be assumed that most South Africans are now aware of the problem.  
 
3.4.2 Jali Commission 
 
The Jali Commission, as a judicial commission of inquiry, had the necessary independence, 
resources and powers to conduct thorough investigations. The Jali Commission and its 
findings remain a watershed event in the history of the Department, for it officially exposed 
the corrupt and criminal practices prevalent in DCS. The Commission held public hearings at 
intervals from February 2002 to March 2005 in the course of its investigations. These were 
well covered by the media for the simple reason that it was a banquet of shock and scandal, 
as described in Chapter 3. The public was treated to tales that astounded belief, and even the 
Commission remarked in respect of one particular case: “If not for the consistency of his 
evidence, one would have been forgiven to think that one was reading a novel because the 
facts he revealed were facts of which bestsellers are made.”155 The testimonies given at the 
Jali Commission’s hearings fuelled public perceptions about wide-scale corruption in the 
DCS and added further to the legitimacy crisis of the prison system. Through the media, the 
Jali Commission served an important public-education function, affirming the importance of 
the constitutional requirements of accountability and transparency as well as highlighting the 
grievous consequences that arise when there is a failure to comply with them.  
 
3.4.3 Grootvlei video 
 
Shortly after the Jali Commission commenced with its work, the SABC3 investigative 
journalism programme Special Assignment aired, on 18 June 2002, a video secretly recorded 
by a group of prisoners at Grootvlei prison near Bloemfontein.156 The video showed how 
warders engaged in a range of corrupt and dishonest practices, such as selling alcohol to 
                                                            
154 ‘Welcome in South Africa Mthatha Jail’ Dispatch On-line Multimedia Productions 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z8t1yAGd_wQ Accessed 21 October 2011.  
155 Jali Commission, p. 292.  
156 Government Communication Service (2002) Allegations of Corruption,  19 June 2002, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02061916241001.htm Accessed 21 October 2011.  
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prisoners, selling a firearm, drinking alcohol with them, trafficking in juvenile prisoners and 
taking bribes. The Grootvlei management area was not originally a target of the Jali 
Commission’s investigation but after Minister Skosana had seen the video, the Commission’s 
scope was extended to include the Grootvlei management area. The screening of the video on 
national (and later international) television during prime time elicited disbelief followed by 
fierce responses from various stakeholders about the state of the prison system. It showed 
with clarity the state of ethics in the prison system: officials were freely and unashamedly 
engaging in criminal behaviour.157 
 
Even if certain groupings in DCS were attempting to dispute and discredit the findings of the 
Jali Commission (as noted in Chapter 3 section 4.8), the release of the Grootvlei video to the 
media and its broadcast on national and international television placed beyond doubt that the 
legitimacy of the prison system was in an abysmal state. If the public image of the DCS was 
not already in tatters, the Grootvlei video untangled the last few threads. The hyper-
transparency provided by the Grootvlei video placed additional pressure on DCS to address 
governance and enforce the disciplinary code.  
 
3.4.4 Tender manipulation  
 
Good investigative journalism also added to the woes of the DCS, and in this case it 
prompted a high-level official investigation, as discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.2) with 
reference to high-value contracts. In February 2005 the DCS issued an invitation for tenders 
to supply hi-tech security equipment to 66 maximum security prisons. What followed baffled 
security industry insiders, because the R237 million (US$ 30.8 million) contract was not 
awarded to one of the established security technology providers but to a small company, 
Sondolo IT (part of the Bosasa Group of Companies), which was entirely unknown and not 
even a registered company when the tender was advertised. Two journalists investigated the 
tender and Sondolo-IT, finding evidence of tender manipulation as well as uncovering links 
between the National Commissioner (Linda Mti) and Sondolo-IT.158 The investigation 
                                                            
157 Coetzee, W. (2003) Ethics in corrections – a South African perspective, Acta Criminologica, Vol. 16 No. 1 p. 
63. 
158 Taco Kuiper Award 2006, Forum for Investigative Reporters, 
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attracted the attention of the Auditor General, and the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) was 
tasked to investigate high value contracts,159 as described in Chapter 4 (section 4.2). 
 
Even though the SIU submitted its report to the Minister of Correctional Services in 2009,160 
no response was forthcoming from the Minister. In March 2011 the newspaper City Press 
published a summary of the key findings after it obtained a leaked copy of the SIU’s 
report.161 Unlike the SIU when it briefed Parliament (see Chapter 4 section 4.2), the City 
Press article disclosed the names of individuals and companies allegedly involved. At the 
time of writing (December 2011) the implicated officials have not yet been prosecuted, but 
seeing as their identities are known, closer monitoring would be possible. 
 
The combined effect of the media coverage of the Jali Commission’s public hearings, the 
Grootvlei video, the investigation into tender manipulation, and other scandals and incidents 
of a lesser nature, has had a devastating impact on the public image of the DCS as well as the 
morale of the average DCS official. It is therefore with good reason that the DCS has, as part 
of its strategic plan, an “Image Turn Around Campaign”.162 However, efforts to improve the 
Department’s public image are undermined by a fairly consistent stream of negative media 
reports on the DCS and its officials.163 Notwithstanding these concerns, the media have 
played an important role in promoting transparency in the prison system and also served a 
critically important public education function. Moreover, the influence of the media on prison 
                                                            
159 ‘Bosasa's tender touch’ Mail and Guardian, 13 February 2009, http://mg.co.za/printformat/single/2009-02-
13-bosasas-tender-touch/ Accessed 21 October 2011; PMG Report 17 November 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091117-special-investigations-unit-findings-their-investigation-department-c 
Accessed 21 October 2011. 
160 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional services of 17 November 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091117-special-investigations-unit-findings-their-investigation-department-c 
Accessed 21 October 2011. 
161 ‘Prison boss bribed’ City Press, 20 March 2011, http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/Prison-boss-bribed-
20110320, Accessed 21 October 2011. 
162 Department of Correctional Services (2011) Annual Report 2010/11, Pretoria: Department of Correctional 
Services, p. 40. 
163 For example, an August 2011 report related an incident in which a male DCS official and female SAPS 
official had sex while they were supposed to guard a prisoner at a hospital. The DCS official recorded the 
incident on video and circulated it. He was subsequently dismissed from the Department. (‘Officer in sex video 
dismissed’ Times Live, 31 August 2011, http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2011/08/31/officer-in-sex-video-
dismissed Accessed 3 November 2011) 
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reform underscores the importance of media freedom, which is amply demonstrated by the 
Auditor General and SIU investigations that were initiated after journalists reported on the 
manipulated tenders. 
 
3.5 Civil society and international human rights law 
 
With the DCS being generally unresponsive to civil society advocacy efforts aimed at 
improving the human rights situation in prisons, a small number of organisations turned their 
focus to international human rights law after 2004. South Africa ratified the UN Convention 
against Torture (UNCAT) in 1998 and submitted its initial report to the Committee against 
Torture (CAT) in 2005 – some five years late. The report was considered at the 37th session 
of CAT in November 2006. Three submissions from South African organisations were made 
to CAT, in addition to three submissions from international organisations.164 The submission 
by CSPRI focused exclusively on prisons, whereas the submission by Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) covered some aspects of prisoners’ rights. The 
submissions were well received by CAT, and an assessment of the submissions and the 
Committee’s concluding remarks165 found that there was a 
 
high level of congruence between the concerns raised by the civil society organs and 
those highlighted by the Committee. This cannot conclusively be regarded as a cause-
and-effect relationship and should rather be seen as the consolidation of shared 
concerns and the development of an inclusive South African agenda aimed at the 
prevention and combating of torture.166  
 
                                                            
164 Muntingh, L. (2008) ‘The betrayal of Steve Biko – South Africa’s Initial Report to the UN Committee 
against Torture and responses from civil society’ Law, Democracy and Development, Vol. 1, p. 46. 
165 UN Committee against Torture (2006) Consideration of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under 
Article 19 of the Convention Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture 
– South Africa CAT/C/ZAF/CO/1, 37th session, 6 – 24 November 2006. 
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One of the issues raised in the CSPRI submission to CAT was a mass assault on prisoners at 
St Albans prison in June 2005,167 as discussed in Chapter 5 (section 5). Ultimately it would 
lead to the McCullum decision by the UN Human Rights Committee.  
In 2010 CSPRI launched a campaign to see the domestication of the UNCAT, with specific 
reference to the criminalisation of torture as required by Article 4 of the Convention.168 
Subsequently the campaign has mobilised a number of civil society organisations in support 
of domesticating UNCAT. Even though a draft bill was prepared by the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development as early as 2005, the Bill had not been tabled in 
Parliament.169 
In a further development, in early 2007 the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) established a thematic committee on torture170 known as a Section 5 Committee, 
with reference to section 5 of the Human Rights Commission Act (Act 54 of 1994).171 The 
Committee has representation from a number of civil society organisations and has proven to 
be valuable in coordinating activities in the sector, although the focus is not strictly on prison 
reform.172 
On a more general level it is surmised that there is little evidence that the DCS invited and 
entertained international involvement from organisations with an overt human rights focus. 
The DCS did, however, engage increasingly with professional corrections associations, 
                                                            
167 Muntingh, L. And Fernandez, L. (2006) Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI) Submission To The 
UN Committee Against Torture in response to ‘Republic Of South Africa – First Country Report On The 
Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, And Other Cruel, Inhuman And Degrading Treatment Of 
Punishment’, para 57. 
168 Domesticate the Convention Against Torture (CAT) Campaign http://www.peopletoparliament.org.za/focus-
areas/prisoners-and-detained-persons/campaigns/icescr-ratification-campaign Accessed 13 January 2012. 
169 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 30 November 2011, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111130-stakeholder-hearings-prevalence-torture-correctional-centres Accessed 
13 January 2012. 
170 Telephonic interview with Ms F. Adams, SA Human Rights Commission, Cape Town, 16 January 2012. 
171 s 5 (1) The Commission may establish one or more committees consisting of one or more members of the 
Commission designated by the Commission and one or more other persons, if any, whom the Commission may 
appoint for that purpose and for the period determined by it. 
172 The author is a member of the Committee. 
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ministers, senior officials from other prison services, and academics,173 and was indeed 
instrumental in establishing the African Correctional Services Association (ACSA), a body 
consisting of African Commissioners of Prisons.174 International interactions were aimed 
rather at gathering information on specific issues such as public-private partnerships, 
electronic tagging of parolees, and unit management.  
 
International expertise and a greater sense of transparency would have been of significant 
benefit, as has been found in other young democracies and emerging states. Sustained 
international involvement and support for prison reform efforts are valuable to ensure that 
external influence stimulates the debate and a human rights focus is maintained. The value of 
continued international involvement has been demonstrated in the Palestinian Authority,175 
Russia,176 South Sudan,177 and Kazakhstan.178 International involvement appears to be more 
successful where this is done through and supported by regional (e.g. European Commission 
in the case of the Palestinian Authority) and/or international structures (e.g. UNODC and 
UNMIS179 in the case of South Sudan). International involvement should ideally support both 
                                                            
173 See Department of Correctional Services Annual Reports 1997-2010/11. 
174 South Africa’s leadership role in African corrections re-affirmed SA Corrections Today, August/September 
2008, pp. 102.  
175 ‘PM Fayyad and EU Representative lay first stone at €14.3 million Nablus Security Compound’ and 
‘European Neighbourhood Policy in action: EU and PA hold first joint meeting on human rights, good 
governance and the rule of law’. ReliefWeb Briefing Kit for European Union and Palestinian National Authority 
and Protection and Human Rights, Compiled on 18 October 2011, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/briefingkit-a441c21365f98a26566e43d622113f51.pdf 
Accessed 20 October 2011. There are several detention systems under the Palestinian Authority, for example 
under the military, police and intelligence service. In this case reference is made to the civil prisons known as 
Reform and Rehabilitation Centres (RRCs) and administered by the General Administration of Reform and 
Rehabilitation Centres (GARCC) and is managed as a unit within the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP). 
176 Coyle, A. (2002) Managing prisons in a time of change. London: International Centre for Prison Studies. p. 
22-23. 
177 Kuuire, R. (2010) ‘Corrections/prisons in United Nations peacekeeping operations’. In Aromaa, K. and 
Viljanen, T. Survey of United Nations and other best practices in the treatment of prisoners in the criminal 
justice system. Proceedings of the workshop held at the 12th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, Salvador, Brazil, 12-19 April 2010. Helsinki: European Institute for crime Prevention and 
Control. 
178 Coyle, A. (2002), p. 25-26. 
179 UN Office on Drugs and Crime; UN Mission in Sudan under the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO). 
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technical assistance and infrastructure development, if the latter is indeed needed. Prison 
construction has been supported by UNMIS in Southern Sudan180 and the European 
Commission in Palestine,181 but both have been supported heavily with technical assistance 
and not only infrastructure development support.182 Multi-stakeholder partnerships over a 
broad front of development and reform areas have also been shown to be effective in 
promoting prison reform when there is a strong focus on compliance with international 
human rights norms.183 
3.6 Summary of issues 
 
After the TFCS was dissolved, civil society organisations adopted different tactics to 
advocate for prison reform. First, it found a useful platform in Parliament and developed a 
mutually beneficial relationship with the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services from 
2004 onwards. Second, where it concerned fundamental rights, litigation was used in respect 
of the right to vote and the rights to equality and primary health care. Third, civil society has 
been drawing increasingly on international human rights law to advance prisoners’ rights, 
focusing on the absolute prohibition of torture. However, the DCS has remained true to 
character – a preserving and inward-looking organisation, resisting outside influences and 
changing tack only very slowly and begrudgingly. 
4. The emergence of organised labour 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, overview descriptions of the influence of organised labour were 
provided, specifically of POPCRU, and this requires closer analysis. Compared to the other 
                                                            
180 ‘Bor commences construction of prison and police buildings’ The Sudan Tribune, 3 November 2008, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=29143 Accessed 20 October 2011.  
181 ‘PM Fayyad and EU Representative lay first stone at €14.3 million Nablus Security Compound’. ReliefWeb 
Briefing Kit for European Union and Palestinian National Authority and Protection and Human Rights, 
Compiled on 18 Oct 2011, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/briefingkit-
a441c21365f98a26566e43d622113f51.pdf 
182 ‘South Sudanese Prisons Set for Reforms - The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has launched 
training sessions for prison officers in South Sudan’. Gurtong.net, 13 June 2010. 
http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/3697/South-Sudanese-
Prisons-Set-for-Reforms.aspx Accessed 20 October 2011.  
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unions active in the DCS, POPCRU has had significantly more members and because of its 
actions, a more visible impact on the DCS and the prison system. The Interim and 1996 
Constitutions granted employees the right to organise184 and the Labour Relations Act created 
the framework for this.185 In its early days, POPCRU’s activities were aimed at the 
recognition of civil rights of all prisoners186 and the organisation was part of the PRLG (as 
noted in section 3.1 above), an alliance focusing on prisoners’ rights. In October 1994 the 
DCS signed a recognition agreement with POPCRU.187 In a joint media statement following 
the signing of the recognition agreement, DCS and POPCRU said: “. . . the process of labour 
relations is a novelty to the employees and management of this Department . . . but we are 
committed to promoting good labour relations”.188 Regrettably, the events that followed did 
not bear this out, as described in Chapter 3 (section 4.3). In the two years following the 
agreement there was general unrest in the public service, and events in DCS should be seen 
against this background. There are, however, a number of features of POPCRU’s activities in 
DCS worthy taking of note.  
First, the recognition agreement did not change POPCRU’s militant modus operandi evident 
since 1989, which included mass protests,189 disruptions,190 strikes,191 sit-ins,192 use of 
firearms,193 hostage-taking,194 and even mobilising prisoners for its cause.195 POPCRU’s 
                                                            
184 s 27 of Act 200 of 1993 and s 23 of Act 108 of 1996. 
185 s 4 Act 66 of 1995 
186 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992) South African Prison Law and Practice. Durban: Butterworth Publishers, p. 41. 
187 Department of Correctional Services, Annual Report 1994, p. 2. 
188 ‘Departement erken Popcru amptelik’ Die Burger, 7 October 1994. [Department officially recognises 
POPCRU - own translation.] 
189 ‘Popcru lede met griewe na Parlement’ Die Burger, 24 January 1995. [Popcru members take grievances to 
Parliament – own translation.] 
190‘Bewaarders ontwrig medaljeparade oor lys van griewe’ Die Burger, 9 June 1994 [Warders disrupt medal 
parade due to grievances – own translation]; ‘Popcru lede jou Jessie Duarte uit’ Die Burger, 3 February 1995 
[Popcru members jeer Jessie Duarte – own translation]. 
191 ‘Chaos neem af by tronke; Popcru staak by Pollsmoor’ Die Burger 15 June 1994. [Chaos at prisons 
subsiding – own translation.]  
192 ‘Bewaarders beset kantore in Paarlse gevangenisse’ Die Burger, 21 May 1994. [Warders occupy offices and 
Paarl prisons – own translation.] 
193 ‘Balju vlug toe stakende bewaarders begin skiet’ Die Burger, 16 December 1994. [Sherriff flees when 
warders start shooting – own translation.] 
194 ‘Langa se oud-polisiehoof stel eis teen Popcru in’ Die Burger, 2 February 1995. [Langa police chief sues 
POPCRU.] 
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militancy was also not restricted to DCS but also occurred in relation to SAPS, where this 
union enjoyed support, too.196 By 1994 it had a tradition of aggressive and militant action for 
achieving its objectives, a willingness to depart wholly from established labour law 
procedures and a flagrant disregard for authority. The Jali Commission found ample evidence 
of how POPCRU used these tactics to achieve its ends. 
Second, during the pre- and post-1994 election prison unrest (described in Chapter 3 section 
3.3.2) there were a number of instances that POPCRU members acted in sympathy with 
prisoners regarding the anticipated amnesty to be granted, even siding with SAPOHR’s197 
call for mass action at some prisons affected by the unrest.198 Sympathy for prisoners was, to 
some extent, a vestige of its civil rights roots, but it was also a way of challenging the then 
predominantly white management: it was black prisoners and black warders together against 
white management. By the mid-1990s, it is safe to say, POPCRU had abandoned its civil 
rights motivations and narrowed its focus on serving a particular interpretation of its 
members’ interests. 
Third, POPCRU was started in the Western Cape in 1989 by a police officer (Lt. Gregory 
Rockman)199 but soon found support from colleagues in the DCS. POPCRU evidently 
appealed to DCS officials, and membership grew rapidly. In 2001 POPCRU had 45% of DCS 
officials as members and by January 2005 this had grown to 63.5% of DCS officials; by 
comparison, the traditionally white Public Servants Association (PSA) had 27.9% of the DCS 
staff as members.200 Even more remarkable was the extent to which senior DCS officials 
joined the union. By 2001 the majority of Area Managers, Provincial Control Officers and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
195 ‘386 op Mosselbaai wou nie na selle ‘omdat Popcru hul aanhits’’ Die Burger, 1 April 1995. [386 in 
Mosselbay refuse to return to cells ‘because Popcru incited them’ – own translation.] 
196 ‘Polisie-krisis: Fivas gryp in - vakbond belowe selfbeheersing na samesprekings’ Die Burger, 2 February 
1995 [Police crisis: Fivas intervenes – unions promise self-discipline – own translation]; ‘Militante optrede by 
Polisie wek kommer’ Die Burger, 1 February 1995 [Militant actions at police give concern – own translation]. 
197 South African Prisoners Human Rights Organisation. SAPOHR had a high profile prior to 1994 and in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1994 elections, but its controversial CEO, Mr. Golden Miles Bhudu (a former 
prisoner himself), had been implicated in the mismanagement of donor funds and also prosecuted for assisting a 
prisoner to escape (‘Golden Miles Bhudu granted bail’ Mail and Guardian, 5 February 2009, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2009-02-05-golden-miles-bhudu-granted-bail Accessed 2 November 2011). 
198 Kriegler Commission, pp. 40, 49, 59, 60, and 65. 
199 Van Zyl Smit, D. (1992), p. 41. 
200 Jali Commission pp. 105-106. 
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Heads of Prisons were POPCRU members.201 In addition, 20% of Deputy Commissioners 
and 31% of Chief Deputy Commissioners were POPCRU members.202 The Jali Commission 
reported that by 2005 the situation remained by and large the same and that 63% of senior 
managers (salary bands 11 to 15) were POPCRU members.203 Equally remarkable was that in 
2005, 99.9% of DCS staff belonged to a union, the same unions to which senior managers 
belonged.204 It was therefore not only a question of the level of unionisation (close to 100%) 
but how trade union alliances and allegiances affected the hierarchy and management 
structure of the DCS. The potential for internal conflict and conflicts of interest are obvious 
in respect of disciplinary enquiries, promotions, appointments, salary increases and merit 
awards when managers and junior staff belong to the same union. The perverse consequences 
of this situation were outlined in Chapter 3.  
Fourth, the point was made above in section 3.1 that POPCRU saw transformation of the 
prison system as the (rapid) implementation of affirmative action. In 1995 POPCRU 
members in the Eastern Cape demanded not only the resignation of then Minister Mzimela, 
this because they saw him as a stumbling block to reform, but the scrapping of the 
Constitutional guarantee that white civil servants will not lose their jobs.205 Race had become 
an overriding concern for POPCRU, and from 1994 onwards the union would use its power 
in the Department to ensure that appointments were made accordingly. 206  
Fifth, as a result of union influence, the Department was not able to pursue its chosen 
strategic direction, assuming such a direction existed.207 POPCRU’s influence had become 
destructive, and by the late 1990s violence and intimidation were the norm. The Jali 
Commission did not mince its words: 
A culture of lawlessness had been introduced into the Department in that it had become 
the norm for members to be forcibly removed from their positions and for unlawful 
actions to happen with impunity. This culture was reinforced by the benefits, which 
                                                            
201 Jali Commission p.110. 
202 Jali Commission p.110. 
203 Jali Commission p.120. 
204 Jali Commission p.120. 
205 ‘Popcru eis Sipo se bedanking en bevorderings’ Die Burger, 23 January 1995. [POPCRU demands Sipo’s 
resignation and promotions – own translation] 
206 Jali Commission, Chapter 5. 
207 Jali Commission, p. 116. 
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were derived from the unlawful activities. The members were getting appointed on the 
strength of their influence within the union, and management, which did not have union 
protection, was intimidated. They ended up resigning and those who remained had to 
“toe the line” or be forcibly removed. The union’s intentions were not in doubt as this 
was happening in various Management Areas. It was clear that the union was no longer 
playing its lawful role in the Department, and appointments, even that of the 
Commissioner, had to get union approval.208 
 
Under POPCRU’s influence “state capture” took place: powerful groups with vested interests 
had exerted undue influence in shaping the rules of the game for their own benefit, taking 
advantage of the various deteriorating governance mechanisms and resisting demands for 
change.209 The impact of unionisation as it happened between 1994 and 2000 can only be 
described as devastating. Management’s failure to understand the crisis in 1994 and develop 
an appropriate response had in fact resulted in the “perverse consequences” described by 
Boin and t’Hart (see Chapter 2 section 2.2). The collapse of order and discipline in the DCS 
can by and large be attributed to union influence, or at any rate to factions operating under the 
POPCRU banner. Covert programmes, clandestine meetings, coercion and the threat thereof 
saw the prison system regressing into an institution incompatible with the Constitution and 
the rule of law. 
 
5. The legislature 
 
The extent to which Parliament, and more specifically the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services, has influenced prison reform after 1994 is explored in this section. 
Parliament holds legislative, oversight and accountability mandates.210 The legislative 
mandate refers to the making, introducing and amending of laws. The Constitution requires 
that the executive must account to Parliament211 for its actions, policies, expenditure, etc. 
Corder, Jagwanth, and Soltau explain it as follows: 
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209 Kaufmann, D. (2004) Corruption Matters: Evidence-Based Challenge to Orthodoxy, Journal of Development 
Policy and Practice, Vol. 1 No. 1, p. 7. 
210 s 55 Act 108 of 1996. 
211 Section 55(2). 
 
 
 
 
415 
 
 
Accountability can be said to require a person to explain and justify – against criteria of 
some kind – their decisions or actions. It also requires that the person goes on to make 
amends for any fault or error and takes steps to prevent its recurrence in the future.212 
 
Oversight has a broader meaning than accountability and includes a wide range of activities 
and initiatives aimed at monitoring the executive.213 While accountability and oversight may 
differ in respect of their scope and focus, it is also clear that the two are closely linked and 
mutually reinforcing.214 
 
In respect of its legislative mandate, the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services has 
had a relatively light load since 1994 compared, for example, to the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Constitutional Development. After passing the Correctional Services Act (111 of 
1998), there have been only three amendments to the Correctional Services Act.215  
The history of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services can be divided into three 
periods: 1994 to 2003, during which the Committee played a lesser role; 2004 to 2009, when 
the Committee re-asserted itself; and 2009 to present, where the work methods of the 
Committee can be characterised as a stern and methodical approach to oversight, one building 
on the foundation laid in the preceding period. 
                                                            
212 Corder, H., Jagwanth, S. and Soltau, F (1999) Report On Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability 
Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town http://www.pmg.org.za/bills/oversight&account.htm Accessed 14 
August 2010. 
213 Corder, H., Jagwanth, S. and Soltau, F (1999). 
214 Muntingh, L. (2011 d). 
215 The first was the Correctional Services Amendment Act (32 of 2001), and the most significant amendments 
dealt with the further regulation of the treatment of prisoners; clarifications of sentence calculations; further 
regulating the functions of the Inspecting Judge; and further regulation of the functions and composition of the 
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5.1 The period 1994 to 2003 
 
However, the relatively light legislative load did not translate automatically into more 
effective fulfilment of the oversight and accountability mandates. Under the chairmanship of 
Carl Niehaus (ANC), there were, it appears, sincere efforts at building trust between the 
Committee and the DCS.216 The Committee was also assisted informally by the TFCS for a 
short period in 1995 to 1996, as noted in section 3.1. After Carl Niehaus left the Committee 
in 1997, it seems that the Committee’s willingness and ability to hold the DCS accountable 
diminished. From 1997 to 2003 the Committee had five chairpersons, making consistency in 
strategy and actions difficult.217 In respect of this period (1997 to 2003) Dissel concludes: 
The Committee has received regular briefings from the Department on its various 
policies and practices and questioned DCS representatives following oral presentations. 
But its response is mainly reactive and mostly concerned with current issues that arise 
through the media or that are brought before the Committee. While this may be an 
indication that the Committee has been satisfied with the performance of the 
Department, it may also indicate that the Committee has seldom taken a pro-active role 
that allows it to influence the direction of policy. It has also not effectively made use of 
its authority to make recommendations to shape policy.218 
The Committee was also constrained by a number of internal and external factors during this 
period, limiting its ability to exercise oversight and accountability. Most obvious, however, 
was the number of meetings the Committee held, which dropped from 17 in 1998 to a mere 
eight in 2000.219 Between 1998 and 2001 there were also no submissions made by civil 
society organisations, and it must be assumed there was a deliberate choice by the successive 
chairpersons to exclude civil society organisations from making submissions and engaging 
the Committee on policy and performance issues. In addition to this, the Committee had 
limited research support.220 The result was that the Committee depended by and large on 
media reports and information presented to it by DCS functionaries. The exclusion of civil 
society organisations, as representatives of the broader public, was indeed contrary to the 
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constitutional requirement for public involvement in the work of Parliament.221 Further 
limitations to the work of the Committee included members’ interest in, and knowledge of, 
imprisonment in general and of the DCS in particular, as well as the workload of committee 
members.222 Effective oversight is dependent on adequate information being available, but it 
also requires that committee members should ask pertinent and penetrating questions of the 
DCS when it is not satisfied with information presented to the Committee.223  
 
Bearing in mind that the years 1996 to 2003 were deeply troubling times for the DCS, the 
overall impression gained is that the Committee lacked strategic direction and generally 
reacted to issues presented by the DCS or reported in the media instead of following a 
proactive and inclusive approach. There was equally little follow-up on issues raised with the 
DCS on which feed-back or additional information was being sought.224 Whilst corruption 
was rife in the DCS and numerous allegations were being made, as well as investigations 
being instituted by other state agencies,225 the Portfolio Committee had very little to say 
about corruption during this period. In mitigation it may be argued that this was indeed the 
first democratically elected Parliament and that members had not yet developed the 
confidence, maturity and expertise to hold the executive accountable. Notwithstanding this 
and other reasons that may be forwarded in mitigation, the result was that the Portfolio 
Committee failed to hold the Department accountable.  
 
5.2 The Bloem Committee, 2004 to 2009 
 
Following the 2004 general elections, a new chairperson was elected, Mr. L. Modisenyane 
(ANC),226 but he remained in the position for a few months and in July 2004 was replaced by 
Mr. D. Bloem (ANC), who would remain the chairperson for the full term until April 2009. 
He was a member of the previous Committee and had some familiarity with the issues at 
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hand. The Committee quickly demonstrated a higher work rate, and in the remainder of 2004 
it held 25 meetings – substantially more than in the previous year. In October and November 
2004 the Committee held several meetings reviewing the 2003/4 DCS Annual Report and 
itself adopted a report in which its views were reflected.227 The report acknowledged the 
work of the Department, but also raised a number of problem areas under each of the seven 
DCS programmes,228 supporting these with “decisions and recommendations” from the 
Committee and frequently asking for additional information. This approach departed from 
past practice in which Annual Reports were not even discussed by the Committee. Indeed, 
many of the problem areas raised in the Committee’s report would remain on the agenda for 
its full term, such as prison construction, electronic tagging, corruption, ill discipline of staff, 
overcrowding, poor conditions of detention, and qualified audits by the Auditor General. 
 
At the end of its term the Bloem Committee adopted a hand-over report to be given to its 
successor after the April 2009 general elections. 229 This report provides a useful gauge to 
assess the work of the Portfolio Committee under Bloem and its contribution to prison 
reform. In contrast to its predecessors, the Bloem Committee proved itself to be extremely 
active and vocal, and was frequently cited in the media. The Committee was furthermore 
characterised by a somewhat unusual sense of unity of purpose amongst MPs from different 
political parties, which was ascribed to the leadership of the Chairperson.230 The unanimous 
adoption of the hand-over report by the Committee gives further support to this view. The 
                                                            
227 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 2 November 2004, 
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report was critical of both the DCS and, in particular, its Minister at the time, Ngconde 
Balfour (ANC). This gave the Committee an air of independence, impartiality and fairness.231 
 
5.2.1 The relationship with the Minister 
 
The hand-over report dealt briefly with some of the Portfolio Committee’s achievements. It 
noted: the amendments to the Correctional Services Act; improvements to the prison health 
care system; improved cooperation with other Parliamentary Committees; improved public 
awareness about prison reform issues; and the Portfolio Committee’s participation in a review 
of the criminal justice system. Nonetheless, the hand-over report also mentions two important 
challenges to its oversight role: the relationship with the executive authority of the DCS, and 
the quality and accuracy of the Department’s presentations and reports to the Committee. In 
respect of the latter, the Portfolio Committee notes that “it has at times been very difficult to 
obtain accurate information from its officials. Documentation for meetings is often received 
late, sometimes with insufficient and inaccurate information.”232 This remark should, 
however, be seen within the context of the relationship between the Portfolio Committee and 
the then Minister of Correctional Services, Ncgonde Balfour, which the Portfolio Committee 
described as follows:  
The Committee’s relationship with the entity and the department it oversees was 
generally very good. Unfortunately the relationship with the DCS’ Executive Authority 
was less so. The extent of the breakdown in the relationship between the Committee 
and that authority is starkly illustrated by the latter’s neglect to inform the Committee 
of the re-deployment of the former National Commissioner in November 2008.233 
The breakdown in the relationship is somewhat perplexing, since the Portfolio Committee 
was chaired by an ANC MP, the Minister was from the ANC, and the majority of Committee 
members were also ANC. It is consequently difficult to pinpoint the circumstances that led to 
the breakdown. The Portfolio Committee noted its dissatisfaction with reports received from 
the DCS as well as the accuracy of the information received,234 yet it appears that Minister 
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Balfour had frequently deflected criticism by the Portfolio Committee aimed at the DCS. 
Heated debates on a number of issues (e.g. the prison construction programme, privatisation 
of food provisioning, corruption and poor health services) indicated that the Portfolio 
Committee was resolute about not “rubber-stamping” the decisions of the executive. What 
provoked the ire of the Portfolio Committee more was perhaps the Minister’s responses to 
some of the questions it raised. When the Portfolio Committee rejected, in March 2007, the 
DCS report on the escape of Annanias Mathe from C-Max Prison (see Chapter 5 section 7), 
the Minister’s office issued a statement labelling the members of the Portfolio Committee as 
weak political leaders lacking sound judgment.235 He apologised later, explaining that the 
statement was issued without his authorisation, but the damage had been done.  
In October 2008, in its review of human resource matters, the Portfolio Committee received a 
briefing from the then National Commissioner on resignations and suspensions of senior 
officials. Initially the Minister was reported to be absent from the meeting due to ill health. 
However, he later sent a letter that stated: “Regarding the instability within the Department, I 
must submit that it is not an oversight matter for the Portfolio Committee.”236 It was not for a 
Minister to tell Parliament what it can and cannot do, and this was not well-received. The 
relationship between the Committee and the Minister was now firmly in trouble. It was 
therefore not surprising that in February 2009 the Committee Chairperson accused the 
Minister of directly interfering in the awarding of the controversial prison catering contract to 
Bosasa.237 The tensions between the minister and the Portfolio Committee did demonstrate 
the Committee’s independence, but whether it was good for prison reform is a different issue. 
Ultimately the bureaucrats in the Department would take instructions from their political 
heads and not Parliament.  
5.2.3 Private sector involvement 
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The Portfolio Committee took a particular interest in private sector involvement in the prison 
system primarily because of the budget implications, but also because of persistent suspicions 
that there may be corruption related to private sector involvement in the prison system. In 
addition to the two existing privately operated prisons (see Chapter 3 section 4.1.3),238 the 
DCS was by 2008 planning for seven prisons to be constructed and operated as public-private 
partnerships (PPP),239 as discussed in Chapter 3 (section 4.1.5). Since October 2004 the DCS 
had also sub-contracted food provisioning to the private sector at a number of prisons.240 The 
Portfolio Committee consistently expressed deep concerns about private sector involvement 
in the prison system and found the changing policies of the DCS perplexing:  
Taking into consideration the inordinate cost escalation, the government took the 
decision to halt any further plans to build prisons using the PPP financing model. That 
notwithstanding, the Minister of Correctional Services stated that the DCS would 
continue with the construction of five such additional prisons in Nigel, Klerksdorp, East 
London, Port Shepstone and Paarl.241 
The debate around privatisation and private sector involvement in the prison system has been 
continuing since the mid-1990s without clear answers emerging and with the DCS changing 
its position frequently on the desirability of private sector involvement.242 It is therefore not 
surprising that the Portfolio Committee “has not been convinced” about private sector 
involvement.243 The manner in which the contracts for food provisioning were renewed 
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without being placed out on tender also raised strong suspicions with the Portfolio 
Committee, and the former National Commissioner’s (Vernon Petersen) transfer to another 
department during this period served only to add to already existing doubts (see Chapter 4 
section 4.3.1). As noted in Chapter 3, in 2011 the PPP prison tender would be withdrawn and 
the SIU conclude its investigations into the high-value contracts. The Portfolio Committee’s 
scepticism about private sector involvement was ultimately vindicated. 
 
5.2.4 Human resource management 
 
Human resource management in DCS was also a continuous concern for the Bloem 
Committee. The DCS has a large staff corps: more than 40 000 employees in 45 000 posts at 
the time of the Bloem Committee.244 This amounts to roughly one official for every four 
prisoners. The situation at ground-level is, however, often far different from what this ratio 
may indicate. In the programmes’ key to the implementation of the Department’s 2004 White 
Paper, the DCS records, to the great concern of the Portfolio Committee, vacancy rates 
ranging from 19% to 27%. It was further noted by the Portfolio Committee that the overall 
vacancy rate increased from 8% to 11% whereas the target was to reduce it to 5%. The debate 
around vacancies frequently centred on the attraction and retention of scarce skills. To 
address this, the Occupational Specific Dispensation (OSD) was developed in the Public 
Service Coordinating Bargaining Council in an effort to adjust remuneration for these skills 
categories.245 The OSD was to be implemented from 1 July 2008, but in May 2008 the DCS 
informed the Portfolio Committee that it would not be able to implement the OSD by the due 
date.246 The Portfolio Committee requested a revised time-frame from the DCS but this was 
not submitted by the end of the Bloem Committee’s term.247 The OSD was heralded as the 
solution for the Department’s long-standing problem with the remuneration of professionals 
and other scarce skills, yet it appears that despite having nearly one year’s forewarning of the 
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245 Public Service Collective Bargaining Council Resolution 1 of 2007, Gazetted 29 August 2007. 
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implementation date, it was unable to make the necessary arrangements. The Committee was 
equally concerned about the Seven Day Establishment (see Chapter 4 section 2.2.4) and 
became increasingly frustrated with the Department’s lack of progress. 248  
5.2.5 Qualified audits 
 
For the full term of the Bloem Committee the DCS received qualified audits, as described in 
Chapter 4 (section 2.4.2). Of particular concern to the Portfolio Committee was the fact that 
the DCS did not implement previous recommendations from the Auditor General and also 
failed to implement resolutions from SCOPA. Key to the problems around financial 
management seems to be a lack of skill and expertise at the level of Chief Financial Officer. 
Nonetheless, the Portfolio Committee was well supported by SCOPA, and the DCS appeared 
before that committee annually as a result of its successive qualified audits. 
5.2.6 Summary of issues 
 
Even though the Bloem Committee did not achieve all it set out to do, it has nevertheless 
established a new standard in Parliamentary oversight over the DCS. It pursued a number of 
issues in the Department’s performance with doggedness and, at times, made it quite 
uncomfortable for the Department’s officials when they were unable to provide convincing 
responses to questions. It was in these instances that the media picked up on the growing 
tension between the Portfolio Committee, the DCS and the Minister. A further result that can 
be ascribed by and large to the pressure from this Committee was a more systematic and 
methodical approach by the DCS in addressing problems. Annual reports since 2004 show a 
more accurate description of problems and proposed solutions, development of targets and a 
range of managerial tools and processes more likely to be found at business schools. While 
implementation remained a problem, the Bloem Committee left its mark on the DCS and its 
senior management. The Committee took full advantage of the mandate provided to it by the 
Constitution.249 
5.3 The Smith Committee, 2009 to present 
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On 28 May 2009 the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services elected Mr. Vincent 
Smith (ANC) as chairperson. Smith was previously a member of SCOPA and thus came with 
skill and experience in financial oversight. The Smith committee would consequently pay 
focused attention to financial matters and for this purpose scheduled quarterly meetings with 
the DCS to review financial management and related matters.250 Given the DCS’s history of 
qualified audits, the Committee expressed its desire that there should be at least be one 
unqualified audit during its term.251 Cooperation between SCOPA and the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services would carry on, and the DCS would continue to appear 
before SCOPA as a result of successive qualified audits and unauthorised expenditure. 
5.3.1 A focused approach 
 
Compared to the Bloem Committee, the Smith Committee adopted an even more strategic 
and proactive approach252 towards the Department and ensured that issues not dealt with 
satisfactorily were indeed followed up.253 Repeatedly the DCS was reminded of issues that 
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had not been clarified or to which unsatisfactory replies were received. The Committee 
remains critical of the Department’s budget and strategic plan, stating clearly that the two are 
not aligned and, more specifically, that the budget is not aligned to the 2004 White Paper.254 
 
The Committee had also made it clear to the Department that it would not tolerate poor 
performance, and at times adopted a strict and stern stance towards Department’s failings. 
After a briefing on the outsourcing of services by the DCS to the Portfolio Committee on 14 
October 2009, the chairperson’s concluding remarks were noted as follows: 
 
In conclusion, the Chairperson warned the DCS that there was a rocky road ahead of 
them. He reminded the Department of its mission statement, which stated that the DCS 
strived to provide humane conditions and re-integrate inmates into society. He 
perceived a contradiction between the mission statement and what was said by the 
officials, for example that the provision of food to inmates was not a core business. He 
said that the Department needed to develop a better understanding of what their core 
business was. He asked how the DCS could consider that the provision of anti-
retrovirals was a core business but the provisioning of food was not.255 
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The Committee has also been firm in that it holds the senior management and in particular the 
National Commissioner responsible and accountable. It has been very clear about the 
seriousness of the situation. The new National Commissioner (Tom Moyane, from May 
2010) was not spared, despite being in the position for only five months at the time, when the 
Chairperson told him that if matters do not improve and the Committee not supplied with 
accurate information, it will ask for his removal.256 The Committee has been extremely frank 
in expressing its frustrations with the Department. It called Department’s management 
“chaotic”,257 saying it was being run like a “spaza shop” (a small informal convenience shop, 
usually operated from the owner’s house),258 and told the National Commissioner he must get 
his management team in order.259 Committee members have also accused the Department’s 
management of trying to undermine it.260 Importantly, the Committee has threatened to not 
approve the Department’s Budget Vote, a situation that would have serious repercussions.261 
 
5.3.2 An inclusive approach 
 
The Smith Committee, building on the work method established under Bloem, sought 
information from sources other than the DCS. This included several briefings by non-
governmental organisations, receiving submissions from other government departments (e.g. 
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http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111012-department-correctional-services-dcs-2011-budgetary-review-briefing-
d Accessed 16 January 2012. 
260 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 15 September 2010 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100915-department-correctional-services-feedback-outstanding-matters 
Accessed 16 January 2012.  
261 PMG Report on meetings of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 20 October 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101020-department-feedback-matters-emanating-14-october-interaction-its-
2009 Accessed 22 October 2011. 
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Auditor General,262 National Treasury,263 Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services,264 
Department of Public Works,265 Department of Health266), Correctional Supervision and 
Parole Board chairpersons;267 and inviting MPs from other relevant Portfolio Committees to 
the meetings (SCOPA,268 Police,269 Public Works270). It was in particular in relation to inter-
departmental cooperation that the Committee has played a problem-solving role. An example 
is the relationship between DCS and the Department of Public Works. After a four-year 
delay, a service level agreement between the two departments was eventually finalised after 
                                                            
262 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 20 October 2010 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101020-department-feedback-matters-emanating-14-october-interaction-its-
2009 Accessed 22 October 2011. 
263 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 1 June 2011 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110601-national-treasury-matters-related-public-private-partnership-correcti 
Accessed 16 January 2012.  
264 PMG Report on meetings of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 12 May 2010 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100512-update-ms-wilson-matter-preliminary-inputs-portfolio-committee-
member and 17 November 2010 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101117-judicial-inspectorate-correctional-
services-200910-annual-report-brie Accessed 16 January 2012. 
265 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 25 May 2011 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110525-department-public-works-progress-made-construction-four-new-
generatio Accessed 16 January 2012. 
266 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 21 April 2010 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100421-department-correctional-services-report-amaravathee-wilson-matter-
pro Accessed 16 January 2012. 
267 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 8 September 2009 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20090908-briefing-selected-parole-board-chairpersons-challenges-functioning-pa 
Accessed 16 January 2012. 
268 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 1 June 2011 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110601-national-treasury-matters-related-public-private-partnership-correcti 
Accessed 16 January 2012. 
269 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 3 November 2010 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101103-departments-correctional-services-justice-police-impact-delays-invest 
Accessed 16 January 2012. 
270 PMG Report on meetings of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 2 June 2010 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100602-department-correctional-services-public-works-their-service-level-agr 
and 25 May 2011 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110525-department-public-works-progress-made-
construction-four-new-generatio Accessed 16 January 2012. 
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intervention by the Portfolio Committee.271 Similarly, the Committee has continued with 
announced and unannounced oversight visits to prisons, providing it with first-hand evidence 
of what is happening on a daily basis in South Africa’s prisons.272 Frequently this information 
has contradicted what the Department’s senior management had been telling the Committee 
during its meetings; this has often placed the Department’s officials on the back-foot at 
Committee meetings. 
 
5.3.3 Showing results 
 
The increasingly methodical and sustained pressure on the Department has, since the Bloem 
Committee, started bearing fruits. The Department has become less elusive when responding 
to Committee questions, and in this regard the meeting of 20 October 2010 is instructive. The 
chairperson explained that, following a meeting with the Auditor General the previous day, it 
seemed as if the DCS Head Office was unable to enforce instructions as regions ignored 
directives, there was no follow-up, and departure from compliance was pervasive. Instead of 
defending the criticism, the National Commissioner (Moyane) gave a frank assessment of the 
situation, explaining that when he assumed the position of National Commissioner he noted 
the lack of accountability.273 He described the leadership of the Department as “lethargic and 
office-bound”, lazy and lackadaisical, and that this led to mediocrity. More specifically, the 
regional leaders did not visit prisons in their area of control and there were regional fiefdoms. 
His frankness earned the National Commissioner a good measure of respect with the 
Committee, and in the months to come there would be improvements, albeit small, in the 
Department’s performance. The quarterly report-back meetings of 15 June 2011 and 13 
October 2011 noted a number of achievements and reflected a more cooperative working 
                                                            
271 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 25 May 2011 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110525-department-public-works-progress-made-construction-four-new-
generatio Accessed 16 January 2012. 
272 PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 1 July 2009 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20090701-prisoner-complaints-committee-strategy-2009-and-2010-committee-
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relationship between the DCS and the Committee. Importantly, the number and scope of 
qualifications in the Auditor General’s report for 2010/11 has shown a significant 
reduction,274 as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Since 2004 the successive Portfolio Committees on Correctional Services have remained 
critical of the Department’s performance, affirming the institutional crisis. Under Smith the 
Committee’s focus has, however, become more methodical and their interventions more 
aimed at addressing the institutional crisis, with particular reference to accurate reporting, 
managing governance and accounting problems, and enabling more effective delivery on the 
mandate. The Committee has also not allowed itself to be distracted as much by scandals and 
embarrassing incidents even though they still occur.275 The quarterly meetings gave structure 
to this focus and have been well-supported by following up on issues and, where necessary, 
involving other stakeholders in government to resolve long-standing issues. Although it is 
difficult to furnish detailed evidence, there are signs that the DCS leadership is responding 
more constructively and less evasively to concerns raised by the Committee. 
 
5.3.4 Summary of issues 
 
The history of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services since 2004 reflects an 
increased willingness and maturity in Parliament to fulfil its oversight and accountability 
mandate. This accords with the views of the manager of Parliament’s Legislation and 
Oversight Division:  
There is a shift in emphasis from initiating, amending and passing legislation to 
increasing the effectiveness of Parliament’s oversight capacity. Parliament has 
developed an Oversight and Accountability Model, which provides for the 
                                                            
274 Department of Correctional Services (2011 a), pp. 124-125. 
275 The suspension of the National Commissioner, for example, was discussed only in one meeting. (PMG 
Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services held on 11 November 2009, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20091111-minister-progress-case-against-national-commissioner-developments-
vet Accessed 22 October 2011.  
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strengthening of existing parliamentary oversight practices, as well as the establishment 
of new processes and structures to enhance this capacity.276 
 
The task of oversight centres, in its crudest form, on monitoring the strategic priorities of the 
executive and the utilisation of resources allocated thereto with the aim to ensure that 
resources are being used effectively and efficiently to achieve the stated aims.277 In this 
regard, two instruments stand out as tools that have been used with particular effectiveness by 
the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services: the budget vote (which is read together 
with the department’s strategic plan) and the departmental Annual Report. The budget vote 
and strategic plan, read together, set out a multi-year plan for the department concerned. 
Based on this, Parliament will approve, amend or reject the proposed budget for the year. In 
fulfilling this duty, the committees of Parliament are obligated, by virtue of the Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (Act 9 of 2009), to assess the performance of 
each national department with reference to the following: the medium-term estimates of 
expenditure; its strategic priorities; measurable objectives; prevailing strategic plans; the 
expenditure report published by National Treasury; financial statements; annual report; the 
report from SCOPA; and any other information presented to or requested by any house of 
Parliament.278 While Parliament may undertake other activities to exercise its oversight 
mandate, such as inspection visits to government facilities (e.g. prisons), the duties imposed 
by the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act are a very clear and 
tangible operationalisation of the oversight mandate. The Portfolio Committee of 
Correctional Services has not yet utilised the mechanisms provided by the Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act to its fullest extent, for example, by 
changing or even rejecting the budget vote. Nonetheless, it provides the Committee with a 
powerful tool. 
 
While the DCS remains confronted with internal problems, the Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services has grown in stature and influenced the performance of the Department 
in significant ways. There has developed a greater sense of transparency, reflected in the 
                                                            
276 Parliament’s 2007 Reflections (2007) December 16, Cape Town: Parliament of South Africa 9 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/content/Reflections_Final_12pg%209.pdf Accessed 14 August 2010. 
277 Muntingh, L. (2011 d). 
278 Section 5 Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (9 of 2009). 
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detailed reports, regular meetings, and thorough questioning on the budget and strategic plan; 
information from multiple sources is now also available to the Committee. The oversight 
function has seen equal improvement, as is evident in the Committee’s less tolerant approach 
to poor performance on a broad front of issues. To address performance issues, the 
Committee has placed particular emphasis on encouraging the Department to develop the 
necessary institutional capacity to deliver on its mandate and rid itself of long-standing 
problems such as corruption. While results may at times seem modest, the Department has 
made significant gains since 2001 when the Jali Commission started its investigations, even 
though it is frequently a case of three steps forward and two steps back. Notwithstanding 
these concerns, it is evident that the Portfolio Committee took its Constitutional mandate to 
heart, demonstrating that it will and can use the powers entrenched by the Constitution to 
effect prison reform. 
 
6. The Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
 
The mandate of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services was already described in 
Chapter 4 (section 2.4.3) and need not be repeated here. Other authors have also done more 
detailed analyses of the Inspectorate.279 In the course of its existence the Judicial Inspectorate 
initially focused on overcrowding but has broadened its scope over time. However, the 
Inspectorate has not been without its limitations, and three issues are discussed below. 
 
6.1 Overcrowding 
 
The second Inspecting Judge (Judge Fagan),280 in the first annual report that he authored (in 
2000), made the point that prison overcrowding was the root cause of the “most awful 
conditions” of detention281 and elsewhere called conditions “horrendous”.282 Under Judge 
                                                            
279 Jagwanth, S. (2004); Dissel, A. (2003); Gallinetti, J. (2004); Hettinga, B., Mandlate, A. and Muntingh, L. 
(2011). 
280 The first was Judge Trengove, from 1 June 1998 to 30 March 2000, who oversaw the establishment of the 
Judicial Inspectorate. 
281 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2000) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2000, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 3. 
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Fagan (from 2000 to 2006) the Judicial Inspectorate would, through a variety of means, draw 
attention to overcrowding in prisons.283 It targeted Parliament, members of the judiciary, 
SAPS, DCS, the media, civil society and the general public. Placing overcrowding, and with 
it poor conditions of detention, on the national agenda has been an important achievement of 
the Inspectorate and influential in the prison reform discourse.284 For example, it resulted in a 
number of research publications aimed at gaining a better understanding of the causes of 
prison overcrowding and possible solutions.285 The Annual Reports of the Judicial 
Inspectorate have provided detailed information on trends, problems encountered and also 
advances made in addressing prison overcrowding. In short, the Inspectorate fulfilled a 
valuable public education function about prisons and conditions of detention.  
The Inspectorate took the initiative and encouraged government to take or create measures to 
alleviate prison overcrowding. In 2000 the Judicial Inspectorate encouraged government to 
use its powers under section 66 of the 1959 Correctional Services Act and release certain 
categories of awaiting trial prisoners. The result was that 8 451 awaiting trial prisoners with 
bail of less than R1 000 (US$ 150) were released in September 2000.286 An amendment, 
under pressure from the Inspectorate, to the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977) broadened 
the scope of police bail with the aim to reduce the use of pre-trial detention in prison.287 In 
2001, again under pressure of the Inspectorate, an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
282 Fagan, H. (2002), p. 17. 
283 Mubangizi, J.C. (2002) Some reflections on the promotion of the rights of prisoners in South Africa’. Acta 
Criminologica, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 26-34. 
284 Fagan, H. (2005) ‘Dramatic Drop in Prison Numbers, Less Overcrowding: Fagan’ AllAfrica.com, 16 
September 2003, http://allafrica.com/stories/200309170018.html Accessed 21 October 2011; PMG Report on 
the Meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services of 16 September 2002, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030915-progress-report-regard-overcrowding-and-current-situation-prisons 
Accessed 21 October 2011; Fagan, H. (2002); Fagan, H. (2004) Curb the vengeance - Laws on minimum 
sentencing and parole spell worsening prison conditions. SA Crime Quarterly, No. 10.  
285 See Karth, V. (2008) Between a rock and hard place. Cape Town: Open Society Foundation (SA); Giffard, 
C. and Muntingh, L. (2006); Redpath, J. and O’Donovan, M. (2006) The Impact of minimum sentencing in 
South Africa - Research into the impact of minimum sentencing in South Africa. Cape Town: Open Society 
Foundation (SA); Sentencing in South Africa - Report on a conference on sentencing in South Africa held from 
25 -26 October 2006, Cape Town. Cape Town: Open Society Foundation; Steinberg, J. (2005) Prison 
Overcrowding and the Constitutional Right to Adequate Accommodation in South Africa. Johannesburg: Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. 
286 Jagwanth, S. (2004). 
287 Jagwanth, S. (2004), p.52. 
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was made to allow a Head of Prison, who is satisfied that the population of the prison “is 
reaching such proportions that it constitutes a material and imminent threat to the human 
dignity, physical health or safety of an accused”288 to apply to court for their release under 
specific conditions.289 This amendment would, for a variety of reasons, prove to be 
ineffective in reducing overcrowding (see Chapter 5 section 3.2).290  
 
Nonetheless, the focus on overcrowding has been a strategic one, not only because it is a key 
driver of other problems but because it is one issue which the DCS can associate itself with 
and openly acknowledge. If more sensitive matters, such as gross human rights violations, 
corruption and dishonest practices, were to have been the focus of the Judicial Inspectorate, 
especially in the early years, it is likely they would have summoned far more resistance from 
the DCS. In focusing on overcrowding, the Inspectorate has consistently called for the use of 
non-custodial sentences,291 the scrapping of the minimum sentences legislation,292 earlier 
release on parole,293 the use of plea bargain agreements,294 diversion,295 police bail,296 greater 
                                                            
288 s 63A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977. 
289 Jagwanth, S. (2004), p.52. 
290 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2003) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2002/3, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 23. 
291 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2001) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2000, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 17; Office of the Inspecting Judge (2004) Judicial Inspectorate 
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of the Inspecting Judge (2005) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2004/5, Cape 
Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, pp.19-26. 
292 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2003), p.27; Office of the Inspecting Judge (2004), pp. 24-26; Office of the 
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use of admission of guilt fines,297 and granting of affordable bail.298 This approach placed less 
pressure on the DCS and instead targeted other role-players in the criminal justice system. 
6.2 A widening focus 
 
From 2006/7 the Judicial Inspectorate has, in its Annual Reports, broadened its focus 
somewhat to emphasise general conditions of detention. To this end it conducted a national 
inspection in that year and an infrastructure audit in the following.299 Although still 
recognising prison overcrowding as a major driving force, it started identifying other 
systemic problems such as poor management and low performance levels of staff.300 The 
prevention of human rights violations301 also received increasing attention from the Judicial 
Inspectorate, and in recent years it has paid particular attention to deaths in custody,302 with 
the result that deaths in custody have been discussed more frequently at Portfolio Committee 
meetings.303 The data reported by the Inspectorate on unnatural deaths in custody (see 
Chapter 5 section 4.2) have been an extremely valuable contribution to bringing about greater 
transparency on this issue. 
 
Since its establishment, the Judicial Inspectorate has made significant contributions to 
transparency chiefly in two ways. The first is the deployment of the Independent Visitors, 
whereby community members have access to prisoners, documents and facilities. Visits to 
places of detention remain the most effective mechanism for preventing rights violations, and 
                                                            
297 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2001), p. 16; Office of the Inspecting Judge (2004), pp.24-26; Office of the 
Inspecting Judge (2005), pp.19-26. 
298 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2001), p. 16; Office of the Inspecting Judge (2003), p.27; Office of the 
Inspecting Judge (2004), pp.24-26; Office of the Inspecting Judge (2005), pp.19-26. 
299 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2007) and Office of the Inspecting Judge (2008) Judicial Inspectorate for 
Correctional Services Annual Report 2007/8, Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge. 
300 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2007), p. 6-8. 
301 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2009) Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2008/9, 
Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, Chapter 2. Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010) Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services Annual Report 2009/10, Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, 
Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, Chapter 3. 
302 Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010), pp. 59. 
303 See PMG Report on meeting of the Portfolio Committee on 24 November 2010, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101124-meeting-finalisation-department-public-works-department-
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in particular torture and other ill-treatment.304 While some concerns have been raised about 
the independence and effectiveness of the Independent Visitors,305 the mere fact that an 
external person has unrestricted access to a prison and its prisoners necessitates a different 
response from the officials in charge. The second is that through its annual reports as well as 
other activities (e.g. media responses, meetings, workshops, conference presentations and 
assistance to researchers), the Judicial Inspectorate has placed a significant amount of 
hitherto unavailable information in the public domain. Importantly, the Judicial Inspectorate 
has access to the Management Information System (MIS) of the DCS, and it is particularly in 
respect of quantitative information that more thorough analyses of prison population trends 
became possible. Other stakeholders, such as Parliament and civil society organisations, now 
have access to information that the DCS had been rather reluctant to share with outsiders. 
6.3 Limitations of the Judicial Inspectorate 
 
The Inspectorate has not been without limitations and two are noted, namely the impact of 
complaints lodged by prisoners with Independent Visitors, and the Inspectorate’s relationship 
with the Minister and the DCS. With regard to the handling of the high number of complaints 
recorded, it must be enquired if this has had any impact on conditions of detention. For 
example, in 2009/10 the Inspectorate recorded 276 636 complaints and the 220 Independent 
Visitors made 8 346 visit to prisons and consulted with 78 883 prisoners.306 The Inspectorate, 
does not, however, provide any further information in respect of the resolution of complaints, 
the monitoring of agreed-upon solutions, time duration for resolution and additional 
information on the handling of complaints. Other information presented by the Judicial 
Inspectorate in its Annual Reports since 2000, research by other organisations, and DCS 
Annual Reports indicate that changes in conditions of detention, the treatment of prisoners 
and the protection of human rights have changed very slowly, if at all, since the establishment 
of the Inspectorate. The types of complaints and their proportional distribution have also 
                                                            
304 The Special Rapporteur on Torture is clear on this issue: ‘The most important method of preventing torture is 
to replace the paradigm of opacity by the paradigm of transparency by subjecting all places of detention to 
independent outside monitoring and scrutiny. A system of regular visits to places of detention by independent 
monitoring bodies constitutes the most innovative and effective means to prevent torture and to generate timely 
and adequate responses to allegations of abuse and ill-treatment by law enforcement 
officials.’(A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 para 157) 
305 Gallinetti, J. (2004). 
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remained very stable,307 indicating that the same problems persist and are of a systemic 
nature. A similar conclusion, that conditions of detention and the treatment of prisoners has 
remained by and large unchanged, was drawn in earlier research as well.308 While the lodging 
of complaints with an Independent Visitor may benefit the individual prisoner, it is concluded 
that these individual complaints have not resulted in large-scale systemic changes to the 
treatment of prisoners and prison conditions. 
Second, and possibly the underlying reason for the stagnation in prison conditions, is the 
relationship that the Inspectorate has with the DCS senior management and Minister of 
Correctional Services. The Correctional Services Act obligates the Inspecting Judge to submit 
an annual report as well as a report on each inspection undertaken to the Minister of 
Correctional Services and to Parliament.309 This has been done duly and the Annual Reports 
of the Inspectorate are distributed widely as well as made available on its website. Since the 
2000 Annual Report the Inspectorate has been critical of conditions of detention, the 
treatment of prisoners, and systemic failures of the DCS. Yet there has been very little, if any, 
reaction from the DCS on these reports. The overall impression gained is that the DCS and 
the Minister had not given the necessary weight to the findings and recommendations of the 
Inspectorate as presented in its annual reports. This issue was driven to the fore in November 
2010 when the Minister of Correctional Services, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, accused the 
Inspecting Judge, Judge Van Zyl, of leaking the Inspectorate’s Annual Report to the media 
and also briefing Parliament without briefing her. In response, he explained that he had tried 
to make an appointment with her for three weeks to brief her, but her office failed to 
respond.310 Regardless of this, it was indeed the Minister’s office that tabled the report in 
                                                            
307 The recorded complaints profiles for 2004/5 and 2009/10 were compared. This period was selected as the 
Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) came into force in October 2004 and the 2004 White Paper was 
adopted by the Department of Correctional Services, in that year. Only four categories of complaints showed 
changes of more than 3%, being access to bail (up by 5%), access to legal representation (up by 3.4%), access to 
rehabilitation programmes (up by 4.4%), and other (down by 11.9%) (Office of the Inspecting Judge (2005) and 
Office of the Inspecting Judge (2010). 
308 Jagwanth, S. (2004), p.53. 
309 S 90(3-4) of the Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998). The requirement that the inspection reports should 
also be submitted to Parliament was added through an amendment to the Act, the Correctional Services 
Amendment Act, 25 of 2008. 
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Parliament and not the Inspecting Judge. It meant the Minister had simply tabled the report in 
Parliament without having read it. 
 
In the following week the DCS briefed the Portfolio Committee on its “high-level action 
plan” in respect of the Inspectorate’s Annual Reports.311 The proposed measures were indeed 
telling of what the Department’s attitude and actions have been to date. A senior official 
explained that “the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS) Annual Report 
would henceforth be taken as a guide to service delivery” and that management will address 
the “disregard by the Department of Judicial Inspectorate reports”. Other issues to be 
addressed in the plan included: complaints registered with JICS Independent Visitors (IVs) 
would be taken more seriously; concern about Heads of Prisons reports on natural/unnatural 
deaths, and the reluctance of management to deal with officials implicated in prisoner deaths; 
research into the effect of long sentences on costs, overcrowding and gang activity; the 
efficiency of parole boards; lack of briefing to officials on high-risk prisoners; the persistence 
of solitary confinement despite it being prohibited by law; the majority of complaints by 
inmates remained unresolved, with transfers away from families as punishment ranking as the 
most common complaint; infrastructure challenges that compromised human dignity during 
imprisonment; improved utilisation of vocational workshops; the incremental provision of 
rehabilitation programmes; attention to conditions of detention for remand detainees; and the 
increased use of plea bargaining to avoid imprisonment for minor offences. It remains to be 
seen whether the DCS will deliver on this plan and if it does use the Inspectorate’s reports as 
a guide to service delivery. However, the plan confirmed what has long been suspected, 
namely that the DCS essentially ignored the recommendations made by the Inspectorate, 
especially when they were critical of how the Department and officials dealt with human 
rights issues. 
6.4 Summary of issues 
 
There is little doubt that the Inspectorate has since its establishment made an invaluable 
contribution to prison reform by promoting a more transparent prison system and educating 
the general public about imprisonment and conditions of detention. It has also been able to 
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mobilise a wide range of stakeholders inside and outside of government around the prison 
overcrowding. Despite these achievements, it also has to be acknowledged that it has not 
been able to exert its authority over the DCS. The attitude of the DCS and Ministry has, until 
very recently, been dismissive of the Inspectorate’s work and recommendations. 
7. Conclusion 
 
Reviewing the role of external influences on the prison system since 1994 leaves the 
impression that, due to a confluence of a number of factors, the DCS was by and large left to 
its own devices until 2001 when the Jali Commission was appointed. By that stage it had 
become an institution where through organisation and control, corrupt structures developed, 
grew and prospered over time. This is what Nötzel refers to as a “calm biope”.312 In this 
assessment of the influence of external stakeholders on prison reform, the conclusion is 
drawn that – in respect of not only corruption but on a broad range of issues, and due to a 
lack of external pressure – the Department remained undisturbed by the Constitutionally-
imposed demands for reform. At national government level the lack of policy direction under 
the GNU on the transformation of the public service allowed the DCS essentially to continue 
as it had before 1994, but this did not diminish growing demands and militancy for 
affirmative action. Failure to develop capacity and skills in the public service, coupled with 
the slow response by the national government to deal with corruption and maladministration 
in general, enabled the DCS to become a “calm biope”. There was little guidance at national 
policy level for the DCS to reinvent and re-institutionalise the prison system. Lack of 
political leadership (especially under Mzimela), the exclusion of civil society from the 
discourse on prison reform, the delay in the coming into force of the full Correctional 
Services Act (111 of 1998), and an apathetic Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 
added to the calmness. While the lack of reform and the widespread corruption that 
developed between 1994 and 2001 in the DCS is not the fault of the national government 
alone, its level of inaction created the necessary environment for perverse forces to take 
control of the DCS and delay fundamental reform of the prison system. 
 
                                                            
312 Nötzel, M. (2002) ‘Investigation Strategies and Tactics in the prosecution of corruption offences: experiences 
from Germany’. In Fijnaut, C. and Huberts, L. (eds) Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, p. 51. 
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The first substantial and visible disturbance of the calm biope in DCS took place with the 
appointment of the Jali Commission in 2001. In a short period of time successive scandals 
uncovered were reported in the media and the calm was broken. Shortly after the Jali 
Commission started its work, the SIU started its investigations in 2002 in the DCS. At more 
or less the same time, government (through the DPSA and PSC) started responding to 
corruption in the public service at policy level.  
 
The Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity requirements (MACC) were adopted and from there 
flowed other actions to deal with corruption in the public service. In 2004 new legislation 
dealing with corruption was passed. In the same year a new Portfolio Committee on 
Correctional Services started its term and this Committee (under Bloem) took a 
fundamentally different approach to previous committees in respect of its oversight mandate. 
Under Smith (from 2009) the Portfolio Committee would continue with perhaps even greater 
vigour. It was also in October 2004 that the Correctional Services Act came into force, 
placing very clear obligations, derived from the Constitution, on the DCS. From 2003 
onwards civil society re-entered the debate on prison reform and found its platform in 
Parliament.  
 
In short, due to external influences, the DCS was disturbed from a number of directions, 
prompting the management to take action. In less than three years (September 2001 to July 
2004) the external environment of the DCS changed dramatically, placing the emphasis 
increasingly on transparency and accountability. After 2004 pressure on the DCS would 
continue, and this has been important in sustaining the re-institutionalisation of the DCS. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
 
The history of prison reform after 1994 was problematised and shaped by the relationship 
between governance and human rights standards, the requirements for both set out in the 
Constitution and elaborated on in the Correctional Services Act. It was shown that good 
governance and human rights converge in five dimensions of a constitutional democracy: 
legitimacy, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and resource utilisation. The new 
constitutional order established a set of governance and rights requirements for the prison 
system that demanded fundamental reform. It de-legitimised the existing prison system and 
thus placed it in a crisis. This required its reinvention to establish a system compatible with 
constitutional demands. In 1994 there were legitimate expectations that fundamental prison 
reform based on the Constitution would follow, but by and large these expectations have not 
been met.  
In this concluding chapter, an overview is first provided of the main points made in the thesis. 
Flowing from this, it is argued that the critically missing element was a constitutional 
imagination to guide the reform process. It is furthermore posited that disagreement about 
what reform meant and the agenda to be followed would constrain reform itself. Furthermore, 
the 2004 White Paper redefines rehabilitation of offenders as the Department’s core business, 
but this requires closer examination and it is argued that the decision to focus on 
rehabilitation was not based on the existing evidence on effective interventions, nor was it 
founded on a Constitutional imperative. Throughout the period under review, lack of 
transparency emerged as a problem area and had a material impact on the reform process. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of possible implications for reform efforts in other 
jurisdictions.  
2. Overview 
 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that reform through crisis is an acknowledged construct in the 
literature and that the reform-crisis thesis fits the events that unfolded in the South African 
prison system after 1994. The lack of, or inadequate, response by the DCS management to the 
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impending democratic reforms prior to 1994 and thereafter, shaped the history of prison 
reform especially in the first ten years of democratic rule. The new democratic order placed 
radically different demands on an organisation that was highly institutionalised, preserving in 
nature, conservative in outlook, and unresponsive to external influences. The internal 
constraints of the DCS corresponded with what has been noted in the literature and would in 
fact aggravate the situation. It was concluded that management failed to put in place 
preparations for reform. 
It was argued furthermore that prisons suffer from an inherent legitimacy deficit but that 
reform driven by, and focused on, giving tangible and sustained expression to the values and 
prescripts of the Constitution would address such a deficit. A prison system in a 
constitutional democracy would consequently be based on four pillars: an underlying 
philosophy (and knowledge) creating the anchor points for justifying and using 
imprisonment; clear and full recognition of prisoners’ rights which is expressed in practice; 
effective horizontal and vertical accountability of the executive; and maximum transparency. 
Weak or absent compliance with the accountability and transparency requirements leaves the 
recognition of rights and the underlying philosophy without substance and meaning; such 
oversight creates the risk that it will be “business as usual”, or worse, that perverse results, 
enabled by a crisis situation, may ensue. 
When faced with a crisis, policy-makers must not only act with haste but also develop 
effective policies. However, effective policy-making is a carefully managed process that is 
highly reliant on knowledge and information. Poorly institutionalised organisations will 
struggle to assimilate and use information and consequently experience difficulties in 
implementing reforms. Effective policy-making and the re-institutionalisation of an 
organisation in crisis are thus prerequisites for stability and meaningful reform. 
Contrary to expectations in 1994, rapid reform of the prison system did not materialise, but 
rather the opposite occurred and a second crisis developed, namely the collapse of order and 
discipline in the Department. The period 1994 to 2004 was characterized by a series of 
governance failures in the prison system. Instead of reinventing the prison system, the result 
was rather a near-intractable mess of operational challenges such as prison overcrowding, 
poor skills levels, management inexperience, misdirected policy initiatives, poor financial 
management, lack of strategic vision, unionisation, corruption, human rights violations, 
resistance to reform and so forth. By mid-1996 the lack of re-institutionalisation and the 
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poorly planned and executed demilitarisation of the DCS had created a management void into 
which organised labour (POPCRU in particular) stepped, and the erstwhile rigid distinction 
between management and labour faded. Through purposefully designed campaigns and 
actions POPCRU took control of key functions in the Department to force the rapid 
implementation of affirmative action by all means necessary and at least in some 
management areas a culture of lawlessness, fear and intimidation prevailed. Although the 
events in DCS should be contextualised by the general state of the public service at the time, 
corruption and maladministration attained exceptional dimensions and it was conceded that 
the state had lost control of the Department by 2000. 
In analysing the events after 1994, it was argued that in many regards the problems were 
created prior to 1994. Even though it was clear that democratic reforms were under way, little 
preparation was undertaken. The DCS management at the time failed to recognise that it was 
already in a crisis, but more importantly, it lacked strategic vision as exemplified by the 
hastily drafted 1994 White Paper which failed to draw a clear link with the Constitution. The 
prison system inherited by the Government of National Unity (GNU) was a highly 
institutionalised organisation characterised by a conservative, preserving, non-responsive, 
and inward-looking approach. These traits remained dominant at least until mid-1996 and 
accords with the definition of crisis by ignorance, showing “cognitive arrogance – a hermetic, 
chronically overoptimistic self-image that shuts out discrepant information”.
1
 However, from 
1996 onwards, levels of institutionalisation eroded rapidly as a consequence of the failure to 
implement a new management system replacing the abolished military command structure. 
Coordination problems emerged, basic discipline was not enforced and the Department was 
increasingly unable to implement reforms even if it wanted to.  
At management level there was a failure to problematise the relationship between the 
requirements of the Constitution and the state of the prison system. The 1994 White Paper 
was woefully inadequate to steer the post-1994 reform task of the newly elected government 
to fulfil its historical mission in respect of the prison system. Following the 1996 
Constitution, new prison legislation was drafted (the 1998 Correctional Services Act) and 
                                                            
1
 Boin, A. and T’Hart, P. (2000) Institutional crises and reforms in policy sectors. In Wagenaar, H. (ed) 
Government institutions – effects, changes and normative foundations. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
p. 17 citing Kouzmin, A. and Jarman, A. (1989) ‘Crisis decision making – towards a contingent decision path 
perspective’. In Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T. and ‘T Hart, P. (eds) Coping with crises: the management of 
disasters, riots and terrorism. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, pp. 397-435. 
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even though this presented an opportunity to give new direction and impetus to reform, it was 
concluded that its drafting was detached from the Department and that when adopted, it 
would not have any noticeable bearing on the operations of the Department. It would take six 
years for the Act to come into force, leaving the prison system during this period with 
patchwork legislation not aligned to the 1996 Constitution. This further diminished the 
chances for constitutionalism driving prison reform. 
Between 1994 and 2004 the Department engaged in a number of policy initiatives that were 
either cosmetic or fundamentally so ill-conceived or poorly implemented, frequently with 
unintended consequences, that they detracted from reform efforts. Given the prevailing 
governance failures, including leadership instability, it is hard to see how any new policies 
could possibly have been implemented successfully. The new constitutional framework 
should have emancipated policy-makers from previous constraints and seen imaginative 
redesign and redevelopment of the prison system, but this did not come to pass.  
It was concluded that the legitimacy crisis of the prison system deepened as corruption, poor 
service delivery and maladministration became increasingly prevalent. The campaigns 
launched by POPCRU also had unintended consequences in the sense that a general culture 
of lawlessness and impunity permeated the Department. A culture of lawlessness placed 
prisoners in a particularly vulnerable position since the wide-ranging failure to adhere to 
general principles of good governance made compliance with human rights standards near 
impossible. Several investigations were undertaken into the Department, but the Department 
remained unresponsive to their recommendations. It was, however, only with the appointment 
of the Jali Commission that full recognition was given to the crisis in discipline and order. In 
the eyes of the public and Parliament, the prison system had become deeply corrupted and far 
removed, ideologically and in practice, from an institution that could provide safe custody 
and enable offenders to be law-abiding and responsible citizens. In respect of prison reform 
in the first ten years of democratic rule, it was concluded that very little progress was made to 
give expression to constitutional requirements and redefine a new purpose for the prison 
system. In short, during this period constitutionalism did not establish the transformative 
basis for fundamental prison reform. Consequently, prisoners remained the victims of 
widespread rights violations, the Department lacked transparency and impunity prevailed at 
all levels. 
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In response to the Jali Commission, SIU, PSC and DPSA investigations as well as political 
pressure, the DCS commenced with a number of reforms from 2001 onwards to address 
specifically corruption and maladministration. Gradually gains were made as perpetrators of 
corruption were sanctioned, financial controls improved and the disciplinary code more 
effectively enforced. At policy level, the Department’s approach to corruption emphasised 
law enforcement and paid less attention to the prevention requirements of an effective anti-
corruption strategy. The DCS also developed internal capacity to investigate corruption and 
enforce the disciplinary code and centralised this function in the Head Office, while the 
prevention function remained decentralised. It is uncertain to what extent the prevention 
function has been successfully assimilated in the lower rungs of the Department. 
The history of corruption and maladministration in the DCS should be seen against the 
general state of the public service by the late 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 6. By the late 
1990s government incrementally appreciated the extent and seriousness of corruption in the 
public service and a number of policy and legislative steps were taken. It was concluded that 
the Department’s post-2001 response to corruption may not have been possible at an earlier 
stage as there was simply not the political support from national government for this and nor 
were the necessary supportive policies, legislation and resources in place.  
The Department targeted corruption cases resulting in losses to the state and thus paid less 
attention to corruption where prisoners were the victims. Symptomatic of this approach is that 
the Department has by and large ignored the influence of the prison gangs as a threat to good 
governance. Enforcing the disciplinary code gave the Head Office the means to reassert its 
control over the Department, but based on the evidence presented it appears that the Head 
Office has a fluctuating authority-relationship with its subordinate structures and there remain 
notable areas of legislative and administrative non-compliance. 
Results in respect of addressing the legitimacy deficit of the prison system are varied. The 
legal basis for the prison system is found in the 1998 Correctional Services Act, which is 
firmly based on the 1996 Constitution, as it should be. The Correctional Services Act set new 
standards of performance, but power has not always been exercised within the bounds of the 
law. Philosophically, the 2004 White Paper attempts to provide the justification for the prison 
system, stating that rehabilitation is the core business of the Department. This construct is, 
however, undermined by several contradictions at the sociological level. Importantly, 
rehabilitation is not a constitutional imperative. The setbacks described in Chapter 5, in 
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addition to human rights violations, have continued to erode confidence in the 2004 White 
Paper. In assessing progress made towards addressing the legitimacy deficit, it is concluded 
that while there has been a legal and policy framework in place since 2004, successful 
implementation of this framework has been beleaguered by capacity constraints and 
deliberate, if not criminal, actions on the part of some DCS officials. Scandals and 
embarrassing incidents have had immediate negative consequences for reform efforts as they 
strongly influence public perceptions about the Department and the integrity of its leadership 
to deliver on the demands for prison reform. Notwithstanding these concerns, it can be 
concluded that concerted actions on multiple fronts, even when induced through pressure, 
were moderately effective in addressing corruption and maladministration in the Department. 
The prognosis for further success in reform may, however, be constrained by the 2004 White 
Paper itself. The appropriateness of the White Paper to guide reform is questionable, as is 
demonstrated in its lack of alignment with the DCS budget. Developing new policies and 
procedures, setting up systems, creating internal structures, and so forth are all part of re-
institutionalisation and is a tedious and time-consuming enterprise. It was noted that 
information management and reporting thereon have become more sophisticated and 
managerialist in nature, but this has not translated into the realignment of the Department’s 
budget to the 2004 White Paper.  
It was argued that the more overt focus by the DCS management on addressing governance 
resulted in neglecting compliance with human rights standards. It was therefore concluded 
that prisoners’ rights, as a legal and ideological construct, had not attained the necessary 
prominence in the Department’s strategy development and consequently failed to permeate 
the execution of policy. It was shown that, notwithstanding the rhetoric about prisoners’ 
rights, there is little to indicate that there exists, or that systematic efforts were made to 
create, a pervasive awareness of prisoners’ rights among the staff of the Department. Rather 
than dealing with risks and violations proactively, the approach had been reactive.  
While the Department engaged a number of external stakeholders to address corruption and 
maladministration, and also developed internal capacity to investigate cases and enforce the 
disciplinary code, this did not happen in respect of addressing prisoners’ rights concerns. 
Even though governance and human rights are inextricably linked, both require an explicit 
focus to give effect to fundamental reform. Evidently, violations of prisoners’ rights were not 
regarded by the Department’s leadership with the same reverence as allegations and findings 
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of corruption and mismanagement. Symptomatic of the Department’s attitude and approach 
to prisoners’ rights was that it actively resisted and attempted to undermine efforts to improve 
the situation in respect of prisoners’ rights, for example in EN and Others, the McCullum 
case (and St Albans assault) and litigation on parole decisions. Reported rights violations 
were at best seen as individual incidents as opposed to systemic problems. The problem 
remains one where the proverbial basket is rotten and not just a few apples. While the 
Department acknowledged that in respect of governance it was in a crisis and thus required a 
focused and strategic response, the same conclusion was not made about the level of 
compliance with prisoners’ rights standards.  
Notwithstanding the inherent problems of the 2004 White Paper as a policy framework, it had 
a further adverse consequence for prisoners’ rights. The White Paper assumed great 
prominence in the reports, communications and policies of the Department after 2004, but 
this was done at the cost of meticulous compliance with the standards set in the Correctional 
Services Act. Furthermore, it was concluded that little preparation was undertaken to 
implement the Correctional Services Act when it came into force in mid- 2004 and training 
on the Act appears to have been of a superficial nature. Evidence for the lack of knowledge 
and understanding of the Correctional Services Act amongst the staff corps is found in the 
increased litigation against the Department, failure to comply with statutory reporting 
obligations, and denying prisoners rights clearly articulated in the Correctional Services Act. 
Despite Departmental rhetoric about rehabilitation, realising the aims of rehabilitation in an 
environment where basic rights, especially the right to dignity, are compromised is extremely 
difficult. It was therefore concluded that meeting the minimum standards of humane 
detention is a prerequisite for the rendering of effective interventions with offenders.  
Despite the transition to democracy, constitutional and legislative reform, and the 
requirements for transparency, the Department remained less than responsive to concerns 
raised by domestic and international stakeholders to human rights violations. Progress in 
respect of delivering on prisoners’ rights has been slow since 2004, and this can by and large 
be attributed to the Department’s lack of emphasis on compliance with the Correctional 
Services Act. It may have been deliberate, but it may also indicate that the Department was 
beguiled by populist notions of punishment and punitive attitudes in the light of the high 
violent crime rate. The expectation that post-1994 South Africa’s prison system would indeed 
embody, as far as is possible, the values of a constitutional democracy has consequently not 
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been met and all the thematic areas reviewed in respect of prisoners’ rights found that serious 
deficiencies remain. 
The influence of external stakeholders on prison reform since 1994 has been varied. Under 
the GNU the lack of policy direction on the reform of the public service essentially allowed 
the DCS to carry on as it had before 1994, but this did not diminish growing demands and 
militancy for affirmative action. The failure of the national government to develop at an 
earlier stage a comprehensive and strategic response to corruption and maladministration 
enabled the DCS to become a calm biope. Lack of political leadership (especially under 
Mzimela), the exclusion of civil society from the discourse on prison reform, the delay in the 
coming into force of the full Correctional Services Act (111 of 1998) and an apathetic 
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services (until 2004) added to the calmness. While the 
lack of reform and the widespread corruption that developed between 1994 and 2001 in the 
DCS is not the fault of the national government alone, its level of inaction created the 
necessary environment for perverse forces to take control of the DCS and delay fundamental 
reform of the prison system. 
 
The Jali Commission represents a turning point in the history of the Department, for it laid 
bare the toxic environment that had developed in the Department. Media coverage of 
corruption and other scandals uncovered ensured that the calmness was broken. A number of 
initiatives at national government level (i.e. Public Service Anti-Corruption Policy, Minimum 
Anti-Corruption Capacity requirements and new legislation) supported efforts by the new 
leadership in the Department to develop a more coherent response to corruption.  
 
From 2004 the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services adopted a fundamentally 
different approach in respect of its oversight mandate compared to the previous committees. 
The Committee would grow in stature and exerted increasing pressure on the Department to 
address long-standing problems. In 2003 civil society re-entered the debate on prison reform 
and found its platform in Parliament, inserting new energy and knowledge into the discourse.  
 
3. A constitutional imagination 
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The Freedom Charter saw a limited role for imprisonment as punishment and instead 
emphasised re-education and warned against vengeance.
2
 In 1994 there was the opportunity 
to re-imagine
3
 the South African prison system using the Interim Constitution as guidance, 
but the 1994 White Paper failed to do this. What was needed was a realistic constitutional 
imagination that would have embraced the specific prescripts of the Constitution and 
imagined giving effect to them in real and practical terms in daily prison life. If “the 
sociological imagination”, as coined by C. Wright Mills, would require the individual to seek 
understanding of broader societal processes, the constitutional imagination required 
understanding of how the Constitution and the democratic order would have meaning in the 
lives of individuals, in this case prisoners. Fundamentally it would ask the question: What 
does the Constitution mean for the purposes of the prison system, for the prisoner and his 
custodian? Such an imagination would not seek goals beyond what the Constitution requires, 
but rather see that prisoners’ dignity, as a core value of the Constitution, is maintained in a 
measurable way. Consequently detention conditions consistent with human dignity must 
prevail and would, for example, prohibit overcrowding. As the Constitution requires, at 
minimum, daily exercise, three separately served meals per day, access to adequate reading 
material and medical treatment equal to that in free society, and contact with the outside 
world are not beyond the reach of available resources. The Alternative White Paper on 
Corrections (1995) developed by the Penal Reform Lobby Group did draw upon such a 
constitutional imagination, and the 74-page document describes in a fair amount of detail 
how the prison system should function. However, the Department failed to engage with the 
Alternative White Paper and the imagination presented therein was lost. 
A constitutional imagination also would have developed responses that address the nexus 
between governance and human rights. The preceding chapters, especially Chapters 4 and 5, 
examined this nexus and affirmed its inextricable nature. That the South African prison 
system remains without an oversight structure operating at this nexus remains one of the most 
important post-1994 failings. 
Imagining a new prison system would also have seen a critical questioning of the purpose of 
the prison system in the broader criminal justice system and more specifically the use of 
                                                            
2
 Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the people, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance 
(The Freedom Charter, as adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, on 26 June 1955). 
3
 With acknowledgment to Van Zyl Smit, D. (2005) Imagining the South African prison, Valedictory lecture, 
University of Cape Town, 20 October 2005. 
 
 
 
 
450 
 
imprisonment on the continuum of punishments. However, the function of the prison system 
has remained by and large unchanged, namely incapacitation. There was no attempt from the 
DCS (through the two White Papers) to reserve imprisonment for a particular group of 
offenders or to redefine the modes of imprisonment. Rather the DCS worked from the 
assumption that it has no control over whom the courts send to prison and that this does not 
matter very much either. A more imaginative interpretation would have seen the Department 
critically examining sentencing practices and attempting at least to garner and build support 
for a new sentencing regime. Indeed, there was a golden opportunity for this in the South 
African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) project on sentencing.
4
 Instead of investing in 
the research and development of creative solutions (e.g. pilot projects on new interventions 
such as open prisons), the Department plied its time and effort into planning to build new 
prisons (but failing) and various other disjointed policy initiatives.  
Any observer in 1994 would have agreed that reinventing and reforming the prison system 
would not be a short-term endeavour and have accepted that there would be setbacks. In the 
ensuing ten years fundamental prison reform was effectively placed on hold while the DCS 
disintegrated into chaos, adding to the legitimacy deficit. By 2004 the White Paper presented 
a new vision and attached a 20-year time-frame to its ambitious goals. From a strategic 
planning perspective this was a mistake on two fronts – the goals were too ambitious and the 
time-frame too long. “Over-ambition” in this regard refers to exceeding the requirements of 
the Constitution and more specifically the Correctional Services Act. A more realistic and 
knowledge-based approach would have seen more modest goals staggered in, for example, 
five-year periods, as argued with reference to the principles for effective policy-making in 
Chapter 2 (section 2.4). 
The 1998 Correctional Services Act did apply a constitutional imagination, articulating 
minimum standards in respect of conditions of detention and the treatment of prisoners. 
However, as was described, not only was its coming into force delayed by six years, but even 
then little was done to prepare for and monitor its full implementation. In effect the 2004 
White Paper has trumped the Correctional Services Act in the Department’s strategic 
approach to prison system reform, but the abstract and confusing language of the 2004 White 
Paper does little to guide legislative compliance at operational level.  
                                                            
4
 South African Law Reform Commission (2000) Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) Discussion Paper 
91 Project 82, Pretoria: South African Law Reform Commission. 
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4. Lack of consensus on reform 
 
Prison reform after 1994 was substantially constrained by: the system inherited from the 
apartheid regime; the broader political context; government’s response to the high violent 
crime rate; the state of the public service, especially under the GNU; and the ability of the 
DCS leadership to translate the new constitutional demands into a programme of action. 
These five factors placed prison reform on a particular trajectory that would see limited 
progress towards establishing a prison system reflective of the Constitution. Notably the 
GNU accepted and confirmed the institutional arrangements created in 1990 that saw the 
establishment of a Ministry and Department of Correctional Services. Despite the 
institutional arrangements, the contestation of authority in the prison system reduced the 
leadership’s ability for flexible responses and capacity to follow through on policy reform. 
More importantly, it was not able to build consensus on what reform is, or should be. 
In Chapter 2 reform was defined as the intended fundamental change of the policy and/or 
administration of a policy sector. It was said furthermore that reform efforts in the prison 
system are regarded as particular actions undertaken by the state and its stakeholders to 
change the prison system, actions necessitated by the large-scale socio-political changes 
taking place in South Africa from 1994 onwards. The scope of reform therefore includes but 
is not limited to the policies, strategic direction, legislative framework (including subordinate 
legislation), organisational structure, human resources, financial management, and day-to-day 
operations.  
However, the meaning of reform in the prison sector was not agreed upon nor was it stable. 
In the period 1996-2001 it was in practice understood by the DCS management and organised 
labour to mean the racial transformation of the staff corps. Even though the 1994 White Paper 
articulated vague aims regarding humane custody and rehabilitation, these never had a 
material effect on the strategic direction and thus reform of the Department. The meaning 
attached to reform by civil society groups in the early 1990s, especially the PRLG, 
emphasised constitutional values and human rights standards, as articulated in the Alternative 
White Paper. Others have argued that “transformation” was required as opposed to “reform”.
5
 
                                                            
5 Giffard, C. (1997) Out of Step? The Transformation process in the South African Department of Correctional 
Services. Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of Master of Science in Criminal Justice 
Studies, Scarman Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester.  
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It can thus be surmised that even amongst civil society organisations in the 1990s there was a 
lack of consensus on what reform meant and what exactly it was that needed to change. 
 However, a number of important reforms (e.g. demilitarisation in 1996 and privatisation) 
were unplanned for and were not derived from the policy framework in place at the time. The 
Jali Commission understood reform efforts to focus on addressing systemic weaknesses and 
establishing a functioning Department able to deliver on the rehabilitation mandate. The 2004 
White Paper regards the rehabilitation of offenders as the reform target for the prison system, 
but is vague on how this should be achieved. Civil society groups and Parliament have since 
2003 focused on legislative compliance, governance and human rights as areas of reform. It is 
thus concluded that agreement between DCS, on the one hand, and civil society and 
Parliament, on the other, on what prison reform constitutes, remains contested and elusive, 
preventing constitutionalism from driving reform. 
Prison reform since 1994 has also been surrounded by mixed if not contradictory messages 
from government.  
On the one hand, rehabilitation, restorative justice
6
 and ubuntu
7
 are central to DCS policies, 
especially since 2004, and frequently feature in media reports and public statements. These 
notions reflect a particular tolerance and understanding of offending behaviour, condemning 
the criminal acts but not the person who committed them. Restorative justice and ubuntu also 
embody notions of offender reintegration and stand diametrically opposed to retributive 
justice. Further reflective of this “softer” approach was the change in Departmental 
nomenclature: prisons became correctional centres, prisoners became inmates, and so forth. 
The change in nomenclature was also an attempt to sanitise the prison system from its past 
and legitimate it. However, it was little more than rhetoric.  
On the other hand, minimum-sentences legislation, longer non-parole periods, stricter 
security measures, and super-maximum security prisons communicated a message that had 
little to do with rehabilitation, restorative justice and ubuntu. Moreover, reports about rights 
violations, overcrowding, assaults on prisoners, and corruption contradict the rhetoric 
espoused by the leadership of the Department. Consequently there remains a deep chasm 
                                                            
6 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) The White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, Pretoria: 
Department of Correctional Services, para 5.2.3, p. 82. 
7 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b) para 5.3.5, p. 87. 
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between the agenda for reform and claims made by the Department in this regard, not to 
mention the results to date. Fundamentally, there remains a lack of consensus on the 
substance of prison reform and what the prison system should ultimately look like in South 
Africa. It can furthermore be concluded that especially since 2004 there has been more 
penetrating questioning about the reform agenda articulated in the 2004 White Paper. Its 
appropriateness to guide reform is increasingly contested by Parliament and civil society 
groups. Past failures and other embarrassing setbacks have also instilled a deep sense of 
mistrust in the Department’s ability to deliver on reform promises. With reference to the 
reform and crisis thesis it must therefore be concluded that the crisis is not over yet.  
5. The rehabilitation goal 
 
In Chapter 4 (section 5.3) an assessment was provided of the 2004 White Paper as a policy 
document and it was concluded that it suffers from a number of substantial shortcomings. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the White Paper has gained great prominence in the 
thinking and rhetoric of DCS. Central to the White Paper is the rehabilitative goal and in 
view of the centrality given to the White Paper a closer assessment of the rehabilitation goal 
is required.  
In South Africa and other parts of the world and at different times in the history of penal 
reform, the rehabilitation goal had been abandoned and rekindled from time to time. The 
rehabilitation goal, in the vague form it was articulated in the 2004 White Paper, sought to 
reinvent the prison as institution. From the White Paper it is evident that the 
conceptualization of rehabilitation was not an imaginative engagement with the principles 
and values of the Constitution. The vague, idealistic and aspirational language of the White 
Paper provides little clarity on what exactly it is that the DCS must do. On the one hand it 
states that rehabilitation is the core business of the Department, but then, on the other, argues 
that “correction is a societal responsibility”.
8
 
Van Zyl Smit points out that the Correctional Services Act deliberately avoids the term 
“rehabilitation” with all its baggage and that the “language is that of the Sozialstaat or, in 
South African terms, of the socio-economic rights that are a prominent feature of our 
                                                            
8 Department of Correctional Services (2004 b), pp. 66-72. 
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Constitution”.
9
 Against this background the Correctional Services Act therefore requires the 
Department to “provide amenities which will create an environment in which sentenced 
offenders will be able to live with dignity and develop the ability to lead a socially 
responsible and crime-free life”.
10
 Neither the Constitution nor the Correctional Services Act 
affords sentenced prisoners a right to rehabilitation. Subsequent jurisprudence has in fact 
questioned the rehabilitation objective of imprisonment,
11
 and others have concluded that the 
possibility of rehabilitation is indeed highly speculative.
12
 
The focus on rehabilitation was adopted although it had by now been well established in 
research that rehabilitation, on the scale that the Department wanted it to be, would not be 
possible. The ideal of rehabilitation articulated in the 2004 White Paper was, however, not 
new and scientific studies have increasingly questioned the rehabilitation ideal.
13
 The growing 
consensus is that there are a fairly limited number of programmes that have been able to effect 
substantial reductions in re-offending. However, the programmes shown to be effective 
require well-trained staff and implementation integrity, rely on cognitive behavioural therapy 
                                                            
9 Van Zyl Smit, D. (2005) Imagining the South African prison, Valedictory lecture, University of Cape Town, 
20 October 2005, p. 14. 
10
 s 37(2). 
11 ‘It is a notorious fact that our prisons are overcrowded, often subjecting our prison population to undignified 
conditions of detention. It is optimistic in the extreme to assume that there are always effective rehabilitation 
programmes in place.’ Director of Public Prosecutions, Kwazulu-Natal v Ngcobo and two others (165/08) 
[2009] ZASCA 72 (1 June 2009) para 21. 
12
 S v Nkomo 2007 (2) SACR 198 (SCA); Mujuzi, J.D. (2008) The prospect of rehabilitation as a ‘substantial 
and compelling’ circumstance to avoid imposing life imprisonment in South Africa: A comment on S v Nkomo, 
South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 1, pp. 1-21. 
13
 Since the second half of the nineteenth century there has been a claim that ‘scientific methods’, based on 
positivist thinking, would be used to reshape people into law-abiding citizens. (Van Zyl Smit D (2000) The 
Place of Criminal Law in Contemporary Crime Control Strategies, European Journal of Crime Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, Vol. 8 No. 4, p. 362). In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison Foucault cites 
several reports from the 1830s and 1840s that lament the miserable failure of prison as an institution of 
correction and rehabilitation and assert that prison in fact only contributes to worsening the situation (p. 265). In 
What works? Questions and answers about Prison Reform Robert Martinson gave a pessimistic account of the 
prospects for rehabilitating offenders and concluded: ‘With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative 
efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.’ This conclusion was soon 
reduced to ‘nothing works’. (Cullen, F.T. and Gendreau, P. (2000) Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy 
Practice and Prospects. In J Horney (ed) Criminal Justice 2000, Volume 3: Changes in Decision Making and 
Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, US Department of Justice, Washington, p. 111.) 
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and must be subjected to rigorous evaluations. These are not production-line programmes 
operating across entire prison systems, as envisaged in the 2004 White Paper. Seven years 
after the 2004 White Paper was adopted, the rehabilitation ideal remains elusive. The noble 
and overambitious focus on rehabilitation at policy level distracted the DCS from its primary 
obligation, namely to ensure safe and humane custody under conditions of human dignity, as 
is required by the Constitution. 
6. Transparency 
 
Throughout the period (1994 to 2011) the DCS has been suspicious if not dismissive of 
advice, guidance and at times orders (including court orders) offered or given by external 
stakeholders. After 2004, facilitated by a more active Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services and increased involvement and research by civil society, the transparency of the 
prison system has improved. The preceding years, however, were characterised by a lost 
dialectic between the administrators of the prison system and the external stakeholders who 
had a legitimate interest in or a legal mandate in respect of the prison system. However, it 
remains the case that there is no forum for interaction between the DCS and its stakeholders 
with regard to the strategic direction of the DCS and to assessing progress made.  
While civil society organisations and even prisoners have increasingly engaged with 
international structures and drawn on international human rights standards to advocate for 
prison reform, the DCS has since 1994 remained insulated and isolated from the global 
human rights framework. It has equally failed to engage actively with applicable human 
rights treaties that South Africa has ratified. A greater awareness of and engagement with 
international human rights law would have made a valuable contribution to human rights 
reform in the prison sector.  
From the events of the past 17 years it is evident that prisoners had not been given a central 
or influential role in the prison-reform discourse. There is no available record indicating that 
the DCS had consulted or sought the opinion of prisoners about their needs and what they 
saw as the purposes of imprisonment. The entire approach of the 2004 White Paper is based 
on the assumption that it is the Department’s task to correct offending behaviour and that it 
alone knows what is required. A more inclusive consultation process with prisoners, their 
families and their communities of origin may have made a valuable contribution to policy 
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development. Even though the Constitution requires transparency and public participation in 
the working of government, the Department has not utilised this requirement to inform and 
strengthen the reform of the prison system. 
7. Implications and recommendations 
 
Following from the preceding chapters, a number of implications are drawn in this section for 
states engaged in constitutional and prison reform. The transition to democracy in South 
Africa was in many ways unique, but in other jurisdictions new constitutions have been 
adopted in recent years in emerging democratic states. A new constitution presents the rather 
rare opportunity to re-think, redefine and redevelop the prison system. In autocratic states the 
prison system is usually part and parcel of the state’s repressive apparatus and the new 
constitutional and democratic order requires a reversal of this. A new constitutional and 
democratic order following autocratic rule places the prison system per definition in crisis 
whilst simultaneously presenting the opportunity for reform through crisis. It is because the 
transition to democracy enables the critical examination of the previous order that previous 
constraints on policy-makers are lifted. The immediate implication is that the crisis needs to 
be recognised as such. Furthermore, there should be broad agreement between policy-makers, 
senior management and operational staff on the nature and extent of the crisis. The 
appreciative gap should therefore be as narrow as possible. 
While time is of the essence, it follows that it is important to understand the current 
organisation and how its inherent traits may assist or inhibit a successful crisis management 
stage. Its level of institutionalisation, its sense of preservation or responsiveness, and the 
ability to deal with an influx of new information are issues requiring consideration at this 
stage. A successful approach would see the rapid de-institutionalisation of the organisation 
(doing away with past counter-productive policies and practices) and establishing new 
policies, procedures and practices that are aligned to and reflective of the new constitutional 
order. In developing a new strategy and subordinate polices it appears that modest plans over 
shorter time periods yield better results. More specifically, it should be accepted that not all 
reform challenges can be addressed simultaneously and that a process of prioritisation would 
be required. 
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In a democratic state it is important that the range of participants in the policy discourse be 
expanded to ensure representivity and the recognition of the legitimate interest and role to be 
played by those formerly excluded from the policy sector. Under a new and democratic order 
the ground rules have changed and the role of the state is redefined, but equally so are the 
rights and responsibilities of the individual. What may have been unacceptable under the 
previous order can now be considered as legitimate possibilities. This requires imagination – 
to rethink the role of the prison, what its needs to achieve and what its purpose is in relation 
to other penalties. A paradigmatic shift, as required by constitutional transition, requires the 
imagination to see beyond established practices and procedures. Such an imagination also 
requires critical analysis of how the daily prison regime will give expression to constitutional 
values.  
In a constitutional democracy prison reform must have a clear, explicit and almost 
propagandistic focus on meeting the rights requirements articulated in the Constitution and 
subordinate legislation. Failure to do so undermines the authority of the Constitution and de 
facto permits the state to ignore Constitutional prescripts. It clearly implies that the 
Constitution does not have the same normative force when applied to prisoners.  
Prison reform remains a dynamic and dialectic process highly dependent on an inclusive 
approach. Because the prison has such potentially negative consequences for constitutional 
rights and broader society, it is essential that multiple stakeholders need to be consulted 
extensively on policy development and provided information on performance. From the 
South African experience it is clear that prison reform is not an “in-house affair” – it demands 
that external influences set in motion a process of sustained problem-solving directed towards 
imaginative solutions.  
Given the inherent tendency of prison systems to be closed to outsiders, the reform process 
demands vigilance in oversight. Ineffective or weak oversight will not be able to apply the 
necessary external pressure to see the reform process advancing in line with constitutional 
demands.  
While high-level strategic planning is required, compliance with constitutional and legal 
prescripts must be monitored at operational level. Successful reform requires this link 
between macro-level strategy and micro-level implementation. This implies that transparency 
and accountability should also operate at this level and not only at Head Office level. 
Transparency therefore means transparency at all levels of the organisation: it is not 
 
 
 
 
458 
 
constrained by the hierarchy of the prison system. Prison reform should be knowledge-driven 
and aimed at meeting constitutional and legal standards. Not only does this require a process 
based on evidence of what works, it requires that the implementing officials are skilled and 
equipped with the knowledge and expertise needed to perform their redefined job functions.  
In a constitutional democracy, prisoners, their families and communities of origin should be 
recognised not only as legitimate stakeholders but as important stakeholders. In the same way 
that the reform process will require a redefined employer-employee relationship, the same 
applies in respect of prisoners. Prisoners need to be part of the development of reform plans 
and understand what the aims are, how it will affect them and what the anticipated challenges 
are. They need to see sense and benefits emanating from reform, but moreover, it may require 
different standards of performance on their part. While there will always be a different and 
unequal distribution of power between prisoners and their custodians, it does not preclude a 
relationship that is moral and respectful. 
New rules bring new standards of performance and this may lead to uncertainty and conflict. 
In order to demonstrate and sustain the validity, legitimacy and stature of the new rules, it is 
required that they are enforced impartially and that violations are appropriately dealt with. 
Not enforcing the new code will immediately communicate the message that the reforms are 
not being pursued by management with a sense of rigour and commitment and that it remains 
business as usual.  
Reforming large organisations requires an effective communication structure and strategy. 
More specifically, the leadership must communicate the goals, results and challenges to the 
reform process in a sustained manner. The leadership must visibly engage with the rank and 
file and understand how they are experiencing the reform process.  
8. Conclusion 
 
The thesis traced prison reform in South Africa after 1994. In the post-1994 period the liberal 
democratic Constitution redefined the new state, necessitating a critical interrogation of the 
prevailing order. Constitutionalism prompted numerous reforms across the South African 
state and society to dismantle, formally and informally, the apartheid state that was inherited. 
The prison system did not embrace constitutionalism as the transformative basis for reform, at 
least not until the early 2000s. Contrary not only to expectations but also constitutional 
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requirements, the situation in DCS became chaotic, the legitimacy deficit of the prison system 
deepened and the state lost control of the Department by the late 1990s. As a result of external 
political and administrative pressure on DCS, a reform process to address governance and 
corruption after 2001 was initiated and yielded some results. However, constitutional 
obligations in respect of the rights requirements received less attention and material areas of 
non-compliance remain. It is therefore concluded that in the post-1994 period 
constitutionalism resulted in governance reforms in the prison system, but did not deliver 
human rights reforms of the nature and weight demanded by the Constitution. 
Constitutionalism requires that the obligations of good governance and human rights are 
pursued not only simultaneously but also in equity.  
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